INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION

VOLUME VIII

MEMORANDUM

SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF

BENGAL

TO THE INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION

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

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

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INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION.

LIST OF VOLUMES.

VOLUME I.—REPORT (SURVEY).

VOLUME II.—REPORT (RECOMMENDATIONS).

VOLUME III.—Reports of the Committees appointed by the Provincial Legislative Councils to co-operate with the Commission.

IV.—Memoranda submitted by the Government of India and the India Office. (Part I.)

V.— Do. (Part II.)

VI.—Memorandum submitted by the Government of Madras.

VII.—	Do.	do.	Bombay.
VIII.—	Do.	do.	Bengal.
IX.—	Do.	do.	United Provinces.
X.—	Do.	do.	Punjab.
XI.—	Do.	do.	Burma.
XII.—	Do.	do.	Bihar and Orissa.
XIII.—	Do.	do.	Central Provinces.
XIV.—	Do.	do.	Assam.

XV.—Extracts from official oral Evidence.

XVI.—Selections from memoranda and oral Evidence by non-officials (Part I).

XVII.— Do. (Part II).

See also

(1) Report of the Indian Central Committee—issued as Command Paper No. 3451 of 1929; and

Supplementary Note by Dr. A. Suhrawardy, M.L.A.—issued as Command Paper No 3525 of 1930.

(2) Review of Growth of Education in British India by the Auxiliary Committee appointed by the Commission—issued with Interim Report by the Commission as Command Paper No. 3407 of 1929.

FOREWORD.

In reply to the invitation of the Indian Statutory Commission, the Government of Bengal have in the first part of this volume collected material relevant to the enquiry of the Commission, and have endeavoured to describe the working of the system of government introduced by the Government of India Act of 1919. The second part contains the conclusions which in their opinion are indicated by the experience of the past seven years and the suggestions which they have made for the revision of the constitution.

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Part I.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

1. **General physical features.**—The boundaries of the Presidency of Bengal have undergone no change since the 1st April 1912, when the provinces of Bengal and of Eastern Bengal and Assam, as constituted in 1905, were converted into the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam. Bengal consists largely of a vast fertile alluvial plain, intersected in its southern portion by an infinity of rivers, creeks and channels.

2. **Difficulty of communications.**—The general level of the country is very low; in the rainy season—roughly, from June to September—communications in the country districts are very difficult and even in the dry cold weather transport in the interior is slow. In parts of Eastern Bengal, the villager can move about only by boat during the rains. On the other hand, steamer and motor boat services, in areas where the rivers are navigable, afford a means of communication to those who live on main river routes. In recent years, too, the motor bus has penetrated in the dry season to the most unlikely places, and more or less regular services are maintained.

3. **Metalled roads and railways.**—The mileage of metalled and unmetalled roads in 1927 was as follows:—

	Metalled (miles).	Unmetalled (miles).
In municipalities (excluding Calcutta)	1,306	1,577
Under rural authorities ..	2,513	15,447

The total mileage of railways open to traffic in 1927 was 3,289. The total area of the province is about 77,000 square miles; and there are 85,111 inhabited towns and villages. There are therefore large areas in which there are neither railways nor metalled roads, and communication is by paths and unmetalled roads. Some of these roads are raised above flood level and bridged, but the rest are little more than tracks made passable by a little earthwork in the cold weather.

4. **Distribution of the population.**—There are only five towns, including Calcutta with a population exceeding 50,000. Save where the headquarters town of the civil administrative unit, the district, or a railway or steamer junction or terminus, has assumed an urban character, the bulk of the population lives in agricultural villages, and no fewer than 12,000,000 are distributed in 59,000 hamlets of fewer than 500 inhabitants. There are about 3,750 post offices and 535 telegraph offices in the province. The majority of villagers are, therefore, out of reach of the Press, and news is local in character.

5. **Village life.**—The routine of village life is disturbed only by visits to the homes of relatives, to the local market, and occasionally to the local headquarters of the civil administration. Monotony is relieved, too, by the home visits of students, and of those who have entered service elsewhere. Conditions vary considerably; some villages are isolated and see or hear little of the outside world; others on main roads or at central points have considerable contact with the wayfaring classes.

In the hot dry season, agricultural work is in many places at a standstill. But after the rains begin, there is much activity in ploughing, sowing and weeding. There is then a lull until harvest time, relieved in some parts by the pursuit of fishing in rivers and marsh lands. The *intelligentsia* of the village consists of the local school and post masters, where there are such, the local agent, if any, of the landlord, and those smaller land-owners, whose limited means compel them to stay in their ancestral village home. Educated people, who are in a position to do so, usually migrate to larger towns to escape the monotony of village life.

6. **Town life.**—Outside Calcutta, town life is centred in important railway or steamer stations, or at the headquarters of the civil administration. In the former, trading interests predominate, and many Indians who have had years of contact with foreign business, show a considerable knowledge of modern commerce, and its methods. In the latter, a more official atmosphere prevails. The scholastic, legal and medical professions are strongly represented; and, with the official classes and land-owners of moderate income, form a society which is in close intellectual touch with the metropolis and, at the same time, has steady contact of a professional or legal character with the country villager. The Calcutta newspapers are read daily, and local and provincial politics are a subject of constant discussion, while a real knowledge of village life and thought is maintained.

7. **The metropolis.**—Calcutta and its environs offer an entirely different picture. A keen commercial spirit, and the luxuries of civilisation mark the city proper. The labouring population in the mills and factories comes mostly from other provinces. It formerly retained its connection with the ancestral village, where the family of the worker remained, and looked after the family holding. But gradually this labouring community has become more permanent, and hence there is a greater tendency to combine and demand better conditions. A feature of recent years has been a series of strikes, supported sometimes by trades unions, which, however, are still deficient in organisation, leadership and financial resources. It is a striking fact that the Bengali generally has not yet taken to factory or mill work. He leaves that almost entirely to the up-country coolie or artisan.

8. **The European and Anglo-Indian population.**—At the census of 1921, Bengal had a European population of 22,700, and an Anglo-Indian population of 22,250. More than half of these two communities are congregated in Calcutta. The remainder are concentrated in railway and trading centres, or scattered over the tea districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, and the coal mining area of Burdwan. Elsewhere, the European is represented only by a few officials and an occasional missionary.



9. **Distribution by religion and its effects.**—The statistics which follow show that out of a population of about 46,600,000, 53·55

per cent. are Muhammadans, and 43·72 per cent. are classed as Hindus, the balance being made up of Animists, Buddhists and Christians. Broadly speaking, the Muhammadans are concentrated in Eastern and the Hindus in Western Bengal. But even in Eastern Bengal the town population is largely Hindu, a feature which reflects the pursuit of the more literary callings and professions by that community. This geographical distribution tends to emphasise the communal aspects of social and political life in the province. In many districts one section or the other predominates to such an extent that if it chooses to do so, it can control local self-governing bodies. The rich and fertile lands of Eastern Bengal place the Muhammadans of that area in a position of comparative affluence, which relative to their standard of living, is beyond the reach of the poorer Hindus who rely on service for their maintenance. On the other hand, the Hindus have taken considerable advantage of the superior educational facilities of Calcutta and Western Bengal and of the towns in Eastern Bengal where they congregate. Cultural as well as religious differences make it difficult for the two communities to coalesce either socially or politically.

10. **The depressed classes.**—The term " depressed classes " has never been defined. It has not quite the same meaning as the " backward classes "—many of whom though " backward " in education and standards of living could not by any means be described as " depressed." Examples of such are found amongst the Buddhists, Animists and certain of the lower castes of Hindus, and of the poorer sections of Muhammadans. There are, nevertheless, about 30 or 40 castes which may be held to come within the " depressed " category. Some of these are represented in Bengal by small numbers, either distributed throughout the province, or congregated in petty groups. The main masses of the " untouchables " are the *Bauris* and *Santals* on the western side of the Burdwan Division, the *Bagdis* and *Chasi Kaibarttas* on the plains of Western Bengal, the *Namasudras* in adjoining parts of Faridpur, Khulna and Jessore and the *Rajbansis* of Dinajpur, Rangpur and Jalpaiguri. They come to a total of about 11½ millions, and are for the most part engaged in agriculture, although they monopolise a few trades such as that in hides and skins. A striking feature of recent times has been a sustained effort by certain sections of the lower castes and particularly the *Namasudras*, to rise in the social scale. The last named have evinced a keen desire to educate themselves, and a few have entered the learned professions.

11. **Caste System.**—Generally, among the Hindus the social rules and customs of the caste system are observed in family life, but, as between castes, there is not the same degree of rigid aloofness that prevails in other parts of India. In the commercial life of Calcutta, for example, the Indian seems to take his part without caste diffi-

culties coming in his way, and all sections of the community mix freely in tram-cars, buses and suburban trains.

12. **Occupations.**—The distribution of the population reflects the manner in which it is occupied. Over 77·3 per cent. is dependent on agriculture. From the point of view of economic stability, it is an



important factor that so many people can and do produce almost the whole of their own food. And it is amongst those classes that have tended to sever their connection with the land, that economic distress

is most prevalent. This is particularly true of the middle-class Hindus, who have taken so readily to Western education, have entered the learned professions in large numbers, and supply the rank and file of the commercial community. Without the land to fall back upon or, at any rate, sufficient to maintain it in the style to which it is accustomed, this section of the community is at once seriously affected by trade depression and high prices. The effort to maintain appearances involves a severe strain on the resources of the family, and the "bread" problem looms large and ominous before many who fall within this class.

13. **Backward tracts.**—The Darjeeling district and the Chittagong Hill Tracts are "backward tracts" within the meaning of section 52 A (*2*) of the Government of India Act. Part of the Darjeeling district lies in the plains, and the remainder is in the Himalayas, with an average level of about 3,000 feet, rising in the north-west corner to 12,000 feet. Only one-third of the district is culturable, the rest being largely covered by forests. In the plains area the population consists mainly of Bengalis, while that of the rest of the district contains representatives of numerous hill races, of which the principal are the Lepchas, various sections of Nepalese, and Bhutias from Bhutan, Sikkim and the Chumbi valley of Tibet. In the trading community, the up-country plainsman of India is also found. In language, religion and customs, the hill people are quite distinct from the rest of Bengal. They have their own type of civilisation and, among the religious leaders, some degree of culture is attained. In the monasteries, libraries of ancient books are carefully preserved.

Darjeeling is administered by the reserved side of Government, in most subjects under the ordinary law, but also under special Acts dealing with problems that arise only in Darjeeling. The population is 282,000.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts consist of parallel ranges of hills running mainly north and south—largely covered by virgin forest. The cultivated area is only ten per cent. of the district. The population is made up of *Maghs* from Arracan, *Tiparas*, the indigenous tribe known as the *Chokmas* and other tribes. Agriculture is carried on mainly by the *jhuming* system. An area of forest is cleared and burned, and when the rains soften the ground crops are sown. As soon as the fertilising effect of the ashes has passed away, the process is repeated on a fresh area. The plough is used only in the valleys adjoining the Chittagong district. The people are as primitive as their agricultural methods, and the tracts are administered under special regulations. The population is 173,000.

14. **Administrative divisions.**—For administrative purposes, the province is divided into 27 districts, grouped into five divisions. The

average area of a district is 2,744 square miles, and the average population 1,667,000, ranging in the plains districts from 847,000 in Birbhum to 4,837,000 in Mymensingh. Each district contains from one to five subdivisions, at the headquarters of which there are subordinate criminal and, in most cases, civil courts, along with a sub-treasury and other offices. The next unit of administration is the police-station, with an average population of 69,000, and ranging from 45,000 in Murshidabad to 130,000 in Tippera.

15. **Density of population.**—The density of population varies from 512 per square mile in the Chittagong Division to 866 in the Dacca Division. The latter comprises the best jute growing areas of the province, and the density of the population is probably connected with the steady flow of money every year to the districts of that division.

16. **Effects on political life and thought.**—The effects of the geographical and administrative features of the province on political life and thought so far as these can be said to exist in rural areas, are far-reaching. The electorate has no regular source of information on political matters. It is difficult for the villager to attend meetings or polling stations, and equally difficult for a candidate to visit his electors or a member of the legislature to explain his policy to his constituents. In so far as public opinion is influenced at all, it must be mainly through the *intelligentsia* of the larger towns, who come into contact with members of the rural population. And when any party has sufficient enthusiasm to send out propagandists or canvassers, they usually have the field to themselves.

A further important reflection is the vastness of the sum of money required to provide rural Bengal with suitable means of communication and other amenities of village life. It is not difficult to realise the importance these subjects must have in the mind of the average villager compared with the more remote problems of provincial politics. The cultivator wants roads, water-supply and dispensaries, and facilities for marketing his produce. He requires education for his children, though he does not always realise it. The middle classes, on the other hand, want employment and, as they are naturally more vocal, they have succeeded in imposing their views, to an undue extent, on the political thought of the province, while the needs and wishes of the more important and more numerous agricultural community find few avenues of expression.

Statistical summary.

Bengal.

	Area in square miles.	Population.		
		Male.	Female.	Total.
British territory	76,843	24,151,222	22,544,314	46,695,536
Deduct backward tracts—				
(*a*) Darjeeling	1,164	149,094	133,654	282,748
(*b*) Chittagong Hill Tracts.	5,138	93,286	79,957	173,243
Total ..	6,302	242,380	213,611	455,991
Balance ..	70,541	23,908,842	22,330,703	46,239,545
Adults of 20 years of age and over		12,573,565	11,381,252	23,954,817
Adults of 20 years of age and over who are literate.		2,827,819	233,645	3,061,464
Adults of 20 years of age and over who are literate in English.		483,422	26,809	510,231
Hindus		10,858,323	9,950,825	20,809,148
Hindus of 20 years of age and over		5,937,599	5,293,715	11,231,314
Hindus of 20 years of age and over who are literate.		1,855,576	185,999	2,041,575
Hindus of 20 years of age and over who are literate in English.		377,856	12,135	389,991
Muhammadans		13,104,307	12,381,817	25,486,124
Muhammadans of 20 years of age and over.		6,295,743	5,783,192	12,078,935
Muhammadans of 20 years of age and over who are literate.		917,630	28,671	946,301
Muhammadans of 20 years of age and over who are literate in English.		81,803	1,749	83,552
Indian Christians		53,688	50,524	104,212
Indian Christians who are literate		16,198	10,409	26,607
Indian Christians who are literate in English.		7,402	3,817	11,219
Anglo-Indians		11,160	11,082	22,242
European British subjects ..		14,145	8,570	22,715

Population and area of Divisions.

	Area in square miles.	Population.	Density of population per square mile.
Burdwan	13,854	8,050,642	581
Presidency	17,410	9,461,395	543
Dacca	14,822	12,837,311	866
Chittagong	11,710	6,000,524	512
Rajshahi	19,047	10,345,664	544

Comparison of area and population of districts in the main provinces.

Province.	Number of districts.	Average area in square miles.	Average population.
Assam	12	4,418	633,853
Bengal	27	2,744	1,667,698
Bihar and Orissa	21	3,960	1,619,152
Bombay (excluding Aden) ..	28	4,412	688,990
Burma	43	5,435	307,260
Central Province and Berar ..	22	4,540	632,398
Madras	27	5,269	1,567,370
N.-W. F. Province	5	2,684	450,268
Punjab (excluding Delhi) ..	29	3,443	713,277
United Provinces	48	2,214	945,329

Occupations.

Occupations.	Total number and dependents.	Actual workers.	
		Males.	Females.
I. Cultivation	37,429,852	10,824,706	1,264,512
II. Mining	97,471	38,258	29,073
III. Industry	3,621,831	1,245,599	428,691
IV. Transport	739,490	354,004	17,799
V. Trade	2,439,859	801,447	182,558
VI. Public Forces	177,657	68,565	....
VII. Public Administration ..	144,269	47,893	404
VIII. Professions and Liberal Arts.	783,288	236,352	16,770
IX. Persons living principally on their income (Pension-holders, etc.).	37,420	10,206	3,440
X. Domestic Service ..	688,268	338,881	116,365
XI. Insufficiently described occupations.	980,187	405,530	54,393
XII. Unproductive occupations	452,870	128,202	157,882

Literacy.

	Literate per mille—age 5 and over.	
	Males.	Females
Hindus	268	36
Muhammadans	109	6
Indian Christians	317	164
Buddhists	169	19
Animists	14	1

CHAPTER II.

The Growth of Education in Bengal.

Primary education.

17. In the desolating wars which preceded the consolidation of the power in India of the East India Company, learning had been reduced to dire straits and was even in danger of dying out. The new rulers felt this at first in the courts of law. They therefore established the Calcutta Madrasah in 1782 and the Sanskrit College at Benares in 1791, so that there should be trained a number of men competent to quote Muhammadan and Hindu law. This was followed in 1814 by an annual grant from the Company of one lakh of rupees for " the revival and improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories of India ". This declaration contains the seed of that struggle between the views of the " Orientalists " and the " Anglicists," which was to continue for many years, and of which in a modified form one hears echoes even to-day. The question was settled in favour of the Anglicists by Lord William Bentinck after considering Macaulay's Minute of 1835. While making no attempt to suppress existing schools, it was decided that " all funds appropriated for the purposes of education would be best employed on English education alone ". To carry out this policy, schools, which still exist as Government high schools, were established at the headquarters of districts and called zilla schools. These were to be the nucleus of a " system of national institutions," which was to spread to the villages. They were to be " normal schools," that is, schools showing the correct form of instruction or organisation, and teachers were to be trained in them before being sent out to found similar schools further afield. The indigenous schools of the rural areas were in the meantime to carry on their traditional activities, finding their own support.

In 1835, the very year of Macaulay's Minute, as a result of another line of thought, Mr. Adam began his four years' survey of education in Bengal. He found that the teachers were " for the most part simple-minded, but poor and ignorant ". They reflected as little honour on their occupation as they derived emolument from it. " They do not understand the importance of the task they have undertaken; they do not appear to have made it even a subject of thought, they do not appreciate the great influence which they might exert over the minds of their pupils; and they consequently neglect the highest duties which their situation would impose if they were better acquainted with their powers and obligations;.....they produce chiefly a mechanical effect upon the intellect of their pupils..... As to any

moral influence of teachers over pupils, any attempt to form the sentiments and habits, and to control and guide the passions and emotions, such a notion never enters their conceptions." Mr. Adam recommended the encouragement of these schools by the payment of grants, and that they should be co-ordinated with the central " Anglo-vernacular " schools which have already been mentioned.

We thus see two clear and clearly opposed views of the policy that should be adopted. Macaulay despaired of these indigenous schools, saying: " We do not at present aim at giving education directly to the lower classes.....we aim at raising up an educated class who will hereafter, as we hope, be the means of diffusing among their countrymen some portion of the knowledge we have imparted to them." He says further " I do not see how we can either make the present teachers of elementary knowledge more competent or supply their places as yet with fitter men. The evil is one which time only can remedy. Our schools (zilla) are nurseries for school masters for the next generation. If we can raise up a class of educated Bengalis they will naturally, and without any violent changes, displace, by degrees, the present incompetent teachers." Mr. Adam's view, on the other hand, was that improvement would be effected by a system of payment by results, by assigning small grants of land to teachers trained in the zilla schools, and by the distribution of vernacular text books. The Committee of Public Instruction considered carefully these two policies, viz., the spreading of a good education which was to include the teaching of English and the knowledge of the West outwards and downwards, from well-organised centres, as against the view that money should be spent in improving the existing indigenous schools; and decided in favour of the former, declining even to experiment with the latter.

In 1848, Lord Hardinge endeavoured to reconcile the two ideas by starting 101 schools of a type between the zilla schools and those that were indigenous. The attempt appears to have been premature, for in ten years only 26 of these schools remained in existence.

Meanwhile Mr. Thomasson had experimented with Mr. Adam's scheme in a modified form in the United Provinces, and Lord Dalhousie determined to introduce it into Bengal since the downward filtration was making but slow progress. The Commission of 1882 blessed the dual system, but desired that provision should be made for boys from the primary schools to go on to the higher ones.

18. **Control.**—Much of the early work in primary education was done, and is still being done, by religious societies. At first the comparatively small Government funds were distributed without difficulty, but in 1823 it was found necessary to appoint a " Committee of Public Instruction " with local committees in country districts to assist it.

By 1842 the funds to be utilised had reached a sum of over 5½ lakhs and a Council of Education was formed to control all educational institutions, except those of a purely vernacular character.

The local authorities were so apathetic that in 1844 it was found necessary to supersede them by the appointment of an inspector of schools. One of the results of the celebrated despatch of 1854 was the appointment of a Director of Public Instruction in place of the Council of Education.

The first attempt at any organisation of schools in Bengal appears to have been made by the Christian Knowledge Society in 1822. Three " Circles " were established at Tollygunge, Cossipore and Howrah, each containing one central and five ancillary schools, each school being in charge of its own *guru*, and the circle of schools being superintended by a " Circle Pandit ". This was afterwards elaborated into the " Circle System " in which stipends were paid and not grants-in-aid. This system was recognised by the Government of Bengal in 1863-64 and ten years later was much extended by the division of every district into " Circles " for convenience in the examinations that accompanied the acceptance of the plan of payment by results. The " Circle System " developed into the " Chief *Guru* System," in which the head teacher of the central school became responsible for the schools of his circle and became the medium of control between the department and the small scattered *pathsalas* (or village schools). Ultimately it was found to be impossible for the chief *gurus* to manage their own as well as to visit and supervise the work of other schools. They therefore became the " *guru* instructors " or " inspecting pandits " whose successors are still working. This system was intended to increase the number of schools, and succeeded in doing so, but it ultimately outlived its usefulness as some of the schools only existed in name, while others rose to a higher standard than that of the central institution. The increase in the number of the schools had been so great under this system that in 1882-83 a halt was called and it was decided to try to consolidate and improve the existing schools. By 1890-91 the " Circles " seem to have become indistinct and they were finally abolished in 1911.

Meanwhile local government was developing and the control of primary education was considered in connection with it at each step. In 1873 Government was empowered to require municipalities to establish and maintain schools. In 1882 the Municipal Act relieved municipalities of police charges, on condition that the money should be devoted to education. The Education Commission of 1882 stated that they attached great importance to the connexion of all agencies of primary education with the scheme of self-government which was being developed in India. In 1882 also authority was taken to give the union committees certain limited powers in relation to primary

schools. The control of local bodies at first resulted in a decrease in the expansion of primary education relatively to that of secondary schools, but later much was hoped from the work of union boards which are being constituted under the Village Self-Government Act of 1919.

In order to make the control of the district boards real, sub-inspectors were at one time made servants of the boards. The district deputy inspectors were made *ex-officio* members of the boards in 1890, but remained Government servants. This plan did not work for two principal reasons. First, the sub-inspectors were given all kinds of non-educational work to do, such as the supervision of pounds, ferries and the sale of quinine; and, secondly, the district deputy inspectors had not sufficient control over them, for they were not in a directly subordinate position. The sub-inspectors were therefore again made into Government servants and remain so now, being subordinate to deputy, district deputy, and divisional inspectors, and so to the department.

The increase in the number of primary schools in recent years has demanded an increase in the number of sub-inspectors. It was unfortunately impossible to find the funds to finance this large increase. A new class was therefore called into existence, and they were termed " assistant sub-inspectors ". These officers are on low pay, but are in many cases of similar qualification with the sub-inspectors. They sometimes have separate areas and sometimes are under the general control of a sub-inspector. The only reason for their existence is economy. The average number of schools per sub-inspector (including assistant sub-inspectors) is 172.

In order to give Muhammadans every chance to develop educationally, Government has recognised their special schools, called maktabs and madrasahs, by special grants. They are supervised by special sub-inspectors, and other special Muhammadan inspecting officers, while at headquarters there is a special " Assistant Director of Public Instruction for Muhammadan Education ". A class of low grade inspecting officers, styled " inspecting maulvies," corresponds to the inspecting pandit mentioned above.

19. **Teachers.**—In 1885, it was the intention that when the zilla schools were started they should be " normal," that is, showing the proper form of organisation, standard of work, staff, and methods of teaching. They were to be examples for new schools that might be started, and to them were to be attached teachers for training. If the " filtration " policy had been retained as the sole guide, this plan would perhaps have succeeded, but in the wide increase of the numbers of schools for which some responsibility was taken under Mr. Adam's scheme, it became necessary to adopt some plan for turning out trained teachers more rapidly. In 1854, therefore, " normal schools " were

started and have done good work in training teachers for middle schools and the lower departments of high schools.

Later on it was found necessary to proceed still more rapidly with training, and the " *guru* training schools " were started for the training of teachers of primary schools. These have taken in any teachers they were able to secure, the qualification often being only that of the lower primary school, viz., bare literacy, though a middle school standard is aimed at, and they do with this material what is possible in one or two years. All the *guru* training schools were staffed till recently by a head pandit on Rs. 18 and two others on Rs. 10 each, while the students could only be secured by the payment of Rs. 11 a month! These schools are being replaced by a more ambitious type under teachers trained in the secondary training colleges assisted by two pandits on Rs. 30—1—50. Unfortunately in many cases these schools have been built where land was cheap because population was thin. The result has been that this fact, combined with the natural aversion of the people to having their children practised on by 40 *gurus* in training, has destroyed any chance of a real practising school. These " practising schools " are often the merest pretence, having not more than a dozen on the rolls. Recently recourse has been had to practising students in neighbouring schools, but the distance to be walked by the students and their supervisors and the difficulty of securing real school conditions during practice, seem to make the effort exceedingly difficult.

One more matter in this connexion calls for remark and that is the comparatively large percentage of trained *gurus* who fail to become *bona fide* teachers. Over 20 per cent. are estimated to go away into other work after Government has spent considerable sums on their training. The real remedy lies in improving the prospects of the primary school teacher till he can with certainty earn more than, say, a day labourer.

20. **Finance.**—From the original grant of 1 lakh of rupees for education in 1814 until the present time the expenditure of Government has been steadily increasing until in 1918-19 that on primary education alone reached the total of Rs. 23,01,585. Of this Rs. 16,40,467 was actually spent on the recurring expenses of the schools themselves and the balance on supervision, inspection, capital costs, etc. It has been shown how after Macaulay's Minute it was considered necessary to spend all public educational funds on schools designed mainly for the upper classes. It was soon found that this policy alone would not meet the needs of the case, and in 1839 Lord Auckland returned to institutions for Oriental learning the funds they had lost, and supplied additional funds for English education. At first Government was responsible for the whole expenditure on English schools except what was obtained from fees, but it was soon found to be economical

to substitute for this a system of grants-in-aid to schools under private management. After Mr. Adam's plan was adopted this method of finance was applied to the primary schools and took the form principally of " rewards corresponding in value to the progress made by the pupils ", in other words of " payment by results ". This plan was definitely accepted in 1871-72 and afterwards approved by the Commission of 1882. Expansion under it was so rapid that funds ran short. The amount of the reward was reduced and the conditions of its attainment made more difficult, but the expansion continued.

In 1901 " payment by results " was abandoned on the recommendation of a Conference in Simla, and it was decided to pay teachers " subsistence allowance " quarterly, and extra payments at the end of the year, the latter depending on the numbers in the school and its general character as judged by inspection. In 1911 this was modified so that the subsistence allowances were to be paid twice a year and the grants earned by merit marks the following year. The practically unanimous opinion of the country is in favour of the re-institution of a primary school examination and of some reward being given to the teachers on its results, not as part of, but in addition to their pay.

The great despatches of 1854 and 1859 aimed at a wide diffusion of elementary education, which was to be carried out by Government agency through the levy of a compulsory rate. The Government of Bengal, unlike the Government of India, took the view that the Permanent Settlement made the levy of a cess impossible. It also contended with more force that, if a cess was to be levied, it should be imposed on both agriculturists and non-agriculturists, since about one-third of the children in the *pathsalas* belonged to the middle and upper classes. The Duke of Argyll's despatch of 1870 confirmed the view of the Government of India, which was strengthened by the opinion of Mr. Wilson. The cess was, however, never levied, and fees continued to be charged to help out the grants-in-aid, and to-day the expenditure from public funds is still a little less than half the total cost of primary education in Bengal. The question of the financing of primary education has never been put upon a definite and satisfactory basis, and its more recent history has been one long struggle to meet an impossible situation with wholly inadequate funds.

Meanwhile district board schools were being established in backward areas with a view to giving the people a " taste for literacy ". It was intended to convert them into aided schools as the people were prepared to undertake their upkeep. This process of conversion was unduly hastened by the financial difficulties of Government, and by 1905 the existing board schools had come to be regarded as obsolete survivals. The Government of the short-lived province of East Bengal and Assam, seeing their importance, revived the scheme, and embarked upon a policy that was intended to place a board lower primary school

in every panchayati or chaukidari union* that was not already in possession of an upper primary school which could be regarded as of equivalent standard. The scheme was extended to Western Bengal when the two parts of the province were re-united. Over 3,000 unions remain to be provided, and at the present rate of progress it will take periods varying from 3 to 78 years to complete the scheme in the different districts. This scheme makes provision for the payment of Rs. 10 per month between two teachers. The head pandit generally gets Rs. 7 and his assistant gets Rs. 3. The fees usually amount to about Rs. 6 a month and these are also divided. The completion of this scheme is merely a matter of the provision of funds which have hitherto been found from Government grants. Beyond this there does not seem to be any plan in existence for expanding primary education in Bengal.

The fact is that the starting of schools with the exception of the board lower primary schools is left to private enterprise. A pandit, who may be a person almost wholly without educational qualifications, may be needing some addition to a slender living eked out in some small trade or profession. He goes to a place where fees are to be obtained and opens a school, it may be on a benevolent patron's verandah or in a bamboo and matting hut of his own. He then applies to the municipality or district board and to the inspecting officer concerned for grants of various kinds. If he is financially successful, it is quite possible that a rival will set up near at hand and they will enter into a mutually debilitating competition, instead of co-operating in one larger school.

21. **State of primary education.**—The primary schools of the country are bad. They are often used as crèches rather than as schools, and parents value them so little that, of 540,000 children in the first year infant class, they remove nearly 170,000 after the first year, an additional 116,500 after the second year, and over 400,000 before the final year of the primary school is reached. Only a few schools have buildings of their own, and those are generally of poor quality. The equipment is almost always either defective or absent. The teachers are for the most part poorly qualified and worse paid. Indeed they are so badly paid that, in order to live at all, they have to earn outside the school at least as much as they earn inside it. When grants are given to teachers from public funds the people are inclined to consider that there is the less need for them to contribute towards their support and as prices rise, this tendency is emphasised to the further undoing of the teacher.

This is the description of the condition of primary education prepared by Mr. Biss preparatory to his report on how to solve the problem

*Those unions are groups of about ten villages formed for the assessment and collection of the tax for paying chaukidars or village police.

of spreading literacy. It is corroborated by the words of Mr. Hornell in the Quinquennial Report of 1912-13 to 1916-17—" The primary school system depends naturally on the amount of money available for its support. The money now available is not sufficient for anything approaching an adequate and efficient system. Miserable pittances are doled out by way of grants to teachers in approved primary schools. All the funds available are paid out. If new schools are started their teachers can only be assisted by reducing the amounts paid to teachers who receive grants. Progress is under these conditions impossible."

Although in 1916 there were a large number of primary schools in Bengal, so large that on an average there appeared to be a school for every 2·4 square miles, these schools were distributed so unequally that there were large areas without a school, while in others were many little schools indulging in cut-throat competition for the children. How small the schools are is shown by the fact that the average strength of a primary school was 35, the pupils being at all stages in the curriculum, but concentrated in the infant classes—the schools usually in charge of a single teacher whose pay varied from Rs. 3 to Rs. 30 a month. The average pay of a teacher in a school under public management was Rs. 12 a month and Rs. 8 under private management and more than 85 per cent. of the schools were of the latter variety. The average cost of a school, including all expenditure on the pay of teachers, writing materials, repairs if made, amounts to Rs. 9·7 a month—an incredibly low figure, but still a distinct advance on Rs. 7·8, the figure of 1911. Is it to be wondered at that the number in the infant classes shrunk to one-twentieth by the fourth standard, the first stage at which there was a chance of literacy? The outstanding fact was that the system of education in the primary schools was failing to produce literates.

One may pause for a moment here to consider why the children were sent to school if the results were so barren. As the *bhadralok* classes practically send all their boys to school, school attendance is a mark of respectability and a sign of a desire, however vague and indefinite, for a better career than that open to the ordinary cultivator or labourer. The school is the one gate to the society of the *bhadralok*. The desire for education, now an economic necessity for the *bhadralok*, has in its turn called to life a like desire among the masses of India. Such a desire has filtered down to the masses, but, as has been shown, the means to satisfy this desire in any adequate manner are almost completely wanting. The census figures clearly prove that while the literates are slowly but steadily increasing, so also are the illiterates. While the literates increased from 3,311,000 in 1901 to 4,807,000 in 1921, the illiterates increased from 39,570,000 to 42,785,000 in the same period.

If Burma be left out of account, it would seem that Bengal at the institution of the Reforms stood foremost in literacy amongst the provinces in India, as is shown by the table below:—

1921—Percentage of literacy.

	Male.	Female.	Total.
Bengal	18·1	2·1	10·1
Madras	17·3	2·4	9·8
Bombay	13·8	2·4	8·1
Bihar and Orissa ..	9·6	·6	5·1
Punjab	7·4	·9	4·1
United Provinces ..	7·4	·7	4

The percentage of boys in primary schools does not correspond even roughly with the literacy figures and it is possible that literacy is due more to the expansion of secondary schools, high and middle, rather than to the growth of numbers in primary. This, however, is merely a rough guess and unfortunately we can have no idea about the progress towards literacy under the Reforms until the taking of the Census of 1931.

Such being the situation it must now be seen what has been done to solve this problem of illiteracy during the years of the Reforms. Fortunately, in 1919, a careful survey had been made by Mr. West who showed that for a comprehensive scheme of primary education, paying teachers as low an average wage as Rs. 15 a month, an annual expenditure of two crores would be needed. At this time the total expenditure on primary education was 49½ lakhs, of which 17 lakhs was provided by Government. There was probably for the first time a definite idea of the immensity of the problem.

Secondly, in 1919, the Provincial Council passed the Bengal Primary Education Act which applied at first only to municipalities and later on was extended to all unions in rural Bengal. All municipalities had to survey their needs in the matter of primary education and were given the power to levy an education cess. Power was also provided to introduce compulsory education for all boys when the necessary funds, accommodation, etc., were present. At first no action was taken under this Act as no municipality was ready to levy a cess for the amount required.

Thirdly, in 1921, Mr. Biss who had been put on special duty the year before, put forward a scheme for the extension of free primary education on the basis of the local body and Government sharing equally the capital and recurring expenses. Although it would not have been possible for Government to find the money if there had

been any large acceptance of the scheme, the policy was adopted by the then Minister of Education as there was nothing better in sight, and it was rightly judged that very few local bodies would be willing, whether by levying a cess or otherwise to find even half the cost of providing for primary education on a large scale.

22. **Biss Scheme.**—These schemes were taken up very gradually by the local bodies so that by the end of the year 1924-25 free primary schools had been started in 14 municipalities and in 31 unions, towards which the Government contribution annually amounted to Rs. 60,733. By the end of 1926-27 free primary schools had been started in 21 municipalities and in 72 unions, towards which Government contributed Rs. 1,04,102. In no case had provision been made for all the boys in the area. It was not till the end of 1927 that Chittagong Municipality, having provided the necessary schools for all boys of the primary school going age, obtained the distinction of being the first place in Bengal to introduce the principle of compulsion for boys.

The table below gives a statement of the number of children, boys and girls, in primary schools and in the primary classes of secondary schools. From these figures it is clear that while the number of children at school has steadily and largely increased from 1922-23 till the present time, yet the increase in number in class IV, where literacy may be said to start, is very small, so small that one is forced to the conclusion that the greater part of the money spent on the primary schools is wasted. Such wastage will continue till proper primary education can be given and compulsion gradually introduced.

While the expenditure on primary schools has increased by 16 lakhs, the contribution by Government has risen only 4 lakhs. This means that practically nothing has been done to improve the state of these primary schools and that little if anything has been done to increase the literacy of the mass of the population, and this at a time when it is estimated that 50 per cent. of the electorate is illiterate.

Number of pupils in primary schools and expenditure thereon.

Year.	Number in primary classes.	Number in Class IV.	Total expenditure.	Contributions from provincial sources.	Contributions by local bodies.
			Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1920-21 ..	1,456,000 174,000*	Not known	51,56,000	18,05,000	8,07,000
	1,630,000				
1921-22 ..	1,436,000 157,000*	....	54,08,000	19,45,000	8,95,000
	1,593,000				
1922-23 ..	1,465,000 165,000*	88,649	54,52,000	19,86,000	9,58,000
	1,630,000				
1923-24 ..	1,546,300 167,300*	88,725	56,73,000	19,73,000	9,97,000
	1,714,600				
1924-25 ..	1,615,000 180,000*	89,858	59,58,000	19,93,000	10,42,000
	1,795,000				
1925-26 ..	1,651,000 194,000*	91,355	62,33,000	20,69,000	11,12,000
	1,845,000				
1926-27 ..	1,742,000 201,000*	96,366	67,61,000	22,64,000	12,66,000
	1,943,000				

* Children in the primary classes of secondary schools.

23. Since 1925 the Government of Bengal have had under preparation another Primary Education Bill in the hope that a great advance in this branch of education may be made if the provincial Council will accept its provisions without substantial alteration.

The bill is confined to the rural districts of Bengal because both the system of taxation and the system of control must be different in municipalities from that in the country, and even now any municipality, if it cares, has complete power of extending primary education under the Bengal Primary Education Act, 1919 (Bengal Act, IV of 1919).

The objects of the Bill in brief are—

(1) to provide a central authority for each district to control primary education,

(2) to raise the funds necessary to go a long way—if not the whole way—towards universal primary education, and
(3) to provide for compulsory attendance at school.

Chapter II deals with the new controlling body—the District School Board—which has been composed to combine the greatest administrative efficiency with the best local village experience. This body will in the first instance be somewhat under official control, since the start of such a vast scheme would require the best administrative experience available. Nine years after the introduction of the Act it is expected that the scheme will be working in a more or less routine manner so that official control can be greatly relaxed.

The first duties of this board will be to survey the situation and find out exactly how schools must be selected, constructed or enlarged so that the children of the district can have educational facilities in the most economical and efficient manner. Further, the board will have to train teachers on a large scale for this work and this will have to be taken in hand from the start because if such teachers are lacking schools will be of little use. When the schemes and teachers are ready, schools must be erected and teachers selected and paid. From this brief survey of the preliminary work of the board it is clear that all portions of the Act cannot be brought into use at one and the same time. In all probability there will be no imposition of the cess until at least a couple of years after the introduction of the Act because it will take at least that time to prepare the schemes and train teachers. For this reason power has been taken to bring the Act into force in whole or in part on different dates in different districts.

In this province the greatest difficulty in connection with the advance of primary education has been the want of money; so if any advance has to be made in this direction new money must be found. It is proposed to do this by the levy of a primary education cess on exactly the same lines as the roads and public works cesses, the proceeds of which, amounting to about a crore per annum, will be earmarked for primary education. The cess proposed will fall mainly on the cultivator who will pay four pice in the rupee of rent and partly on the landlord who will pay one pice. As this cess does not touch those who derive income from trade, business or profession, a special section has been introduced to empower each District Magistrate to assess people who have incomes derived from sources other than the cultivation of land, so that they too may bear their share of the new taxation.

Chapter V makes provision for an annual audit of the accounts of the District School Board and gives the auditor powers of disallowance and surcharge. The provisions of this chapter are largely taken from the English Public Health Act of 1875.

Compulsory education is dealt with in chapter VIII which empowers Government to enforce the attendance at a primary school of all children except those who are exempted for well-defined reasons, while in answer to the widely-expressed demand of the public, provision has been made in chapter IX for the possibility of religious instruction during school hours.

While all classes at first protested against the proposed taxation, it has been admitted more and more generally as people became familiar with the idea, that new taxation is essential, the main objections coming not from the poorer classes, but from the *bhadralok*, who already have almost universal primary education whether at home or in school and who protest against having to pay for the education of the children of the cultivators or depressed classes.

Another feature on which protests have concentrated is the constitution of the District School Board. It has been characterised as being too official, and too little amenable to the representatives of the people. In this case the opposition emanates mainly from the *bhadralok* and not from the people who will be most affected.

The proposal to give facilities for religious instruction having met with a mixed reception, the discussions on this point in the provincial Council should be interesting. On the whole the Muhammadans have supported this idea.

Secondary education.

24. In the description of primary education brief notice was taken of the conflict between the "Orientalists" and the "Anglicists" which, ending in the victory of the latter, resulted in the establishment of Government high schools in each district in the hope that pupils therein trained would spread education throughout the masses. With a knowledge of English being the passport not only to Government service but also to the learning of the rest of the world, it is not surprising that the *bhadralok* have ever since shown their eagerness for this type of education, with the result that at the beginning of 1917 there were 698 high schools and 1,602 middle English schools in Bengal. With these figures may be contrasted the 349 middle vernacular schools steadily declining in numbers, each Director of Public Instruction in succession affirming that their doom was certain—a correct forecast as shown by their present number—74. The demand for education by the upper classes in Bengal is a demand for English education, the entrance to the University. Of these secondary schools only 45 high schools and 48 middle English schools were under public management

Out of a total expenditure of Rs. 72,66,000 on secondary education, only Rs. 9,47,000 was found from public funds. In spite of the lack of Government support, these schools arose and multiplied till

they are now the most striking feature of the educational system in Bengal. It is in these schools and not in the primary schools that the education of the *bhadralok* is conducted.

While the numbers of pupils in these schools were large, 218,000 in the high schools and 116,000 in the middle schools, the condition of the majority of them was most unsatisfactory. The pay given to teachers is illustrated by a quotation of Mr. Dunn, the Inspector of Schools:—

"The increased scale of salaries recommended by the local Government for the various classes of secondary schools has been adopted only in a few selected cases. The minimum for a high school according to this scale is fixed at Rs. 540; of a middle English school at Rs. 145, and of a middle vernacular school at Rs. 40 a month. An extensive adoption of this scale cannot be enforced unless sufficient funds are available for supplementing the existing grants. Comment has already been made upon the need for improving middle English schools, and it is necessary to remark that the staff of our high English schools are deplorably below any adequate standard. The junior classes are invariably left to matriculate and failed-matriculate teachers whose presence on the staff should never be tolerated at the present time. It is hoped that definite steps will be taken to improve this state of affairs within the next quinquennium. Certainly nothing will be accomplished without pressure from the higher authorities."

Quotation may also be made from the following three paragraphs from the Quinquennial Review for 1912-13 to 1916-17 which give a striking picture of the actual state of affairs at the time:—

"Is it reasonable to expect that teachers engaged to work on such salaries and under such conditions will prove stimulating in their class rooms? Moreover, the university regulations ordain that a teacher of either of the two highest classes of a high school shall teach 50 boys at one and the same time; that each of the next four classes is to contain 40 boys, and each of the two below that, 30. How many English trained teachers would undertake to teach a class of 50 boys in a secondary school, and the ordinary Indian teacher is not the equivalent of an English trained teacher! He has never seen effective class teaching in his life; nor have the boys any idea of it. The result is that class teaching is not attempted; the boy has to learn something or he will stand no chance of passing the matriculation examination; that something is not very much, but the long-suffering parent has long since realised that it is hopeless to expect that the school will impart it. So the boy goes to school and sits there for many hours every day, not that he may learn anything, but because sitting in a recognised school is a condition precedent to appearance at the matriculation examination. The boy's real work is done with a private tutor either before he goes to school in the morning or when he

comes back from school in the evening. His tutor is by preference his class teacher, who is in rather a delicate position. If he taught the boys of his class what they are supposed to learn, his services as a private tutor would not be required, in which event he would starve.

" This custom of having the average schoolboy coached out of school time in the ordinary subjects of the school curriculum calls for special consideration. That the system is widespread cannot seriously be doubted. ' The teachers being ill-paid men,' writes Dr. Chatterjee, in the Rajshahi Division Report, ' they are naturally anxious to do the work of private tuition.' ' There is hardly any teaching,' says the Dacca Division Report, ' but there is too much examining in the class; in all schools, Government schools not excepted, pupils are required to learn their lessons at home and when they come to school they have only to answer the questions which the masters put to them.' But the most convincing testimony to the prevalence of the custom is to be found in the fact that the schools are staffed by the teachers working on the starvation wages now paid. That many of these unfortunate men do suffer considerable hardships, I have no doubt; but they somehow contrive to live, to educate their sons and to marry their daughters. If the great majority of the secondary school teachers did not earn money by private coaching, they could not subsist and the whole of the existing system of secondary schools would collapse.

" But the whole situation is really a remarkable one. It is being incessantly proclaimed that the great majority of parents who send their sons to secondary schools are so poor that even to pay the fees which are charged is a great strain. And yet here we are face to face with a system, one of the main features of which is that it involves over and above the school fees the hiring of private coaches. I am unable to say what the private coaching of an average schoolboy costs. One can, however, safely venture on two assertions. The first is that no parent who arranges private tuition for his son at the hands of a man who is at least nominally qualified to give it pays less than double the school fee—in the great majority of cases he pays a great deal more. The second is that if all the money which is now spent in private tuition were available for the secondary schools, the problem presented by the secondary school system would be considerably simplified."

This gloomy picture of secondary education just before the Reforms is fully corroborated by chapter VIII of the Calcutta University Commission Report: " The contrast between what parents hope to get from their sacrifices on behalf of their sons' education and what (in spite of the earnest efforts of headmasters and many of the teachers) the boys actually receive, is tragic..... It is on the weakness and more than on the weakness—on the deadening ineffectiveness and intellectual sleepiness—of the high schools that the critic would lay

his finger if asked to point to the capital defect in the higher education of Bengal."

By the Indian Universities Act of 1904 the Senate of Calcutta University was authorised to make regulations regarding the conditions to be complied with by schools desirous of presenting candidates at the matriculation examination. The very existence of every one of these schools depends upon its right to present candidates for this examination. It rests entirely with the University, *i.e.*, the Syndicate, to say whether any particular school shall or shall not exercise this right. Schools may find it hard to exist without grants from public funds, and in the future they may find it harder still. The majority, however, of the private schools do as a fact manage to exist without any grant from Government, but even a Government school cannot present candidates at the matriculation examination unless the Syndicate allows it to do so. Consequently, while in the case of the private unaided school it is the University which holds its fate entirely in its hands, even in the case of a Government school or a school heavily subsidised by Government, the University is still in a very real sense the arbiter of its destinies. But the Syndicate is not responsible for these regulations under which it has to control the work of the schools. It has neither funds nor machinery of its own to deal with the local educational needs of an area, and though the reports of the Government inspectors have been treated with consideration the system is ineffective. There was nothing to bring the members in contact with the circumstances of each school. Accordingly Mr. Hornell, a former Director of Public Instruction in Bengal, was of opinion that the progress of secondary education was being hampered and prejudiced by the inherent ineffectiveness of the system of ultimate control.

This opinion was completely confirmed by the Calcutta University Commission who (in chapter XXXI of their report) recommended as one of the essential and pressing reforms for secondary education, the establishment of a board which should control both secondary and intermediate education, which should be provided with a competent inspecting staff and ample funds to improve the schools and intermediate colleges so that students would start their university studies thoroughly equipped for that type of work.

Since the introduction of the Reforms steady attempts have been made to reform the system of control over secondary education, but so far without success. The course of these attempts has been described in the portion on university education and so need not be dealt with at this stage, save to remark that control still rests with the Syndicate of the University, although that body has appointed a sub-committee of itself to do most of the work. This relieves the Syndicate meetings to some extent, but otherwise does not alter the unsatisfactory nature of the control.

Although there was a decided set-back in the numbers attending schools during the non-co-operation period of 1921 and neighbouring years, yet there has been a considerable increase in the number of schools. The number of scholars in the high and midde English schools in 1926-27 was almost the same as in 1916-17. Omitting the middle vernacular schools that may now be neglected, the following figures will show the situation :—

Year.	High schools.	Scholars.	Middle English schools.	Scholars.
1916-17	798	218,070	1,602	160,359
1921-22	878	190,630	1,468	108,582
1926-27	985	233,353	1,616	142,684

The large increase in the number of high schools is confined to private schools, and an attempt was made by the Bengal Retrenchment Committee to do away with Government high schools as they were so much more costly to maintain than the private schools with resources augmented by a grant-in-aid from Government. Every proposal, however, in this direction was met with vehement opposition both local and general so that the policy of deprovincialising the Government high schools was dropped.

The greatest contrast, however, between these schools and the primary schools lies in the fact that we are no longer confronted with extraordinary figures of wastage from the lower classes to the higher. Naturally the number does decrease as the higher classes are reached, but only gradually. Parents who send their children to these schools appreciate the value of education and do their best to keep their children at school for as long a period as possible.

The annual expenditure in such schools has risen steadily to Rs. 1,07,37,075 in 1926-27, of which Rs. 19,30,000 or about 18 per cent. came from public funds.

There are now some signs that progress (such as it was) has been on the right lines and not just a mere expansion of the old pernicious system. Towards this the University has helped during the last two years by enforcing stricter standards in the matriculation examination, which not only is preventing the admission into colleges of many unfitted for higher education, but is also rousing school committees from their self-satisfied complacency engendered by the low standards formerly maintained by the University. Fortunately this has coincided with an increase in the Government control over such schools by the indirect

method of the grant-in-aid system. In 1925-26 Government were able to sanction an extra annual recurring grant of three lakhs and the opportunity was taken to lay down certain elementary but sound principles on which aid was to be given, such as—

(1) no aid was given to any school, unless its permanency was assured and necessary in the opinion of the inspector;

(2) a minimum monthly scale of expenditure of Rs. 540 (11 teachers) was insisted on in the case of schools to which a new grant was given;

(3) no grant, old or new, was to be given where the rate of fees fell below a certain minimum scale;

(4) no grant was to be given unless the school had a provident fund for teachers;

(5) the minimum grant to a high school was fixed at Rs. 100 a month.

Thus only schools which deserved to survive were helped, and the schools which have been helped have been made better fitted to survive.

The time is almost past when a school was regarded as a productive enterprise yielding a regular income to its proprietor. It is competition that has killed the schools as a business concern. The multiplication of schools was accompanied by a decline in their strength, caused partly by this multiplication, partly by the failure of illusions as to the material prospects of educated men, and partly by other causes. In spite of sweated labour the fee income no longer equals the working cost. For most schools, public aid is becoming a necessity—and this necessity knows laws; it provides the opportunity for insistence on a higher standard.

The following figures showing the numbers of aided and unaided schools illustrate the steady and rapid growth of this system of Government control over high schools:—

	Aided.	Unaided.
1916-17 ..	265	396
1921-22 ..	340	502
1926-27 ..	489	469

With this control slight improvements have been made in the condition of teachers, whose salaries have been raised a little and for whom provident funds have been constituted. Even if progress can be claimed here the inefficiency of teaching and the vicious system of private coaching by the school staff have not changed for the better during the last ten years.

One experiment that will shortly be tried and which may have far-reaching results, is the introduction of the vernacular as the medium of teaching and examination up to the matriculation standard. The advocates of this change claim that there will be a possibility of the avoidance of mere cramming, that boys will exercise not merely their powers of memory, but also those of thinking. While possibly sentimental reasons have been the most powerful in effecting this change, the working of the new system will be of the greatest interest for the future. Unfortunately the introduction of the new system cannot take place before 1930.

At one time the idea was widely current that the solution of the problem of a growing educated proletariat was to be sought in the creation of " vocational " schools, which would train boys for practical occupations. But a truer conception of education, a deeper analysis of the situation and actual experiment have combined to prove that this solution is illusory. Under the sway of the ideas that produced the non-co-operation movement spinning, weaving and other " vocational " classes were started in many schools, but they soon returned to their first love—the matriculation curriculum—and the discarded spinning-wheels were put discreetly out of sight.

If, however, it is neither wise nor practical to regard secondary education as an immediate preparation for a vocation, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that a purely literary training does not afford a complete education and that manual arts of various kinds have a high cultural and educational value. In about 22 schools manual training of various kinds has been given—but this needs to be widely extended. The Conference of Educational Officers, February 1925, advised that while vocational training might more properly be given in special institutions after the school course, some subjects which train the hand and the eye and give scope for " the creative joy of the artist," should be introduced into schools. To this desire the University has added its powerful voice. Subjects like carpentry or metal work, spinning and weaving, gardening and agriculture, drawing and painting, will show the boy that he can educate himself through his finger-tips as well as through the ear and the eye, add variety and diversion to a course now intolerably monotonous and hum-drum, and, by accustoming him to manual work, teach him the dignity, the joy and the productive worth of labour. There is a general desire to make experiments along these lines, but so far practically nothing has been done.

University education, 1917-27.

25. The report of the Calcutta University Commission gives a full, vivid and authoritative account of the condition of higher education in the province in 1917. On the whole it is a mournful account, demonstrating the need and urgency for both investigation and

reform. This is a short summary of the state of things which the report revealed.

26. **Conditions in 1917 as analysed by the Calcutta University Commission.**—There is a widespread desire for higher education in Bengal and the number of high schools in the province is almost as great as that in all the rest of the country put together. But the training given in the high schools suffered from three radical defects. In the first place, it was directed solely to the matriculation examination of the University, although it is evident that to prepare boys for the University should not be the only business of the school, and although, in fact, a large number of the boys at school were unfitted for a university career and many of them left school either without passing the matriculation or without going on to the University. In other words, all the schools concentrated on one out of many legitimate and necessary objects of their training. Secondly, the matriculation itself was unsatisfactory, even as a test for entering the University; the courses were narrow and purely literary, the standard low, the whole examination ill-conceived and ill-conducted. " At the very time," says the report, " when the instinct of the people is turning its hopes towards education, the work actually done in the schools is suffering from a blight which spreads so quickly as to threaten public and private hopes with disappointment. The desire for education, though it springs from needs which good schools alone can satisfy, is perverted into a demand for what a school must deteriorate in consenting to give. But the pressure is irresistible, and the schools in yielding to it are spoiled. Nor is this the whole of the loss. The profession of teaching becomes less and less attractive to able and generous minds." Thirdly, the school exerted little influence on the formation of character, and failed to convey to the boy's mind any clear apprehension of an ideal of duty. " Pressed further home, the charge amounts to more than even this: it implies that the schools have no spiritual life which touches a boy's inner nature, no corporate unity which appeals to and can sustain his affectionate loyalty, no moral or intellectual flame which may kindle his emotions."

The high schools of Bengal were thus little more than mere coaching establishments to prepare boys for the University. But when students entered the University they were found to be unfit, because they had never had a sound general education. The result was that the first two years, the intermediate, became in effect a supplement to the high school course rather than the beginning of the college course. It was regarded as a natural stopping place and a large proportion of students ceased their education at that stage. But while there was this disposition to act as if the intermediate marked a distinct stage, yet the

training in the intermediate was ill adapted to the needs of such students as went no further. There was little choice of subjects, no attempt to provide any introduction to vocational or practical training and a complete neglect to use the methods of teaching appropriate to schools and boys, the system of mass lecturing only being followed.

Things were not much better in the next two college years, the period of proper undergraduate work. The colleges were isolated and each had to offer a complete scheme of instruction and subjects, each was a small university, and, needless to say, a very inadequate and ill-equipped university. The private colleges relied on fees and, to make ends meet, had to entertain vast numbers of students to be taught in huge classes by a small number of ill-paid teachers, often discontented with their lot, deprived of all joy in their work and reduced to the position of lecturing machines. There was scarcely any personal contact. Everything was directed again to the sole end of passing an examination. The able student was sacrificed to the mediocre. The average students, for whose sake this terrible sacrifice is made, suffer as much as any. For they are deprived of the best thing which university life has to offer to a young man—daily contact with his ablest contemporaries when these are full of intellectual vitality, eagerly pursuing their own special interests, and testing their young strength on the problems of life and thought.

What made the whole problem much more acute was the concentration of colleges and students in Calcutta. There were about 16,000 university students in the city, only about a fourth of whom had their homes to live in, the rest being gathered from all parts of the province and obliged to live in hostels or messes or wherever they could. Many of them were intermediate students, not old or strong enough to face the temptations of city life. " It is impossible to exaggerate the evils that are likely to result from this drift of boys from country districts, ill-trained and knowing nothing of the world, into the dangerous conditions of life in a great city, where they are lost in the crowd and where it is impossible to provide for them any adequate supervision." It is impossible to provide decent hostels for them except at an enormous outlay; and it is altogether impossible to provide adequate space for recreation and exercise. Their needs could quite well be met and ought to be met nearer their homes.

The system of post-graduate teaching, which is concentrated in and controlled by the University, did not meet with as general condemnation as other parts of the educational scheme. But it was pointed out that post-graduate work was entirely divorced from undergraduate work and that this cleavage might prove disastrous to both, and that no arrangements for higher work in the mufassal had been contemplated.

The Commission recognised that one of the great difficulties was the problem of numbers. The single University of Calcutta had to control and train about the same number of students as the 18 universities of the United Kingdom. The population of both countries is about the same; but a far smaller proportion is literate in Bengal; and when it is remembered that the number of women students is negligible, it is obvious that the proportion of the educated classes of men who take advantage of a university course is several times greater in Bengal. Nearly all of them pursue the same courses of study, more or less academic and not practical, and not leading directly to any profession or industry in the great majority of cases. As far as the capacity to earn a living is concerned the greater number of graduates are no better off after than before their university career; and hence the acute and dangerous problem of the educated proletariat. A crushing burden was also thrown on the university which has to control this enormous family. It had to conduct examinations every year for about 30,000 candidates (in 1927, 37,000). It had to deal with 26,000 students scattered over an immense province wherein communications are very difficult; it was responsible also for the educational control of more than 800 (in 1927, 1,003) schools, a function such as no university outside of India is called upon to perform. " It is a commonplace," says the report, " that a university, just because it is concerned with so individual a business as the training of the mind, can easily become too large. There is no doubt that Calcutta University was much too large for the efficient discharge of its duties and it is little wonder that its governing bodies proved inadequate to the task.

These governing bodies were defective in their constitution and might well have proved unequal to a less heroic task. The Senate, the majority of the members of which were nominated—on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellors—was not properly representative, either of the colleges, of the general bodies of learned professions, of commercial, industrial and agricultural interests or of different communities, especially of the Muhammadans. The Syndicate, on which the Muhammadans had for years been unrepresented was even less satisfactory. The amount and variety of work which fell upon it was intolerable; and yet it had no effective responsibility and the work of the so-called executive was discussion rather than deliberate decision. There was no effective academic body to direct the more purely educational functions of the University, for the faculties and boards of studies were not composed of experts and had only advisory powers. Thus there was no clear differentiation of functions and no careful adaptation of means to ends. The organs which existed were unsatisfactory in composition and not well articulated.

The control of the University over the colleges was as rigid as it was ineffective. The University had been powerless to secure really

efficient teaching, but it had crushed out all independence or freedom in the subjects and methods of teaching. On the other hand, the control of Government over the University was also unsatisfactory, for that control was exercised by the Government of India, which was a thousand miles away, and not by the local Government on the spot.

27. **Attempts at reform.**—Such was the analysis of the conditions of higher education made by the report. We have now to trace the various attempts made to effect general or particular reform and to discuss the extent of their success.

28. **Creation of Dacca University.**—One thing was done almost at once, the creation of Dacca University. The scheme for a university at Dacca goes back to at least 1912; and in its origination, as the Sadler Commission Report says, two main factors may be distinguished: " first and foremost, the desire of the Mussalmans of Eastern Bengal to stimulate the educational progress of their community, and secondly, the desire of the Government of India to create a new type of residential and teaching university in India as opposed to the present affiliating type. To these must be added a third factor of special importance, the desire of the Government to relieve the congestion of the University of Calcutta." A detailed scheme was drawn up by the Nathan Committee in 1912 and another, rather different, scheme by the Sadler Commission. The latter was adopted, in the main, in the Dacca University Act, which received the assent of the Governor-General in Council on March 23rd, 1920, and came into force on the 1st July 1921.

The Governor of Bengal is the Chancellor; the Vice-Chancellor, a whole-time official, is the academic and executive head. The supreme body is the court, a large body of " *ex-officio* " elected and nominated members, over 150 in number. The court makes new statutes on the recommendation of the other university bodies and may cancel new ordinances passed by the Executive Council. It has the power of reviewing and passing resolutions on the annual budget and report and is aided for this purpose by a budget committee.

The Executive Council is a small body of about 15 persons and is the chief executive body. The academic work is under the control of the Academic Council, which includes the Vice-Chancellor, the Deans, the Provosts, the Professors, the Librarian, and a certain number of Readers and Lecturers.

One of the special features of the University is that separate representation is given to the Muslim community on all university bodies. Another is the elaborate arrangements for residence and tutorial supervision. There are three Halls, one of them for Muslim students, each controlled by a Provost, who is assisted by two house tutors and by the University teachers distributed for this purpose

among the three Halls. The head of each department is further directly responsible for the tutorial supervision of his honours students. An attempt is made in this way " to encourage originality and individual effort, to ensure that each student shall be enabled to learn something of intellectual production as well as of reproduction ".

The University is fortunate in its situation and occupies buildings, many of which formerly housed the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, scattered about an area of about a square mile of park land. There is thus ample space for games and each Hall has, at present, two playing fields and tennis courts.

29. **Development of Dacca University.**—These were the lines on which the University of Dacca was established, and it is on these lines that it has developed during the last six years. In 1925, the Dacca University Amendment Act passed by the local legislature provided the University with a statutory recurring grant of Rs. 5½ lakhs and put its finances on a stable basis. For the rest, there have been no legislative changes, but steady progress. The number of students rose from 1,030 in 1921-22 to 1,484 in 1926-27. The number in residence in the three Halls rose during the same period from 337 to 569 and the Halls have justified their existence as organisations for fostering corporate and social activities and creating a real *esprit de corps*. The library has been largely and wisely increased and now contains over 46,000 volumes. A valuable collection of Sanskrit and Bengali manuscripts has been gathered together. The Science Departments have been properly equipped; and a considerable amount of original work has been produced in every subject. There seems to be no reason to doubt that Dacca University has " made good ".

30. **The influence on the general position.**—The foundation of Dacca University has provided Bengal with at least one centre of higher education, where resources are pooled and there is little waste and where some of the more flagrant defects of the earlier system have been removed—the lack of individual attention, the lack of facilities for corporate fellowship and for physical recreation, the monotony and deadening influence of a too rigid and ponderous machinery. But the creation of Dacca University has done little to ameliorate the conditions of Calcutta. It is true that the Commission pointed out the erection of new universities in chosen mufassal centres as the only escape from the congestion of Calcutta; but Dacca University, from this point of view, has done little more than absorb the local student population. A few hundreds more or less make little difference to Calcutta. The problems of Calcutta have to be faced and solved separately; and if for the most part they still remain unsolved it is not for want of attempts to tackle them.

31. **Attempts to reform Calcutta University.**—The first attempt was made by the Government of India soon after the publication of the Commission's report. It should be remembered that the University of Calcutta was at that time immediately under the Government of India and the Governor-General was its Chancellor. In a resolution, dated the 22nd January 1920, the Government of India gave notice of its intention to publish and place before the Imperial Legislative Council a bill to give effect to the main recommendations of the Commission regarding the reconstitution of the University of Calcutta, while the administrative matters including the future organisation of intermediate and secondary education were to be decided by the Government of Bengal. But the proposals of this resolution and of the draft bill, which intended to give effect to them and which appeared as a confidential document some months later, were attacked from several sides at the same time. The local Government, while agreeing that the bill would enable a complete and satisfactory reorganisation of Calcutta University to be carried out, given good will and the necessary funds, pointed out that the Government of Bengal was not in a position to finance the scheme and that, unless the Government of India was prepared to find the money, the measure would remain a dead letter. The University of Calcutta, dominated largely by elements which feared any attack on their vested interests, pleaded for postponement on various grounds, emphasised the necessity for a careful consideration of the financial basis of the scheme and put forward a vast number of resolutions and criticisms on the Commission's report. But what gave the bill its quietus was the disapproval of the Secretary of State, who took serious exception to the procedure suggested by which the Legislative reconstitution of Calcutta University was to be carried through by the Government of India, while the local Government was to be left to take action later about the separation of the intermediate classes and the constitution of an authority to control intermediate and secondary education; he regarded the question of finance as fundamental. In the event, the bill was dropped and the Government of India had to abandon all intention of legislating for Calcutta University. That task was left to the local Government; and by Act No. VII of 1921, the powers over the University hitherto exercised by the Government of India were handed over to the Government of Bengal and the Governor of Bengal became the Chancellor. Meanwhile the Reforms had come into operation; and as Education is a transferred subject, the control of the Government over the University came into the hands of the Minister of Education and the local Legislative Council.

Before going any further, it may be said at once that no really thorough and comprehensive scheme of reorganisation has since been

proposed. The obstacles were two—the financial stringency, which only became greater as time went on and which forbade even a contemplation of a scheme calculated to cost Rs. 150 lakhs capital and Rs. 80 lakhs recurring expenditure; and secondly, the failure to reach any agreement with the University on the lines of reform. The local Government were convinced that reform of a far-reaching character was urgently necessary; and this had indeed been abundantly demonstrated by the report itself. The lapse of time only made matters worse, stiffened opposition, increased the congestion, accentuated the evils, political, social and intellectual; but the lack of funds was an insuperable obstacle. The existing resources were thoroughly inadequate, the Government of India found itself unable to give any substantial help, and, in the political condition of the province, no Minister who depended on the Council could ask for the imposition of fresh taxation for the University The curious and melancholy result has been that the report of the Commission has had more practical effect in most other provinces and universities than in Bengal.

32. **Financial difficulties of the University.**—But if no complete scheme could be proposed yet smaller measures of reform were put forward by the local Government at various times. The most important of these was the Calcutta University Bill of 1922-23. The immediate occasion for it was the financial difficulties in which the University found itself. Owing chiefly to the expansion of the post-graduate department, income no longer balanced expenditure. The growth of the post-graduate department was remarkable; it was as fast as that of a mushroom, although it has shown itself much more tenacious and deep-rooted. In 1916-17, before the concentration of higher studies in the University, there were 46 University teachers; two years later, after the concentration, there were 188 including 58 part-time teachers attached to colleges. In 1921-22 the total had risen to 233 and it increased still further in the next year or two. With the increase in the number of teachers and of their salaries, the University found it impossible to make ends meet. Every year there was a deficit; and application had to be made to Government for funds to wipe it off.

Meanwhile, the Legislative Council had added its witness to the need of university reform by passing several resolutions. One of them dealt with the composition of the Senate and urged that at least 80 per cent. of the members should be elected by the registered graduates. Another demanded the formation of a board for the superintendence of secondary schools without delay, by legislation if necessary, a board representative of the various interests and communities concerned and with a non-official majority. A third, carried against the Government, proposed the appointment of a committee of

two financial experts, two members of the Senate nominated by Government and three non-official members of the Legislative Council to inquire into the general working of the University, in particular its financial administration, and recommended the most urgent measures of reform, before any financial assistance was rendered to the University.

The attitude taken up by Government was this. The financial difficulties of the University were the result of post graduate expansion. The salaries and other charges of the post-graduate department came to about Rs. 6 lakhs, while the income from the fees of students was less than Rs. 1½ lakhs. There was reason to think that the number of teachers was unnecessarily large. The extraordinary increase of the last few years was in itself suspicious. The University of Dacca had, for all its work including undergraduate teaching, a staff of only about 100 lecturers, less than half the staff entertained by Calcutta University for its post-graduate work alone. There was a case at least for investigation. Further, the post-graduate department had been so constituted that it was an *imperium in imperio* in the University, not wholly amenable to the control of the Vice-Chancellor and occupying a more or less independent position. There were other matters also which needed investigation. The recognition of inefficient schools—for long a cause of contention between University and Government—had been proceeding apace.

33. **Lowering of the matriculation standard.**—Meanwhile, the standard of the matriculation, low as it had been, had fallen still lower; and not only of the matriculation but of the other examinations as well. Calcutta degrees had become almost a by-word in the rest of India. The following figures speak for themselves:—

Matriculation.	Percentage of passes.
1917-18	58·2
1918-19	63·8
1919-20	66·5
1920-21	75·3
1921-22	78·4

Intermediate.	Arts and Science.	B. A. and B. Sc.
1917-18	55·6	49·9
1918-19	66·4	49·6
1919-20	63·5	68·6
1920-21	67·6	74·9
1921-22	68·4	71·7

M. A. and M. Sc.	
1917-18	54·7
1918-19	54·7
1919-20	54·3
1920-21	62·8
1921-22	75·7

34. **Amending bill of the Government.**—It was to meet this situation that Government put forward its new bill which, without incurring fresh expenditure, sought to remove some of the outstanding defects in the administration of the University. The objects were—

(1) to improve the financial and academic administration of the Calcutta University on the assumption that its existing functions would remain unchanged;

(2) to provide for co-operation and improved relations between the local Government in the Ministry of Education and the Calcutta University, as it was felt that the smooth working of the provincial educational system could only be ensured by the existence of such co-operation;

(3) to secure a larger elective element in the constitution of the Senate, with due regard to academic interests. To secure these objects it was proposed that of the 100 ordinary fellows of the Senate only 35 should be nominated, the rest being elected by various bodies like the registered graduates in the different faculties, the Legislative Council, the teachers and principals of colleges, and the teachers of the University. There was, however, to be an Academic Council of about 53 members, including the principals of the chief Calcutta colleges and representatives of the mufassal colleges, of the faculties, the University teachers, the ordinary fellows and so forth, as well as a certain number nominated by Government. Financial administration was to be in the hands of a Board of Financial Control of 5 members, 3 nominated by Government and 2 elected by the Senate, and a Treasurer. The Minister for Education was to be the Rector of the University and to exercise any powers delegated to him by the Chancellor. Such were the main provisions of this bill.

It was clear from the first that the bill would be opposed by the University. The Senate objected to the procedure and to the provisions. His Excellency Lord Lytton thereupon called together a conference, in which the Government of Bengal, the Government of Assam and the University were all represented, and which was also attended by representatives of the Government of India, to discuss the whole question and reach, if possible, some lines of agreement. The conference held various meetings. The University stood out for a consolidating bill rather than an amending bill and in fact produced a draft bill of its own for discussion. Its effect would have been to sever all connection between the University and the Government and to place the whole of the education of the province above the primary stage, under the control of the University. It proposed

to create a court, based on the elective principle, which was, however, to be an executive as well as a legislative body. The powers of the Chancellor were reduced to the point of extinction; the Minister was excluded altogether. There was to be an Academic Senate for academic matters. Financial control was to be altogether in the hands of the University itself. The Vice-Chancellor was to be unpaid, but there was to be a Pro-Vice-Chancellor of undefined powers who was to be a paid official. A board of secondary education was to frame rules for the recognition of schools, to give or withdraw recognition, arrange for inspection and advise Government about the distribution of grants. But the board had no independent powers; it was to be under the general control of the court, exercised through the Syndicate. The result would have been to hand over Secondary Education also to the University and to make the Ministry and Department of Education meaningless and superfluous.

35. **Problem of the control of secondary education.**—An impasse had been reached. The University would not look at the Government bill and Government could not, without abdicating its educational responsibilities and without giving further powers to a body which had in the past abused its existing powers, accept the principles of the University bill. It was then felt that the best way out was to clear the school problem out of the way. All along, the University had shown itself most reluctant to abandon any of its powers over schools. But these powers, as the Sadler Report had clearly shown, had led to the demoralisation and deterioration of secondary education. The interests of schools had been sacrificed to the supposed interests of the University. University finances depended on the fee fund and it was an irresistible temptation to make the matriculation easy so as to attract to the examination and to the college classes the largest possible number of students. On the other hand the University had a fairly strong case in demanding that it should have the sole control over its own entrance examination. In theory, this was an eminently reasonable demand and one which it was difficult to impugn. The difficulty was that the control over the Entrance Examination tended inevitably to mean control over secondary education generally; and not only control, but tyranny; and a tyranny in the interests of the University. This was a strong argument; and the University had another. The Commission had come to the considered opinion that the end of the secondary stage was not the matriculation, but the intermediate; and they had advised the removal of the intermediate classes from colleges and their association with the high school classes under a single board. But to effect this much money was needed; and the money was not forthcoming. The University took up, accordingly, the attitude that the recommendations of the Commission should be carried out either altogether or not at all. Till

provision was made for the removal of the intermediate classes, they urged that secondary schools should remain under its control. If Government could not create a single authority for both, the University would undertake the task. It is clear that this was a claim that could not be admitted by Government.

A further complication was introduced by the terms of the Dacca University Act. This Act forbade the Dacca University to touch education below the intermediate standard; and as a corollary, a Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education had necessarily to be created for the Dacca University area since the Act excludes this area from the control of Calcutta University. In the immediate expectation of a similar provincial board, the Dacca Board was only authorised for a year; but as this expectation remained unfulfilled, it became necessary to prolong the life of the Dacca Board from year to year. This was, in every way, unsatisfactory as the board was unable to undertake any thorough reform of the institutions within its jurisdiction. Some solution was urgent.

36. **Draft bill on secondary education.**—Government decided, therefore, to proceed with a bill for the reorganisation of secondary education, and after much departmental discussion, a bill was drafted for the purpose. It was decided that intermediate as well as secondary education should come within its purview. The bill proposed to create a board, consisting of a president to be appointed by the local Government, the Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, five persons to be elected by Calcutta University, two to be elected by Dacca University, an inspector and a headmaster of a school and a principal of an intermediate college and five to eight others to be appointed by the Government. This board was to supervise education up to the intermediate standard, to recognise institutions, conduct examinations, appoint inspectors and so forth. It was also specifically laid down that the intermediate examination of the board should be accepted as the entrance test for the universities and that no university should hold any other examination for admission. In case of disputes between the University and the board, the Local Government was to refer the matter to a special arbitration board.

This bill was intended merely to serve as a basis for discussion, and accordingly another meeting of the Joint Conference was called to discuss it. The University representatives objected to the amount of control over the board reserved for Government and maintained that this was at variance with the recommendations of the Commission. To this it was replied that Government in educational matters meant a popular Government, represented by a Minister who depended on a majority in the Council, and that it was difficult for the Minister to justify the educational expenditure of the province unless he had some

control over its administration. The University representatives further reiterated the old demand that the same authority should be responsible for both secondary and intermediate education and that, since the intermediate classes could not be easily or immediately severed from the colleges, the University should be that authority. In face of the resolute opposition of the University, no progress could be made.

37. **Reform by the University—Finance.**—But, while the period has thus been sterile of broad reforms, in certain details change or improvement was effected. Under the pressure of its financial difficulties, which allowed Government to demand and compelled the University to conduct an inquiry into the possibilities and means of retrenchment, certain economies were effected, especially in the staff of the post-graduate departments. But the economies were not on a scale to reduce expenditure to the level of income. From time to time Government had to make grants to wipe off deficits, but the University protested that, in spite of all possible efforts, it was impossible to produce a balanced budget. Accordingly, in 1926, Government sanctioned a recurring grant of Rs. 2,43,000 a year with a contingent liability for Rs. 57,000 for a period of five years. This has given to University finances some measure of stability.

38. **Raising of examination standards.**—In recent years, again, the University has attempted to set its house in order in other ways as well. The standards of the examinations have been considerably raised, as the following figures will show:—

Percentage of passes.

	Matriculation.	I.A. & I.Sc.	B.A. & B.Sc.	M.A. & M.Sc.
1921-22 ..	78·4	68·4	71·7	75·7
1922-23 ..	73·9	69·4	....	....
1923-24 ..	75·9	63·7	70·6	71·4
1924-25 ..	72·5	67·7	69·6	....
1925-26 ..	56·3	44·5	55·7	....
1926-27 ..	52·7	47·3	40·5	....

It cannot be denied that this is a move in the right direction long overdue, although, on the other hand, it must be remembered that severe examinations are good only in so far as they help to improve the quality of the teaching.

39. **Device for practical courses.**—Meanwhile, there has been abundant evidence to prove that higher education of the kind given in Bengal did not meet all the needs of the community and only led many into a blind alley. The worth of a university education has

always been estimated by the market value of the degree. An ordinary degree did not lead directly to any profession nor, in many cases, to any remunerative occupation, and students were willing to explore any avenue that might lead to better things. This, rather than any disinterested love of learning, explains the extraordinary rush to the post-graduate classes in the early twenties of the century. But it soon became clear that an M.A. degree had no more market value than a B.A. once it became a common possession; and in the last three or four years, the number of students in the M.A. classes has decreased strikingly. In 1923-24, there were 1,051 M.A. students, in 1925-26 only 604. The same cause explains the vogue of a subject like Economics which was supposed vaguely to have a practical value. The futility of the B.A. and the M.A. was responsible also for the remarkable diversion of the stream of students to the B.Sc. and M.Sc. classes, which was a marked phenomenon during the last two or three years. The number of candidates for the I.A. in 1921 was 4,858 and in 1927, 4,175; but during the same period the number of I.Sc. candidates jumped from 1,851 to 4,485. The number of candidates for the B.A. in 1921 was 3,927 and in 1927, 3,117; but the number of B.Sc. candidates rose from 608 to 1,240. Here again disillusionment is inevitable and, in fact, has already begun. A flow back to Arts is already noticeable. The demand for Science did, however, produce at least one good result: it led to the provision of laboratories and a wider range of studies in most of the colleges.

40. **Conditions in colleges.**—Generally, conditions in the colleges are better now than ten years ago. The staff are more numerous, rather better paid and secured by the creation of provident funds. The libraries and laboratories show fewer conspicuous gaps. The dissatisfaction felt with the system of mass lecturing is shown by the attempts, not always well conceived or well sustained, to introduce some kind of tutorial supervision. The elaborate survey of the students undertaken by the University Welfare Committee has underlined the fact of the alarming physical deterioration of students and drawn public attention to the need for some definite scheme of physical training and for facilities for recreation and for healthy conditions of residence and work. There is now more good hostel accommodation than there used to be, more keenness for games and more chances of playing them, wider playing fields, especially in the mufassal, and altogether a greater variety of interests. We are yet far from any satisfactory solution of these things, but the fact that the problems are perceived is itself the first step to any solution.

41. **Subjects of study.**—In the courses and subjects of study there has been little change. At the post-graduate stage provision has been made for a very full choice of subjects, in the arts and sciences; and

the staff is on the whole competent. The pity is that a large proportion of the students are men entirely ill-equipped for any kind of advanced work; and the consequence is that the same methods have to be employed as in the lower classes, mass lecturing, dictating of notes, cramming of text-books. The stimulation of the student's own intellectual curiosity and activity is scarcely ever attempted or achieved. This is perhaps the most serious drawback to the intellectual work of the University. Meanwhile, large private benefactions have enabled the University to increase its professorial staff considerably; and recently two chairs were established, for Sanskrit and for Islamic Culture, in memory of the long and distinguished services of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjea, for many years Vice-Chancellor.

At the undergraduate stage the courses remain ill articulated. It has long been pointed out that the distinction between pass and honours work at this stage is almost meaningless, as the range of subjects is practically the same and lectures are usually common and honours men gain no advantage when they go on to the M.A. In Dacca University the system is quite different; pass and honours work is completely differentiated; the pass course is for two years and the honours extends over three and honours men may obtain their M.A. after a year, while pass men must take two years. This approximates to the system in vogue in several other Indian universities, like Madras, and many foreign universities. It was more than once proposed that Calcutta should reorganise its courses on the same lines, and the Committee for Higher Education discussed the subject, but without reaching any definite conclusion. The chief obstacle is that the institution of a three-year honours course must involve the remodelling of the post-graduate system, of which the University is jealous.

42. **New matriculation regulations.**—It is otherwise with the matriculation. Here at last some action has been taken. The University has remodelled the matriculation course and its proposals have for the most part received the sanction of Government. On the failure of the attempt to create a separate secondary board, it became imperative to do something to improve the course, and the initiative was taken by the University. But it is worth while noticing that the course as suggested is a combination of a general secondary school course and one intended as an entrance to the University. In other words, the University has been acting as a secondary board and its passive (or active) resistance has gained the day. For instance, the chief change contemplated is the substitution of the vernacular for English as the medium of instruction and examination, a change of great significance, recommended strongly by the Commission and from the introduction of which much may be reasonably hoped. But it is obvious that this change does not affect the University directly as the medium in the

University will continue to be English. In the same way, the inclusion of subjects like Commercial Geography and Business Method and Correspondence in the matriculation course has no relevance to university studies at all, although they are rightly included in a general school course. But, even if the manner is illogical, it is satisfactory that the change has been effected; for the narrowness of the matriculation was one of the greatest defects in the whole education system. Much more remains to be done to evolve a good secondary training, but at least a beginning has been made.

Progress of education among the Muhammadans.

43. During the years 1921-26 the number of Muhammadan pupils in all educational institutions for Indians rose from 880,374 to 1,139,949, an increase of 29·4 per cent. Of this, 913,918 were males and 226,031 females. The increase, if not remarkable, is yet satisfactory at first sight. But on a nearer view the picture appears much less roseate.

Moslem pupils are found in general institutions side by side with Hindus and others, but they have their own special and exclusive institutions as well. Let us reckon the number of Muhammadan pupils in the former:—

Muhammadan scholars in general institutions.

Year.	Universities and arts colleges.	Percentage.	Professional colleges.	Percentage.	High stage.	Percentage.	Middle stage.	Percentage.	Primary stage.	Percentage.	Total.	Percentage.
1921-22	2,175	12·8	440	9·4	15,715	17·1	16,047	20·9	784,874	49·5	819,251	46·7
1926-27	3,419	14·2	886	14·6	16,049	15·5	18,567	19·3	994,855	51·4	1,033,776	47·7

The most striking feature of this table is the relative decline in the number of Muhammadan pupils in the high and middle stages of instruction of the general schools. Even if we take into account the pupils reading in the high stage of the madrasahs, the figures are not much altered. The percentage of Moslem scholars at the high stage in 1921-22 rises to 17·5 and in 1926-27 to 16·6. This decline is not new, but a continuation of a movement that was noticed in the previous quinquennium. In 1916-17 the Muhammadans formed 19·7 per cent. of the pupils in the high stage, in 1921-22 17·1 per cent., in 1926-27 only 15·5 per cent. In other words, in secondary education the community is not keeping pace with the general progress. It is true that there is advance in higher education and in the primary

stage. But the progress in primary education is more apparent than real, for many of the pupils never pass beyond the lowest class, and the wastage is enormous. The figures for the Chittagong Division will illustrate this. The Inspector writes " while the total number of Muhammadan children attending schools is 283,000 out of a total of 408,000 or approximately 70 per cent., if one excludes class I the figures are 50,000 out of a total of 101,000 or less than 50 per cent. If one excludes classes I and II the figures are even more illuminating for then the percentage of Muhammadans falls to 22 per cent."

There is then little room for congratulation on the progress of the community in general education. The forces that retard progress are the same as those noticed on several occasions—the fact that the Hindu population early took to secondary education and naturally established the schools where they themselves were concentrated, the dispersion of the Muhammadan population in villages often far from secondary schools, the scarcity of Moslem-managed high schools, and the preference for special institutions like madrasahs and maktabs controlled by Moslems and teaching Islamic ritual and religion. These causes are still operative and apparently in no diminishing measure. Add to them the poverty of the mass of Muhammadans who are small farmers or peasants.

One very important reason for the slow increase of Muhammadan pupils in general schools is, as has been pointed out, their preference for madrasahs and maktabs. That the community desire these separate institutions and that they are popular cannot be denied. One must sympathise with some of the underlying motives—especially with the conviction that only in separate institution can " the traditional and revered ideals of Islamic culture and Islamic piety " be preserved. But, on the other hand, as one Inspector puts it, " nothing is likely to perpetuate the present unfortunate communal differences more than the separate education of members of the different communities." He goes on to add " The maktabs and madrasahs are extremely inefficient. This is not prejudicial criticism, but is the unanimous verdict of the Muhammadan Inspectors..... It is extremely unlikely that the products of such institutions will ever be able to compete successfully with those who have been taught in ordinary high schools. This is the private opinion also of many Muhammadan gentlemen."

The most hopeful feature of the situation is the large increase in the number of students at the universities and the professional colleges. Of course, in this matter the Muhammadans are much behind the Hindus, but some progress is being made and it is hoped that it will continue. The increase in the number of university students is largely due, firstly, to the foundation of the Dacca University with its Muslim Hall, and, secondly, to the start of the Calcutta Islamia College.

In the Muslim Hall the numbers of students have risen in the last six years from about 160 to over 400. While there the Muhammadan students can get the best education available in Bengal and are beginning to hold their own against the other students that attend. Undoubtedly the Muslim Hall, if it can proceed in the way it has started, will have the greatest effect on the political situation by turning out large numbers of well-educated Muhammadan young men in the same way as Aligarh has affected the political situation in the United Provinces.

The foundation of the Islamia College may be said to be directly due to the Reforms, for it is doubtful whether it would have been in existence at this day had it not been for the strong stand taken by the Muhammadan Minister, Mr. A. K. Fazl-ul Huq, who was successful in forcing Government to allot funds for the start of this communal institution. Another way in which the Reforms have affected the education of the Muhammadans is in the large growth of pupils in the special Muhammadan institutions. Again and again have questions been asked in the Legislative Council about the supply of funds for these new madrasahs and it is doubtless due in a great measure to the pressure put on Government that grants for this form of education have been increased whenever funds were available. As has been pointed out above, it is perhaps doubtful whether the increase in this form of education is for the good of the community as a whole, as it undoubtedly withdraws scholars from the ordinary secondary schools which would fit them better to avail themselves of the facilities at the universities. However that may be, the sympathies of the community are with all these special institutions, and it may be that the confining of themselves to this narrow communal form of education may give them greater concentration and driving power in political matters.

In literacy the Muhammadans are still far behind the Hindus. According to the Census of 1921 only 9·4 of the Muhammadan males and ·4 per cent., of the Muhammadan females were literate while the corresponding numbers for the Hindus were 27 and 3·2. In 1911 the figures for the Muhammadans were 7·9 and 0·2 and for the Hindus 21 and 2.

Progress of girls' education since the Reforms.

44. There is considerable difficulty in giving an accurate description of girls' education in Bengal because it has attracted comparatively little notice in the past and the one or two advanced schools have attracted attention away from the vast majority. Although on paper the period since the institution of the reforms appears to be a time of considerable progress—the number of girls under instruction in the

last 10 years having increased from 285,000 to 420,000—yet this increase is much more apparent than real because only about 3 per cent. of these are under instruction at a stage beyond the primary, while even in the primary classes the great concentration remains in the infant classes of the primary schools. Out of 360,000 girls in all girls' schools, 290,000 were in the infant class. This would seem to show that the primary schools are regarded as convenient nurseries for young children rather than as educational institutions. As most of these girls leave after the first year, their schooling can have no effect on the spread of literacy among women.

The great majority of the primary schools are " aided " either by local bodies or by Government or by both. They have been thus described by the Inspectresses: " These schools receive Rs. 1-8 to Rs. 3 per month and with this grant the pandit cannot be a whole-time one, as in most cases he has to teach in a boys' school and devotes 2 to 3 hours a day only to teaching girls. Naturally all the consideration is reserved for the boys. The schools are held in huts or cow-sheds or in dilapidated houses. There is often no apparatus and no furniture and children sit on mats and write with chalk on the floor. Even when they come to school the children hardly learn anything. In many cases even after one year they have not learnt to read or write the alphabet. It is the common practice among the teachers of such schools to supply pupils with school books from their own meagre remuneration, very often only amounting to Rs. 3 or Rs. 4 a month. The improvement of primary schools in the interior is almost an impossibility unless and until more money from public funds and better qualified teachers are available." Such was the condition of the great majority of primary girls' schools before the Reforms and there has been little improvement since then, though it has been possible to add a rupee or two per month to the pay of the teachers. What little education there is, lies in the special schools maintained by missionaries or the few model municipal or Government schools. Staffed often with women teachers, such schools give children real primary education, giving them a mastery over the 3 R's and a wider outlook on life. These however are, comparatively speaking, few in number and merely serve to indicate what might be done were teachers and funds available. In general, however, we have a gloomy picture of girls' primary schools served by men teachers whose main work is looking after boys' schools. Children remain for one or perhaps two years and receive little if any benefit from their schooling. As a matter of fact, neither Government nor the general public have so far taken much interest in these primary schools, and although the numbers attending them are so enormous compared with those attending the middle and high schools for girls, the Government grant for the latter has always been considerably greater than for the primary schools.

45. **Secondary.**—It is the secondary stage of education that has gripped the imagination of that portion of the public that has become alive to the necessity for the education of their boys and is now beginning to see its utility even for girls. Yet even though there is now a considerable demand for literate girls as brides for young men of the *bhadralok* families, the numbers reading in secondary schools are still small, namely, 17,500. Although the number is small, it is 50 per cent. greater than 10 years ago, while the number of girls in high schools has more than doubled in that time. The fundamental fact, however, still governing girls' secondary education is that except in a small number of cases girls are removed from school while yet in the middle stage of instruction, somewhere between the ages of 11 and 13, either for marriage or for household duties. In 1926-27 there were only 1,226 girls reading either in the higher classes of secondary schools or in colleges. From these figures it is clear that only the fringe of the problem of women's education has been touched.

Apart from the difficulty caused by the early removal of girls from schools, there is another special difficulty which greatly handicaps girls' education, and that is the great objection that there is to girls walking along the public streets. So strong is this objection that most girls have to be brought to school in some sort of conveyance or other. How great a handicap this is to girls' education may be illustrated by the fact that a large well conducted school in north Calcutta spends about Rs. 7,000 a year on bus hire, Rs. 5,000 on salaries of teachers, and only Rs. 2 on the library!

One redeeming feature of this picture is that the educated women of Bengal are every year taking more and more interest in the problem of girls' education. For the last two years the Bengal Women's Educational Conference has been holding sessions morning and afternoon for three days, attended by three to four hundred teachers and other women interested in education. The proceedings of the conference were conducted behind the *purdah* so that the women might talk freely and state clearly what they think wrong with girls' education and what is needed to put it right. The committee of this Conference has already been able to convince Government on several points; firstly, that the new Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Bill should apply to girls as well as to boys and thus make it possible that the girls should share in any improvement in primary education that is made; secondly, on the necessity for the proper physical education of girls. A great difficulty in the education of girls in high schools as well as in colleges has been the problem of keeping them in good health under the strain of working at their books and for their examinations. Often it is found that the general health of girls declines during their years of study. To remedy this state of affairs it will be necessary to organise a fitting system of physical education, and already experiments are being made for that purpose. Other questions

of fresh air, leisure and diet will be taken in hand. Thirdly, the Conference has properly urged the necessity for a college for training women teachers. Little if any improvement has been made in the training of women teachers in Bengal in the last 10 years, and now that we seem to be on the threshold of a big advance in women's education it is essential that steps should be taken to organise this training on proper lines. Fourthly, the Conference urges the necessity for a change in the curriculum for girls in secondary schools, so that it should not be wholly subordinate to the matriculation examination. They have pointed out with considerable force that it is much more important to prepare these girls to be better mothers or better teachers than that they should strive to get the same sort of label as their brothers. More than ten years ago an Inspectress of Schools pointed out the folly of making all the secondary girls' schools work for the Calcutta matriculation examination, but public opinion was not to be deterred. The public generally know of only one goal for secondary education and that is the matriculation examination and they have not yet awakened to the idea that what has seemed to be suitable for the boys might not necessarily be suitable for girls. It is hoped that the Bengal women teachers will continue to hold their annual conference and be able to awaken the public to reasonable views of the requirements of women's education in Bengal.

Education of the depressed and backward classes.

46. The Government of Bengal have long been alive to the necessity of taking measures for the encouragement and diffusion of education among the depressed classes, in spite of the difficulty caused by their general indifference to the benefits of education. Endeavours have been made to attract the children of such classes to primary schools by admitting them as free pupils or by giving capitation grants to teachers in the schools which they attend. These methods have been fairly successful, for though the children may belong to the lowest classes of the Hindu social system or be outside the pale of caste altogether, there is no difficulty in their being admitted to primary schools. In localities where they are congregated in fairly large numbers, it has been the policy of Government to establish special schools. Government scholarships are also reserved for members of the backward classes, for which pupils of the depressed classes are eligible.

47. The following is a brief account of the special measures which were being taken till 1919 for the development of education among such children:—

(*a*) *Education on tea gardens.*—A scheme for the development of the education of the children of labourers in the tea gardens of the

Duars, who are chiefly members of hill or aboriginal tribes, was drawn up by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam and 30 schools were established. This number was added to from time to time.

In 1919-20 in the tea districts of Darjeeling-Jalpaiguri there were 110 tea garden primary schools with just under 2,000 pupils. Most of these schools received grants from Government which amounted to Rs. 7,502 a year.

(*b*) *Education of Sonthals.*—In West Bengal the majority of the aboriginal and hill tribes are Sonthals living in the districts of Bankura, Birbhum, Midnapur and Burdwan. The District Boards of Birbhum and Midnapur have for many years past subsidised primary schools for aboriginal children, while schools for Sonthal children are also maintained by missionary bodies with which Government co-operate. In 1915 Government sanctioned a scheme for the improvement and expansion of Sonthal education in the districts of Birbhum, Bankura and Midnapur. The scheme provided for the improvement of existing Sonthal schools by raising the pay of the teachers, the establishment of ten new schools and the appointment of two assistant sub-inspectors of schools for the inspection of Sonthal schools. Six special lower primary scholarships for Sonthals were also created; a training school in the district of Bankura was made a central school for the training of Sonthal teachers and a grant was given for the payment of the fees of Sonthal boys attending ordinary primary schools. The annual cost of the scheme was Rs. 10,257.

In 1918-19, Government approved a scheme for the improvement and expansion of education among the Sonthals in the district of Dinajpur and assigned a sum of Rs. 3,924 per annum for its introduction. The scheme proceeded on the same lines as the one already introduced in the Burdwan Division.

(*c*) *Education of fishermen.*—Three special schools were started in Dacca district for the elementary education of the children of fishermen. Instruction was given in these schools in boat-repairing and net-making, in addition to the three R's. Boys in these schools were taught free and the poorer boys were supplied with books and other necessary materials. These schools received grants at special rates from the Education Department and the district board. Besides these three schools, the fishermen of the district had four other ordinary primary schools for the education of their children.

(*d*) *Education of Namasudras.*—Of the backward classes the Namasudra community has shown the greatest appreciation of education. As they had difficulty in getting accommodation in general hostels, Government established special hostels for them at Dacca, Faridpur, Perojpur, Jhalakati and Calcutta. Efforts were also made to provide separate accommodation for them in aided and unaided hostels.

(*e*) *Education of children employed in factories.*—In 1915 Government approved a scheme for the provision of improved facilities for elementary education for children employed in the mills near Calcutta. It included—

(*a*) the establishment of four schools at different centres of the area between Bhatpara and Jagatdal;

(*b*) the establishment of five schools attached to five mills at Titagarh.

The initial and recurring costs to Government were estimated at Rs. 27,000 and Rs. 6,488 a year, respectively. On account of want of funds complete effect could not be given to the scheme. In 1916-17 a grant of Rs. 5,893 was made for the construction of a school building at Titagarh. In the following year a special lower primary school with two departments, namely, Hindi and Urdu, was started for the education of mill hands of the locality. The school was placed under the management of the local mill owners and Government contribution to it amounted to Rs. 60 per mensem.

(*f*) *Education in the colonisation areas in the Sundarbans in the districts of Bakarganj and the 24-Parganas.*—In 1917-18 improved facilities for primary education were provided in the colonisation areas in the districts of Bakarganj and the 24-Parganas at an initial and recurring expenditure of Rs. 2,500 and Rs. 2,004, respectively.

(*g*) *Education of Chakmas, Tiparas and Mughs in the Chittagong Division.*—A Government high school was established at Rangamati where free education with free board and lodging were given to the boys of Chakmas, Tiparas and Mughs. There was also a training class in connection with the school for the benefit of Chakmas and Tiparas.

(*h*) In the district of the 24-Parganas 2 primary schools for boys and 1 for girls, which had been originally started by the Secretary of the Depressed Classes Society were taken over for maintenance from the Sussex Trust Fund. A sum of Rs. 50,000 was set apart from the endowment on account of these schools.

(*i*) *Non-official agencies.*—The Bengal Social Service League and the Society for the Improvement of Backward Classes opened many primary schools in two parts of the Presidency. To encourage the educational activities of the latter association, Government sanctioned in 1918-19 an annual grant of Rs. 3,000 and a non-recurring grant of Rs. 5,000.

48. The special measures taken in this direction since the introduction of the Reforms are mentioned below:—

(*a*) Two new schools were started at Ichapur by the authorities of the Rifle and the Metal Factories for the education of the children of their employees. The former school was subsidised by Government, Government aid during 1925-26 to the institution being Rs. 2,700.

(*b*) In 1922-23, an extra recurring grant of Rs. 20,000 a year, was made available and it was distributed for expenditure on the following objects:—

(1) A recurring grant of Rs. 642 per annum for the Baptist Zenana Mission at Entally as contribution towards the cost of the education of Sonthali and aboriginal girls undergoing a course of instruction extending over four years in the mission in order to qualify themselves as teachers of Sonthal schools.

(2) The creation of several scholarships varying from Rs. 3 to Rs. 30 a month for the benefit of the depressed or backward classes.

(3) A grant of Rs. 15 per month towards the rent of a house hired for the Namasudra Students' Hostel at Faridpur and another grant of Rs. 11 a month towards the allowance of the Superintendent of that hostel.

(4) A capital grant of Rs. 12,329 and an additional recurring grant of Rs. 3,250 a year, to the Society for Backward Classes, in order to enable it to start new schools.

(5) A capital grant of Rs. 250 and a recurring grant of Rs. 1,656 per annum for the training class for Sonthal *gurus* opened at Bhimpur in the district of Midnapur by the local mission authorities.

(*c*) A scheme for education of aboriginal children living in the district of Rangpur was approved by Government for introduction from the 1st April 1926. The cost of scheme was estimated at Rs. 50 initial and Rs. 540 recurring per annum. In its features the scheme was similar to the Sonthal education scheme already in operation in the Rajshahi Division.

(*d*) In 1923-24 Government sanctioned a scheme for the education of Sonthals in the district of Malda at a cost of Rs. 3,400 capital and of Rs. 2,752 recurring from provincial revenues. A revised enlarged scheme for the same purpose was introduced with effect from April 1927 at a total cost of Rs. 2,504 recurring and of Rs. 7,350.

The following two schemes have also received the administrative approval of Government and now await the provision of funds:—

(*i*) An extension of the scheme already in operation for the education of Sonthals in Dinajpore at an extra cost of Rs. 1,080 recurring and Rs. 5,075 capital from provincial revenues.

(*ii*) Certain improvements in the scheme of Sonthal education in the Burdwan Division at a recurring cost of Rs. 17,861 (ultimate) and capital cost of Rs. 2,400.

(*c*) The Society for the Improvement of Backward Classes have been given an additional grant of Rs. 3,000 a year with effect from 1926-27 for the expansion of its educational activities in the province.

Technical Education.

49. Technical education is under the charge of the Minister for Agriculture and Industries. In 1921 the subjects of Commerce and Art were included under technical education, but were afterwards transferred to the Education Department. Excluding the cost of these two subjects, the expenditure on technical education increased from less than Rs. 3 lakhs in 1921-22 to Rs. 4½ lakhs in 1926-27, and has since been raised by another lakh.

The development of technical education has been mostly on the lines which had already been laid down before 1921, and has largely been guided by the recommendations of a committee which sat in 1919 with Sir Rajendra Nath Mukherji as Chairman. To this committee were due the opening of the Kanchrapara Technical School in 1922, providing higher theoretical training for apprentices on the Eastern Bengal Railway, and the opening in 1926 of the Calcutta Technical School which provides similar training for apprentices employed in the large industrial workshops in and around Calcutta.

Before the introduction of the Reforms there were three Government technical schools, besides a number of junior technical schools and classes maintained by local authorities. A fourth Government school was added in 1922. When the report of the Bengal Retrenchment Committee was considered by Government, it was decided that the four schools should be retained as model schools. It was further decided in 1925, when there was no Minister, that apart from these schools, technical education should be encouraged by a system of grants-in-aid. In the following year effect was given to this policy by a decision to increase the grants-in-aid to technical and industrial schools by providing additional sums of Rs. 30,000, Rs. 60,000 and Rs. 90,000 during the next three years.

There has been a steady expansion since 1921 in the number of weaving schools. Before that year there were six district and seven peripatetic weaving schools, all connected with the Government Weaving Institute at Serampore. There are now eight district and twenty-six peripatetic schools; it is intended to increase this number when funds are available, and also to open a power-weaving section at the Serampore Institute. Parties for demonstrating hand-loom weaving, dyeing and printing were sanctioned in 1922, and the present Minister proposes to employ five more parties of this kind. A school for silk weaving and dyeing was opened at Berhampore in 1927, effect thus

being given to a scheme of the first Minister, Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri.

The Bengal Tanning Institute, which was started in 1919 as a research tannery, has been developed. In 1922, during the first ministry, the retention of the institute was sanctioned for five years, and a new departure was made in the creation of a party to demonstrate modern methods of tanning. The institute was made permanent in 1926. During the present Ministry a proposal for establishing courses of instruction in boot and shoe making has been approved, and a scheme for a two-year course of theoretical training is under consideration.

Engineering continues to be taught at the Bengal Engineering College, Sibpur, the most important institution for technical training in Bengal, and also at the Ahsanulla School of Engineering at Dacca. Arrangements for giving instructions in mining in the Bengal coalfields were made in 1922 during the first ministry.

State scholarships for technical training abroad have been a charge on provincial revenues since 1921. They are given from time to time on principles similar to those formerly followed by the Government of India.

The progress of technical and industrial education under the Agriculture and Industries Department from 1921 to the end of 1926 is shown in the following statement:—

Year.	No. of institutions.	No. of scholars.	Total expenditure.
1921 ..	90*	4,693*	Rs. 6,62,316 (Government. Rs. 1,88,682; Non-Government. Rs. 4,73,634)
1926 ..	119	6,532	11,59,045 (4,92,518; 6,66,527)

* Excluding figures for Commercial and Arts institutions since retransferred to the Education Department.

The above statement refers to Government or Government-aided institutions. There also exists—and it dates from before the Reforms—the well-equipped Technical School at Jadabpur, 24-Parganas, which is maintained by the National Council of Education. It now has an income of some 3 lakhs and receives no aid from Government.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.

Growth of expenditure on Education in Bengal, 1921-22 to 1926-27, under the three main heads University (including Collegiate) Secondary and Primary, but omitting expenditure on Inspectorate and Special Schools such as Training Schools, Madrasahs and School of Art.

	University.		Secondary.		Primary.	
			Total Expenditure.			
	Rs.	Per cent.	Rs.	Per cent.	Rs.	Per cent.
1921-22 ..	68,16,600	or 30·3	1, 02,84,000	or 45·7	54,08,400	or 24·0
1926-27 ..	88,21,300	or 31·0	1, 28,34,600	or 45·2	67,61,100	or 23·8
Increase ..	20,04,700		27,50,600		13,52,700	
			Expenditure from Government Funds.			
1921-22 ..	30,89,300	or 42·4	19,92,560	or 27·4	22,05,200	or 30·2
1926-27 ..	38,72,500	or 44·7	24,71,600	or 28·5	23,25,600	or 26·8
Increase ..	7,83,200		4,79,040		1,20,400	

The effect of the shortage of Government funds is shown in the table below:—

	1921-22.	1922-23.	1923-24.	1924-25.	1925-26.	1926-27.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Primary ..	22,05,200	21,64,800	21,47,700	20,95,000	23,61,300	23,25,600
Secondary ..	19,92,560	20,66,700	20,42,000	19,89,800	24,59,100	24,71,600
University ..	30,89,300	33,86,700	34,97,400	34,23,300	36,08,000	38,72,500

CHAPTER III.

Local Self-Government in Bengal.

50. In describing the framework of local self-government in Bengal it is not necessary to go further back than the middle eighties of the last century when the two principal enactments under which the local affairs of the province are administered—the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 and the Local Self-Government Act of 1885—were passed into law. Under the one Act there are " towns " with a municipal government such as obtained in England and, under the other, rural areas with a much less advanced form of self-government.

51. **Municipalities.**—The conditions for the formation of a municipality are that at least three-fourths of the adult male population must be chiefly employed in pursuits other than agriculture, that the number of inhabitants is not less than 3,000 and that the density of population is not less than 1,000 to a square mile. In the districts adjoining Calcutta several municipalities have been formed to meet the needs of industrial or middle-class populations. There are a few industrial towns in other parts of the province, such as Asansol and Raniganj in the coal mining area, Narayanganj, the centre of the jute trade in Eastern Bengal, and the port of Chittagong. Most of the other municipalities are the market towns of country districts; the district or subdivisional courts and the bazars form the centre, and the rest of the town often consists of little more than groups of villages interspersed with fields. Conditions have not changed during the years of the reforms; the total number of municipalities in 1919 was 115 and it is now 116. There are more in Western Bengal than elsewhere, the number, excluding Calcutta and Howrah, being 74 with an average population of 15,000. In Eastern Bengal there are 26 municipalities with an average population of 19,000. The city of Dacca has 119,450 people; the next largest town has 36,030 and the smallest 1,858. In the plains districts of Northern Bengal there are no large towns and only 13 municipalities; the average population is 14,000; the population of the largest town is 25,518 and of the smallest 3,145.

52. **District and local boards.**—While it was decided that for town areas municipal bodies like the British Town Councils should be set up, the prime unit adopted for rural self-government was the civil district. Each district was to be administered by a " district board " on the analogy of the county councils at Home. The comparison is, however, fallacious. There are 26 district boards in Bengal and the average area under the charge of each is 2,700 square miles. In

England the average area under a county council is only 800 square miles, and in Scotland 900.

When we come to population and consider the comparative lack of transport facilities in Bengal, the contrast is still more striking. The average population classed as rural in an English shire is 128,000; and in Scotland just over 30,000; in Bengal the average population of a district is between 1½ and 1¾ millions or greater than that of New Zealand. The Midnapore district has an area of 5,186 square miles and Mymensingh of 6,300 square miles. The population of the latter district at the 1921 Census was 4,838,000—almost entirely rural. It is obvious that a body with so large an area and population under its charge cannot administer local affairs properly without the most thorough-going decentralisation of powers and activities. All except two small districts are divided into subdivisions, and the Act established local boards for these areas. There are 82 such boards with an average area of 813 square miles and an average population of 512,250. These local boards having more manageable areas under their charge than district boards might on that account be expected to be more efficient units of local self-government. The Act, however, imposed no statutory duties on them, but simply empowered them to deal with such matters as might be transferred to their control and administration by Government or the district board. So far as Government are concerned, this provision seems to have been a dead letter except in the Asansol subdivision—a coal mining area—where conditions are peculiar. District boards have devolved a certain number of duties on local boards, but have in general given them little independence and less money.

53. **Union committees.**—The Act further provided for the establishment of units of local administration dealing with still smaller areas called union committees, each to administer the affairs of a village or a group of villages. Union committees are empowered by the Act to take certain elementary sanitary measures, to construct and repair village roads and bridges, to maintain primary schools and dispensaries, to keep an establishment for cleansing the villages and to provide a water-supply. For financing their activities it left them dependent on the charity of the district board and on such taxation as they might choose to levy of their own accord. Little advantage was taken of the provisions of the Act relating to union committees, and by the year 1919 only 5 per cent. of the population of Bengal lived in the jurisdiction of union committees. By 1925-26 almost half of these union committees had been replaced by the new union boards.

54. **Chaukidari unions.**—Another unit of rural self-government of a limited kind had been created by the Chaukidari Act of 1870 in order to provide for watch and ward in the villages. Practically the whole

of rural Bengal was divided up into local areas, described in the Act as villages but more commonly referred to as unions. According to the principles of the Chaukidari Manual the unions are compact units, neither so small that they can be controlled by village cliques, nor so large that the panchayat or committee of assessment is out of touch with the villagers. Ten or twelve square miles and a population from 6,000 to 8,000 are laid down as suitable standards for the area of a union. Within this area the Magistrate appoints not less than 3 nor more than 5 residents to be the panchayat. The statutory duty of the panchayat is to assess and collect chaukidari tax, which is a rate assessed on householders according to their means, and to pay the chaukidars or village police. One member of the panchayat is appointed as the collecting member and, in practice, little work is done except by him. It is he who prepares the assessment list for the approval of the panchayat, and collects the tax and pays the chaukidars. It is from him in the first instance that, in case of default, the pay of the chaukidars is realised. With the object of encouraging a feeling of responsibility and self-respect in the panchayats, the system has been modified in some districts by appointing a president, and giving him and the panchayat wider powers; but the main features of the system remain the same. The panchayats are responsible to the Magistrate who appoints them; the members are personally responsible for the collection of the tax and the payment of the chaukidars; and the appeal of the assessees is to the Magistrate. It is only in the chaukidari panchayat that the principle of the personal financial responsibility of the members of a local body is found. It does not exist in any of the local self-governing bodies.

55. The chaukidari panchayat system is still in force in about two-thirds of the province. It is gradually being displaced by the newer system of union boards. As the chaukidari system is under the control of the Magistrate and the Police Department, and the union boards are under the district boards and the Local Self-Government Department, the change involves a partial transfer of control from the reserved to the transferred side of Government.

56. **Union boards.**—The creation of the union boards was the outcome of the advice of the District Administration Committee of 1913 that the duties hitherto discharged by the chaukidari panchayat together with those assigned under the Local Self-Government Act to union committees should in future be entrusted in each group of villages to a single authority—the union board. The whole of Bengal was to be mapped out into unions, each under a union board, which in turn were to be grouped into circles, each consisting of 30 or so unions under the charge of a Circle Officer. The union boards were to pay and to some extent to control the village police, and at the same time were to be entrusted with the spending of such amounts as they might

obtain by local taxation or in the form of grants from the district board on supplying the elementary wants of the village people in respect of communications, sanitation, primary education, and medical treatment. It was also proposed that benches and courts might be formed of selected members of boards to decide petty criminal cases and civil suits. In all these matters the boards were to act under the supervision and with the advice of the Circle Officer as representing the District Magistrate. The Circle Officer was to be and has actually proved to be an important, perhaps an essential, feature of the whole system. He is a member of the Bengal Junior Civil Service. Spending most of his time on tour he acts as the guide, philosopher and friend of the union boards, most of which are composed of ordinary agriculturists with little education or knowledge of how to conduct public affairs.

These recommendations were embodied in the Village Self-Government Act of 1919. Union boards have under this Act been established in one district after another till by this time 2,874 of them are actually working or are ready to start working out of a possible total of 6,478. The work of establishing them was hampered in the beginning by the non-co-operation movement, and the Swarajist Party have extended their policy of obstruction to these boards. Progress too would have been quicker had a sufficient number of Circle Officers been available at the start, but a large number of additional officers has had to be recruited, and new boards could only be started as the services of these officers became available. It has been decided that the normal area of a union should not be less than 10 square miles unless the density of population materially exceeds 1,000 per square mile, and that it should not be greater than 16 square miles unless large tracts of uninhabited country have to be included.

Municipalities.

57. **Calcutta Corporation.**—Whilst all other municipalities in Bengal are governed by the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884, this Act does not apply to Calcutta, a city with a population of about a million, and is modified in the case of Howrah, a town of 200,000 people, by the application of certain provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act. The Bengal Municipal Act has remained unchanged since 1884, but the municipal constitution of Calcutta was entirely changed in 1923 by an Act based on a bill drafted in 1918 which the Minister Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea described as the most important measure of municipal legislation during his Ministry—a measure which he conceived as " placing the new law in conformity with the spirit of the Reforms," and creating " a veritable *Swaraj* in the government of the second city of the Empire." " Be it remembered," he wrote in his

book *A Nation in Making*, " that the revenues of municipal Calcutta are nearly one-fifth of the revenues of Bengal, and will under the new law be controlled by the representatives of the people. The Corporation, with four-fifths of the members elected by the rate-payers, will have supreme authority. Their Chief Executive Officer will be elected by them, subject to confirmation by Government. The Mayor, who will be the Speaker of the House, will also owe his office to popular election. The constitution of the Corporation has been democratised by the broadening of the franchise, the abolition of plural voting and the admission of women into the electorate."

58. **Former constitution of Calcutta Corporation.**—Under the old law Calcutta was governed by three separate authorities—the Corporation itself, the General Committee, and the Chairman—each with independent and separate powers. The Corporation was constituted as follows:—

(1) Elected Ward Commissioners ...	25
(2) Commissioners appointed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce ...	4
(3) Commissioners appointed by the Calcutta Trades Association ...	4
(4) Commissioners appointed by the Port Commissioners ...	2
(5) Commissioners appointed by Government ...	15
Total ...	50

The General Committee consisted of 12 members—4 elected by the Ward Commissioners, 4 by the other Commissioners, and 4 appointed by Government. Until Mr. S. N. Mallik was appointed as Chairman in 1922, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman were members of the Indian Civil Service appointed by Government.

59. **Former franchise for Calcutta Corporation.**—The franchise under the old law was limited to male adult residents who—

(*a*) owned and occupied land or buildings in Calcutta valued for assessment purposes at not less than Rs. 150 a year;

(*b*) owned land or buildings in Calcutta valued for assessment purposes at not less than Rs. 300;

(*c*) occupied land or buildings in Calcutta valued for assessment purposes at not less than Rs. 300;

(*d*) had taken out a license for the practice of certain trades and callings (minimum payment Rs. 25 a year); or

(*e*) had paid on their sole account not less than Rs. 24 by way of municipal taxes.

60. **Present franchise.**—Under the Act of 1923 the franchise was extended to adult residents of either sex who have—

(*a*) paid not less than Rs. 12 by way of municipal rates;

(*b*) have paid rent for not less than six months at a rate of not less than Rs. 25 a month; or

(*c*) own huts in a *bustee* on account of which huts not less than Rs. 12 by way of municipal rates has been paid.

61. **Constitution of new Calcutta Corporation.**—The new Corporation is constituted as follows:—

(1)	Councillors elected by general non-Muhammadan constituencies	... 48
(2)	Councillors elected by Muhammadan constituencies	... 15
(3)	Councillors elected by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce	... 6
(4)	Councillors elected by the Calcutta Trades Association	... 4
(5)	Councillors elected by the Port Commissioners	... 2
(6)	Councillors appointed by Government	... 10
(7)	Aldermen elected by the Councillors	... 5

The Mayor and Deputy Mayor are elected yearly. The Mayor's duty is to preside over meetings of the Corporation. The intention of the Act is that the ordinary administration should be carried on by the Chief Executive Officer who is described as " the principal executive officer " of the Corporation with authority over all other officers and servants and with the right to be present at meetings and to take part in the discussions, but not to vote. Certain duties, for example in regard to elections and assessments, are assigned to the Chief Executive Officer by the Act, while the Corporation is authorised to delegate any of its powers to him. The Chief Executive Officer, in fact, was to take the place of the Chairman under the old constitution.

62. **The Corporation under Swarajist control.**—When the first elections took place under the new Act the Corporation was captured by the Swaraj party which ran the elections on party lines and secured the return of a large number of candidates. The late Mr. C. R. Das, the leader of the Swaraj party, was elected Mayor while his chief lieutenant, Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, was elected Chief Executive Officer. Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea commented on these proceedings at pages 363-365 of his book *A Nation in Making*. He described the election of Mr. C. R. Das as the crowning blunder of the new régime in view of that gentleman's total lack of experience of municipal administration. He pointed out that Mr. Das defeated the objects of the Act by becoming not only the Speaker of the House, but also to all

intents and purposes, the real head of the executive. He further commented on the election as aldermen of young men who might have easily contested seats, for no other reason apparently than that they were Swarajists. The intention of the Act in providing for the election of aldermen was that seats should be provided for a few elderly men who would not care to face the risk of an election, but whose advice would be useful and whose presence would add to the dignity of the Corporation. The Swarajist majority, however, merely used this provision in order to add to their numbers. By his great influence and outstanding personality Mr. Das succeeded in creating from among the Swaraj councillors a compact, well-drilled caucus which administered municipal affairs from a political instead of a civic point of view. The policy to be adopted in regard to any important question that was to come before the Corporation was settled beforehand in a party meeting. After Mr. Das' death, the executive appeared to be dominated by the new Mayor, Mr. J. M. Sen Gupta, who was also the leader of the Swaraj party, and by the members of his party in the Corporation. There were continuous encroachments on the power of the Chief Executive Officer, which reduced the initiative and authority of that officer to a mere shadow.

A change has been taking place since the second election under the new Act in 1927. The bond which attached a number of Muhammadan councillors to the Swaraj party was dissolved, and the Swarajists found themselves in an actual minority in the new Corporation. The choice of aldermen was made more in accordance with the spirit of the Act, two at least of those who were elected being elderly men with long experience of municipal affairs. The Swaraj party, however, remained the only organised party in the Corporation, and as the only bond of union between the remaining councillors was opposition to the caucus it was not found easy to secure united action. Mr. Sen Gupta was re-elected Mayor, and the standing committees were packed with Swarajists. The opposition, however, have recently shown more power of combination; and after a preliminary success in the matter of an appointment, have succeeded in defeating the Swarajist candidate for the Mayoralty, and have ousted the Swarajists from the standing committees.

63. **Working of the Corporation.**—About the working of the Corporation under the new system opinions naturally differ. Its critics allege that there is a lack of financial sagacity and a tendency to disregard the advice and warning of the Corporation's financial advisers. In the conduct of business there is great delay, and time is wasted in long discussions. The fear of unpopularity causes a reluctance to take coercive measures against defaulters and other offenders. The relaxation of discipline among the staff both in the offices and outside is attributed to the lack of supervision and the undermining of

the Chief Executive Officer's authority by the interference of individual councillors. Corruption has been freely asserted to be prevalent in some departments.

Whatever foundation there may be for these criticisms, there is much to be said on the other side. The difficult period of transition from a wide official control to the complete control of elected representatives has passed without disaster, and there is no apparent demand for a return to the former constitution. Mr. Das and Mr. Sen Gupta both presided over meetings with fairness and dignity. Councillors in general show no lack of interest in civic affairs and give up much time to attendance at Corporation and committee meetings. There is great keenness on medical and public health work, and the zeal for free primary education is shown by the large number of new schools which have been started during the last few years.

64. **Control.**—The control of Government over the Corporation was largely relaxed by the Act of 1923, but there are still, at least in law, some powers of control in matters of appointments, contracts, loans, and audit, in the making of bye-laws and other matters. Thus the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer, the Deputy Executive Officer, the Chief Engineer and the Health Officer is in each case subject to the approval of Government. In the case of works and contracts Government sanction is required in cases involving an expenditure of more than Rs. 2½ lakhs. Without the sanction of the local Government no loan can be raised by the Corporation and loans exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs require the sanction of the Government of India. All bye-laws and rules framed by the Corporation require the previous approval of Government. The local Government may require the Corporation to furnish them with any return or statement regarding any matter under its control or with a copy of any document in its charge and may depute any officer to make inspection of any department, service, work or thing under the control of the Corporation. If the local Government are of opinion that any of the duties imposed on the Corporation has not been performed or has been performed in an imperfect manner they may take action for the due performance of such duties. Government have also power to annul any proceeding of the Corporation which is not in conformity with the law and do all things necessary to secure such conformity. The accounts of the Corporation are audited by officers appointed by Government. The Corporation is obliged to report to Government the action taken or proposed by it in respect of any defects or irregularities that may be pointed out by the auditors. Government's orders on such report are to be final. But no power of surcharge is conferred by the Act.

In practice, however, the control exercised by Government since the Act of 1923 came into force has been slight. There has been correspondence about the rate of growth of the sinking fund of the

Corporation, but so far no loan has been refused. The form of bye-laws and rules has been settled by discussion. The powers of inspection have not been used, and generally speaking Government have been reluctant to interfere with a powerful Corporation which has a strong sense of its own dignity.

65. **Audit.**—The position with regard to audit is unsatisfactory. The Corporation accounts for the year ending 31st March 1925, the first year under the new régime, were examined and test audited by the Accountant-General, Bengal, and the Examiner, Outside Audit, Calcutta. The Corporation accounts are supposed to be ready by the 15th July of the year after the financial year to which they relate; but they were not ready for audit till December 1925. The Accountant-General commented on the gradually increasing delay in getting these accounts ready. A copy of the audit report was furnished to Government on the 25th August 1926 and a further report dealing with the accounts of the year 1925-26 has since been received. The Corporation has not yet replied even to the former report in spite of reminders. The latest letter from the Chief Executive Officer states that the report is still under consideration. The delay in preparing accounts and in dealing with audit reports is not a new feature peculiar to the Corporation as now constituted; but it is evident that the cumbrous machinery of the Corporation and the dilatoriness of its procedure tend to make Government control in the matter of audit somewhat illusory.

Other Municipalities.

66. **Constitution.**—The Bengal Municipal Act divided municipalities into two main classes—

(1) those in which two-thirds of the number of Commissioners were to be elected and the remaining one-third appointed; and

(2) those in which the whole number was to be appointed.

Since the Act was passed the privilege of electing two-thirds of the Commissioners has been extended to one municipality after another until now there are only three municipalities in the plains from which this privilege is still withheld. Under the Act the Vice-Chairman is elected by the Commissioners, while except in the case of certain specified municipalities the Commissioners are given the option of either electing a Chairman from among their own number or of requesting Government to appoint a Chairman. In the specified municipalities, the Chairman is appointed by Government. For many years a large proportion of municipal chairmen were officials; not only were there official chairmen appointed by Government, but in some instances

the municipal commissioners themselves elected Government servants as their chairmen. The position at the end of 1915 was as follows:—

Chairmen of Municipalities.

Elected non-officials	...	... 75
Elected officials	...	... 8
Nominated non-officials	...	... 10
Nominated officials	...	... 19

After consulting the municipalities concerned, it was decided in 1916 to extend the privilege of electing their chairmen to 11 municipalities which had not hitherto enjoyed it. There are now only three municipalities in the plains which have chairmen appointed by Government, and only one of these is an official.

Unlike Calcutta, in which a certain number of seats are reserved for Muhammadan representatives to be chosen during the first nine years by Muhammadan electorates, there are no separate Muhammadan constituencies in Bengal. The representation of minorities is secured by the exercise of Government's power to appoint one-third of the members. In most towns in Bengal the Hindus are in the majority, and Government's power to appoint is generally used to give representation to Muhammadans; but it is also used in a few cases to give representation to other minorities and to industrial interests in towns such as Budge Budge and Narayanganj. So far, almost no attempt has been made to provide seats by nomination for representatives of the labouring classes in manufacturing towns, chiefly because genuine representatives are difficult to find.

67. **Franchise.**—The municipal franchise outside Calcutta is exercised by adult male rate-payers, and is based on the possession of certain qualifications. The most general of these is the payment, during the year immediately preceding the election, of any rate or tax of not less than Re. 1-8. Other qualifications are the payment of or assessment to income tax, the payment of rent of not less than Rs. 20, and various educational qualifications. The proportion of voters to the general population in municipalities outside Calcutta is 8·1 per cent.

For the purpose of election the municipalities are divided into wards; the number of members to be elected by each ward varies from one to four. Voting in municipal elections is by ballot.

68. **Functions.**—All municipalities are authorised to maintain and construct roads and bridges, primary schools and dispensaries, to carry out measures of elementary sanitation including the provision of water-supply from wells and tanks, to cleanse streets and public conveniences, and to require the removal of nuisances on private premises. Other duties that may be undertaken by municipalities with Government's

consent are lighting with gas or electric light, the provision of water-supply, and the cleansing of private privies and cesspools, for all of which services special rates may be levied. There are also certain other regulations, for example in regard to buildings, which may be enforced by municipalities specially empowered in this behalf. It is noteworthy that no responsibility in respect of police has been laid on municipalities. Townsfolk in Bengal, unlike the villagers, have nothing to pay for watch and ward, the whole cost of this service being met by Government both in Calcutta and in other towns.

69. **Finance.**—The mainstay of municipal finance is one or other of the following taxes; both cannot be in force in the same area:—

(*a*) A tax on persons occupying holdings according to their property and circumstances in the municipality.

(*b*) A rate on the annual value of holdings.

The tax on persons, if equitably assessed, may be regarded as an ideal form of taxation, as individuals are taxed according to their means. It is, however, difficult in practice to assess fairly and it lends itself easily to evasion and to partiality. For this reason the tax on the annual value of holdings is regarded as a preferable form of impost, and the tendency has been for municipalities, which began by adopting the tax on persons, to substitute the tax on holdings; there are, however, towns in Eastern and Northern Bengal, where the value of holdings is low, in which the substitution of the tax on holdings for the tax on persons would involve a loss of revenue. The Bengal Municipal Bill proposed to abolish the tax on persons and make the tax on holdings universal. The tax on persons may not exceed Rs. 84, and the rate on the value of holdings is subject to a maximum of 7½ per cent. In addition, municipalities may be authorised to levy the following taxes:—

(1) Fees for cleansing private privies and cesspools, usually called the "latrine tax." These fees are fixed on a scale with reference to the annual value of holdings. No maximum rate of incidence has been prescribed in the Bengal Municipal Act, but the fees cannot exceed Rs. 480 in respect of any one holding.

(2) A water rate subject to a maximum of 7½ per cent. on the annual value of holdings.

(3) A lighting rate for lighting with gas or electricity, the maximum being 3 per cent. on the annual value of holdings.

Municipalities have certain minor sources of income, but the only one which need be mentioned is the cart tax, which is an important source of income in some rural municipalities. This tax is a fee levied on owners for the registration of carts, which are kept or used

in the ordinary course of business within a municipality. Much of the revenue from these fees is derived from carts which are actually kept outside the municipality in rural areas where for want of statutory authority no similar tax is imposed by the district board.

70. **Income and expenditure.**—In 1926-27, the average income of municipalities in Bengal, excluding the metropolitan municipalities of Calcutta and Howrah and leaving out of the calculation opening balances, loans and extraordinary receipts was Rs. 51,000 or about £3,825. The income of individual municipalities varied from Rs. 6,76,000 in Dacca to Rs. 4,148 in Maheshpur and Rs. 2,584 in Debhatta.

In the small municipalities a comparatively large proportion of their incomes was spent on the upkeep of dispensaries, the main function of which is to supply medicine free to outdoor patients. Thus Maheshpur spent Rs. 1,203 on its dispensary out of its income of Rs. 4,148. But on the average, the municipalities spent their income on different purposes according to the following percentages:—

	Per cent.
Conservancy ...	... 28
Water-supply ...	... 11½
Communications ...	... 11
Office and tax collecting establishment	... 9¼
Lighting ...	... 7¼
Drainage ...	... 6
Education ...	... 5
Hospitals and dispensaries ...	... 4
Other expenditure ...	... 18

71. **Borrowing.**—Under the Local Authorities Loans Act, local bodies may borrow money from Government or, with Government sanction, from private sources. In practice, private loans are very seldom sanctioned, and local authorities in any case prefer to borrow from Government as they get better terms than they would in the open market. Municipalities borrow freely from Government for the execution of capital works—chiefly water-supply schemes—and Government readily lend money for approved projects if funds are available and if the local authority can show that it is in a position to meet interest and sinking fund charges. At the end of 1925-26, 43 municipalities were in debt to Government, the total amount outstanding being nearly Rs. 35 lakhs. Of this total, Howrah is responsible for 14 lakhs, Darjeeling for 6, Dacca for 2¾, and Krishnagar for 2.

72. **Bengal Municipal Bill.**—The Bengal Municipal Act dates from 1884 and no longer meets the needs of the larger municipalities. Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea adopted with some modifications a bill which

had been prepared before 1921. The main features of the bill were an increase in the proportion of elected commissioners, provision for the representation of minorities, and a change in the franchise. To Government's existing powers of control were to be added the power to take over the management of water works and sewerage installations, and as an alternative to supersession, authority was to be given to Government to dissolve a municipal board and order a fresh election. The taxing powers of municipalities were to be enlarged, and the tax on persons abolished. A new appellate committee was to be created for hearing appeals against assessments. The powers of municipalities in matters of public health were to be enlarged and a statutory obligation imposed on them to provide a suitable system of water-supply, drainage and lighting.

Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea introduced the bill in 1923, but before it had made any progress the Council was dissolved. The Member in charge of Local Self-Government sought to introduce it again in December 1925, but the motion for introduction was rejected by 60 to 29 votes.

73. **Working of municipalities.**—The non-official chairman of a municipality had been a familiar figure in Bengal for many years before the Reforms, and the framework of municipal government in Bengal has remained unaltered since 1920 except that the elective system has been introduced into one or two industrial towns where the municipal commissioners used to be wholly nominated. It is hardly possible therefore to trace any particular development and to ascribe it to the influence of the Reforms. Like district boards, municipalities are hampered by lack of funds, but not to the same extent, nor can it be said that their comparative poverty is due altogether to causes beyond their control. Municipal commissioners have generally shown a disinclination to increase the burden on the rate-payers. Nevertheless, that there is a growing readiness to impose and to submit to municipal taxation is shown by the fact that the yield of municipal rates, which was about Rs. 48 lakhs in 1920-21, had risen in the same number of municipalities to about Rs. 64 lakhs in 1926-27. In the larger towns at least there is a general willingness to carry out drainage schemes or schemes for water-supply and to find the recurring cost of the latter by means of a special rate. Like district boards, municipalities may on the whole be said to show good sense and public spirit in the allocation of their revenues to different heads of expenditure. Expenditure on establishment is usually kept to a low figure and the bulk of the municipal income is devoted to services for the benefit of the rate-payers. Municipal commissioners too are usually well guided in the choice of their executive. A chairman may sometimes lack energy, but he is almost invariably honest and trustworthy. The chief faults of municipal administration are neglect of accounts

rules, slackness in the realisation of demands and indifference to audit reports, whilst outdoor work suffers from lack of supervision.

Embezzlements are fairly frequent, and municipal commissioners tend to show excessive leniency towards those who misappropriate their funds.

74. **Control of municipalities.**—The comparative inefficiency of municipalities in Bengal must be partly attributed to the lack of sufficient control by outside authorities. When the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884 was passed, a large number of the municipalities, and those the more important, had official chairmen, usually the District Magistrates and Subdivisional Magistrates; outside control was exercised by the ordinary official method of inspection, and was effective because the chairmen were officials. It was also more effective than now in other municipalities because the influence of the Commissioner and the Magistrate was still powerful and their advice was not lightly disregarded. With the passing of the official chairmen and the waning of the influence of inspecting officers, the control by inspection has ceased to be effective and no other form of control has taken its place. Under the Act of 1884 copies of proceedings are sent to the Magistrate and both he and the Commissioner have the right to inspect all the work of the municipalities, but there is little power to compel the municipalities to accept their advice. They may suspend the execution of an order of a municipality which is likely to cause a breach of the peace or injury or annoyance to the public or a section of the public. In case of a serious default the Government may order performance of the duty in which default is made, and has the further power of superseding the municipal commissioners, if they persistently make default in the performance of their duties. This last power was exercised in two cases in 1918, but generally speaking these powers of control are rarely used and are not effective as instruments for maintaining a fair standard of municipal administration.

The control by audit is also weak. The accounts of municipalities are audited by Government agency, but it is far from easy to compel the municipal authorities to pay attention to the auditors' criticisms. There is no system, such as there is in England, by which the responsibility for the collection of municipal taxes can be laid on any person or body of persons, nor is there any statutory provision for punishing the neglect of this duty. There is also no provision by which the auditor can fix and enforce responsibility for irregularities by a system of surcharges and disallowances.

District, Local and Union Boards.

75. **Constitution.**—In almost all the districts two-thirds of the members of the district boards are elected by the members of local

boards, the remaining one-third being appointed by the Commissioner subject to the Minister's approval. The proportion of elected members was raised from one-half to two-thirds in 1920. Under the Local Self-Government Act the chairman is to be appointed by Government or elected by the members, according as Government may decide. The former practice was to appoint the District Magistrate as chairman. In 1917 five district boards were for the first time allowed the privilege of electing their own chairmen, and non-official chairmen are now elected in all districts in the plains. The vice-chairmen are also elected.

The areas of district boards and local boards are the same as those of the administrative districts and subdivisions. Of the members of the local boards, not less than two-thirds are elected, and represent the thanas or police-station areas within the subdivision. The remaining members are appointed by the Commissioner on the nomination of the District Magistrate and with the approval of Government, and are ordinarily selected to represent minority communities. Formerly the Subdivisional Officer was one of the appointed members, and was usually elected as chairman; but in order to encourage the election of non-official chairmen, Subdivisional Officers have not been appointed since 1921 and both the chairmen and vice-chairmen are now elected from among the non-official members.

76. **Franchise.**—The general qualification for electors is the payment of road cess of not less than one rupee. Other qualifications are the payment of license tax and the possession of an annual income of Rs. 240; members of union committees and persons with certain educational qualifications are also electors. In areas in which union boards have been established persons possessing the union board franchise are also qualified to be electors for local boards. This has the effect of widening the franchise as the union board franchise depends on the payment of not less than one rupee for road and public works cess taken together, and not road cess only, and the payment of not less than one rupee as union rate or chaukidari tax is also a qualification. The local board electors are about 4 per cent. of the population.

Union boards consist of 6 to 9 members, Government retaining the right to fill one-third of the seats by nomination, while the rest of the members are elected. In practice Government have hitherto always exercised the right of appointing one-third of the members. The appointments are made by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Chairman of the district board. The president is elected by the members.

77. **Finance.**—The main sources of district board finance are the road and the public works cesses. Each of these is levied at the rate of half an anna on the annual value, that is, on the rental of land. The proprietor pays half from his own pocket, collects the other half

from the holder of subordinate interests and with certain deductions pays the total to the Collector of the district. District boards have to decide each year at what rate the cess will be levied; but in practice they never decide on less than the maximum. The work of revaluation is so great and costly that the cess demand is revised only after long intervals of years, and during the intervening periods the income of the district board is practically stationary. The yearly incidence of cess is at present only about annas three per head of population. Other sources of income locally derived are of minor importance. Government contributes a sum the total of which is equal to one quarter of the entire yield of the road cess throughout the province. This is distributed among district boards with practically no conditions attached. There are other Government grants for special purposes such as primary education, which bring the total average income of district boards up to annas 4-8 per head.

The average income of district boards excluding opening balances, loans and other extraordinary receipts, but including Government grants was Rs. 4,83,241. The largest income was that of Mymensingh Rs. 11½ lakhs, of which more than Rs. 2½ lakhs was derived from Government grants. It is to be remembered that this district has a population equal to that of Scotland. The smallest incomes leaving out Darjeeling were those of Malda district board, Rs. 2,17,000, and of Bankura, Rs. 1,93,000. The main heads of expenditure in Mymensingh (whose allocation of income to various heads may be taken as typical) were—

	Rs.
Office establishment	47,000
Education	2,67,000
Medical and Sanitation (mainly supply of medicines to outdoor patients).	1,78,000
Communications	3,52,000
Water-supply	92,000

Local boards have no independent sources of income, and can only spend what the district board can spare for them.

78. **Union boards.**—Union boards impose a tax on property and circumstances within the union. The greater part of the income so derived has, under statutory obligations, to be spent on establishment, the main charge being that for the pay of the village police. The balance which amounted in 1925-26 to an average of five pies per head is available for expenditure on other objects of the Village Self-Government Act. No individual can be required to pay more than Rs. 84 a year. Otherwise there are no restrictions on the amount which a union board can raise.

The 2,217 union boards which were working in 1925-26 had a total income, leaving out opening balances but including grants-in-aid, of Rs. 39 lakhs. Out of this total just over Rs. 25 lakhs was spent on establishment, most of it going towards the pay of the village police. A little over Rs. 3 lakhs was spent on roads, Rs. 2½ lakhs on water-supply, just under Rs. 2 lakhs on primary education and Rs. 67,000 on dispensaries, while Rs. 2½ lakhs was classed as "miscellaneous" expenditure.

79. **Borrowing.**—District boards, like municipalities may borrow under the Local Authorities Loans Act, and also prefer to borrow from Government. In 1925-26 nine district boards were indebted to Government, and Rs. 92,701 was spent on the repayment of loans.

80. **Working of district boards.**—The most important functions of district boards are the maintenance of roads and other communications, the maintenance of primary schools and dispensaries and the care of public health. They are also responsible for the upkeep of cattle pounds, maintain a small veterinary staff, and spend some money on agricultural shows. In times of distress they are empowered to incur expenditure on relief.

In the days before the Reforms, when the District Officer was the chairman of the district board and the Subdivisional Officer the chairman of the local board, greater importance was attached to the maintenance of roads and communications. Since the transfer to non-official control, the tendency has been to attach less importance to roads and more to medical relief and the establishment of new dispensaries, to public health and water-supply. Comparing the average expenditure of the three years 1917-18 to 1919-20 with that of the three years 1924-25 to 1926-27, the expenditure on roads and communications has fallen by over Rs. 3 lakhs; the expenditure under the head "Medical" has risen from under Rs. 7½ lakhs to over Rs. 11 lakhs; and the expenditure on Public Health from under Rs. 2 lakhs to nearly Rs. 3½ lakhs. On water-supply the district boards have spent whatever amounts could be spared from year to year from current income. There has always been an anxiety to meet the demand for water-supply, but this has been tempered by the knowledge that the cost makes it impossible for a district board to deal adequately with this big problem without a large increase in funds. The difficulty in district board work, whether under the official or the non-official chairmen, has been that the money available has fallen far short of the amount required to carry out the duties imposed upon the boards. These boards were originally committees formed for the maintenance of roads, and were financed from the road cess. The boards were the only convenient agency on which the new duties demanded by modern ideas, such as the care of public health, could be imposed, and there has been a tendency to

increase the burdens of district boards without a corresponding increase in their funds. In England there are a number of special authorities to which important functions such as the maintenance of highways, education, sanitation and poor relief are entrusted. In Bengal a multiplicity of such functions is devolved on the district boards, and with their limited resources it is not surprising that they have not been able to achieve great results.

The change from the official to the non-official chairman has had both advantages and disadvantages. There can be no doubt that the change stimulated the interest taken by the ordinary members in the work of the boards and, as the annual resolutions of the Ministry of Local Self-Government will show, the non-official chairmen have, on the whole, carried out their duties well. The main disadvantages are that it is difficult for non-official chairmen to tour throughout the district in the thorough way in which, on account of their other work, the official chairmen used to tour. There is also less effective supervision of the office work. The official chairman was amenable to instructions of superior authority, and made it his business to see that audit objections were duly met. The control thus exercised through the official chairmen has almost disappeared, and nothing has taken its place. In England Government control over local bodies is real and can be effectively exercised. In Bengal there are several authorities who can criticise and advise; the Magistrate, the Commissioner of the Division, the Superintending Engineer have rights of inspection; the Accountant-General causes audits to be made; and Educational, Agricultural, Medical and Sanitary authorities can advise; but no authority has effective power to enforce action.

81. **Working of local boards and union boards.**—It has already been stated that local boards perform the functions allotted to them by the district boards and are dependent on them for their funds. In practice local boards are usually given funds for the maintenance of the less important roads in the subdivision and for the construction and maintenance of wells and tanks; they are allowed to exercise their own discretion in the spending of the money given to them for these purposes, but the amounts given them are small. In some cases they also carry out routine functions in regard to education. The staff of a local board usually consists of one or two clerks and an overseer to look after the outdoor work.

It is at first sight surprising that more use has not been made of local boards; for not only are the areas with which they deal more manageable than the areas under district boards, but the elected members of the district boards are elected by the members of the local boards, usually from among their own number. It is the financial difficulties of the district boards which make them unwilling to assign more adequate grants to local boards, together with the

feeling that with the limited funds available the work of the district can be done more economically by the district staff under a competent engineer.

The position of the local boards has also been affected by the Village Self-Government Act of 1919, which created union boards. Although the Act assigns certain duties to local boards, its tendency in working has been to take away from local boards some of the work they were doing. An extreme example of this is a district in which the district board made over the control of all roads other than those under its own control and all other minor works to the new union boards, and the principal duty left to the local boards was to grant leave to the lowest grade of primary school inspectors.

The growing preference for the union board as the agency for carrying out minor local works is due to the belief that in the small area of the union board such work is likely to be better done under the personal control of members of the union board than by the local board contractor. The comparative success of the union boards is a justification of the theory which underlies the Village Self-Government Act, that it is the village or the small group of villages which is the right basis for local self-government. In these small areas the members of the board are known to the people generally, the work they do is seen and understood and the objects on which public money is spent can be appreciated. An interesting feature of the union board is that in it dyarchy ceases, and the board manages matters pertaining both to " reserved " and " transferred " subjects. Not only does it look after roads and wells, dispensaries and schools, but it also collects the tax for the village police, and may provide courts for petty criminal and civil cases.

The Village Self-Government Act was the work of the pre-Reform Government, and was based on the advice given by the District Administration Committee. Since the Reforms the policy of the Minister has been to encourage the formation of union boards. Only a few boards had come into existence when the first Minister was appointed; there are now 2,874. Whilst the local boards only perform functions assigned to them by the district board, the union boards derive theirs from the Act itself. Not only is it their duty to maintain roads within the union, but the Act says that they shall execute all works that are necessary for the preservation of public health and for improving the sanitation, the conservancy or the drainage of the union; and requires that they shall construct, repair and maintain water works, if ordered to do so by the district board. But in providing the union boards with funds to carry out these duties, the Act is less stringent, with the result that the duties are not generally performed. In addition to imposing the obligation to collect the tax for

the village police, the Act requires the union board to impose a rate amounting to the sum estimated to be required to meet the expenses of the board in carrying out any of the purposes of the Act; but this requirement is rendered of little effect by the condition that the estimate is to be approved by not less than two-thirds of the members at a special meeting. The result is that union boards are left free to do as much or as little as they like with their wide powers of taxation. The total amount raised by the union boards in 1926-27 by the imposition of rates of this kind was Rs. 5,31,151, or an average of Rs. 185 for each union, to which were added pound rents, fees paid to union benches and courts, and district board grants.

It may be said generally that the union boards have justified the hope that advance in local self-government may be based on village organisation. A few have been very good, and a few very bad; the majority have not achieved much, but have begun to do a little useful work. There are a few boards which deal with small densely populated areas where administration approaches municipal standards. At the other end of the scale are others which are content simply to raise enough money to pay the village police. Much depends on the personality of the president, and on the interest taken in the boards by the District Magistrate and other officers and by persons of local influence. A hopeful sign is that whilst, when a union board is first started, it is sometimes difficult to induce people to stand for election, yet when the second or third election is held there are often keen contests. Conferences of members of union boards are held annually at several district and subdivisional headquarters. Although the usual tenor of the resolutions passed at these conferences is to demand more powers for union boards and more money from sources other than local taxation, still the fact that these conferences are held and are well attended is evidence of a quickened interest in corporate village life.

CHAPTER IV.

The Financial Position in Bengal.

82. Of the causes which have hampered the working of the reformed constitution in Bengal, there is one about which there is no difference of opinion in the province. The Meston Settlement, which was incorporated in the Devolution Rules made under the Government of India Act, was alone sufficient to make the successful working of the new constitution extremely difficult.

83. **Separation of Central and Provincial resources.**—The aim of the authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms was to

find some means of entirely separating the resources of the Central and Provincial Governments, for "if provincial autonomy is to mean anything real, clearly the provinces must not be dependent on the Indian Government for the means of provincial development." To effect this separation, the revenues accruing in respect of provincial subjects were assigned to provinces. But it was calculated that this assignment, whilst giving a surplus of revenue over expenditure to every province, would leave the Government of India with a deficit; to make good this deficit, it was decided that the provinces should contribute a part of their expected surplus to the Government of India.

84. **The assumed normal income.**—Unfortunately for Bengal the calculation of the expected surplus was made without due appreciation of the expenditure that was to be met from provincial resources. The Financial Relations Committee simply took a figure of Rs. 7,09 lakhs based on the 1919-20 budget, as representing the normal income of the province under the classification of revenues then in force, and a figure of Rs. 8,57 lakhs as representing the normal income under the proposed classification. Allowing for Rs. 43½ lakhs of imperial expenditure transferred to the province, they calculated the expected surplus in Bengal at Rs. 1,04 lakhs, out of which a contribution of Rs. 63 lakhs was to be paid to the Government of India.

85. **Resulting deficit in Bengal.**—The fatal mistake of ignoring expenditure quickly became apparent. In the first year of the working of the Reforms the expenditure required to carry on the administration of the province exceeded the revenue by Rs. 1,20 lakhs. This was admitted by the Government of India. On the 30th September, 1921, Sir Malcolm Hailey, in moving a resolution to remit the Bengal contribution said: "We (Government of India) have examined the case, both narrowly and critically, and it appears certain that with every economy Bengal must have a deficit of not less than Rs. 1,20 lakhs. Even if we made no allowance for any extra expenditure for improvements in transferred subjects such as are desired by Ministers, improvements which we are told are necessary if the Reforms are to be a success—Bengal would have that deficit, even if it provided only the bare minimum expenditure required to carry on the ordinary administration of the Province." What was to the Financial Relations Committee "an unthinkable sequel to a purely administrative rearrangement of abundant general resources" came to pass in the very first year, for not only did the Government of India have to forego the provincial contribution, but the province had to provide for the bare minimum expenditure by imposing additional taxation. A note by the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, Kt., C.I.E., showing the effect of the financial difficulty of 1921 on the Government of Bengal is printed as an Appendix to this Chapter.

86. **Fiscal and economic differences ignored.**—No less serious in its results has been the adoption of an allocation of revenues which was based on administrative convenience and ignored important fiscal and economic differences in the provinces. The result in Bengal is that the Government of India hold the elastic resources yielding more than two-thirds of the revenues, whilst the province is left with a meagre third of the revenues and with resources of which the expansion capacity has already been exploited to the practical limit. Bengal shares with Bihar and Orissa the effect of a Permanent Settlement that bars the expansion of land revenue, and with Bombay the loss of revenues derived from industrial and commercial wealth; but Bengal alone suffers from both these causes.

87. **Effect of Permanent Settlement on land revenue.**—The provinces chiefly affected by the Permanent Settlement are Bengal and Bihar and Orissa. The Settlement was made in the year 1793 by the Government of India. Its effect was to fix permanently the land revenue payable to the State. In other parts of India the land revenue is subject to periodic settlements. The result is that in permanently settled areas the land revenue is inelastic, whilst in other areas it has steadily grown. This will appear from the following statement; the year 1912-13 is taken because the large changes in provincial boundaries made in the previous year make it difficult to take an earlier year:—

[The figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Province.	Land Revenue in—		Difference.
	1912-13.	1925-26.	
Permanently settled provinces.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Bengal	2,70,42	2,78,77	+8,35
Bihar and Orissa	1,49,21	1,55,71	+6,50
Other provinces.			
United Provinces	6,64,13	7,04,99	+40,86
Madras	6,83,62	7,48,18	+64,56
Punjab	3,15,79	4,57,58	+1,41,79
Bombay	3,92,26	5,03,68	+1,11,42
Central Provinces	1,80,04	2,02,78	+22,74
Burma	2,86,16	4,08,29	+1,22,13
Assam	71,50	92,54	+21,04

The whole of the increase in Bengal has been derived from Government estates and the small area which is not permanently settled.

The receipts per head of population from land revenue in the different provinces also show clearly the effect of the Permanent Settlement.

	Land revenue per head in 1925-26.
Permanently settled provinces—	Rs. A.
Bengal	0 10
Bihar and Orissa	0 7
Other provinces—	
United Provinces	1 9
Madras	1 11
Punjab	2 8
Bombay	2 7
Central Provinces	1 7
Burma	4 15
Assam	1 3

The statements given in paragraph 95 will show that in spite of the low receipts from land revenue the incidence of taxation in Bengal is higher than in all other provinces except Bombay, though the greater part of the taxes go to the Government of India.

88. Some idea of the loss of revenue caused to Bengal by the Permanent Settlement may be gathered from the fact that the export duty on jute yielded no less than Rs. 3,64 lakhs to the Government of India in the year 1925-26. Almost the whole of the jute crop is grown in Bengal, and its development since the days of the Permanent Settlement represents a great increase in the agricultural wealth of Bengal; but because of the Permanent Settlement it has added nothing to the land revenue. Its revenue-producing value is taken by the Government of India in the form of export duty, income-tax and railway receipts, and the province gets nothing.

89. **Revenue from industrial wealth lost to province.**—Whilst the provincial finances receive little benefit from the growth in agricultural wealth, the allocation of revenues operates to divert to the Government of India the expanding revenues derived from the development of industry. Income-tax and customs were assigned to the Government of India, and in these sources is largely concentrated the taxable capacity of the province. It is true that the Joint Parliamentary Committee, on the representations of Bombay and Bengal, advised that some share in the growth of revenue from taxation on incomes should be granted to the provinces, and this led to the enactment of Devolution Rule 15. But the boom of 1920 has been followed by a slump; as the following statement shows Bengal has derived no benefit from this rule, and Bombay has been only a little less unfortunate. The result of the rule has been that while it has not given relief to the province which required it, it has given an accession of revenue to provinces for which it was not intended.

Statement showing the income-tax received by the various provinces since 1921 under Devolution Rule 15.

Provinces.	Actuals.						Budget, 1927-28.	Revised Budget (Preliminary).	
	1921-22.	1922-23.	1923-24.	1924-25.	1925-26.	1926-27.		1927-28.	1928-29.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Madras	4,08,000	..	10,81,650	1,56,810	4,27,084	4,64,228	5,46,000	5,10,000	6,50,000
Bombay	14,72,000	3,00,000	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Bengal	95,000*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Provinces	3,20,000	33,596	..	..	2,504	..	..	..	..
Punjab	30,000	5,69,120	4,24,168	1,90,046	3,82,372	402	4,23,000	2,75,000	3,65,000
Burma	3,85,000	..	38,233	5,89,575	8,92,174	14,31,607	10,20,000	10,20,000	13,00,000
Bihar and Orissa	58,000	2,86,699	2,54,848	2,54,519	2,41,320	3,24,361	4,83,000	3,31,000	3,34,000
Central Provinces	90,000	1,48,790	3,41,858	2,30,522	1,35,687	2,17,893	1,00,000	1,04,000	1,62,000
Assam	2,000	1,15,130	4,16,085	5,54,226	5,29,456	4,92,008	5,27,000	5,80,000	6,00,000
Total	28,60,000	14,53,335	25,56,842	19,75,698	26,10,597	29,30,499	30,99,000	28,20,000	34,11,000

* A sum of Rs. 93,892 was paid to the Government of India as cost of establishment.

90. **Income-tax whence derived.**—A statement given in paragraph 94 will show not only that the Government of India receive from Bengal more revenue in the form of income-tax and customs dues than from any other province, but also that this revenue has steadily expanded. It is of course true that not all the money raised in Bengal by means of customs duties and income-tax is paid by the people of Bengal, but the part paid by persons from other areas is small. An analysis of income-tax assessments was made in 1920 at the instance of the Finance Relations Committee and shows that over 90 per cent. of the income-tax collected in Calcutta came solely from Bengal. Out of assessments amounting to Rs. 2,52 lakhs, which came under examination, Rs. 2,28 lakhs could be definitely assigned to Bengal, Rs. 23 lakhs were of doubtful origin and only half a lakh came from assessees whose incomes were known to be derived from outside Bengal. There is no reason to suppose that there has been any great change in the proportions, and it may be assumed that out of the total of Rs. 3,41 lakhs of income-tax collected in 1925-26, more than Rs. 3,00 lakhs came from incomes derived from Bengal.

91. **Customs revenue whence derived.**—The customs revenue is derived from both import and export duties. It is not possible to say what part of the imports paying duty at Calcutta go to areas outside Bengal, but it is certain that the larger part is consumed in Bengal. With regard to exports, there is no question. Almost all the jute and much of the rice and tea on which export duties have been levied at Calcutta are grown in Bengal. The yield of these duties in 1919-20 and 1925-26 was as follows:—

			(In lakhs of rupees.)	
			1919-20.	1925-26.
Jute	...	...	2,92	3,64
Tea	...	...	50	43
Rice	...	...	2	7

The export duty on tea was abolished from the 1st April, 1927.

92. **Cost of administration due to industrial development.**—The denial of any share in the expanding revenues derived from income-tax and customs dues, or indeed, in any revenue based on the commercial and industrial wealth of the province except that from stamps, has been felt all the more because the province has been burdened with the increasing cost of administration which the commercial and industrial development has made necessary. The increase in cost is spread over a large number of heads and cannot be stated in figures; it is by no means limited to Calcutta; but it may be illustrated by the fact that the cost of the Calcutta Police in 1925-26 (not including pensions, home leave charges and buildings) was more than Rs. 31 lakhs.

93. **Additional taxation.**—Early steps were taken to ease the position by additional taxation. Three Bills (one imposing a tax on certain forms of amusement and a tax on certain forms of betting, one enhancing court-fees and another enhancing stamp duties) were presented and passed by the legislature in 1922; and the Executive, in exercise of its powers under the Indian Registration Act, passed orders enhancing registration fees. The taxes on amusements and betting yielded Rs. 5,37,000 and Rs. 14,44,000 respectively in 1925-26; and the revenue from court-fees, stamp duties and registration fees rose appreciably after their enhancement though not in each case to the degree expected. The feasibility of imposing other new taxes in addition to the taxes on amusements and betting was considered with special reference to the other six heads of new taxation mentioned in Schedule I of the Scheduled Taxes Rules; but it was decided to be impossible or inadvisable to attempt such legislation, partly owing to inherent difficulties in particular cases, and partly owing to the practical limits set by the reluctance of the Legislative Council to impose taxes to make up the deficit due to the Meston Settlement.

94. **Comparison with other provinces.**—In this statement of the effects of the Government of India Act and the Rules made under it on the finances of Bengal, the endeavour has been made to avoid comparison with other more fortunate provinces. The Government of Bengal, however, have always contended that an allocation of resources which ignored alike the needs of provinces and their fiscal and economic differences could not be satisfactory. The following statements, which sum up the experience of the last six years, prove their contention. The provincial contributions have not been deducted in the first statement from the revenues of 1925-26 in order to show the result of their remission:—

Provincial Revenues.

[Figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Province.	1921-22.			1925-26.	Population.	Revenue per head.
	Actual revenues.	Provincial contributions.	Net provincial revenues.	Actual revenues.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.		Rs. A.
Bengal ..	8,94,82	63,00	8,31,82	10,70,58	46,695,536	2 5
United Provinces ..	12,38,83	2,40,00	9,98,83	12,71,07	45,375,787	2 13
Madras ..	15,39,31	3,48,00	11,91,31	16,89,33	42,318,985	4 0
Bihar and Orissa	4,42,32	..	4,42,32	5,76,73	34,002,189	1 11
Punjab ..	8,64,41	1,75,00	6,89,41	11,34,75	20,685,024	5 8
Bombay ..	11,96,15	56,00	11,40,15	15,58,39	19,348,219	8 0
Central Provinces ..	4,93,61	22,00	4,71,61	5,47,03	13,912,760	4 0
Assam ..	1,96,64	15,00	1,81,64	2,53,82	7,606,230	3 5

In the following statement the percentages of the revenues of the Government of India derived from the different provinces are given. In calculating the percentages of 1925-26 the provincial contributions have been deducted, to show approximately the result of the abolition of these contributions:—

Province.	Percentages in—	
	1921-22.	1925-26.
Bengal	36·0	45·0
United Provinces	6·0	7·6
Madras	12·3	9·6
Bihar and Orissa	0·7	0·7
Punjab	4·0	1·5
Bombay	39·0	40·0
Central Provinces	1·5	1·0
Assam	0·5	0·6
Total	100·0	100·0

The details of the receipts from which these percentages are calculated are given in the following statement:—

Receipts by the Government of India derived from Provinces.

[Figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Province.	1921-22.							1925-26.							
	Income-tax.	Super-tax.	Customs.	Salt.†	Excise opium.	Provincial contribution.	Total receipts by the Government of India.	Income-tax.	Super-tax.	Customs.	Salt.†	Excise opium.	Provincial contribution.	Total receipts by the Government of India.	Total receipts by the Government of India *less* provincial contributions.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Bengal	3,87,47+2,01*	2,68,74	14,26,72	1,55,77	8,27	63,00	23,11,98	3,41,72	2,51,87	18,43,41	1,71,64	15,03	..	26,24,27	26,24,27
United Provinces ..	84,63+26*	37,16	5,87	..	7,06	2,40,00	3,74,98	63,23	17,31	5,17	..	78,87	1,83,83	3,48,41	1,64,58
Madras	1,26,37+7,27*	44,09	2,12,45	1,39,02	8,68	3,48,00	8,85,88	1,19,07	22,31	3,68,69	1,47,59	6,48	2,21,98	8,86,12	6,64,14
Bihar and Orissa ..	30,70+14*	10,03	1	..	7,64	..	48,52	32,81	4,24	1	..	7,47	..	44,53	44,53
Punjab	46,65+50*	9,97	5	..	9,32	1,75,00	2,41,49	59,06	6,17	4,13	..	2,23	1,13,84	1,85,43	71,59
Bombay	4,80,65+11,03*	3,44,62	14,36,41	1,21,35	12,03	56,00	24,62,09	2,64,30	86,19	18,78,73	1,52,20	6,62	34,00	24,22,04	23,88,04
Central Provinces ..	38,12	18,41	8,90	..	6,42	22,00	93,85	30,57	7,57	5,78	..	3,17	13,00	60,09	47,09
Assam	8,47	..	1,98	..	8,42	15,00	33,87	16,57	2,47	10,09	1	5,02	9,00	43,16	34,16
Total ..	....	..	..	..	..	..	64,52,66	..	..	..	..	..	..	66,14,05	60,38,40

*Excess profits duty.
†Figures of Northern India Salt Revenue not included as they are not shown in the accounts under any province.

95. The Government of India takes from Bengal a far larger part of the total revenues, both central and provincial, derived from the province than from any other province. This may be seen from the following statement based on the revenues of the year 1925-26:—

[Figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Province.	Central revenues derived from province.	Provincial revenues.	Total of columns 2 and 3.	Percentage of column 2 on column 4.
1	2	3	4	5
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Bengal	26,24,27	10,70,58	36,94,85	71
United Provinces	3,48,41	12,71,07	16,19,48	21
Madras	8,86,12	16,89,33	25,75,45	34
Bihar and Orissa	44,53	5,76,73	6,21,26	7
Punjab	1,85,43	11,34,75	13,20,18	14
Bombay	24,22,04	15,58,39	39,80,43	60
Central Provinces	60,09	5,47,03	6,07,12	9
Assam	43,16	2,53,82	2,96,98	14
Total ..	66,14,05	81,01,70	1,47,15,75	44

If central and provincial taxations are taken together, the incidence of taxation is higher in Bengal than in any other province except Bombay. The figures are:—

Province.	Provincial.		Central.		Total.	
	Rs.	A.	Rs.	A.	Rs.	A.
Bengal	2	5	5	3	7	8
United Provinces	2	13	0	9	3	6
Madras	4	0	1	11	5	11
Bihar and Orissa	1	11	0	1	1	12
Punjab	5	8	0	14	5	6
Bombay	8	0	11	11	19	11
Central Provinces	4	0	0	7	4	7
Assam	3	5	0	8	3	13

96. **Result of abolition of provincial contributions.**—It is apparent that it is largely the increased revenue from customs duties since 1921 which has enabled the Government of India to abolish the provincial contributions. The result is to enhance the injustice of the allocation of revenues in two ways. The provinces which received a large increase in income as a consequence of the allocation of revenues, and were therefore required to contribute a large share of the increase to the Central Government, have now received a further large addition to their income by the abolition of their contributions. On the other

hand, the provinces which received little or no increase in income from the allocation of revenues again receive little or no increase from the abolition of the contributions, and their peoples have to bear a large part of the burden of the increased customs duties. In other words, the people of industrial provinces such as Bengal are now paying the contributions of other provinces.

97. **Present financial position in Bengal.**—The financial position imposed on Bengal by the Reforms may be summed up by saying that the figure of bare minimum expenditure admitted by the Government of India in 1921 was Rs. 10,72 lakhs. The revenue in 1925-26, including the proceeds of additional taxation, was Rs. 10,70 lakhs; the budget figure for 1927-28 is Rs. 10,71 lakhs.

This means that for a population of 46 millions, 3 millions more than that of Great Britain, Bengal has a total revenue of £8,000,000 from which to provide for the following heads of expenditure; they are arranged in the order of their cost in 1925-26, from highest to lowest:—

Police.	Jails.
Education.	Excise.
General Administration.	Public Health.
Civil Works.	Agriculture.
Justice.	Registration.
Pensions.	Stationery and Printing.
Medical.	Forests.
Land Revenue.	Industries.

98. The effect of the financial position on the administration has been comparative stagnation. The general effect can be seen from the following statement of the expenditure charged to Revenue under the main heads during the first five years of the Reforms:—

[Figures in lakhs.]

Expenditure heads.	1921-22.	1922-23.	1923-24.	1924-25.	1925-26.
(*1*) *Reserved subjects.*					
Police	193	187	179	182	183
General Administration	113	121	120	116	120
Justice ..	104	113	109	110	111
Land Revenue ..	36	29	29	31	36
Jails	38	36	33	32	31
Irrigation (interest on debt and miscellaneous expenditure): Revenue account ..	27	29	37	32	34
Irrigation : Capital account charged to Revenue ..	35	−21	18	4	−3
Forests ..	13	13	13	15	14
(*2*) *Transferred subjects.*					
Education ..	121	123	125	122	133
Civil Works ..	142	102	93	96	111
Medical ..	53	55	51	57	59
Excise	15	15	13	13	26
Public Health ..	23	25	24	29	24
Agriculture ..	21	21	20	18	20
Registration ..	16	17	18	18	19
Industries ..	12	13	10	10	12

NOTE—A small part of the expenditure shown under Reserved subjects is actually " transferred " and *vice versa*. Of the expenditure on Excise in 1925-26, Rs. 13 lakhs were due to a change in the system of accounts.

99. The largest increase in expenditure has been in the Education Department, from Rs. 121 lakhs (about £907,500) in 1921-22 to Rs. 133 lakhs (about £997,500) in 1925-26. The transfer in 1921 of the charge of the Calcutta University from the Government of India to the Government of Bengal and the creation of the University of Dacca by an Act of the Indian Legislature have forced Bengal to make recurring grants of Rs. 3 lakhs and Rs. 5½ lakhs to those Universities. This expenditure on these Universities was not taken into account by the Meston Committee, nor were additional resources given to Bengal

when the transfer was made, in spite of the Secretary of State reminding the Government of India of the Joint Parliamentary Committee's recommendation as to the special financial position of Bengal. The burden so transferred was made far greater by the fact that in the previous year the Government of India had accepted the recommendations of the Calcutta University Commission involving Rs. 65 lakhs recurring and Rs. 61 lakhs capital expenditure. They transferred this liability to Bengal in the same year in which they admitted that the revenues of this province were Rs. 120 lakhs short of the amount required for the bare minimum expenditure. It is hardly necessary to add that the Government of Bengal have been able to do nothing to carry out the Commission's recommendations for the reorganisation of University and secondary education.

With great difficulty the grants have been found which enable the Universities to exist. The grants for primary education have been increased, but are still hopelessly insufficient; the average pay of a Board primary school teacher is Rs. 9-12 or about 13½ shillings a month. A committee prepared a scheme for technical and vocational education, but nothing has been done; and manual training has made no advance since 1916.

Bengal can hardly find £1,000,000 to spend on education of all kinds for a population of 46 millions. Local authorities contribute about £150,000.

£12½ millions was the sum spent by the London County Council on its schools in 1926, £10 millions of this being for elementary schools. Half of the amount came from national revenues.

100. The Police Department is one for the needs of which no public sympathy is shown, but none the less those needs are real, as the following examples will show.

The police of the districts surrounding Calcutta was reorganised in 1905. Since then there has been much industrial development. In 1919, the Secretary of State sanctioned a scheme for further reorganisation costing about £17,800 a year. For want of funds nothing has been done except that, when communal rioting compelled action in 1926, the force in the mill area near Barrackpore was strengthened.

It is an accepted principle that all ranks should get a money grant for uniform. Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of the Bengal Police have not got it because money is not available. It would cost £3,525 annually.

The time-scale system of pay has been adopted generally in services in Bengal, including the police. But for want of funds it has been held back from the assistant sub-inspectors and head constables. It would cost about £2,325 a year.

The general rise in wages makes it difficult to recruit constables, head constables, assistant sub-inspectors and sergeants of the right stamp on the present rates of pay. It will cost about £130,000 annually to put this right.

The Indian Police Commission of 1902-03 recommended that subordinate Police officers should be provided with rent-free quarters. This was accepted in principle by the Government of India. The Bengal District Administration Committee observed in 1914 that police buildings generally were miserable structures and that it was essential for the health and efficiency of the force that they should be housed in sanitary buildings. It would cost about £1,000,000 to carry out the schemes to remedy this.

The Bengal Police cost about £1,427,000 in 1926-27. It is a large part out of Bengal's total revenue of £8,000,000, but the Bengal Police serve a population of 46 millions. The annual cost of the London Metropolitan Police and Police Courts is £8,000,000.

101. One district in Bengal has a population of 4,800,000, and the average population of a district in Bengal is 1,667,700; in the rest of British India it is only 831,000. The Bengal District Administration Committee, appointed in 1913 with the concurrence of the Government of India to examine the conditions prevailing in the districts in Bengal, recommended the creation of five new districts and thirteen new subdivisions. Up to date one new subdivision only has been established. Buildings for one new district headquarters were well advanced, and land was acquired for the headquarters of two other new districts and three new subdivisions; but the financial crisis of 1921 forced Government to abandon all schemes of partition, and the work was stopped.

102. The Indian Jails Committee in 1920 recommended many reforms. The necessity of most of these was accepted by the Government of Bengal, but owing to the want of money effect has not been given to those involving much expenditure. Examples are the abolition of convict officers in under-trial prisoners' wards and the reduction of the number of convict officers in other wards; the provision of a separate jail for habitual criminals and of separate accommodation for under-trial prisoners of different classes, and the conversion of four district jails into Central Jails.

103. The examples given above are mostly taken from cases in which the necessity of the expenditure is supported by the recommendation of authoritative Commissions or Committees. They are cases of carefully scrutinised schemes of urgent administrative necessity. But besides these, there are the crying needs of the people. For the prevention and cure of disease, for water-supply and irrigation, for the improvement of agriculture and the encouragement of industries,

and for the solution of the problems of unemployment money is needed, but is not available. Much of the discontent with the Reforms is due to the failure to do more than was done before to supply these needs, and the failure is due to the one cause, the want of money.

104. For Bengal, the revision of the financial settlement is not a matter that admits of delay. In introducing the Budget for 1928-29, and referring to the provision for the contribution to the Government of India, which has since been remitted, the Finance Member said:—

"Even if this contribution is remitted, either temporarily or permanently, we shall have to face a deficit of Rs. 37,43,000 in next year's budget. In these circumstances we may be able to carry on for a year or so, but not unless we can see ultimate relief in the near future; and that relief must take the shape of a new Financial Settlement which will leave Bengal with an expanding income adequate for her needs and proper development.

We are again addressing the Government of India reiterating our protests against the present Financial Settlement and our claims for its complete revision. It is not likely, however, that the Government of India will do anything at the moment beyond continuing the remission of our annual contribution. In all probability the question of the total revision of the Financial Settlement will be left to be examined by the Reforms Commission. The members of that Commission are now in India for a preliminary survey of the position. They will not go into details until next cold weather, but when that time comes, and when the Government of Bengal put their case before the Commission, one of the most important points that they will urge is that the Financial Settlement was wrong *ab initio* and treated Bengal most unfairly, and that it was largely owing to the shortness of funds that the working of the reformed constitution in Bengal has been so hampered and that Ministers have found it so difficult to carry on.

The Government of Bengal will put in the forefront of their case a claim for a complete revision of the Financial Settlement, at any rate so far as Bengal is concerned, and unless that is done, I am convinced that all parties in the province will be unanimous in thinking that the successful working of the new constitution will be impossible in Bengal, however good that constitution may be in other ways."

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV.

Note by the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, Kt., C.I.E., on the financial position in Bengal.

A short account showing the position of the Ministers and the Members of the Government of Bengal vis-à-vis the public of Bengal during the life of the first Council after the reforms. When the provincial purse was separated in Bengal on the 3rd January 1921, the preliminary budget was practically ready. Under the rules in force, before the budget for 1921-22 was prepared in draft, the sanction of the Government of India was necessary to the whole of the provincial budget. The budget that was presented to the Legislative Council in the winter session of 1921 showed a deficit of about 2 crores 12 lakhs. This deficit was due partly because under the financial settlement the normal scale of recurring expenditure for Bengal was not taken into account and partly because items of capital expenditure of a more or less urgent character were also ignored. The Government of India admitted that the deficit in recurring expenditure was at least 1 crore 20 lakhs. A deputation, consisting of Government members and non-officials, went up to Simla, but the only relief that the deputation could get was a remission of the whole of the provincial contribution of 63 lakhs for a temporary period of 3 years. After return of the deputation from Simla, the Government of Bengal decided to cut down the budget as passed by the Legislative Council by 89½ lakhs of rupees. The heads of these cuts were announced by Lord Ronaldshay in the November sitting of the Council. It has already been observed that the excess of the expenditure side on the income side of the budget as passed was about 212 lakhs. The remission of the 63 lakhs and the reduction in expenditure by 89½ lakhs amounted to 152½ lakhs, and thus a gap of over 60 lakhs had yet to be covered. The Government of Bengal was therefore faced with the problem of increasing its resources by taxation. Within about a year's time from the inauguration of the reforms it was forced to take up three taxation bills. So far as I remember the Government of Bengal was the first provincial Government which introduced and successfully passed taxation bills. It was estimated that these taxes would, after liberal deduction, produce about 1 crore 40 lakhs. It has already been observed that a gap of about 60 lakhs had yet to be covered, but in the meantime due to the orders of the Secretary of State about revision of pay of some of the services and other imperative expenditure it was found that a sum of Rs. 1 crore 20 lakhs would be necessary for running the Government of Bengal without any expansion in expenditure. A loan policy was contemplated with regard to some of the

items, and the then Finance Member, Sir John Kerr, announced to the Council that 40 lakhs would be available for expansion. In the autumn session of the Legislative Council in that year supplementary estimates embodying new schemes by Ministers were introduced and passed. Even these schemes suffered from a great handicap because the future of the remission of the provincial contribution was unknown and the schemes had to be drawn up very hurriedly. Within two months from the time of the passing of supplementary estimates by the Legislative Council embodying these new schemes, information became available to the Government of Bengal that the collections from all heads of revenue, including the new taxes, were so unsatisfactory that instead of the total increase in revenue being 1 crore 40 lakhs, the total increase would be even less than half. The result of this unsatisfactory state of affairs was that a heavy retrenchment had to be undertaken, and instead of expansion in expenditure on beneficial measures for which hopes were publicly held out by the passing of these schemes and by the speech of the Finance Member even the ordinary expenditure had to be curtailed. During the years 1921 and 1922 the Government of Bengal retrenched over 1 crore 30 lakhs in expenditure. The result of taxation and retrenchment without the compensating advantage of launching new beneficial schemes naturally made the Government, specially the Ministers, very unpopular in the province. It is submitted that the political history of Bengal would in all probability have been different but for this terrible handicap of financial settlement. The Government of Bengal increased its resources by taxation and retrenchment to the extent of about $2\frac{1}{4}$ crores of rupees. Even if this amount or even half of it were available for expansion of expenditure in the direction of beneficial measures, the history of Bengal would perhaps have been quite different.

CHAPTER V.

Political Conditions.

105. The political atmosphere in which the attempt to work the reforms has been made in Bengal, has been no more favourable than the financial conditions. A marked feature throughout the period has been the persistent hostility of the most actively political class towards Government, a hostility which at one time seemed to involve almost the whole people, and still shows little signs of abatement. The class most affected by it is the Hindu middle class. Its causes are not easily removable; the acute economic distress of a large part of the middle class has embittered racial antipathy, and has enhanced the natural dislike of the dominance of a foreign race in both government and commerce. The reforms have done nothing to remove or modify these causes. On the contrary, the destruction of the reformed system of government has been one of the avowed objects of the leaders of the movements by which the administration has been continuously assailed.

106. **The non-co-operation movement.**—The first of these movements was the non-co-operation movement inspired by Mr. Gandhi, seeking to destroy the Government from without; the second has been the attempt of the *Swaraj* party, largely successful, to attack dyarchy through the Legislative Council. This second movement was accompanied by a revival of revolutionary activity, and later by an outburst of communal enmity between the Hindu and Muhammadan communities. A brief outline of these movements is necessary to the understanding of the circumstances in which the Bengal Government have endeavoured to work the new system.

The Khilafat agitation among the Muhammadans and the feeling over the Rowlatt Bill and events in the Punjab had given Mr. Gandhi the opportunity of uniting the two great communities in opposition to Government and enabled him to get his policy of non-co-operation adopted by the Congress as well as by the Khilafat Conference and Moslem League in September, 1920. But although Hindu extremists were beginning to take an active part, and Mr. C. R. Das and twenty-four others withdrew their candidature for election to the Legislative Council in the latter part of 1920, the movement in Bengal during 1920 was predominantly Muhammadan, largely conducted by Muhammadans from outside Bengal. It was opposed by the more moderate Muhammadan leaders in Bengal, and there was little enthusiasm in Bengal for the demand for the restoration of the territorial authority of the Sultan of Turkey, made by the Khilafat Conference held at Calcutta in February, 1920. A more direct appeal was therefore made to the religious feelings of the masses by the circulation of

rumours such as that Government had ordered prayers to be said on Sunday instead of Friday and had proscribed the *Koran*. But in spite of these wide-spread rumours and attempts to foment trouble in the mill areas on the banks of the Hooghly, no great effect on the masses was at first apparent. The election to the new Legislative Council in the end of 1920 passed without much display of either interest or the wish to interfere.

From the beginning of 1921 the Hindus assumed an increasingly prominent part in the movement and a more systematic attempt was made to stir up the masses, whilst carrying on at the same time a campaign against the whole machinery of education and administration. In the combination of national schools, arbitration courts and volunteer corps, there may perhaps be seen an attempt to set up a parallel system of administration such as had been evident in Sinn Fein methods in Ireland.

107. **The national school movement.**—The national school movement had been in existence for some time, but had not so far achieved much success. A new direction was now given to it, and boys in the established schools and colleges were exhorted to go out and engage in propaganda work, so that *swaraj* might be obtained within one year. The effort achieved for a short time considerable success. Strikes involving five colleges in Calcutta were followed by strikes in all but three districts; more than 11,000 boys out of 103,000 were withdrawn from Government and aided schools and colleges. The economic grievances of ill-paid teachers found expression, and many resigned. "National" schools were started in almost every district. A brief experience, however, showed that they were but an imitation of the older schools, with a lack of discipline which the parents disliked and the further disadvantage that they were not recognised by the University. By April public opinion had turned against them.

108. **Arbitration courts.**—The boycott of British courts by lawyers and litigants was one of the points in Mr. Gandhi's non-co-operation programme which had been accepted by the Congress. In Bengal a considerable number of pleaders and mukhtears were paid to carry on propaganda, but only a few pleaders possessing any practice followed the lead given by Mr. C. R. Das in resigning his practice. But the attempt to establish arbitration courts as an alternative to the regular courts was more successful. In February, 1921, only fifteen such courts were known to exist; by August there were more than five hundred. They varied greatly in constitution and working, from courts constituted by the local Congress and Khilafat committees to courts set up by one or two persons in villages, from courts in which rules were made and fees and punishments prescribed to courts in which the proceedings were merely arbitrary. Abuses led to unpopularity and complaints in the regular courts, and the movement collapsed.

109. **The organisation of volunteers.**—The Nagpur Congress of December, 1920, had provided for the raising of a National Service Corps for propaganda in the country districts. Enlistment in Bengal was fairly rapid. Eleven hundred were enrolled in Calcutta in February, 1921, and by May there were nineteen regular corps in different places in the province. The members were employed not only in enforcing the various boycotts but as arbitration court peons and in other general capacities.

110. **The incitement of the masses.**—The stirring up of the masses which was to achieve such disastrous success by the end of 1921 contains features of more than passing interest. When the circumstances and nature of the agitation are remembered, it is remarkable that success was not sooner attained and was not more wide-spread. The vague resentment against Government caused by the high prices of the war was still felt. The religious feelings of the Muhammadan half of the population had long been disturbed by a natural sympathy for the misfortunes of Turkey. The hostility of the educated classes towards the foreign Government had long been apparent. The supernatural reputation of Mr. Gandhi had permeated the country, and all the time agitators went among the people, apparently without any fear of restraint by Government, filling their ears with amazing stories of the wickedness of the foreign ruler. And yet, in spite of it all, the storm was slow in breaking. One plan after another was tried by the leaders of the agitation, achieved some slight success, and faded away. The cultivator was told to stop growing jute, but was not convinced that it did not pay him to grow it. The cult of the spinning wheel aroused in him little more than a passing curiosity, and the boycott of foreign cloth did not hold his sympathy for long. These devices failed because facts proved too strong for the theoretical and visionary ideas with which they were put forward by the agitators. It was by vile appeals to moral, religious and racial feelings that the animosity of the people in the districts was at length aroused against Government.

111. **Results of the incitement of the masses.**—Although it was not till November, 1921, that the full effects of this agitation among the masses became felt, there were several serious incidents earlier in the year. Of these the mutiny in the Rajshahi Jail was significant of the influence of Mr. Gandhi's name. The prisoners declared a *hartal* and said they would obey Gandhi and not the Government. At midday when the warders were being changed, they rushed the gate and escaped in a body An event more serious in its consequences was the exodus of tea-garden coolies from Assam, and here again it was in the name of Mr. Gandhi that fictitious promises were made to induce them to leave the gardens and return to their homes. They drifted down to Chandpur; the first batches were sent on westwards, but some three thousand were held up at Chandpur. Their removal from the railway station with the help of military police led to the

wildest rumours; the press poured forth a torrent of abuse, and the whole of Eastern Bengal was in a ferment. A strike on the Assam-Bengal Railway quickly became general and was followed by a strike on the steamer services.

Though the railway strike did not come to an end till September, in the rest of Bengal there were few events of any importance, and there was a comparative lull during the months of August, September and October. But although outward disturbances were few, there was little diminution in the stream of propaganda, and the time was used to perfect the organisation of volunteers. Already it had been decided to boycott the Prince of Wales' visit in November, and the Congress now gave its sanction to civil disobedience. Results quickly followed. Land settlement work in Bogra and Pabna districts was held up by the intimidation of surveyors. There was increased activity against the police, both regular and village police, and against all Government servants; so effective was the boycott in some places that supplies for officers had to be sent in convoys with armed escorts. In Midnapore the introduction of the Village Self-Government Act had to be abandoned. In Howrah the police were attacked by a Muhammadan procession and driven back to the police-station. In Calcutta, on the 17th November, the day of the Prince of Wales' arrival in India, a *hartal* paralysed the life of the city, and the resignation of thirty up-country Muhammadan constables after a meeting on the maidan indicated that the morale of the police had been impaired.

112. **Measures taken by Government.**—The attempts made by Government to counteract the agitation by propaganda met with little success and the events of November forced the Government to adopt a more active policy than that of letting the movement die of itself. Congress volunteer corps and similar bodies were declared unlawful under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, leaders were prosecuted for seditious utterances, and efforts were made to counteract propaganda and *hartals*. In reply to these measures, an attempt was made to overfill the jails by sending out volunteers and others, mostly mill coolies and lower class Muhammadans, to court arrest. The number of arrests up to the end of December amounted to 3,230, and jail accommodation was taxed to the utmost. Fortunately, the turning point was now reached in Calcutta, and with the timely help of the Civil Guard formed of European, Anglo-Indian and Indian volunteers, the Calcutta Police, in spite of a *hartal*, succeeded in maintaining order during the Prince of Wales' visit. Public confidence returned, and towards the end of his visit the Prince was welcomed with enthusiasm by a crowd on the maidan.

113. **The lawlessness in the interior.**—In the interior, however, where the forces at the disposal of the authorities were less than in

Calcutta, and scattered over wide areas, the lawlessness took longer to subdue. The agitation had been largely directed against the police, including the village police or chaukidars, for whose wages a chaukidari tax is collected by a non-official agency. The result in many districts was a refusal to pay this tax. Attempts to enforce payment were met with resistance, and the consequent employment of the police led in many cases to serious riots. The violence of the feeling which existed may be illustrated by the attack made by a crowd in Tippera district on the District Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police and 30 constables; it was one of several instances in which it was necessary to open fire and persons were killed. The facts that in this as in some other cases the non-co-operation volunteers tried to restrain the mob, and that in local comment it was recognised that the shooting was justified, indicate that the movement had got beyond the control of the leaders.

The refusal to pay taxes also led in some districts to a refusal to pay rent either to Government or to private landlords, and the non-payment of rent became an important part of the agitation. Though coercion was commonly used by the non-co-operation party, and the landlords who contributed to their funds were effectively helped in the realisation of rent and other difficulties, Government were unable to deviate from legal procedure and were unable to help those who refused to submit to coercion. The unfortunate impression thus created is obvious.

114. **The decline of the non-co-operation movement.**—In Chittagong district, where lawlessness had taken the form of looting the forests and burning down forest offices and beat-houses, order was not restored till July, 1922, but in the rest of Bengal the worst of the trouble was over by April. The massacre of police officers at Chauri Chaura in February had been followed by the Ahmedabad Conference of Congress, at which mass civil disobedience was suspended and a milder programme laid down. Funds were depleted, Mr. Gandhi was arrested in March, many of the leaders were in jail and the glamour of volunteering had faded. There were temporary revivals of picketing, and attacks on the police occurred in July and August; but the situation had so far improved by November that Government were able to withdraw the notifications by which volunteer corps had been proclaimed as illegal. The violent phase of the non-co-operation movement had passed, and the party showed signs of disintegration. The Khilafat agitation had been waning and its influence may be said to have ended with the conclusion of peace with Turkey in July, 1923. The new *Swaraj* party of Mr. C. R. Das was gaining strength, and by the autumn of 1923 the Congress accepted its policy of entering the Legislative Councils and destroying the constitution from within.

115. **The Swaraj party.**—The *Swaraj* party, though weakened by the death of its leader, Mr. C. R. Das, in June, 1925 has continued to receive the support of a large majority of middle class Hindus. In the beginning it was also supported by the still large number of Muhammadans who were bitter against the British Government, and Mr. Das endeavoured to make this support secure by a pact which promised the Muhammadans, on the attainment of *swaraj*, separate electorates and representation according to numerical strength on the Council and local bodies. The *Swaraj* party went to the election as the only well-organised party, and when the new Council met in January, 1924, Mr. Das led a compact party of 47 members, of whom 21 were Muhammadans, and by the middle of March he had the general support of 19 Independent nationalists. He refused office, and the second Council began its work with the strongest party in it set on a policy of obstruction and the killing of dyarchy. The result was that the demand for the salaries of Ministers was rejected in March and, though the Ministers who had been appointed in January continued to hold office, they resigned in August when the demand for their salaries was again rejected. A further attempt to appoint Ministers was made in the beginning of 1925, but again their salaries were refused and the Government was carried on without Ministers until the third Council was formed in 1927.

116. **Revolutionary societies.**—The decline of the more violent form of the non-co-operation movement had been followed by the re-appearance of the revolutionary societies which had been active during the war and by an outbreak in 1923 of dacoities and murders committed by their members. The existence of any revolutionary conspiracy was at first denied in the press and on the platform, but was generally admitted in 1924. The sympathy of the *Swaraj* party with the conspirators was shown by a resolution, supported by Mr. C. R. Das himself at a conference in June, 1924, which praised the murderer of an European in Calcutta who was mistaken for the Commissioner of Police. A series of crimes and evidence as to the high state of development which the conspiracy had reached towards the end of 1924 compelled Government to take extraordinary measures. Sixty-three arrests were made under a new Ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General, and nineteen persons, including the Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation and two members of the Legislative Council, were arrested under Regulation III of 1818.

117. **Criminal Law Amendment Act.**—Shortly afterwards, in January, 1925, a special session of the Legislative Council was held for the introduction of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, the object of which was to replace by a more permanent Act the temporary Ordinance under which the arrests had been made. Lord Lytton addressed the Council and explained the urgency of the necessity for

suppressing terrorist crime, and in introducing the Bill, Sir Hugh Stephenson gave proofs of the existence of a highly organised, well armed and well financed conspiracy, against which the ordinary machinery of the law had failed. It can only be regarded as significant of the hostility to Government, if not of a wide-spread sympathy with the revolutionaries, that the motion for leave to introduce the Bill was lost. The voting is interesting. Of the 57 who voted for the motion, there were 15 Muhammadans and only 6 non-official Hindus, the rest being Europeans, Anglo-Indians, the Indian Christian representative and officials. Forty-four Hindus and 22 Muhammadans voted against it. The Bill was subsequently certified by the Governor. The action taken by Government was justified by the cessation of overt revolutionary crime, but the imprisonment or detention of persons without open trial was disliked even by those who sincerely condemned such crime, and has proved an useful cry in rallying both the ardent and the lukewarm opponents of Government. The campaign of abuse showed no diminution and a flood of seditious articles in newspapers, pamphlets and publications of all kinds continued to represent Government as satanic, oppressive and barbarous.

118. **The Hindu-Muhammadan riots.**—Although Mr. Das had succeeded in persuading a majority of the Muhammadans in the Legislative Council to vote for the rejection of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans were gradually becoming strained. The appeal to religious and communal sentiment had aroused the Muhammadans against the Government and led them to join in the non-co-operation movement. With the decline of the movement and the abolition of the Khilafat by Turkey, the old suspicions returned, and the Muhammadans gradually withdrew from political association with the Hindus. In political circles the successful struggle of the Swarajists in 1924 to depose the two Muhammadan Ministers alienated a section of the Muhammadans, and distrust was increased by the refusal of the Congress to accept Mr. Das' Hindu-Moslem pact and by Mr. Das' own insistence that its terms were to be fulfilled only upon the attainment of *swaraj*. The community as a whole was disturbed by the news of communal disputes and riots in Upper India, and there were several instances in which quarrels about religious observances ended in blows. Sir Abdur Rahim's speech at Aligarh in December, 1925, showed the width of the breach, and feelings were exasperated by a bitter controversy in the press. Suddenly rioting broke out in Calcutta on the 2nd April, 1926, and spread like wild fire over a large part of the city. Temples and mosques were the chief objects of attack; looting of shops was frequent, and there were no less than 151 fires caused by incendiarism. A Fire Brigade report remarks that a disturbing feature of some of the fires ignited by the rioters was that in some cases persons were

imprisoned in premises that were then set on fire. Military assistance checked the disturbances, but murderous assaults on individuals continued. By the 14th, when normal conditions were restored, 44 persons had been killed and 584 injured. Rioting broke out again on the 22nd April, and though, owing to police patrolling, looting, incendiarism and attacks on temples and mosques were less, isolated murders were more numerous; on twelve occasions the police were forced by determined resistance to open fire. When the disturbances ended on the 9th May, 66 persons had been killed and 391 had been admitted to hospitals.

The trouble was not confined to Calcutta. Riots at the railway centre of Kharagpur resulted in 11 deaths and many injuries. A week's rioting in Pabna was followed by another outbreak in Calcutta in July, in which 28 persons were killed and 226 injured. In September there was another riot in the docks area of Calcutta, and in a riot at Dacca in Eastern Bengal 8 persons were killed and 72 injured.

The loss of life and property brought home the gravity of the situation to the leaders of the communities, some of whom in the earlier part of the year were more concerned with attributing the responsibility to Government than composing the strife between their followers. An attempt at reconciliation produced some results in Calcutta, and by the end of the year 1926 a general improvement was visible. There was still however acute tension in Bakarganj district in Eastern Bengal. A serious incident occurred in which seventeen persons were killed during the dispersal of a fanatical mob, and this incident had an important reaction on the political situation. Some of the Muhammadan leaders, including Sir Abdur Rahim, demanded an enquiry by a mixed committee; on Government's refusal they launched a campaign against the Muhammadan Minister for not resigning, and in August, 1927, united with the Swarajists to bring about the fall of the ministry.

In Calcutta there was no outbreak in 1927, but on the occasion of all festivals it was necessary to adopt precautionary measures on an extensive scale, and the absence of trouble was solely due to these measures. Recently there have been signs of some measure of agreement between the two communities, and good work has been done by Unity Committees in composing differences at several places in the province. The passing of resolutions of mutual forbearance at a Unity Conference held in Calcutta in November, 1927, and the drafting of a formula accepted by most of the anti-Government leaders during the last session of the Congress showed that the politicians were conscious of the necessity for better relations.

Opinions differ on the question how far this outburst of communal feeling was due to the reforms. Strong feeling between Hindus and

Muhammadans is no new thing in India but in Bengal Hindus and Muhammadans have ordinarily lived together in peace, especially in the rural areas; the riots which have taken place in Calcutta in the past have been between non-Bengali elements of the population; the trouble of 1926 was due to events outside Bengal, and the rioting was begun and largely carried on by foreign elements. But alongside of this more violent aspect of communal feeling, and necessarily affected by it, there was a growing cleavage of political feeling on communal lines, which was accentuated by the knowledge that the reforms had given greater opportunities of political power and by the fear of the Muhammadans that the result would be Hindu dominance. Politics, religion and communal feeling are confused, and it is not possible to say that a particular event or tendency is due solely to one or the other, or to the reforms. But in Bengal Mr. Das' attempt to secure the support of the Muhammadans by his pact, the subsequent disillusionment of the Muhammadans, the crystallisation of the position between the two communities by Sir Abdur Rahim's speech at Aligarh, the impression caused by the debate in the Indian Legislative Assembly on the question of the North-West Frontier Province, and the political colour of the *Suddhi* and *Sangathan* and other communal movements were clearly connected with the reforms and with the struggle of the two communities for the political power offered by the new system.

119. **The Press.**—The part played by the press in Bengal can be dealt with briefly. There are the British-owned papers, which are conducted on the same lines as the press in England. They have a wide circulation among the Europeans and Indians, and political views are generally expressed with moderation, but their influence among Indians is naturally limited. On the other hand, the attitude among the Indian-owned press has almost entirely been inimical to Government, and there is no Indian paper which consistently supports it. Indian newspapers fell into two groups—Moderate and Extremist. The former accepted the main principles of the system established by the Government of India Act, and they supported the principle of working the reforms in order to get something more later and thus obtain self-government. The extremist press is hostile to the reforms, but has been divided in its attitude—one section advocating non-co-operation from outside the Councils, and another supporting the attempt to destroy the reformed government by entering the Councils. Other papers again, while they are against the reforms, are also opposed to the *Swaraj* party. The organisation of parties in the press, therefore, does not correspond altogether with the parties in political life. Recently the present Ministers have had the support of two papers; but apart from this, only the papers which advocate the Swarajist policy can be described as the press organs of a political party.

The influence of the press in Bengal on middle class opinion is very great, but is subject to this limitation that no Indian paper has any chance of surviving unless it opens its columns to abuse of Government and takes up a strong attitude on racial questions. Compared with a paper like the *Forward* that seizes every opportunity of encouraging racial antagonism, and of imputing evil intentions or unworthy motives to the Government whether of Great Britain or of India or of the province, the moderate press is handicapped if it exhibits a moderate attitude, and the tendency therefore has been for it to become more bitter and unfair in its criticisms in order to maintain the slight influence it has on public opinion. But the criticism is not directed solely against Government, for the various groups lose no opportunity of attacking one another.

In times of communal tension, however, the grouping of the press is changed and the claims of the community rank above everything else. This was especially the case in 1926 when there were serious communal disturbances, and the only point on which the papers of both communities were agreed was that Government was responsible for all the trouble in that it had not taken effective action to prevent it breaking out or to quell it immediately, preferably by taking vigorous steps against the opposite community.

120. **The lack of co-operation.**—The political events of the last seven years show not only that the work of Government has generally been carried on in circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty, but also how small, apart from the efforts of Indian Members and Ministers and their supporters, has been the co-operation received from those on whom, in the words of the Preamble to the Government of India Act, new opportunities of service were conferred. That fact will again become apparent when other aspects of the working of the reforms come to be considered, but it will be convenient here to state briefly the attitude of the various parties or sections in Bengal towards this matter of co-operation. The phrase itself has been widely misapprehended. The Swarajist professes to regard it as involving a servile compliance with the wishes of a bureaucratic Government. Others have appeared to think that a spirit of co-operation was sufficiently shown by the mere decline of the non-co-operation movement or the existence of a limited number of people willing to work the reforms. But if co-operation be taken as meaning a sustained effort to work the constitutional system created by the Government of India Act, then the degree of co-operation has been small.

121. **The European attitude.**—The non-official European community regarded the reforms with misgiving, but the European Association, which represents them politically, adopted loyal acceptance of the reformed constitution as one of their principles. The leader of the

Europeans in the Legislative Council could fairly claim in a recent speech that they had striven their best and done their utmost to give dyarchy the chance to function in Bengal. In that attitude they have had the support of the Anglo-Indian members, and have formed a compact, well-organised party in the Council. In pursuit of their policy they have supported the reserved side of Government and also the Ministers who were from time to time in office. They have not, however, combined with any particular group and, on the occasion of the last motion of nc confidence, made it clear that if the Council persisted in the game of upsetting Ministries, the next Ministry would not have their support.

122. **The attitude of the Hindu bhadralok.**—It has already been said that the party most imbued with hostility towards Government and the reforms is the Hindu middle class. It would be more correct to speak of the Hindu *bhadralok*. The classes included in this term have always been the best educated; they accepted the new Western education eagerly and more and more looked for their livelihood in professional and clerical employment. As the standard of living changed and prices rose, whether they remained in villages or lived in towns, they have found it increasingly difficult to make a living. High schools were multiplied all over the country, and year by year the schools and the University produced more youths to seek for professional and clerical work. There has been a marked change within the last generation; and it is not surprising that the present lack of employment should have produced a strong sense of grievance against the conditions of the present day among the large number of the *bhadralok* who are poor and without a means of livelihood, and that the sense of this grievance should be easily converted by racial antipathy and the dislike of foreign rule and foreign commercial predominance into hostility towards the Government. The leaders of this anti-Government movement are drawn generally from a section of the richer members of these classes, whilst it is largely from amongst the poorer members that the movement has found a ready following.

123. **Political grouping of the Hindu bhadralok.**—Naturally the degree of hostility varies. At the one extreme are the young party, including, besides those who have adopted terrorism as a creed, a large body of young men who are in sympathy with the revolutionary conspiracy. Their importance is felt at the time of elections because they are the most vigorous canvassers existing in Bengal. They have proved themselves to be masterful servants and have exercised a strong influence over the *Swaraj* party. Next to them are the Swarajists, the most influential and best organised party in Bengal, disavowing a policy of violence whilst hardly concealing a strong sympathy for the violent, and following a policy of consistent obstruction. Equally

hostile to Government but professing a readiness to accept office, the Independents have ordinarily followed the lead of the Swarajists.

Orthodox non-co-operation still has its following, but the Swarajists and Independents represent the majority of middle class Hindu opinion. There remain the Hindu moderates. In the first Council they, together with other sections, Muhammadan and European, formed a group with a substantial majority, and were beginning to be organised into a constitutional party. At the general election in December, 1923, they were completely defeated by the Swarajists, and only seven were elected. Their allegiance to the constitution was severely strained by the absence of any Hindu Minister, and two of them supported the Swarajists in bringing about the fall of the two Muhammadan Ministers in August, 1924. There were four other Hindu members whose political leanings can only be described as uncertain. It is significant of the state of political feeling and methods that on the occasion of the vote on the Ministers' salaries in August, 1924, one of these four was besieged all day in his house by a crowd that refused to let him leave, and he declined the offer of a police escort.

At the last general election a new group, known as the Responsivists, came into existence. The old Moderate group and the Responsivist group taken together consisted of 16 members.

The Hindu supporters of the various Ministers have belonged to the Moderate, Responsivist and National groups. The bond of union was their personal attitude towards the various Ministers. This was not strong enough to make them consistent in the support of Government, even when there were Hindu Ministers in office, and it failed entirely to keep them together when the Ministers were Muhammadan and during the period when there was no ministry.

It should however be noted that whilst the number of the moderates is small, their influence is greater than their number indicates. It is a social rather than a political influence, for amongst them are included many of the wealthier landlords and business men and leaders of the Bar and other professions. But a dislike of politics or the lack of any positive policy with a popular appeal deprives them of political influence. Enthusiasm is with the extremist, and when the extremist becomes a moderate, his popularity is gone.

124. **The attitude of the Muhammadans.**—It has already been seen that in the earlier years of the reforms period a large part of the Muhammadans under the influence of the Khilafat agitation joined in the non-co-operation movement, and many of them continued to support the Swarajist party in the second Council. Many, however, continued to follow the more moderate Muhammadan leaders of Bengal, who were willing to work the reforms, and this section grew in strength

with the communal tension of later years. It took all Mr. Das' tactical skill to keep the allegiance of the twenty-one Muhammadan Swarajists in the second Council, and his successor found it a still more difficult task. At the last general election only one Muhammadan supporter of the Swarajist party was elected. The depth of Muslim feeling against any obstructive policy in the Council may be gauged from the fact that in many cases the Muhammadans, who came forward for election as Congress candidates or had identified themselves with the Swarajists in the second Council, were defeated by comparatively unknown opponents, whose main strength lay in their profession of adherence to a policy of co-operation with the Government in working the reforms. The Muhammadans outside the *Swaraj* party had no separate organisation apart from the various Muhammadan associations of which they were members, but while there were Muhammadan Ministers, they accepted their leadership and had a party whip. On all communal questions they were united in the defence of Muhammadan interests and endeavoured to secure as many appointments as possible for Muhammadans. Their bond of union was the protection of Muhammadan interests, but this bond was not strong enough to hold them together when personal interests were involved. The thirty-seven Muhammadan members are divided into at least three parties; the divisions are on personal grounds rather than on grounds of principle, and it is the weakness or dissensions of the leaders which have prevented the Muhammadans from wielding that influence in the Council which seemed open to them. Outside the Council the communal bond has proved more effective, and in several districts the Muhammadans have combined to secure a large preponderance on District and Local Boards. The electorates for such bodies are not communal, but less interest is shown in these elections by the Swarajists and other political groups than in the Council elections.

CHAPTER VI.

The Provincial Government.

125. **Composition of Government.**—Until 1921 the Government of Bengal had consisted of the Governor and three Members of his Executive Council, of whom two were members of the Indian Civil Service and the third a non-official Indian. With the introduction of the Reforms the Government was considerably enlarged, a second non-official being added to the Executive Council, while provision was made for the appointment of three Ministers to administer the transferred subjects.

126. The Governor in Council is still responsible to Parliament for the administration of the reserved subjects; and the Council has

remained a part of the Executive Government throughout with changes only in the personnel. It has consisted of two British Members of the Indian Civil Service and two non-official Indians, one Hindu and one Muhammadan. The Ministers, on the other hand, are responsible to and removable by the Legislature.

Two Hindus (Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee and Mr. Provash Chunder Mitter) and one Muhammadan (Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri) were appointed Ministers in 1921 and held office for the whole of the first Council. Their security was partly due to the attitude of the extreme party of non-co-operation, which consistently with their creed refused to enter the Councils throughout India and aimed at wrecking the Reforms from outside. Mr. C. R. Das, however, broke away from this policy and in 1923 formed the Swaraj party, whose aim was to enter the Councils and force the concession of full responsible government by making every other form of government impossible. At the general election, which was held at the end of 1923, the Swaraj party secured a larger number of seats than any other single group and the Ministerial party fared very badly. Since then no stable Ministry has been possible.

The three Ministers of the first Council resigned before the new Council met. The Governor asked Mr. C. R. Das, the leader of the Swarajist party, to form a Ministry, but he refused. A Ministry was eventually formed with Mr. S. N. Mallik, who had been the virtual leader of the opposition in the first Council until he was appointed Chairman of the Calcutta Corporation, and two Muhammadans, Mr. A. K. Fazl-ul Huq and Mr. A. K. Ghuznavi. They took office on January 4th, 1924, but Mr. Mallik, whose unopposed election was set aside on an election petition, was defeated in the bye-election and resigned from February 29th. No Minister was appointed in his place and since then there have never been more than two Ministers at a time. The Swarajists and their supporters succeeded in securing the rejection of the Ministers' salaries for the following year in March, but as there was reason for believing that the adverse vote was due to a confusion of issues, the Governor retained the two Muhammadan Ministers in office on an honorary footing so as to give the Council an opportunity of reconsidering its decision. In August, however, their salaries were again rejected and they resigned, and the administration of the transferred subjects was taken over by the Governor under the Transferred Subjects (Temporary Administration) Rules.

Ministers were again appointed in March 1925, after the adoption by a substantial majority of a resolution that provision for a Ministry be made in the budget for the ensuing year. A Muhammadan, Nawab Bahadur Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, and a Hindu, Raja Manmatha Nath Roy Chaudhuri, were the Ministers selected, but a

fortnight after their assumption of office the Council reversed their previous decision by rejecting the demand for Ministers' salaries, and the Ministers resigned.

The result was that the transfer of the transferred subjects was suspended in June 1925 for the rest of the life of the Council under rule 6 of the Devolution Rules. In the third Council which met in January 1927 there has been a substantial majority in favour of a Ministry, but the dissensions within this majority have made the position of the individual Ministers insecure. The suspension of the transfer of transferred subjects expired on January 22nd, 1927, and Sir Abdur Rahim was appointed from that date, but being unable to find a Hindu colleague willing to work with him, he had to resign on January 26th. Mr. Byomkes Chakravarti and Mr. Ghuznavi, who were appointed in his place, were also forced to resign in August when motions of no confidence were carried by 68 votes to 55 and 66 votes to 62. The administration of the transferred subjects was again taken over temporarily by the Governor. The present Ministers, Sir Provash Chunder Mitter and Nawab Musharruf Hossain, were appointed in October 1927. They have been attacked more than once, and although a motion to refuse the grant for the Ministers' salaries was defeated in March 1928 by 80 votes to 40, motions of no confidence a week later were defeated by only 3 and 5 votes. In all these encounters the attack has been supported by the whole Swarajist party, numbering about 40, whilst the Ministers have been supported by the official block and the European group as well as by their own groups. Since the beginning of 1924, no Minister has held office for longer than seven months at a time.

127. **The practice of joint deliberation.**—This summary helps to explain the circumstances which governed the attempt to work the Government as a single unit. During the first year of the reformed constitution the principle of dyarchy as outlined in the Government of India Act read with the Devolution Rules and the Instructions to the Governor was followed. The responsibility for the two classes of subjects was kept clear and distinct. Matters relating to reserved subjects were ordinarily decided by the Governor in Council, whilst transferred subjects were the concern of the Governor and the Ministers. The orders were passed and issued either as Orders in Council or as Orders in the Ministry concerned. At the same time Lord Ronaldshay gave a broad interpretation to the Instruction that the Governor was to encourage the habit of joint deliberation. Thus, although the Devolution Rules require only that proposals for raising taxation or for the borrowing of money on the revenues of a province shall be considered at a joint meeting, the Rules of Executive Business made by the Governor under section 49(2) of the Government of India Act not only gave the Governor discretion to direct

that a case shall be discussed at a meeting of the Executive Council and Ministers sitting together, but also provided that he shall so direct in all cases substantially affecting the administration both of a reserved and of a transferred department, on which there is a difference of opinion between a Member and a Minister and in all cases involving legislation. In practice not only these subjects were discussed in joint meeting, but also the apportionment of funds, the settlement of the budget and other matters of importance, including matters coming before the Legislative Council.

Lord Lytton on his assumption of office in 1922 decided to treat the Government as a single unit, although no change was made in the rules framed under section 49. So long as there were Ministers, a joint meeting was held weekly, and separate meetings of the Executive Council almost ceased. The Executive Council met once in 1923 and once in 1924. Decisions were recorded on the files as those of the joint meeting, the cases thereafter being disposed of by the Governor in Council or the Governor acting with his Minister as the case might be. No formal meetings of the separate halves of Government were held to confirm the decisions of the joint meeting. It appears that there was no case in which the majority of the joint meeting differed from the majority of the Executive Council, but that, if there had been such a difference, Lord Lytton would have recorded no decision at the joint meeting, but would have taken the decision at a subsequent meeting of the Executive Council.

During the last year the system followed under the administration of Lord Ronaldshay has been restored, with the exception that the decisions in joint meetings have been recorded as Orders in Joint Meeting. Separate meetings of the Executive Council have again been held, the decisions being recorded as Orders in Council.

128. **Mutual support in the Legislative Council.**—In the Legislative Council Ministers have generally supported Members and Members Ministers. On two occasions of some importance Ministers have abstained from supporting or voting with the reserved half of Government, once during Lord Lytton's administration on a resolution for the abolition of whipping in jails, and again in 1927 on a resolution asking for the release of political prisoners, which had the support of all non-official Indian members of the Legislative Council except one. But these were exceptional occasions in which non-official Indian opinion was strong against Government. Ordinarily, the Ministers have been successful in securing for the reserved half of Government the support of their adherents, so that whilst there were Ministers the reserved business has been carried on without recourse to the Governor's special powers. In return they were able to rely on the votes of the official block for the support of their

own policy. This reciprocal arrangement had the advantage that the two halves of Government worked in unison and the spectacle of a Government divided against itself was avoided. Ministers too were enabled to take part in the business of Government as a whole and to exercise their influence upon the administration of reserved subjects. But it also had its disadvantages. A great deal of the difficulty in working the constitution has been caused by the popular conception of the Government as something apart from the people. This conception is a legacy of the system which had prevailed for so many years, and it was naturally encouraged by the fact that in the past the majority of the important posts had been held by men of a different race from the people. The Legislative Council has failed to realise the change made by the Reforms. The Government is still the natural object of criticism from all sides, and especially that part of it which is responsible for the maintenance of law and order; and no party has been formed with a constructive programme, supporting leaders pledged to carry it into effect; the sole aim of one party has been the obstruction of the Government, and it is due to the strength and policy of this party that the main issue in the Council has been that of destroying or maintaining the constitution. Political effort has been absorbed in this issue, and on other matters policy is vague. The system itself is also largely responsible for this result. The Governor in Council perpetuates and represents the old form of irremovable government, and Ministers in accepting office have been popularly regarded as becoming for the time being a part of that Government. This idea has been strengthened by the treatment of the two halves of Government as a unified whole; the Ministers have become identified with the old bureaucratic form of government, and instead of introducing a popular element into the Government have come to share its unpopularity.

129. **Working of the joint cabinet.**—Within the Government the system of combining the Executive Council and the Ministers in a joint cabinet worked without difficulty. The papers of all questions, which were to come before the joint meeting, were circulated to both Members and Ministers, whether they appertained to reserved or to transferred subjects. In spite of differences of opinion, agreed decisions were usually obtained. This unanimity was partly due to a spirit of compromise engendered by discussion and partly to the need of mutual support in the Legislative Council. It was also due to the influence of the Governors and their constant endeavour to secure agreement, and to a reluctance on the part of both Members of Council and Ministers to interfere in spheres for which they were not responsible. The struggle to keep the constitution working in spite of obstruction added weight to the counsels of the Ministers, who, it was felt, were in closer touch with current political feeling;

and this enabled Ministers to exercise more influence on questions affecting reserved subjects than might have been expected from the constitutional position.

130. **Official block.**—The official block has never played the part contemplated by the Joint Select Committee. In the first Council, Secretaries occasionally replied on behalf of Government, but generally the spokesmen for Government have been the Members or Ministers, and other official members, so far from being allowed to speak and vote as they choose, have not been allowed to speak at all and have been required to support Government with their votes. It was felt that it would not have been expedient to allow officials, especially the Secretaries who make up half the number, to speak or vote against either Members or Ministers.

Governor in Council.

131. **Executive Council.**—While the conduct of Government has naturally been affected by the mutual interaction of its two halves, the internal working of these two halves has proceeded independently on the lines contemplated by the Act.

As has been pointed out above, the balance between officials and non-officials, British and Indian, Hindu and Muhammadan, has been maintained in the Executive Council since its enlargement to four members in 1921. The Government of Bengal's proposal to reduce the number to three (two officials and one non-official) was overruled as it would have disturbed the balance.

The distribution of the portfolios in 1921 was as follows; the grouping of the subjects has since been generally followed with slight variations:—

(1) Sir Henry Wheeler	...	Appointment, Political, Police (Law and Order).
(2) Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan.	...	Revenue, Irrigation.
(3) Mr. J. H. Kerr	...	Finance, Commerce, Marine.
(4) Sir Abdur Rahim	...	Judicial, Jails.

The distribution is at the complete discretion of the Governor, but hitherto officials have always been in charge of the Law and Order and the Finance portfolios, and the principle that the Member in charge of Finance should not have charge of any large spending department has been followed, except during the period when the transfer of transferred subjects was suspended.

The senior Member has always been appointed Vice-President of the Executive Council and has been recognised as Leader of the House in the Legislative Council.

Important questions are decided by a majority of the Executive Council and no occasion has arisen hitherto for the Governor to use either his casting vote or his statutory power of overruling the majority of his Council.

The Governor acting with his Ministers.

132. **Formation of Ministries.**—The absence of parties with clearly defined policies and the existence of personal issues have made the selection of Ministers a matter of great difficulty. When the first Council assembled in January, 1921, there was no party with a real political programme based on political principles. The Ministers belonged to definite political parties in the country and towards the end of March, 1921, political parties of Council members with definite programmes were formed; but the existence of separate groups, namely the Hindu group, the Muhammadan group and the European group, each committed to look after its peculiar interests, rendered difficult the evolution and continuance of genuine parties in the sense in which the expression is understood in England. In the second and the third Councils the problem has been complicated by the fact that the main issue has been that of working or wrecking the constitution.

The real position in all three Councils has been that certain individuals commanded in a greater or less degree the confidence and support of various groups, and the problem has resolved itself into estimating the combination of individual leaders most likely to command a majority in the Council, with due regard to the representation of Hindu and Muhammadan interests.

The position of such Ministries has been made precarious by the combination of the Swaraj party with those who are opposed to the individual Ministers on account of personal animosities or ambitions. The Swaraj party frustrated all attempts to establish a convention whereby a nominal reduction in the Ministers' salaries would be regarded as a vote of no confidence, and it has secured the total refusal of the salaries on three occasions. The Reforms Enquiry Committee recognised the difficulty caused by this confusion of issues and recommended the amendment of section 52(1) of the Act to provide for a reasonable salary for the Ministers and at the same time to give facilities to the Council to show disapproval of their policy by a motion for reduction of salary.

A demand for the pay of two Council Secretaries at Rs. 2,000 a month each was included in the budget of 1925-26 as it was thought

that their appointment would strengthen the Ministry and at the same time give some administrative experience to future Ministers, but when the Ministers' salaries were refused, the demand was withdrawn. There never seems to have been any general desire for the appointment of Council Secretaries.

133. **Joint responsibility.**—The same factors, which have made the selection of Ministers so difficult, have also militated against the growth of the convention of joint responsibility among the Ministers. Generally speaking with the exception of the first Council, the Ministers have been the leaders of separate sets of personal followers and though each has been dependent upon the support of his colleague's adherents for his own retention of office, no cabinet responsibility has been explicitly recognised.

Two attempts, however, have been made to establish such a convention: in January, 1927, Sir Abdur Rahim was appointed a Minister on condition that he could find a Hindu colleague with sufficient supporters willing to work with him. This procedure involved the recognition of joint responsibility and also of Sir Abdur Rahim as Chief Minister. When on his failure to find a colleague, Mr. B. Chakravarti and Mr. Ghuznavi were appointed Ministers, they definitely accepted office with joint responsibility. So when the motion of no confidence in Mr. Ghuznavi was carried in August, 1927, Mr. Chakravarti immediately said that he accepted this as a vote of no confidence in the Ministry as a whole and that he would resign in consequence without waiting for the result of a separate vote being moved against himself. The Council, however, did not recognise such a convention and have always insisted on separate motions against each Minister.

During the second Council both the Ministers in 1924 were Muhammadans and their supporters were to some extent held together by the common bond of communal interests, but this Ministry did not survive and in all the other Ministries one Minister has been Hindu and one Muhammadan, their followers forming separate groups, which have united merely for the purpose of keeping their leaders in office.

134. **Governor's power to overrule Ministers.**—In distributing patronage and making appointments the Ministers are subjected to pressure of every kind and to the influence of communal, racial or political interests; and where, as in the Councils after 1923, a Minister's tenure of office is dependent upon his retaining the support of his personal followers, patronage—whether in the public services or in local bodies—may be a very valuable weapon. In the matter of appointments the Governor has found it necessary to use

his power of overruling the Minister; but in such cases of disagreement he has generally persuaded the Ministers to accept his view, or with their acquiescence, has assumed the responsibility of making the appointment in question.

The instances of the Governor overruling a Minister on questions of policy have been few, and the questions in these instances were of minor importance.

135. **Temporary administration of transferred subjects.**—In view of the Council's refusal to vote salaries for the Ministers, the Governor had himself to administer the transferred subjects from September 1st, 1924, to June 13th, 1925, with an interval of a fortnight in March 1925. Under the rules the Governor is himself responsible for the administration of the departments in such circumstances, but he appointed the Members of the Executive Council to act as his agents for the different departments, their orders being subsequently submitted to him for confirmation.

In regard both to expenditure and to legislation, the Governor's powers were subject to the same limitations as when there were Ministers in charge of the subjects; for instance, he had no power of certification either of expenditure or of legislation: but no occasion arose during the period when he wished to overrule the decision of the Legislative Council.

136. **Revocation of transfer.**—The transfer of transferred subjects was suspended by the Secretary of State from June 13th, 1925, to January 21st, 1927, and all subjects automatically became reserved subjects under the control of the Governor in Council. The subjects which had been previously transferred were distributed among the four Members of the Executive Council.

The Governor and the Legislature.

137. **Nomination.**—While the powers of the Governor are primarily concerned with the executive Government, he has certain powers of control and restraint over the Legislature. In exercising the power of nominating members the Governor has usually nominated the full number of officials, but in January, 1924, at the request of the Ministers to secure the solidarity of their groups, he replaced three of the officials by non-officials. They did not resign when the Ministry fell. Three extra non-officials were similarly nominated in place of officials on the reformation of the Ministry in October, 1927.

138. **Dissolution.**—The power to dissolve the Council before the statutory period of three years or, in special circumstances, to extend

its life-time up to one year beyond that limit rests with the Governor, who however has never exercised it. The Council has been dissolved only at the expiry of its life-time and never because of any constitutional or political crisis or as a means of ascertaining the wishes of the electorate upon some important issue. The English practice, whereby the party in power can choose the most favourable time to itself for a general election, would be difficult to put into operation in the case of a government composed not only of removable Ministers but also of irremovable Members of Council.

139. **Supply.**—Subject to two safeguards, the Executive is dependent on the vote of the Legislative Council for all supplies; the two safeguards are the Governor's power of certification, in relation to a reserved subject, that the proposed expenditure is essential to the discharge of his responsibility for that subject, and his power, in cases of emergency, to authorise expenditure necessary for the safety or tranquillity of the province or for the carrying on of any department, reserved or transferred.

The extent to which the Governor has used these powers is indicated in the following table. In five cases the Council itself at a subsequent session voted in whole or part supplies, which it had refused in the main budget, but which the Governor put up to them for their reconsideration:—

[The figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Year.	Reserved.		Transferred.	
	Amount cut (net).	Amount restored.	Amount cut (net).	Amount restored.
1921-22 ..	6,16	1,30	22,00	13,26
1922-23 ..	2,67	42	13	....
1923-24 ..	2,35	....	....	....
1924-25 ..	3,34,25	3,17,15	21,59	7,05
1925-26 ..	6,58	6,02	2,32	....
1926-27 ..	75	....	one rupee	....
Total ..	3,52,76	3,24,89	46,04	20,31

The magnitude of the figures against 1924-25 is explained by the fact that the majority of the cuts were made not on the merits of the

demands, nor out of any regard for economy, but in pursuit of the Swarajist policy of rejecting as much of the budget as possible and thus wrecking the Reforms. Such items were restored by the Governor in full, while those items which had clearly been rejected on grounds of economy or policy were considered on their merits.

The figure 46,04 on the transferred side includes cuts amounting to 26,63 under the head " Civil Works " in respect of various building schemes for the reserved departments. It seems an anomaly that the Governor has no power to certify expenditure on buildings in the reserved departments merely because the agency which arranges for the carrying out of those works is a transferred subject. There were two cases, one on the reserved and one on the transferred side, in which the Governor used his power of authorising expenditure before the demand had been presented to the Legislative Council; in both cases the Council subsequently voted the amount.

140. **Legislation.**—The Governor has used his powers of overruling the will of the Legislature on two occasions. In 1925, on the failure of the Council to pass the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, he used the power of certification conferred upon him by section 72E to make it an Act. In 1926, he withheld his assent from the Calcutta Municipal Amendment Bill, which had been passed by the Council, on the ground that its provisions were inconsistent and the bill unworkable.

141. **Resolutions and motions for adjournment.**—Although the Governor has exercised his powers of allowing or disallowing resolutions in a liberal spirit, still he has been compelled to disallow more than eighty resolutions since 1921 on the ground that they could not be moved without detriment to the public interest or that they were not primarily the concern of the local Government. Government accepted in whole or in part a large number of the resolutions which were passed and definitely rejected about 20 per cent. On only one occasion did the Governor prohibit a motion for the adjournment of the House.

142. **Allocation of funds between reserved and transferred subjects.**—Except in the case of the main budget for 1925-26, when there were no Ministers in office at the time of the preparation of the estimates, the allocation of funds in the main and supplementary budgets to reserved and transferred subjects was effected by agreement between the two halves of Government, sitting in joint deliberation under the presidency of the Governor, and there was no occasion to use the procedure prescribed by the Devolution Rules to meet cases of disagreement. The statement below shows the allocations of expenditure, including debt heads, in the total estimates (main *plus* supplementary) of each year, and the percentage of the total expenditure allotted to

either side. The figures include non-votable as well as votable expenditure, and the estimates under " 41—Civil Works " are here split up between " Reserved " and " Transferred " according as the work proposed to be done was work for a reserved or work for a transferred subject:—

[The figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Year.	Reserved.		Transferred.	
	Sum allocated.	Percentage of total.	Sum allocated.	Percentage of total.
1921-22 ..	9,31,53	70	3,86,13	30
1922-23 ..	7,21,67	66	3,78,45	34
1923-24 ..	6,97,98	66	3,45,74	34
1924-25 ..	7,02,04	66	3,54,73	34
1925-26 ..	7,61,18	65	3,93,24	35
1926-27 ..	7,30,31	64	4,05,21	36

The following table shows the allocation between either side of Government of funds for expenditure on new schemes, and the nature of that expenditure:—

[The figures are in thousands of rupees.]

Year.	Reserved.				Transferred.			
	Recurring.	Percentage of total recurring.	Non-recurring.	Percentage of total non-recurring.	Recurring.	Percentage of total recurring.	Non-recurring.	Percentage of total non-recurring.
1921-22 ..	13,74*	40	17,28	46	20,56*	60	20,13	54
1922-23 ..	5,61	36	8,00	27	9,72	64	21,36	73
1923-24 ..	10	100	1,25	13	..	..	8,12	87
1924-25 ..	50	29	21,31	51	1,18	71	19,83	49
1925-26 ..	2,00	13	20,52	43	13,11	87	27,02	57
1926-27 ..	4,48	38	44,34	55	7,30	62	36,27	45
Total ..	26,43	34	1,12,70	46	51,87	66	1,32,73	54

* Includes abnormal expenditure on account of revision of pay of officers and menials throughout the province.

The two statements show that the share of the transferred side in the total budget estimates has increased since the introduction of the

Reforms and that the transferred side has also secured larger allotments than the reserved side for expenditure on new schemes. The resources of Government were increased during this period by additional taxation and retrenchment of expenditure.

143. **The Finance Department and other departments.**—New schemes, however, do not necessarily connote new departures in the sense of marked expansion of existing activities or of developments of new activities, and it was a complaint of the Ministers throughout that funds were not available for any large development. Again, the fact that agreements were arrived at in the allocation of funds does not mean that there were not differences of opinion on financial questions. On the contrary, there was a constant tendency to criticise expenditure on the reserved side as being extravagant and disproportionate with the expenditure on transferred subjects; and the demand was made that the finance of the transferred departments should be separated from that of the reserved departments and placed under a Finance Minister, although no request was ever made to the Governor for the appointment of a Financial Adviser under Devolution Rule 36. The control of the Finance Department was found irksome; one of the Ministers complained in July, 1924, that Devolution Rule 37 had had the effect of vesting excessive powers in that department and that the financial examination of schemes was regarded as implying a minute and meticulous scrutiny by the Finance Department of the smallest technical details of every project—details which would be better left to the discretion of the administrative department. The Finance Department were described by the same Minister as having practically placed themselves in the position of experts in every department instead of confining themselves to the more general financial aspects of schemes, the result being that Ministers were often unable to carry through their schemes in the forms approved by them. Complaint was also made of the limitation of the powers of departments in such matters as making re-appropriation. The practical difficulties of estimating a year or more in advance have been felt by both reserved and transferred departments.

The Governor in Council examined the complaints early in 1924 and came to the conclusion that the retention of the financial rules was necessary for the proper working of Government, and a similar conclusion was reached by the Reforms Enquiry Committee, who in particular cited Devolution Rule 37 as a necessary check upon the waste of public funds.

The position of the Finance Department is explained in the following quotation from the budget speech of the Finance Member of 29th February, 1924:—

"Let me now explain the position of the Finance Department. I want to make this clear because there are many, even in the

Secretariat, who are not particularly conversant with the work of the Finance Department. Now the Finance Department has nothing to do with the allocation of money. The business of the Finance Department is to examine and advise on schemes for new expenditure. This is all laid down in the rules. New schemes involving expenditure must all come before the Finance Department. This is laid down in the Devolution Rules. What the Finance Department has to do may be dealt with under four heads. " Their duty is—

(1) to see that a scheme is based on sound financial principles and in accord with the recognised canons for expenditure of public money;

(2) to ensure that the scheme is not extravagant or wasteful. It might, for example, suggest that the scheme that is put forward could be done in a better way and at a cheaper cost;

(3) to ensure co-ordination between the departments as for example in the matter of salaries; and

(4) to see that the proper sanction is obtained—there are certain rules of sanction and the Finance Department sees that necessary sanction is obtained.

" There is nothing in all these which gives the Finance Department power to say that a scheme cannot be proceeded with because there is no money. In connection with a scheme the business of the Finance Department is finished when it has examined the scheme on its merits. The provision of money stands on a quite different footing. This is laid down in the Devolution Rules. Rule 31 of the Devolution Rules lays down that framing of proposals for expenditure in regard to transferred and reserved subjects will be a matter for agreement between that part of the Government which is responsible for the administration of the transferred subjects and that part of the Government which is responsible for the administration of reserved subjects. In other words, the Members and Ministers sit together to decide what schemes are to be provided for.

" It will be helpful if I give some indication as to how a budget is prepared. All departments send in their estimates of expenditure for the ensuing year. These deal with expenditure which has already been approved and sanctioned and which is going on. There are certain variations of expenditure caused by such items as increments of pay, progressive salaries, certain works which may be coming to a close—all variations of expenditure which has already been voted by the Council and passed. All these are checked and examined, consolidated and collected in the light of experience of past expenditure, firstly, in the Accountant-General's office, and secondly, in the

Finance Department. While this is going on, all the new schemes, schemes for new expenditure, which the departments want to put in the next year's budget, are sent into the Finance Department. These schemes have already been examined and approved by the Finance Department in accordance with the rules, and all that the Finance Department does is to see that they are properly presented and that they have been approved. About the 15th January the first edition of the budget incorporating the sanctioned expenditure and estimates of revenue based on the figures up to the end of December, or about that time, is fixed up and checked. We have then a budget of sanctioned expenditure for the coming year. Then we know how we stand; we know what our revenue and existing expenditure will be, what our general financial position is. What the Finance Department does is to place before the whole Government this budget showing the exact financial position of the province and the proposals for new expenditure. It is the business of Government as a whole to determine which of the new schemes shall be included in the budget. This has, of course, to be considered with reference to the funds available. The Finance Department merely comes in to record the decision of Government. The Finance Member does not as such allocate the money; it is allocated by the Members and Ministers of Government sitting together. The Finance Department cannot sanction new expenditure; it must be done by Government as a whole. Therefore I am not, personally, as Finance Member, responsible for the allocation of funds. Let me now look at it from another point of view. How does a scheme find a place in the budget? With regard to a scheme we must first have a policy. When a Minister or Member determines a policy he works out a scheme and that scheme comes up to the Finance Department to be examined on the principles which I have mentioned. As I have said, the Finance Department cannot turn down a scheme. The Finance Department may differ from a Member or Minister in regard to a particular scheme, but it cannot reject the scheme. If the Member or Minister is not satisfied with the decision of the Finance Department he can take it, according to the principle of dyarchy, to the Governor in Council if the question relates to the reserved side or to the Governor sitting with his Ministers if it relates to the transferred side. But we are working on a unified system and the whole Government would be consulted in a matter in which the Finance Department differs from a Member or Minister. Then the decision arrived at is the decision of the Government and there can be no rejection by the Finance Member. If it is decided that it is an approved scheme the next thing is to find funds. As I have said the finding of funds for expenditure on the schemes is a matter which is determined by the Government as a whole. In order that a scheme may find a place in the budget there must therefore be a policy and it must be an approved scheme."

144. **Public Accounts Committee.**—From 1923 onwards the Audit and Appropriation Reports of the province were placed annually before a Committee on Public Accounts consisting of the Finance Member as Chairman and eight other members of the Legislative Council, of whom two were nominated by the Governor and the others elected by the non-official members of the Legislative Council. For each year the Committee embodied its recommendations in a report which was presented to the Legislative Council by the Finance Member, who then invited the House to sanction the demands necessary in order to cover votable excesses brought to notice in the Appropriation Report. The Committee disposed of its work in 1923 in two sittings, but in the four succeeding years the number of meetings held was twenty-three and, though on an average only half of the members (other than the Chairman) attended, the proceedings were characterised by an early appreciation of the objects with which the Committee met and a serious endeavour to achieve them. The Secretary in the Finance Department and the Accountant-General, Bengal, were present at all meetings, to assist when occasion arose: the Committee frequently called for and examined other Secretaries to Government and Heads of Departments; and at a meeting held in 1926 a fruitful discussion on the functions of Public Accounts Committees was introduced by the Auditor-General. While there was no case of substantial difference on any important issue between the views of the Committee and those of the Executive, the Committee made several suggestions which were subsequently carried out and was instrumental in deepening in all departments their sense of financial responsibility: it was also instrumental in imparting to members of the Legislature a fuller knowledge of the accounts system and a new appreciation of the difficulties sometimes involved in working it. On all occasions the demands for sanction of the votable excesses covered by the Committee's reports were passed in the Legislative Council; and except in 1927, when there was a debate of some length on the excesses noticed in the Appropriation Report for 1925-26, and a division on one of the demands, the Council did nothing which indicated a reluctance to accept the recommendations of their Committee.

145. **Relations between reserved and transferred departments.**—There is little in the experience of the last seven years to suggest that the relations between departments, and in particular between the reserved and transferred departments, have been more difficult than they were before. The Appointment Department has had differences with other departments about the supply and reversion of officers, and about additional duties proposed to be imposed on officers by another department. Departments have differed as to which should deal with a question. But these differences caused no difficulty and cannot be attributed to the Reforms. There seem to have been only one or two

cases in which the Governor had to decide under the rules of executive business (rule 37) to which department a case belonged. One of these was concerned with a resolution in the Legislative Council, with which both a reserved and a transferred department were unwilling to deal; the Governor told them to do it in consultation. Ordinarily, such differences are settled between the Secretaries of the departments without any trouble.

146. **Departmental difficulties due to system.**—There are, however, some difficulties, which have a more constitutional aspect, and are due not to any difference of opinion between departments but to defects in the system. The essence of these difficulties is that certain departments or certain officers or certain expenditure which are included in the schedule of transferred subjects may be necessary for the administration of another subject which is included in the schedule of reserved subjects; consequently, it is possible for a Legislative Council with wrecking intentions to cripple the administration even of reserved subjects by rejecting demands for transferred subjects. The following examples will serve to illustrate the point:—

(1) " Medical " is a transferred subject and the salaries of Civil Surgeons, who are not members of the Indian Medical Service, Assistant Surgeons and Sub-Assistant Surgeons, if rejected, cannot be restored by the certificate of the Governor under proviso (*a*) to section 72D (2). These officers, however, perform certain duties connected with reserved subjects, such as Police, Jails and Administration of Justice, and their dismissal would impair the efficient administration of such subjects. In the 1924 session the Legislative Council rejected the demand under the head of " Medical Establishment."

(2) Certain officers, such as the members of the Imperial Services, are placed beyond the reach of the Legislative Council and their salaries are non-votable. Nevertheless, the cost of their office staff, their travelling allowance and their office equipment is votable. It is, therefore, possible for a Legislative Council to cripple the work of, say, a Surgeon-General by refusing the pay of his personal assistant or his office establishment.

(3) The Public Works Department is a transferred subject, but it has to provide buildings for other departments that administer reserved subjects, and therefore the rejection of a demand under the heading of " Civil Works " may cripple the administration of a reserved subject. Instances were the rejection of a demand for the cost of building a house for the Chief Justice and of a demand for the construction of quarters for the Calcutta Police,

In the latter case the Governor decided under rule 7 of the Devolution Rules that the demand related to a reserved subject and certified that the expenditure was essential to the discharge of his responsibility; but it was subsequently decided that the power of certification could not be exercised in respect of a demand in the Public Works Department, even though it related to a reserved subject.

147. **Difficulties due to plural control.**—Minor inconveniences have arisen from plural control. Thus the Public Works Department works under the Minister in charge of the department for ordinary civil works, under the Finance Member in railway matters, under the Political Member in matters connected with the Governor's Estates, and under the Revenue Member for work in Darjeeling district and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which are excluded areas. The excluded areas involve plural control in several departments, and there are other examples in which a department works both under a Member and a Minister.

A more serious difficulty of the kind has been caused by the Village Self-Government Act of 1919. The chaukidars or village police formerly worked under the direction of the local police and the control of the Magistrate. In union board areas the Act has placed them under the control both of the police and Magistrate and of the union board, the departmental control thus being divided between the Police and Local Self-Government Departments. The Inspector-General of Police has expressed great concern at the result of these changes, the chaukidar now being, in his opinion, of little use to the regular force as a source of information. The Governor in Council, however, has declined at present to share this pessimistic view.

148. **Standing committees.**—Standing committees of the Legislative Council are attached to eleven departments. According to the rules major questions of departmental policy are to be laid before them, as well as all schemes involving large expenditure, annual reports, and any other matters on which the Member or Minister in charge may desire the opinion of the committee; but in practice, the committees have been of little value either to the Legislative Council or to the departments, and meetings have been few. The Legislative Council lost interest in them because their functions are only advisory and the proceedings are confidential, and efforts to secure more powers for them failed. During the first Council Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea convened several meetings of the Local Self-Government Committee, and a few meetings were held by other departments; during the second Council and the period during which there was no Ministry, the committees seldom met, and the only committee which still shows vitality is that attached to the Police Department.

CHAPTER VII.

The Electorate and Elections.

The Electorate for the Bengal Legislative Council.

149. **Composition of pre-Reform Council.**—The Bengal Legislative Council, before the introduction of the Reforms, consisted of 5 *ex-officio* members (including the Governor), 20 nominated members, and 28 elected members. In addition, two experts, official or non-official, might be nominated to advise on impending legislation.

The elected members were sent up to Council from very limited electorates, and the vote was the prerogative of a limited number of persons enjoyed by virtue of membership of a municipal or district board, of a special association such as a Chamber of Commerce or the University Senate or by virtue of belonging to a privileged community such as the great land-holders of the province. Five members were elected by the Muhammadan community. The qualifications for the Muhammadan electorate were based on the possession of a certain social, official or professional status or on the payment of land revenue, cesses or income-tax of a certain amount. The number of the electors was a little over 6,000.

150. **Changes introduced by the Reforms.**—The Reforms increased the total number of members of Council to 140, of whom 26 were nominated members, 22 were distributed among special electorates of the same kind as in the old Council, and 92 were assigned to general constituencies. These general constituencies fall into four divisions, representing different classes of the community, Muhammadan, non-Muhammadan, European and Anglo-Indian, and the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan general constituencies are further classified as "urban" or "rural." The bulk of the Council consists therefore of members sent up from general constituencies, the qualifications of a voter being based partly on the community to which he belongs, and partly on residence and the payment, directly or indirectly, of rates or taxes of a certain amount. The qualifications which depend on residence and payment of rates and taxes have been based on the qualifications already prescribed for various local bodies. The following statement compares the qualifications of Council voters in non-Muhammadan and Muhammadan general constituencies with those prescribed for voters in union boards, local boards and municipalities. It will be noticed that the qualifications, although similar,

are by no means the same. In particular, the educational qualification found in local boards and municipalities has no counterpart in the Council electoral rules:—

Qualifications of electors.

Rural areas of the Legislative Council.	Local Boards.	Union Boards.
Payment of cess of not less than Re. 1. Payment of union rate or chaukidari tax of not less than Rs. 2. Payment of income-tax. Military qualification.	Membership of Union Committees. Payment of cess of not less than Re. 1. Payment of license tax. Educational qualification. Possession of annual income of Rs. 240.	Payment of cess of not less than Re. 1. Payment of union rate or chaukidari tax of not less than Re. 1.

Urban areas of the Legislative Council (excluding Calcutta).	Municipalities other than Calcutta.
Payment of taxes of not less than Rs. 1-8 or in the case of Howrah of not less than Rs. 3. Payment of income-tax. Military qualification.	Payment of taxes of not less than Rs. 1-8 or in the case of Howrah of not less than Rs. 3. Payment of or assessment to income-tax. Educational qualification. Payment of rent of not less than Rs. 20.

Calcutta constituencies of the Legislative Council.	Calcutta constituencies of the Calcutta Corporation.
Owners and occupiers of land or buildings valued at not less than Rs. 150 per annum. Owners or occupiers of land or buildings valued at not less than Rs. 300 per annum. Payers of Rs. 24 as rates or taxes. Income-tax payers. Soldiers.	Owners or occupiers of any premises who have paid directly Rs. 12 in rates. Payers of Rs. 12 as license tax. Occupiers paying rent at Rs. 25 per mensem or above for six months. Owner of a hut in a *bustee* for six consecutive months in respect of which Rs. 12 has been paid in rates.

151. **Qualifications of electors.**—The main qualifications of an elector in the non-Muhammadan and Muhammadan general constituencies are (*a*) in rural areas the payment of cess of not less than Re. 1 or union rate (or chaukidari tax) of not less than Rs. 2 per annum; and (*b*) in urban areas payment of municipal taxes of Re. 1-8 per annum (Howrah Rs. 3).

(NOTE.—These qualifications do not apply to Calcutta constituencies, where special qualifications have been prescribed.)

152. **Number and growth of electorate.**—The total number of electors estimated for these constituencies at the time the Franchise Committee made its proposals was roughly as follows: non-Muhammadan voters 786,000 and Muhammadan voters 440,000. Actually, the number of voters in these constituencies turned out to be as follows, in the three general elections of 1920-26:—

	1920.	1923.	1926.		
			Male.	Female.	Total.
Non-Muhammadan voters ..	541,189	557,914	593,414	29,803	623,217
Muhammadan voters ..	465,127	463,386	522,892	7,103	529,995

It will be noticed that the estimate made for the Franchise Committee in 1918 was a slight under-estimate as regards Muhammadan and a considerable over-estimate as regards non-Muhammadan voters.

The growth of the electorate between 1920 and 1926 is remarkable. The 1923 figures show a slight decrease in the number of Muhammadan voters and a considerable increase in the number of non-Muhammadan voters. The explanation of this is probably that the increased interest taken in the Council elections in 1923 was chiefly confined to the Hindu community. The salient features of the 1926 elections were (1) the increase in the electorate owing to increased interest taken by all classes of the community in the elections and (2) the additional increase occasioned by the granting of the franchise to women.

The increase in the electorate in 1926 may also to some extent be due to increase in assessment, which again may be partly ascribed to increase in the wealth of the community and partly to other causes, such as the development of the union board system, which encourages increase in the union rate.

It is feared that increased accuracy in the preparation of the roll has had very little to do with the increase. The present method of preparing the rolls is practically the same as in 1920 and 1923. The natural result of successive revisions is, however, to make the electoral roll more complete, even although the same methods are employed.

153. **Proportion of those enfranchised to total population.**—The following figures show the numbers and percentages of the population enfranchised in 1926 (the census tables do not give the figures of the population of over 21 years of age, but only of those over 20 years; the latter figures are therefore taken):—

Total male population of the age of 20 and over—12,445,013.

Total male persons enfranchised in Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies—1,116,306.

Percentage of male adults enfranchised—8·9.

Total female population of the age of 20 and over—11,276,081.

Total female persons enfranchised—36,906.

Percentage of female adults enfranchised—·3.

Total male and female population of the age of 20 and over—23,721,094.

Total male and female persons enfranchised—1,153,212.

Percentage of male and female adults enfranchised—4·8.

The statement below shows the percentage enfranchised in the general constituencies of the Council, as the result of revisions of the electoral roll in 1920, 1923 and 1926. In calculating the percentage, the 1921 census has been made use of throughout:—

Constituency.	Percentage enfranchised of—				
	Total population, 1920.	Total population, 1923.	Males, 1926.	Females, 1926.	Total population, 1926.
1	2	3	4	5	6
Non-Muhammadan urban..	4·4	4·6	7	2·0	6·0
Non-Muhammadan rural ..	2·3	2·4	5	·2	2·6
Total non-Muhammadan ..	2·5	2·6	5	·3	2·9
Muhammadan urban ..	3·0	3·1	4	1·2	3·1
Muhammadan rural ..	1·8	1·8	4	·03	2·0
Total Muhammadan ..	1·8	1·8	4	·06	2·0
Europeans	18·0	38·0	100	5·0	68·0
Anglo-Indians ..	13·0	19·0	36	3·0	20·0

The large increase in the electorate of the European constituencies occurred simultaneously with a decrease in the number of male voters in the Anglo-Indian constituency from 4,235 in 1923 to 4,029 in 1926, and is probably due, partly to the increased interest taken in politics by the European community, and partly to a tendency on the part of Anglo-Indians to describe themselves as Europeans. This explains the anomalous percentage figure of 100 in column 4 of the statement.

154. **Percentage of illiteracy amongst the electorate.**—During 1925 and 1926 three separate enquiries were made into the illiteracy of the rural electorate in the general constituencies. The first, which was made in June 1925 by a local enquiry in two selected polling areas in each district, resulted in an estimate of 41 per cent. of illiteracy among non-Muhammadans and 55 per cent. among Muhammadan electors. The second enquiry was made on a larger scale at the time of revision of the electoral rolls in 1926 and gave the same percentage of illiteracy among the non-Muhammadans, but a higher percentage of 61·7 among the Muhammadans. The third estimate was made by the polling officers at the time of the elections and indicated that of those who actually voted 33·4 per cent. were illiterate amongst the non-Muhammadans and 52·7 per cent. amongst the Muhammadans.

155. **Interest taken in the franchise.**—There has been a slow but steady growth in the interest taken by the electorate in the elections and in the working of the Council, since the introduction of the Reforms. The percentage of the non-Muhammadan electors exercising the vote in 1926 was 48·3 in urban and 39·4 in rural areas. The corresponding figures for Muhammadan electors were 41·02 and 37·02. Considering the comparatively long distances that voters have to travel in the country to arrive at the polling booths, these figures appear to indicate that the interest taken in elections in rural areas is not less than in the town.

156. **Interest taken by women in the elections.**—In 1925 the sex disqualification was removed, and in 1926 women took part in a general election for the first time. The effect on the polling strength of the province was that 37,830 female voters were registered, an increase of only ·12 per cent. Of these, only 5,132 or 13·6 per cent. voted, and although in Calcutta and other places separate polling arrangements were made, the majority of female voters belonged to the less respectable classes and included a large number of prostitutes.

157. **Method employed in preparing the electoral roll.**—The electoral roll is revised once in three years, *i.e.*, immediately before each general election. In rural areas the President Panchayat of each chaukidari union and the President of each union board is requested to act as agent of the registering authority and revise that part of the register which pertains to his union. This work is supervised by circle officers working under Subdivisional Officers, who, in their turn, are responsible to the registering authority, who is usually the District Magistrate.

The roll is drawn up in the first instance, as a Council electoral roll, and thereafter an asterisk is placed against the name of each elector who appears to be qualified to vote in the Legislative Assembly

constituency also. One roll serves therefore for the purpose of both elections.

In urban areas the registers are prepared ward by ward under the supervision of Municipal Chairmen and sent to the Subdivisional Officer. In Calcutta, the whole work is done by the Corporation, the Chief Executive Officer being the registering authority.

After revision by elimination of duplicate entries and other mistakes and insertion of the names of those qualified by virtue of payment of income-tax, the draft rolls are printed and published. Thirty days are thereafter allowed for claims and objections, which are heard and decided by various officials, mostly Deputy Collectors, Munsifs, and Sub-Deputy Collectors, constituted as revising authorities. The rolls as thus revised are thereafter finally published.

158. **Defects in the system of registration.**—There are obvious defects in this system. In the first place, there is no house to house enquiry, unless this is done now and then by an exceptionally conscientious panchayat. Again, the agency employed in the preliminary revision of the rolls is almost wholly honorary, the work being in no sense a statutory duty of any local body; and a good deal of the preliminary work is inevitably slipshod, though probably carried out impartially.

The checking by Circle and Subdivisional Officers and the opportunity given for claims and objections do a good deal to remedy this preliminary inaccuracy, but in the end it is probable that many mistakes and omissions exist in the finally published roll.

159. **Interest of parties and candidates in the preparation of rolls.**—Owing to lack of party organisation, the registering authority gets little help in the preparation of the roll from parties or candidates, who usually have very little knowledge of their supporters, and consequently have nothing to gain by extensive efforts to bring fresh names on to the roll. Their efforts are mainly concentrated on securing votes immediately before the polling. The errors in the roll, therefore, are not likely to give much assistance to any particular party.

160. **Claims and objections.**—The number of claims and objections filed is extremely small in comparison with the total number of voters on the roll. In 1923, for instance, out of over one million voters, claims and objections numbered a little over 6,000, of which about a third were rejected. It cannot be inferred from the small number of claims and objections that the rolls are accurate.

161. **Merits of the present system.**—To sum up, the present system of registration has obvious defects, but works smoothly and fairly on

the whole. It is economical, and probably the best possible method under existing conditions.

The electorate for the Indian Legislative Assembly.

162. **Qualifications of electors.**—The qualifications of electors in the general constituencies of the Legislative Assembly are much higher than in those of the Council. For instance, in the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies the basis is payment of cess or union rate of Rs. 5 compared with Re. 1 in the Council constituencies, and in the Bengal European constituency of the Assembly the basis is the payment of income-tax on an income of not less than Rs. 12,000 as compared with the payment of income-tax of any amount in similar Council constituencies.

In the special constituencies, on the other hand, the Legislative Assembly qualifications are either identical with the Council, as in the Indian Commerce constituency, or very slightly higher, as in the land-holders' constituency.

163. **Number of electors.**—The effect of the higher qualifications in the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies is seen in the fact that the Legislative Assembly electorate is only about one-fifth that of the Council. The figures for these Assembly constituencies for the three elections are as follows:—

	Number of voters in—				
	1920.	1923.	1926.		
			Male.	Female.	Total.
Muhammadan ..	53,935	45,401	60,844	2,476	63,320
Non-Muhammadan ..	128,604	134,877	145,147	12,319	157,466
Total ..	182,539	180,278	205,991	14,795	220,786

The general increase in the number of both classes of the electorate since 1920 corresponds with the figures given for the Council electorate and is due to the same causes. The temporary decrease of Muhammadan voters in 1923 was fairly generally distributed over Central and East Bengal and cannot now be explained.

164. **Percentage enfranchised.**—The following statement shows the percentage of the population enfranchised in the general constituencies

of the Assembly. The figures have been prepared in the same way as the corresponding figures for the Council:—

Constituency.	Percentage enfranchised of—				
	Total population, 1920.	Total population, 1923.	Males, 1926.	Females, 1926.	Total population, 1926.
1	2	3	4	5	6
Non-Muhammadan ..	·6	·6	1·3	·1	·7
Urban Muhammadan ..	1·7	1·9	3·3	1·3	2·6
Rural Muhammadan ..	·5	·5	1·1	·05	·6
Muhammadan ..	·2	·2	·5	·01	·2
Urban Muhammadan ..	·1	1·1	1·4	·6	1·4
Rural Muhammadan ..	·2	·1	·4	·008	·2
Europeans	7·9	7·0	14·3	·2	13·03

165. **Literacy amongst the electorate.**—The higher qualification required of voters ensures a higher standard of literacy amongst the voters in the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies of the Assembly as compared with those of the Council, but no statistics have been compiled to show what this standard is.

166. **The electorates of the Assembly and the Council compared.**—It is difficult clearly to distinguish between the two electorates as regards interest taken in the franchise, methods of canvassing or influence of electors on members. The fact that elections to Council and Assembly take place simultaneously and that the same voters' list and the same polling stations are used, means that the business of both elections is regarded by the public as one and the same process. It may be said however with some degree of certainty that interest in Council elections was at first comparatively keener, and that the value of the Legislative Assembly franchise is only gradually being realised.

The following figures will indicate this:—

Percentage of votes polled to total number of electors in contested constituencies.

	1920.	1923.	1926.		
			Male.	Female.	Total.
Non-Muhammadan constituencies of the Council ..	34·5	43·8	41·5	18·5	40·3
Non-Muhammadan constituencies of the Assembly	26·8	39·4	42·3	10·3	38·9
Muhammadan constituencies of the Council ..	22·2	33·1	37·5	8·7	37·1
Muhammadan constituencies of the Assembly ..	20·0	39·4	48·1	6·8	46·4

The lower percentage of votes recorded, in spite of the higher qualifications of the electorate, seems to indicate that in the non-Muhammadan constituencies less interest is taken in the Assembly than in the Council elections. During the last two elections the reverse has been true of the Muhammadan constituencies.

Constituencies for the Bengal Legislative Council.

167. The composition of the Legislative Council is as follows:—

ELECTED MEMBERS.

Constituencies.		Number of constituencies.	Number of members.
Non-Muhammadan ..	Urban ..	11	11
	Rural ..	35	35
Muhammadan	Urban ..	6	6
	Rural ..	33	33
Land-holders	.. ..	5	5
University	.. ..	2	2
European general ..	.. ..	3	5
European commerce ..	.. ..	5	11
Anglo-Indian	.. ..	1	2
Indian commerce ..	.. ..	3	4
	Total ..	104	114

NOMINATED MEMBERS.

Indian Christians	.. ..	1
Depressed classes	.. ..	1
Labour	.. ..	2
Others	not less than	2
Officials, including *ex-officio* members	not more than	20
Total ..	.. ..	26
GRAND TOTAL ..	.. ..	140

168. **The area of constituencies.**—Of the general constituencies, the area of the largest non-Muhammadan constituency is 4,730 square miles, of the smallest 667—the average being 2,009 square miles. The corresponding figures for the Muhammadan constituencies are 7,081, 644 and 2,132 square miles. In most of these constituencies, the difficulties with which the candidate is faced, if he tries to get into touch with the electors, are very great. A large part of the popula-

tion lives in scattered villages; the census tables show that out of 85,000 towns and villages more than 59,000 have a population of less than 500. Comparatively few of these can be reached by rail, metalled roads in most districts are few, and the unmetalled roads, even when they are kept in repair, do not permit of rapid travel, especially in the rainy season. In many districts, in the rains, the ordinary means of travelling is by boat.

169. **Inequality of representation in urban and rural areas.**—In the general constituencies the outstanding inequality is the proportionately larger representation given to urban areas than to rural, as the following statement shows:—

	Average population per seat.	Average number of voters per seat.
Urban	120,000	6,022
Rural	656,000	15,453

Judged by population, therefore, urban areas have five times the representation of the rural areas, and on the basis of number of qualified voters, two and a half times. The recommendations of the Southborough Committee were criticised by the Joint Committee on the ground of inequality of representation in urban and rural areas. After further examination, 68 rural and 17 urban seats were created; but this distribution is still very largely in favour of the towns.

From the discussions which resulted in this allocation of seats, it appears that the general standard for the whole of Bengal was to be one million inhabitants or 20,000 voters for each seat, and that separate representation was not to be given to towns with a population below 100,000, estimated to give 10,000 voters.

It is found that the following urban constituencies fall very much below the standard:—

Name of constituency.	Number of voters in 1926.	Number of the community in the population according to last census.
Dacca City (non-Muhammadan) ..	2,501	70,125
Dacca City (Muhammadan) ..	1,605	49,325
Calcutta North (Muhammadan) ..	2,066	109,564
Calcutta South (Muhammadan) ..	2,380	148,012
24-Parganas (Municipal) (Muhammadan)	2,785	39,955

In the following rural constituencies on the other hand the standard was considerably exceeded:—

Name of constituency.	Number of voters in 1926.	Number of the community in the population according to last census.
Midnapore (non-Muhammadan) North ..	26,352	1,371,908
Nadia (non-Muhammadan)	26,779	592,382
Dacca rural (non-Muhammadan) ..	25,646	1,012,586
Dinajpur (Muhammadan)	28,002	836,803

170. **Distribution of seats between Muhammadans and non-Muhammadans.**—The distribution of seats between Muhammadans and non-Muhammadans in the general constituencies is based on the agreement, arrived at by both parties in 1916 at the joint session of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League, that 40 per cent. of the total elected Indian members should be Muhammadans. Actually the elected Muhammadan members number 39 to the elected Hindu members 57, so the percentage is slightly over 40 per cent.

171. **Demand for amendment.**—In February 1926, the Muhammadans in the Legislative Council carried a resolution recommending readjustment of seats in the Council, so as to provide that the representatives in Council should be proportionate to the numerical strength of different communities in the province with just and proper representation of minorities and commercial interests. The Swaraj party left the Council during the debate. The Government of Bengal declined to take any action on the resolution because they regarded the matter of Muhammadan representation in the Councils as closed until it came to be reopened by the Statutory Commission.

172. **European and Anglo-Indian representation.**—The number of elected seats for Europeans and Anglo-Indians is 18, *i.e.*, 15·8 per cent. of the total number of elected seats as compared with 17·8 per cent. in the pre-Reforms Council. The 18 seats are divided as follows:—

European General	...	5
Anglo-Indian General	...	2
" European " Commerce	...	11
Total	...	18

Indians are eligible for some constituencies in this group, for instance, the Indian Mining Association, but none has been elected.

173. **Land-holders in the Council.**—There are 5 land-holders' constituencies, all of which usually return Hindu members to Council. These constituencies were created in the belief that the greater land-holders would find it difficult to enter the Council through the general constituencies, but in the present Council there are actually 18 Hindu and 12 Muhammadan elected members whose names are on the electoral rolls of the land-holders' constituencies.

174. **University constituencies.**—Calcutta and Dacca universities each return one member. The former is a much larger constituency, the number of voters on the roll being 7,886 in 1926, as compared with Dacca University's 1,577.

175. **Commerce and industry constituencies.**—The following special constituencies were formed for commercial and industrial interests:—

Bengal Chamber of Commerce—6 seats.
Indian Jute Mills Association—2 seats.
Indian Tea Association—1 seat.
Indian Mining Association—1 seat.
Calcutta Trades Association—1 seat.
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce—2 seats.
Bengal Marwari Association—1 seat.
Bengal Mahajan Sabha—1 seat. Total 15.

Of these 15 seats, 11 are held by Europeans and the rest by Hindus.

This distribution of seats was arrived at after prolonged discussion. The Marwari Association demanded five seats for their community, the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce four, while the Bengal Mahajan Sabha claimed only one seat, suggesting at the same time one seat for the other two principal Indian commercial associations. It was originally proposed to allot only 3 seats to Indian commerce, but eventually this number was raised to 4 by giving a second seat to the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, which is undoubtedly the most important of the three Indian commercial associations which send up members to Council.

The original intention was to create a joint electorate to represent Indian commerce, but the various associations could not be persuaded to co-operate for this purpose. The two principal associations which are not represented directly in the Council are the Indian Mining Federation and the Chittagong Merchants' Association. The latter was not considered important enough to be formed into a constituency, while the former is affiliated to the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and may be considered as represented through that body.

176. **Representation of agricultural interests.**—The agricultural interests in Bengal may broadly be divided into four classes, firstly, the zamindars or land-holders who pay the land revenue to Government, secondly, tenure-holders, thirdly, raiyats or tenants of holdings with occupancy rights, both cultivating and non-cultivating, and fourthly, under-raiyats. The first class is represented in the Council both through the general and special constituencies, and the second and third classes are also strongly represented, though cultivating raiyats have not yet appeared in person in the Council. There are few voters in the fourth class and it is not represented. Of the cultivators a very large percentage belong to the third class and are raiyats with occupancy rights; probably not more than 10 per cent. are under-raiyats.

177. **Representation of labour.**—At present labour is represented on the Council by two nominated members. In making the nominations endeavour is made to secure men who take an active interest in labour problems. But it is very difficult, if not impossible, to secure suitable men who themselves belong or have belonged to the labouring classes. The illiteracy of these classes is the chief obstacle in the way of their proper representation in Council, and to this may be added the want of proper Trade Union organisation in the case of factory workers. Labour in Bengal is divided into two main classes—rural, which is mainly agricultural, and urban, which mainly consists of factory hands. The former class is by far the most numerous and is entirely unorganised. Agricultural labour cannot be represented properly except through the general constituencies by a great and general lowering of the franchise, and this is hardly possible until a higher standard of education among such classes is attained. It is almost hopeless therefore under present conditions to secure representation of agricultural labour in any form.

The difficulty in the case of urban factory labour is equally great, and it was eventually decided to leave the representation of labour to nomination.

It may be of interest to note that of the two nominated labour members in the existing Council, the Hindu member is a Calcutta business man who takes a keen interest in labour problems, and the Muhammadan member was, at the time he entered the Council, employed as a time clerk in a jute mill.

178. **Representation by nomination of depressed classes.**—It has been generally admitted in the past that the depressed classes should be represented on the Council, but that it is impracticable to form special constituencies out of these classes. The existing arrangement whereby one of the nominated seats is reserved for the depressed classes is based on the recommendation of the Franchise Committee.

It should be noted that the depressed classes in Bengal are not so heavily handicapped by caste prejudice as in some other provinces, though very few members of Council belonging to castes of the sort usually considered as coming within the category of "depressed" are elected from the general constituencies.

179. **Indian Christians.**—The Franchise Committee at the instance of the local Government recommended that one nominated seat should be reserved for this community which, it was believed, would find it impossible to secure representation on the Council through the general constituencies. This recommendation was accepted.

180. **Plural member constituencies.**—In the Reformed Council as originally constituted, there were thirteen plural member constituencies. In 1923 the local Government was given power to split these up into single constituencies, and this change was effected before the general election of 1926 in all the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies of the Council. The plural member constituencies are at present only five, namely—

Presidency and Burdwan (European)—3 members.
Anglo-Indian—2 members.
Bengal Chamber of Commerce—6 members.
Indian Jute Mills Association—2 members.
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce—2 members.

The principle of reservation of seats has not been adopted for any of the constituencies of the Bengal Legislative Council.

Constituencies for the Indian Legislative Assembly.

181. Seventeen elected seats in the Legislative Assembly have been allotted to Bengal, which are divided among fourteen constituencies.

The 17 seats are distributed as follows amongst various interests:—

General constituencies—
Muhammadan—6.
Non-Muhammadan—6.
European—3.

Special constituencies—
Indian Commerce—1.
Land-holders—1.

As the special constituencies send up Hindu representatives invariably, the actual number of Hindu members elected is 8 to the Muhammadans 6. This proportion corresponds roughly with the proportion in the Bengal Legislative Council.

The elections to the Legislative Assembly are direct; and the franchises were framed, so as to yield an electorate bearing the same

proportion to the provincial electorates as the provincial quota of seats in the Legislative Assembly does to the general and communal elective seats in the Provincial Council.

The distribution between rural and urban seats (Muhammadans 5 rural and 1 urban, non-Muhammadans 4 rural and 2 urban) was arrived at by adopting the same proportion as in the Legislative Council.

182. **European constituencies.**—One seat was proposed by the local Government for general European interests and two for European commerce, but when the Government of India decided that European commerce only was to be represented in the Council of State, and Indian commerce on the Legislative Assembly, it became necessary to allot the three seats to the general European constituency.

183. **Indian commerce constituency.**—Owing to the absence of co-operation between the leading Indian commercial associations, it was found necessary, in order to secure fair representation of Indian commerce, to resort to election in rotation by the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, the Marwari Association and the Bengal Mahajan Sabha.

184. **Inequalities in the general constituencies.**—The numerical strength of the electorate in the general constituencies varies within wide limits. Among Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies the smallest is the Calcutta and suburbs Muhammadan constituency with 6,541 electors, and the largest is the Burdwan Division non-Muhammadan constituency with 36,178.

The population, area, number of electors, and the number of members of the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies of the Assembly are given in the statement below:—

Constituency.	Population.	Area in square miles.	Number of electors.	Number of members.
1	2	3	4	5
Calcutta (non-Muhammadan) ..	807,415	32	13,761	1
Calcutta Suburbs (non-Muhammadan)	665,601	169	26,769	1
Burdwan Division (non-Muhammadan)	6,647,817	13,869	36,178	1
Presidency Division (non-Muhammadan)	4,639,756	17,316	27,531	1
Dacca Division (non-Muhammadan) ..	3,891,268	14,822	26,939	1
Chittagong and Rajshahi Divisions (non-Muhammadan)	5,200,109	24,455	26,288	1
Calcutta and Suburbs (Muhammadan)	462,572	201	6,541	1
Burdwan and Presidency Divisions (Muhammadan)	5,366,140	31,186	14,406	1
Dacca Division (Muhammadan) ..	8,946,043	14,822	18,116	2
Chittagong Division (Muhammadan) ..	4,348,915	6,572	9,762	1
Rajshahi Division (Muhammadan) ..	6,341,173	17,883	14,495	1

Candidates for the Bengal Legislative Council.

185. **Effect of deposits and their forfeiture.**—In 1920, the number of candidates nominated was 322 for a total of 113 seats. This number fell to 280 in 1923 and 259 in 1926. The chief reason for the decrease in the number of nominated candidates was the introduction in 1923 of the rules requiring a deposit on nomination and directing the forfeiture of the deposit if the candidate failed to secure one-eighth of the total number of votes polled. In 1923, 61 out of 225 candidates in contested seats forfeited their deposits. In 1926, the number of forfeited deposits fell to 50 out of 226.

186. **Nomination by parties or interests.**—The general election in 1920 was more or less boycotted by the Congress organisations, which either put forward no candidate at all or endeavoured to secure the return of some humble member of society whose election, they hoped, would discredit the Council.

By 1923, the Swarajist party had arisen with improved organisation, a definite political programme, substantial party funds and a declared policy of contesting on behalf of the party as many seats in the Council as possible. The party discipline was also good, and not more than one Swarajist candidate was put forward in any constituency. Consequently in 1923 and 1926 the Swarajists gained a large number of seats and were able to form a powerful party in the Council.

There was no other well organised party in the general constituencies. In most cases candidates fought each for himself with little regard for party. The Muhammadan non-Swarajist candidates, although loosely arranged in groups, were entirely disunited during the general elections, and subjected to no sort of party discipline.

187. **Nominations.**—During the first general election of 1920 there was one case in which no valid nomination was received, and fresh nominations had to be called for. No such incident occurred in subsequent elections. Nomination papers have been frequently challenged and rejected on technical grounds. Such cases were particularly numerous in 1923 and five election petitions resulted, in four of which the decision of the Returning officer rejecting the nomination papers was set aside.

188. **Withdrawals.**—No figures have been collected as regards withdrawals by candidates, but it is known that many such withdrawals take place. In some cases the withdrawal may be due to private arrangements with other candidates, but in the majority of cases it is probable that it is due simply to the fact that the candidate realises that his prospect of success in the election is small.

189. **Uncontested elections.**—The following statement shows the number of elected seats filled with and without contest during the general elections of 1920, 1923 and 1926:—

	1920.		1923.		1926.	
	Without contest.	After contest.	Without contest.	After contest.	Without contest.	After contest.
Non-Muhammadan urban ..	3	8	1	10	3	8
Non-Muhammadan rural ..	3	32	3	32	6	29
Muhammadan urban ..	1	5	..	6	1	5
Muhammadan rural ..	5	28	3	30	3	30
Land-holders	3	2	1	4	..	5
Universities	..	1	..	2	..	2
European general ..	2	3	5	..	5	..
European commerce ..	11	..	10	1	11	..
Anglo-Indian	..	2	2	..	..	2
Indian commerce ..	2	2	1	3	2	2
Total ..	30	83	26	88	31	83

It will be noticed that the European constituencies are usually filled without contest.

190. **Multiple candidature.**—The rules regarding deposit on nominations have acted to a certain extent as a check on multiple candidature. In the general election of 1920, 12 candidates had themselves nominated for more than one constituency in the Council elections, and in one case a candidate was nominated for as many as 9 constituencies.

In the same general election as many as six gentlemen stood both for the Council and the Assembly.

In 1923 the number of multiple candidatures in the Council constituencies fell to 7, while 2 were nominated both for Council and Assembly.

The 1926 elections showed an increase in the number of multiple candidatures. The figures were 11 in the Council constituencies and 2 between the Council and Assembly. It does not often happen, however, that a candidate is elected at the same time for more than one constituency, so the multiple candidatures do not seriously hamper the working of the electoral machinery.

191. **Machinery for dealing with nominations.**—Returning officers perform their duties promptly and efficiently. The only serious defect noticed was a tendency, which was most marked in 1923, to reject nomination papers on rather flimsy grounds. This fault appears to have been corrected by the issue of a circular to Returning officers giving a summary of the decisions given by various courts in such matters.

Candidates for Indian Legislative Assembly.

192. In 1920, the number of candidates nominated was 45 for a total of 17 seats. The number fell to 29 in 1923. The number in 1926 was 33. The reason for the decline in the number of candidates nominated in 1923 has been explained already in the note regarding Council elections. The slight rise in the number in 1926, together with the increase in the percentage of votes polled, is a symptom of the increased interest taken by prospective candidates as well as voters in the Legislative Assembly elections.

193. **Classification of elected candidates.**—The following statement classifies the members of the Legislative Assembly elected from Bengal from 1920 to 1926:—

	1920.	1923.	1926.
Legal practitioners ..	8	4	7
Land-holders	3	5	7
Banking and commerce ..	1	2	1
Miscellaneous	3	4	1
Total ..	15	15	16

The difference in totals is due to a candidate having more than one character being counted twice.

194. **Non-contested elections.**—The following statement shows the number of elected seats filled up with and without contest during 1920-26:—

	1920.		1923.		1926.	
	Without contest.	With contest.	Without contest.	With contest.	Without contest.	With contest.
Non-Muhammadan.	..	6	2	4	1	5
Muhammadan ..	2	4	1	5	..	6
European ..	3	..	3	..	3	..
Land-holders ..	..	1	..	1	..	1
Indian commerce	..	1	1	..	1	..
Total ..	5	12	7	10	5	12

Elections.

195. **Polling arrangements.**—Polling for the Assembly and Council elections takes place simultaneously. The same list of voters is used, the same polling station and the same presiding officer and polling

clerks. In the 1926 election the secret marks used to stamp the ballot papers were also the same.

In large towns polling areas are divided according to streets, and in rural constituencies according to villages. In fixing the number of polling stations, 450 votes in urban areas and 350 in rural areas are taken as the normal maximum that a presiding officer can record. Endeavour is made in rural areas to ensure that there is a polling station within 7 miles of every voter. The speed at which votes can be recorded depends very largely on the proportion of illiterate voters, as well as on the skill and experience of the presiding officer and his staff.

Polling hours in rural areas are generally from 10-30 A.M. to 3-30 P.M. and in urban areas from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., but these hours have to be altered here and there to suit local conditions.

Particular attention has been paid to the shortening of the duration of polling, and an attempt was made in 1926 to reduce the period to not more than two days in all the general constituencies. This was found possible only in urban areas and in the rural areas of eight districts. In other districts the actual polling took three to four days, and in one district (Bakarganj) one additional day had to be allowed for the travelling of presiding officers from one centre to another, so that polling took five days. It has therefore been found impossible to complete polling in Bengal in less than four or five days with the existing staff of presiding officers. By the use of non-officials as presiding officers in some districts, the duration of polling could have been reduced to two days all round, but Government decided that it was best not to allow any extensive employment of non-officials as presiding officers. As a rule, they have not been so employed, except in and around Calcutta for the purpose of recording women's votes.

To provide a sufficient number of presiding officers for the elections, it is necessary to employ practically all members of the Bengal Civil Service of both the judicial and executive branches, and of the Subordinate Civil Service, besides selected Sub-Registrars and gazetted officers of other departments, except the Police. The work of a general election thus throws a great strain on the Civil Services throughout the province and involves a suspension of ordinary business from two to five days. As the franchise is extended, the administrative difficulties will increase.

196. **Means of securing attendance of voters.**—Candidates make considerable use of paid and unpaid canvassers and issue manifestos to the press. Posters and handbills also are numerous during general elections. There is an almost universal practice on the part of candidates of providing free conveyance to the poll to all and sundry in

the expectation of securing votes. To illustrate the extent to which this is done, it may be mentioned that the Commissioners stated in their judgment on an election petition filed in 1923 that one candidate used 120 and another 110 private motor-cars as well as horse-drawn vehicles. A certain amount of treating also goes on and payments in cash and personation are not unknown. There is, however, little reason to believe that such practices have had much influence on the result of elections.

The proceedings in election petitions throw some light on the nature of the corrupt practices employed, though only two contested petitions have been successful. In 1926, for instance, an election to the Council was set aside on the ground of corrupt practices, such as offer of money for withdrawal of candidature, treating of voters, undue influence and personation. In the same case the return of election expenses filed by one of the respondents was found to be false in material particulars.

197. **Use of the vote.**—The statement below shows the percentage of voters that exercised the franchise in the three general elections:—

	1920.	1923.	1926.		
			Male.	Female.	Total.
Non-Muhammadan urban ..	41·8	50·1	53·6	23·1	48·3
Non-Muhammadan rural ..	33·8	42·8	42·4	15·5	39·4
Muhammadan urban ..	16·3	49·6	45·7	11·3	41·02
Muhammadan rural ..	22·4	32·4	37·3	7·7	37·02
Land-holders	84·1	82·9	82·1	26·4	78·9
University	66·4	76·8	77·8	51·8	77·7
European general ..	49·1	..	..	..	..
European commerce ..	..	91·2	..	..	..
Anglo-Indian	27·2	..	76·1	22·1	71·4
Indian commerce ..	95·2	77·1	94·6	..	94·6
All contested constituencies	29·3	39·0	40·1	16·5	39·4

The figures show that more interest was taken in 1923 than in 1920, and that this quickened interest has been well maintained. The drop in the percentage of votes recorded in several constituencies in 1926 is almost entirely due to the inclusion of women in the voters' list.

198. **Illiterate voters.**—According to the Bengal Electoral Regulations, illiterate voters have their ballot papers marked for them by the presiding officer, but they have themselves to place the paper in the proper ballot box. Although the ballot boxes for Assembly and Council are painted in different colours, a certain number of ballot papers always find their way into the wrong boxes.

199. **Women's votes.**—Women's votes first fell to be recorded in the 1926 elections, and special arrangements were made for such voters, as far as possible. Separate compartments for recording of votes and separate entrances and exits to the enclosures were provided in rural areas. In Calcutta, where the services of lady presiding officers could be obtained, separate polling stations were provided for women voters. In spite of these arrangements, very few *purdanashin* women voted, and the large majority of the women who went to the poll were not respectable women. The lady presiding officers consequently found their duties distasteful, and the Education Department have issued instructions that their women officers are not to act as presiding officers in future, and that girls' schools and colleges are not to be used for the recording of women's votes.

200. **Behaviour at elections.**—There is a certain amount of excitement during elections, and voters are occasionally hustled on the way to the polling booths, but cases of serious disorder seldom or never occur. In no case has a Council election failed entirely on this account. This is noteworthy, as disorders during local board elections in rural areas are by no means uncommon. The comparative absence of disorder in Council elections may be attributed partly to the fact that excitement in such elections is not usually so strong, but the secrecy of the ballot is also a factor which tends to prevent disorder by making it difficult to practise intimidation, or marshal voters in blocks.

201. **Invalid votes.**—There were many invalid votes at the first general election in 1920, due to mistakes by the presiding officers and the use of ink in marking ballot papers. The substitution of stamping presses for rubber stamps and indelible pencils for pen and ink in marking the ballot papers has had the effect of reducing the invalid votes to a reasonable number. Statistics regarding the number of invalid votes have not been prepared. No figures have been collected to show the number of tendered votes, but there is no reason to believe that the number of such votes is great.

202. **Special methods of voting.**—Voting by post is a method suitable to constituencies in which the number of voters is small, and the voters are scattered over a wide area. This method is used in the land-holders, University, and Commerce and Industry constituencies. The usual method employed is for the Returning officer to send a ballot paper by post to each voter who has his signature attested on

the paper by a responsible officer, then marks the ballot paper and returns it to the Returning officer, either directly, as in the University constituencies, or indirectly through the Attesting officer, as in the land-holders' constituencies.

This system had been in use for several years before the Reforms in the case of land-holders constituencies, and has always worked satisfactorily. During the 1926 elections Inspectresses and Assistant Inspectresses of Schools were appointed attesting officers for the convenience of *pardanashin* ladies. In spite of this, however, only 26·4 per cent. of the women voters in the land-holders' constituencies recorded their votes, as compared with 82·1 per cent. of the men in the same constituencies.

In the Commerce and Industry constituencies it has been found possible to dispense with attestation, as the identity of the voters is seldom or never in question.

203. **Proportional representation.**—The method of proportional representation is followed in only two constituencies, the Presidency and Burdwan European constituency of the Bengal Legislative Council and the Bengal European constituency of the Indian Legislative Assembly. There was only one instance of a contested election; in this instance the system was used intelligently and worked well.

204. **Status of the candidates returned.**—Of the elected members of the existing Council, 49 belong to the legal profession, 34 are land-holders, 25 are employed in banking or commerce, 6 are teachers, lecturers or professors, 3 belong to the medical profession, and 7 have other occupations or callings. Analysis of the 1923 and 1926 Councils gives similar results. The lawyers predominate, land-holders are second and business men third. Many elected members come under more than one category. The same person, for instance, may be a land-holder as well as a lawyer. Such cases have been shown under both categories in the figures given above.

All elected candidates are now men of fairly good social status. In 1920 some very inferior candidates were returned at the instance of the Congress party, in an attempt to cast discredit on the Reformed Council, but this effort is not likely to be repeated again with success. A good many professional politicians are returned, particularly amongst the Swaraj party, but it is usually difficult for a candidate even with the support of this powerful party to secure election unless he has also local influence behind him. Generally speaking local influence counts for more than party influence in the return of candidates. But it is hardly possible to demonstrate this by statistics.

There were no women candidates, as women are not eligible for election to the Bengal Council.

205. **Election petitions.**—The following statement shows the nature of election petitions since 1920 and their results:—

	Petitions based chiefly on technical defects in the elections.	Petitions based chiefly on corrupt practices during the elections.	Total.
Successful after contest ..	9	2	11
Unsuccessful after contest ..	2	8	10
Withdrawn	2	5	7
Total ..	13	15	28

Commissions for the trial of election petitions are usually composed of a District Judge or Additional District Judge, who acts as President, and two retired judicial officers. The rules for the trial of election petitions have worked satisfactorily.

206. **Cost of elections.**—There has been a considerable decrease in the cost of general elections since 1920. The election in that year cost about 3 lakhs, to which must be added the salaries of the staff of the Reforms officer amounting to about half a lakh more. In 1923, the cost was Rs. 2,38,000 and in 1926 about Rs. 1,90,000. These figures include the cost of preparation of the rolls as well as the cost of actual elections, both for the Assembly and the Council. The cost of preparation of the rolls includes actual expenses of local authorities incurred on behalf of the registering authorities, and contributions to the universities towards the expenses incurred by them. In the Commerce and Industry constituencies the elections have not involved Government in any expense, as the associations concerned have borne the entire cost. The full cost of the elections in land-holders constituencies falls on Government.

207. **Limit of election expenses.**—No limit has yet been fixed to the election expenses of candidates, and returns of expenses show variation within very wide limits, viz., between 3 annas and 23,000 rupees. The normal amount spent by a candidate of average status, who seriously contests a general constituency, seems to be from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 5,000 according to the size and nature of the constituency. The total expenses incurred by candidates in 1923 have been estimated from returns filed, and amount to 5 lakhs of rupees. It is more likely that these expenses have been understated than overstated in the returns.

Indian Legislative Assembly Elections.

208. The remarks regarding Council elections apply also to the Legislative Assembly elections. In spite of the higher franchise in the general constituencies of the Assembly, there is very little difference

in the use made of the vote. The following statement compares the Assembly electorate with the Council electorate as regards the use of the vote:—

Statement showing percentage of votes polled in contested constituencies of the Assembly and Council during the three general elections.

	1920.	1923.	1926.		
			Male.	Female.	Total.
Assembly	25·3	41	44·8	9·6	42·1
Council	29·3	39	40·1	16·5	39·4

CHAPTER VIII.

The Legislature.

The First Council.

209. **First Council, 1921-1923.**—The first Council under the reformed system of Government met on the 28th January, 1921, and was dissolved by the Governor on the 24th September, 1923. The extreme elements both Hindu and Muhammadan as a matter of deliberate policy stood aloof from the elections, and were not represented in the Council except by a few humble members from the Chittagong Division, who were put up by the non-co-operators in order to bring the Council into disrepute. The other members stood for election on the plank that the Reforms, as a vehicle of progress, were worth a trial, so that the Council only represented the less extreme opinions held by Bengalis.

210. **Parties in first Council.**—During the first two months no definite party was formed in the Council, but there were a large number of members who were very critical and suspicious of the Political, Police and Appointment Departments. The strength of this feeling was shown in the refusal of a grant of Rs. 23 lakhs for the Police. After the budget session, however, a Ministerial party was formed under the leadership of the late Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea, to which all the Hindu members adhered except a group of about twenty-five or thirty members. This group formed the opposition both to the Ministers and to the reserved side of Government, adopting towards

the latter an attitude of bitter hostility on Political and Police questions. The Ministerial party included those Muhammadan members who followed the lead of the Minister, Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri. The emergence of a communal question in connection with the Calcutta Municipal Bill increased this following, but for some time weakened the Ministerial party. The question was settled with the help of the leader of the European group, but the Muhammadans tended to form a separate group. The Ministerial party as a whole formed a loosely knit body which, while maintaining an independent attitude in matters of law and order, was united in a determination to support the Ministers on important questions and to avoid a constitutional deadlock. Some of its members often combined with the opposition in attacking the reserved side of Government, especially on Political and Police questions, and even helped in defeating the Ministers on questions of minor importance; but there was no dangerous attempt to drive out a Minister, and on most occasions Government with the help of the officials and the European non-official members were able to defeat all but exceptional combinations of opposing elements.

211. **The Council and the reserved departments.**—The establishment of the reformed system produced no sudden revolution in the existing attitude of the majority of the politically minded that the bureaucratic Government is a body to be criticised rather than assisted. Time has not noticeably lessened this tendency. The Council felt little responsibility for the matters that were still reserved: they were the concern of the irresponsible Government. This attitude was perpetuated if not encouraged by the invention of the phrase "nation-building departments" for exclusive use in reference to the transferred departments. To any expansion of expenditure on the reserved side it is accordingly opposed and much of the existing expenditure it criticises as excessive. The funds which are not available for the transferred departments can, it thinks, in part be found by ruthless lopping of the expenditure of the various reserved departments. It was made the subject of repeated charges in 1924 that the promise given at the time of the passing of the new Taxation Bills by the first Council that the improved finances would be utilised for educational, sanitary and medical progress had not been fulfilled.

Yet the first Council in its control of expenditure was not unreasonable. It expressed a good deal of dissatisfaction at the existence of non-voted items and there is little reason to doubt that had the salaries of imperial officers depended on the vote of the Council, the result would have been devastating. Steady pressure was exercised towards Indianisation by means of motions to cut down grants relating to those European officers whose salaries were votable. Two large projects for the partition of two unwieldy districts with a view to improved administration were abandoned through the refusal of supplies to complete the

necessary buildings, as was also the construction of a residence for the Chief Justice of Bengal. The Council declined to entertain a demand for the erection of quarters for the Calcutta Police. The Governor certified the demand and at the direction of the Government of India he adopted the same course towards the demand for the paper-book department of the High Court. In some cases demands that had been rejected were again placed before the Council for reconsideration and were passed, a notable instance being the demand for the Police which had been rejected in March, 1921. Retrenchments were enforced in several matters through the budget voting, in others they were effected as a concession to the expressed desire of the Council.

212. **The Council and the transferred departments.**—The Council as a whole was interested in and sympathetic towards the administrative activities represented by the transferred departments. The Ministers had no difficulty in securing the passage of their budget demands. The discussion of the demands awakened much more attention than was given to the reserved side though it tended to take the form of a discussion of questions of policy in which practical considerations were sometimes ignored. Fourteen resolutions were passed recommending to Government expensive schemes of improvement.

The conception of ministerial Government set forth in the Joint Select Committee's report laid down one very important condition, namely, that, apart from the Members of the Executive Council and the Ministers, " all other official members of the Legislative Council should be free to speak and vote as they choose." That condition could not be observed in Bengal and the official bloc had to vote with Government. The European group were also solidly on the side of Government. In these modified circumstances the Ministers enjoyed the confidence of the Council in that they were able to secure a majority in all matters of importance. What would have happened if the official bloc had been allowed to speak and vote as they pleased, is a matter of speculation which need not be discussed. The position described above was due to an adjustment by which Members of the Executive Council and Ministers met for joint consideration of all matters of policy; they carried this mutual dependence into the Legislative Council, where the two halves of Government presented a united front. The reserved side thus avoided the risk of isolation in its contentious and unpopular activities; and the Ministers, in addition to the support of their party, obtained an assurance of support from the officials and from the non-official European group. But the Ministers had now become part of an indivisible whole which was not as a whole responsible to the legislature. They incurred the odium of action taken on the reserved side to maintain law and order, and they shouldered the liability of supporting in the Council and recommending to the favour of their followers decisions taken in the reserved departments, a

liability utilised subsequently in the second Council by the opponents of the Reforms to formulate charges against them of being out of sympathy with the views of the majority of the Council.

213. **Legislation.**—The first Council has to its credit a large volume of legislation. Twenty-four Acts in all were passed, some of them of considerable dimensions. One, the Calcutta Municipal Act, which took eighteen months in its passage through the Council, was a voluminous piece of legislation containing over 500 sections. Two Acts only were non-official members' Bills, the first a measure depriving the District Magistrate of certain of his powers in regard to the village police, the second aimed at the suppression of commercialised vice in the town and suburbs of Calcutta. The former was carried despite the opposition of Government; the latter received the sympathy and co-operation of Government throughout.

Towards Government legislation the attitude of the Council was reasonable. Only one Government bill was defeated. That was a proposal to make a small amendment in the Indian Salt Act, an Act against which resentment had recently been directed by the action of the Viceroy in certifying the salt-tax. On the other hand, Government succeeded in passing the Goondas Act, an Act investing the executive with special powers to extern immigrant hooligans from Calcutta. The interest taken in legislation was very considerable, and it had a tendency to show itself in the inconvenient form of innumerable amendments tabled by individual members, dealing not merely with matters of substance but even with purely technical points of drafting. Towards these, however, as towards non-official bills in general the Council exhibited little sympathy. Thirteen non-official bills made their appearance during the life-time of the Council. Only two became law. One or two of them were almost incredibly crude in drafting and conception, and most of them required considerable revision before introduction was possible. Six of them, launched by the same member, merit no further mention. But others were serious attempts to embody reforms or alterations which the movers believed in; and even where there was no immediate prospect of getting the bills passed, these non-official bills exercised a very real pressure upon Government to come forward with proposals of its own in particular directions.

214. **Taxation.**—Three taxation bills were passed in 1922 by the first Council, under pressure of the financial stringency that afflicted Bengal at the inception of the Reforms. All were unpopular in varying degrees, and in judging the work of the Council, the greatest credit must be given to the Ministers and their party for steadfastness in the matter of these bills. They were carried because the Ministers and the Council were impressed by the financial position, the Budget for 1921-22 showing a deficit of Rs. 198 lakhs, and that for 1922-23

a deficit of Rs. 121 lakhs. It was hoped too that a sum of about Rs. 25 lakhs would become available for expenditure in the transferred departments, though this hope was not fulfilled.

215. **The Council and the Governor.**—Some members of the first Council sought to place on record its disapproval of the action of the Governor in appointing Ministers without consulting the elected members of the Council, ignoring the provisions of section 52 of the Government of India Act which vests in the Governor alone the power to appoint Ministers. Similarly, an attempt was made to offer advice as to the distribution of portfolios among the Members of the Executive Council thereby encroaching upon the functions of the Governor under rule 13 of the Rules of Executive Business made under section 49 of the Act. These proposals were ruled out of order.

216. **Questions and Resolutions.**—The first Council under the Reforms discussed 321 resolutions and asked 3,469 questions. The adjournment of the business of the Council was actually moved on six occasions during the first Council. On two of these occasions the motion for the adjournment of the House was made in order to support Government action. In all other instances where adjournment was moved, and in several instances where motions were rejected by the President, the object was an attack on Government for its administrative action.

Of the 321 resolutions discussed, over 100 were passed in the first Council. Government accepted in whole or in part over 70 per cent., undertaking in 11 cases legislation to give effect to the recommendations of the Council. In about 15 per cent. of the resolutions, Government definitely refused to accept the recommendations made.

The Second Council.

217. **Second Council, 1924-1926.**—The second Council under the reformed system met on the 22nd January, 1924; it was dissolved by the Governor on the 22nd September, 1926.

The second Council was radically different in its constitution. The election campaign was carried on with vigour by all parties. The organisation of the *Swaraj* party attained much efficiency, and the Swarajist candidates were assisted by a large number of volunteers. They met with considerable success in the elections, and entered the Council as a compact and strictly disciplined party numbering 47 under the leadership of Mr. C. R. Das. They were pledged to demonstrate that the existing system of Government was unworkable, and they aimed at destroying it by producing a deadlock by persistent obstruction in the Council. They had further the general support of the

Independent Nationalist party led by Mr. B. Chakrabarti, which by March, 1924, consisted of 19 members. The Swarajists were themselves unwilling to take office. They concentrated their efforts on making the survival of a Ministry drawn from any other source impossible and on hampering all the normal activities of Government.

The temper of the Council was indicated at the earliest moment by unsuccessful attempts to discuss the propriety of the Governor's choice of Ministers before the Ministers had taken any official steps to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Council. The strength of the opposition forces was tested by the passing of a series of resolutions recommending release of political prisoners and the repeal of the special legislation used in the control of the more violent manifestations of political ferment. The attack on the Ministers began at the earliest possible moment by the moving of an adjournment of the House by way of censure on the Ministers for their action in voting against the majority of the Council on the resolution for the release of political prisoners. It was developed during the discussion of the Budget demands which afforded the main opportunity for the destructive tactics of the party. Here they secured a spectacular triumph by rejecting almost wholesale the demands for the reserved departments, the rejection of all provision for pay of Ministers being the occasion for considerable excitement both within and outside the Council. Against the demands for the transferred departments they were on the whole unsuccessful. The more sober elements were not prepared to risk the consequences of allowing these demands to be treated in the same irresponsible fashion as those on the reserved side; and Lord Lytton had stated in an address to the Council on the 18th March that he had no power to restore by certification any such grants that might be refused. Two items of the Budget, however, one relating to the Inspecting staff of the Education Department amounting to Rs. 6,35,400, and the other relating to the subordinate staff of the Medical Department amounting to Rs. 5,88,000, were rejected. Government notified the officers concerned that, as there was no provision in the budget for their salaries, their services would be dispensed with. The Council subsequently voted the amounts when a supplementary demand was made in August.

A further effort was made in the following July to secure salaries for the Ministers by means of a supplementary demand. The attempt was defeated by recourse to the High Court which issued an injunction restraining the President from placing the demand before the Council; and it was not until August 26th that the demand was presented, a revision of the rules of procedure having meanwhile placed the position beyond all doubt. The demand was again refused by the narrow margin of two votes.

The Council did not again meet during the year 1924. At the beginning of 1925 its temper seemed less intractable. Mr. C. R. Das's health was failing. The purely negative policy pursued in Council by his party failed to commend itself to some whom his promises of positive results had at first attracted. Others had been impressed by the inconveniences or the danger of refusing the money necessary for the work of Government and the payment of officers. There had been no Ministers since August, 1924, but there were present in the Council individuals each with a small personal following who had hopes of being chosen as Ministers.

The voting on the Budget was reached with some prospect that the Council would make provision for the established form of the administration. It had accepted in spite of the opposition of the whole *Swaraj* party a recommendation that provision for the appointment of Ministers should be made in the Budget. Motions for the total refusal of the grants were, however, at once tabled and were supported by the whole strength of the *Swaraj* party. Their efforts were defeated by a narrow margin until the demand for Ministers' salaries was reached on the 23rd March. The demand was defeated mainly through the action of an ex-Minister and his friends. With the exception of cuts of Rs. 3,40,000 in the Police Budget, the Budget was carried almost intact, its passage being simplified by the sudden retirement of the opposition members in consequence of a disagreement with the President. Supplementary demands brought forward in August were passed with uniform success.

In the spring of 1926 the whole forces of the opposition were mustered within a week of the commencement of the session in an effort to have the President removed from office as a punishment for his firmness in dealing with disorder on the part of prominent Swarajists. The effort was unsuccessful. Almost immediately afterwards, and before the voting on the Budget demands, the whole of the *Swaraj* party, about 48 in number, withdrew formally from the Council, the leader claiming in a brief announcement that though they had failed to mend the system of government, they had destroyed dyarchy. The Budget was accordingly passed without difficulty.

In the subsequent meetings of the Council a certain amount of legislative business was transacted. The opposition did indeed attend again, but their forces gradually weakened. They could never reproduce the conditions which enabled them to defeat the Budget in 1924. But they might justly boast that by rendering the appointment of Ministers impossible, they had destroyed or suspended dyarchy. From August, 1924, onwards until June, 1925, with the exception of a few days in March, 1925, the transferred subjects were administered by the Governor by virtue of the emergency powers given by the Act. In

June, 1925, the transfer of all subjects in Bengal was revoked until the new Council should meet in 1927.

218. **The Council and the reserved departments.**—The foregoing summary indicates that the attitude of the two organised parties which commanded the votes of the majority of the non-official members was uncompromisingly hostile to Government on the reserved side. Their attitude as displayed in resolutions, in their opposition to the budget, and towards legislation precluded the possibility of any large volume of useful work.

219. **The Council and the transferred departments.**—The budgets of the transferred departments were passed, ordinarily without cuts, throughout the life-time of the Council. The two cuts made in March, 1924, to which reference has been made resulted in the issue of notices of discharge to a considerable number of officers of the departments concerned. Until the Council granted the supplementary demands, the apprehensions aroused exercised a chastening effect on the opposition. The Budgets of the succeeding years were prepared by the reserved side of Government and were passed without difficulty. The system of administration by Ministers was in abeyance during most of the duration of the Council, and for such time as Ministers existed their energies were absorbed almost entirely by the problem of survival.

220. **Legislation.**—In the second Council the constitutional struggle to destroy the institution of Ministers coloured all the activities of the Council. Sessions of the Council were curtailed to the minimum necessary for the despatch of the essential work of Government; and Government was afraid to trust any serious legislative project to the tender mercies of a body which exhibited so hostile an attitude. In the first year, the only piece of legislation was a small Act to extend the life of the Calcutta Rent Act passed on the initiation of a non-official member in spite of Government opposition. The Howrah Bridge Bill, a Government measure introduced in spite of opposition in August, was defeated by a dilatory motion in the initial stage. In the second year five small Acts aggregating about a dozen sections in all were passed and in the third seven Acts, amongst which only two, the Presidency Area (Emergency) Security Act and the Howrah Bridge Act, are of any importance. One Act was made in January, 1925, by the Governor by the exercise of his power of certification, after the Council had refused the preliminary motion for introduction of the bill. A Government bill to amend the Bengal Tenancy Act was so mangled in committee that Government withdrew the bill. The bills introduced were either bills of immediate urgency or bills in regard to which malevolence could produce no inconvenient results.

An attempt was made by Government in December, 1925, to introduce a bill to amend the Bengal Municipal Act. This bill had been given its final form by Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea; it was introduced by him in the first Council in 1923, but had made no progress by the time the Council was dissolved. The Council on this second occasion refused leave to introduce the bill. The reason put forward in the Council for this treatment of the bill was that it was reactionary, but the real reason appears to have been that discussion was bound to raise again the question of communal representation which had arisen in an acute form at the passing of the Calcutta Municipal Act: the Swarajists were opposed on principle to any Government legislation, and the bill involved proposals of taxation to which objection was certain.

There was much activity on the part of non-official members in initiating legislation. Thirty non-official bills in all were introduced during the life-time of the Council. All but two failed to reach the final stages. In one or two cases the Council realised its responsibilities at the last moment when, in the discussion of the final motion for passing the bill, the defects of a hasty piece of legislation were pointed out. In most cases, however, the fate of a bill was decided by the fact that it emanated from an individual, and even where it represented the views of a considerable body of the public or was not regarded with any antipathy by the Council, the author failed to attract sufficient interest or confidence in himself.

221. **The Council and the Governor.**—The second Council showed a more marked restiveness towards the powers of administration residing in the Governor. A standing order common to nearly all the Provincial Councils, providing for communications from the Council to the Governor by formal address and through the President, seemed to offer at once an invitation to offer advice and a means of doing so. Efforts were made as soon as the Council assembled to utilise this means to condemn the Governor's choice of newly appointed Ministers, but were ruled out of order by the President who held that only non-controversial and formal matters were contemplated by the standing order. Any other decision would have opened the door to discussions of the action of the Governor, which would have been free from the restrictions imposed by the rules upon the subject matter of resolutions and questions.

In August, 1924, a further attempt was made under cover of the same standing order to discuss in the Council an action of the Governor. It was proposed to present the Governor with a formal address requesting him to withdraw publicly a statement made in a speech at Dacca to which exception had been taken in the press. A more direct and determined effort to reflect upon the conduct of the Governor was

made on 1st April, 1924, during the voting of the Budget demands. His Excellency had convened a conference attended by the more moderate members of the Council on the previous day. The President was invited to pronounce this action unconstitutional. Throughout the whole of the day's debate repeated efforts were made to discuss the conduct of the Governor who was alleged to have attempted by his action to influence the voting and to have entered into party politics. These statements and the unwillingness of the members making them to submit to the authority of the President aroused serious resentment on the part of the supporters of Government, and an uproar ensued, in the course of which Mr. C. R. Das withdrew his party as a protest.

Towards His Excellency the attitude of the members on all occasions on which he addressed the second Council was unfailingly courteous. The *Swaraj* party, however, absented itself *en masse* on the last day of the session of the second Council when the acting Governor Sir Hugh Stephenson addressed the Council, and this policy was repeated in the opening stages of the third Council.

222. **Questions and Resolutions.**—The second Council with more limited time and opportunity discussed 138 resolutions, of which 47 were carried, and asked 1,195 questions. The significant drop in the number of questions as compared with the first Council was due partly to the smaller number of meetings, but also partly to the action of the Council in restricting, by Standing Order, the number of questions which any member might ask in one session, after an experience of the abuse by a member in the first Council of the power of asking an unlimited number. Of the resolutions passed by the second Council, Government accepted, in whole or in part, about 50 per cent. and definitely rejected about 25 per cent.

The adjournment of the business of the Council was moved on two occasions during the second Council. The first occasion was on the 20th February, 1924, in the first attempt to secure the downfall of the newly appointed Ministers. The second occasion was on the 8th December, 1925, when a motion was carried by way of censure on the Government for the transfer, under circumstances alleged to be inhuman, of certain political prisoners from one jail to another.

223. **Elected President.**—Until 12th August, 1925, the Council was presided over by a President appointed by the Governor. On that date a non-official President was elected by the Council, from the Independent Nationalist party, the Swarajists failing to secure the election of their candidate. He incurred the displeasure of the Swarajists by his firmness in dealing with an exhibition of disorder by that party, and was called on to face a motion for his removal under section 72 C(4) of the Government of India Act. The motion failed.

The Third Council.

224. **Third Council.**—The third Council met on 10th January, 1927. The elections of the autumn of 1926 aroused less interest than those of 1923, when hopes of achieving some political progress were vaguely entertained. The main question was again whether dyarchy should be worked or not. There was no sign that the Hindu electors in any way repudiated the actions of the Swarajists. Of the 46 non-Muhammadan general constituencies they captured 35. The party numbers 37 in all. The bitter Hindu-Muhammadan strife of the past year had rendered it impossible for the party to obtain any substantial accession from the ranks of the Muhammadans. It is, however, much the strongest party in the new Council. Of the 39 Muhammadan members of the Legislative Council, 38 are in favour of working the present system of Government. Sixteen Hindu members, who belong to the Liberal and Responsivist groups, accept the same policy. There are, however, internal dissensions both in these groups and amongst the Muhammadan members.

On the 17th January a demand was put forward by Government for a grant of money to pay Ministers for the short portion of the financial year still remaining. In a full house the demand was passed by 94 votes to 38. During the subsequent months also it appeared that the policy of blind obstruction had been abandoned: for the Budget was considered in a reasonable manner and was passed without any great difficulty. The reformed system of government therefore appeared to be again established. Ministers had been appointed after some preliminary difficulties. A motion for refusal of the Budget demand for their salaries was made on March 12th. The attack failed for the moment, but it was renewed at the earliest possible moment in the form of a vote of want of confidence at the next session of the Council in August. The defects of the system of government were again put forward as the main cause of the attack, though no circumstance which could be used to assist in undermining the position of the two Ministers in office was neglected and the determining factor in many of the votes was not hostility to dyarchy, but personal and other reasons. The motion against the Hindu Minister was carried by 68 against 55 votes, and the motion against the Muhammadan Minister by 66 against 62 votes; the Ministers resigned. In October, 1927, two new Ministers were appointed. When the Council next met on the 12th December, 1927, a notice of a motion of want of confidence was sent to the President, but this motion was not moved. On the 16th March, 1928, the motion to refuse the Ministers' salaries was defeated by 80 to 40 votes; but a motion of want of confidence a few days later was only defeated by a narrow majority. Both the reserved and the transferred budgets of the year 1927-28 were passed by the Council with a few token cuts.

General.

225. **Conduct of Members.**—In the Council Chamber itself the conduct of members towards each other and towards the chair is marked by decorum. The President's rulings are usually accepted gracefully, though at times not without argument or protest. Members are conscious of their dignity, and have put forward many proposals from time to time to increase it.

Whilst there are several members who would be capable of holding their own in any assembly, the debates suffer in vitality because the majority of the speakers prefer to deliver carefully written speeches, and all efforts to discourage the practice in the interests of livelier debate have hitherto failed. Practically all the members speak English competently. Efforts to insist upon using the vernacular language were made in 1924 as part of the political campaign of the Swarajists, but were readily abandoned, partly perhaps because of the difficulties in the way of having such speeches reported. The press devotes considerable space to reports of the proceedings, and such matter is regarded as valuable copy. In many instances members have had recourse to the press to publish matter of a propagandist nature which has been ruled out of order by the President, and even to make attacks upon the President's rulings or to impugn his impartiality. It has been definitely recognised that the President has no power to check this impropriety, except by an appeal to the good sense of members themselves, a process which has met with little success. The press was also skilfully and extensively used in furtherance of the Swarajist attacks upon the Ministers in 1925 by the publication immediately before the debate on the Ministers of all the damaging material that could be devised or collected, and it was used in connection with the debates on the release of political prisoners, the repeal of the special legislation dealing with violent unrest and the passing of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act to pillory the members who dared to support Government.

226 **The Presidents.**—There have been four Presidents in the reformed Council, two appointed by the Governor and two since the expiry of the fourth year from the first meeting of the first Council, elected by the Council. Each elected President has accepted in full the obligation to eschew party. Both have been faced with the difficult task of controlling an assembly in which a large, capable, and well organised party is bent on causing trouble.

227. **Difficulties and defects of non-official legislation.**—Although the increase in the number of private members' bills indicates an increasing desire for constructive work the private member is faced

with considerable difficulties in preparing a bill. He has not at his disposal the sources of information which are available to members of Government, nor is there any body of lawyers corresponding with Parliamentary Counsel who can give assistance in the preparation of bills. In the earlier days of the Council private members were sometimes assisted by the officers of the Legislative Department in revising the drafts of their bills, but as the number of bills increased, it was no longer possible to give such assistance.

There is also the danger of ill-digested and loosely drafted enactments being placed on the statute-book after too rapid a passage through the Council without going through the Select Committee stage. Any member may introduce a bill and may with a little trouble under the existing rules secure the consideration and passing of his bill on the day on which it is introduced.

The fact that only three out of forty-three private bills introduced in the first two Councils were passed indicates that the Councils were aware of the inherent dangers in such legislation.

228. **Financial functions—Supply.**—The financial functions of the Legislative Council in relation to supply are derived from section 72D of the Government of India Act. This requires that a statement of the estimated annual expenditure and revenue of the province shall be laid before the Council each year, and that proposals for the appropriation of the provincial revenues shall be submitted to the vote of the Council in the form of demands for grants, which the Council may reduce or refuse. Certain heads of expenditure are specially excepted by sub-section (*3*) from the necessity of such submission. These are, however, included in the form of non-voted items in the Budget or statement of expenditure and revenue. Proposals for appropriation of revenue for any purpose can be made only upon the recommendation of the Governor, and section 80C of the Act prevents the introduction without the previous sanction of the Governor of any measure affecting the public revenues of the province or imposing a charge on them. The Governor has power in the case of the Council's refusal to pass demands relating to a reserved subject to certify that the expenditure is essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the subject and the demand is thereupon treated as having been assented to. And the Governor has power in cases of emergency to authorise expenditure necessary for the safety or tranquillity of the province or for the carrying on of any department.

The Budget is presented in February of each year with a short explanatory statement by the Member in charge of the Finance Department. After an interval of some days the general discussion follows, occupying sometimes as much as four days, during which

the Budget as a whole and any question of principle involved therein are debated. After a further interval, the demands for grants are brought forward *seriatim* and motions for omission or reduction are moved.

This general discussion has shown a progressive tendency to lose interest. Originally four days were allotted for the discussion. In 1926 and 1927, however, only two days were allotted, of which one day in 1926 and both days in 1927 terminated prematurely for want of a quorum. For the detailed demands for grants it has been the practice to allow the maximum number of 12 days, and it is at this stage that the Council displays its greatest activity.

In the second Council the systematic policy of the Swarajists to refuse all supplies caused the tabling of a complete series of motions for refusal of every demand. In the first Council, where no such policy was in existence, it is possible to draw some conclusion from the form taken by the detailed discussion of demands for grants. It appears that the Council had not grasped the principle of criticising policy, or the administration of a department by means of the refusal of supply or a nominal reduction of a demand. It devoted its energies to the detailed control of expenditure and thereby of the executive administration by the expedient of refusing individual details in the Budget. The extremes to which this policy of detailed criticism was pushed are illustrated by the following figures showing the number of motions to omit or reduce grants or items in grants. On the general Budget alone, that is to say, when supplementary demands are excluded, 211 amendments proposing reduction or omission were tabled in 1921, 397 in 1922, 932 in 1923, 1,070 in 1924, 1,234 in 1925, and in 1926, 551.

229. **Taxation.**—The imposition of taxation by the Council is controlled by section 80A of the Act which defines the legislative powers of the Council, requiring the previous sanction of the Governor-General to the imposition of any new tax except those scheduled by rules under the Act, and to the alteration of any tax or duty in force subject to similar exceptions. Section 80C provides further that the previous sanction of the Governor is necessary to the introduction of any measure affecting the public revenues of the province.

Taxation is recognised as essentially an unpopular measure, and no proposal for additional taxation has been made since the three Taxation Acts of 1922 were passed. In several cases bills by non-official members have contained provisions inviting the operation of section 80C, but the tendency of such bills has been uniformly to provide for expenditure of revenue rather than increase of revenue.

230. **Public Accounts Committee.**—A committee on public accounts is provided for by rules made under the Acts and is constituted at the first session of each Council. Two-thirds of the members are elected by the non-official members of the Council and one-third are nominated by the Governor. Its duties are to scrutinise the audit and appropriation accounts of the province and satisfy itself that the money voted has been spent within the scope of the demand granted, and to bring to the notice of the Council all instances of misappropriation.

The latest reports indicate that the members who attend evince interest in the work of the Committee and co-operate with the Finance Department.

231. **Critical and advisory functions.**—There are three direct and many indirect methods by which the Council can express criticism of, or proffer advice to, the Executive Government in the discharge of its functions. The direct methods are the resolution, the motion of adjournment and the Standing Committees. Among the indirect methods are debates on motions of all kinds, the general discussion of the Budget, the non-official bill, and question. The Council has neglected none of these methods, and there are very few aspects of administrative activity which it has failed to pass under review. The resolutions discussed have covered a wide field though many of them were of merely parochial interest.

The provisions of rule 22 of the Legislative Rules, which vests in the Governor the power to disallow discussion of a resolution on the ground that it cannot be moved without detriment to the public interest or on the ground that it relates to a matter which is not primarily the concern of the local Government, have been utilised sparingly. His Excellency has favoured the view that matters of the latter class are also frequently matters of local concern in regard to which it is desirable that the Government of India should know the views of the local Council. Yet since 1921 in more than eighty cases discussion of resolutions has been disallowed under this section on one or other of the two grounds stated. Very many of these dealt with general questions of railway policy or with some similar central subject, many dealt with the affairs of statutory local Government bodies, some contained recommendations to the Governor in regard to matters within his prerogative powers or to the Government of India in regard to Indianisation of the services, revisions of the provisions of, or the rules under, the Government of India Act. Among the subjects of discussion which were banned as detrimental to the public interest were the prohibition of the slaughter of cattle, racial distinctions in courts of justice, and the removal of the Holwell and Black Hole Monuments. The Governor used this power only once to prohibit a

motion for adjournment of the House. That was on the occasion of a proposed discussion of the speech of Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on 3rd August, 1922, on the Indian Civil Service and its function in India.

The use of the resolution has shown a progressive decline. Members have discarded mere recommendations to legislate in favour of the more expeditious process of promoting a non-official bill. And they have found methods of using the interpellation to keep before the public the topics which they wish to exploit and to make the recommendations they desire. The range of questions is unlimited. Local wants and grievances are assiduously ventilated, particularly in regard to railways and other public services, such questions being freely admitted when of local concern. Every conspicuous public event provokes a crop of questions, mostly of a critical tendency, such occurrences as the Calcutta riots of 1926 finding countless echoes in the Council. The claims of the various subordinate services, or of sections of them, and the private ambitions and disappointments of individual officers are frequently forced before Government in this way. Conspicuous use is made of them to advertise the circumstances of political prisoners, to criticise the action of the police, to promote Indianisation in the services, to call attention to differentiation in the treatment of Europeans, to promote the claims of the Muhammadans or other communities to a larger share of public appointments. Many questions are disallowed, for instance, questions involving attempts to influence law-suits pending in the courts, grievances of individuals where no general principle is involved, attacks upon individuals either by innuendo or by directly defamatory statements, appeals against departmental punishments or departmental action and meticulous interference with the affairs of statutory local authorities, questions relating to the internal affairs of the universities and questions trenching upon the charter, jurisdiction and powers of the High Court, or upon the prerogative of the Governor. The most recent development is the use of supplementary questions to insinuate matters which the President has already ruled out of order in written notices of questions, and to cross-examine Members and Ministers, the latter in particular, with a view, as one member put it, " to bring out from the Hon'ble Minister information which we can use for the purpose of showing that the Hon'ble Minister is not fit to be Minister."

232. **Check on Council's interference with courts.**—The Council is debarred by statutory rule from reflecting upon the conduct of any Court of Justice, and no question may be asked in regard to any matter which is under adjudication by a Court of Law having jurisdiction in any part of His Majesty's dominions. These provisions have been responsible for the exclusion of very many questions and motions having for their object the discussion of matters before the courts, and

often characterised, whether consciously or not, by a subsidiary tendency to influence or prejudice the issue.

233. **Check on Council's interference with statutory self-governing bodies.**—Interest of a very similar nature in the doings of self-governing bodies, the municipalities, the district and local boards, the universities, the Port Commissioners, prompts many resolutions and questions which could be adequately dealt with by these bodies themselves. Though there is no statutory ground for their exclusion they are sternly checked on the ground that such matters are not the primary concern of the local Government until a failure to obtain attention from the local body has elevated them to provincial significance. This course alone has prevented the Council from expending much time on the consideration of minor matters of parochial interest, and from interfering extensively in the working of the various statutory bodies.

234. **Lack of sympathy with executive officers.**—The proceedings of the Council show that the executive officer faced with a crisis has good reason to feel that behind the difficulties immediately confronting him lies the certainty of having his action canvassed subsequently by questions, resolutions and debates in the Legislative Council in which every allegation of a hostile press or of an aggrieved party will find sympathetic exposition. No public service suffers from such consistent hostility as the police who discharge their duties under an almost assured prospect of condemnation by the Council; but every District Officer forced to exert himself in the maintenance of law and order knows that he will incur the inquisition, and that his sole safeguard lies in the support which the Executive Government can extend to him. The impatience of the Council at the restriction of its action to mere criticism and condemnation is illustrated by the numerous proposals for the appointment of committees, of which the personnel is sometimes carefully prescribed, to interfere between Government and its officers by an enquiry into circumstances which are invariably, where the case warrants it, investigated by the courts of law. Government has been consistently opposed to such proposals. Many have been made; though most have been defeated in Council or have lapsed for lack of time to discuss them.

235. **Attitude of the Council towards Europeans.**—In the ordinary course of debate few traces of active hostility to Europeans or Anglo-Indians appear in the personal exchanges across the floor of the House. A small group of extremists has always existed whose feelings betray them at times into remarks calculated to offend, and on isolated occasions a sudden gust of feeling has uncovered a latent hostility of disconcerting extent and intensity. There is, however,

ample evidence of an underlying fundamental hostility towards both Europeans and Anglo-Indians on the part of a considerable number of the Indian members of the Council. Into all the causes of that sentiment it is needless to attempt to enter. Three may be mentioned. The first is the widely held theory of the economic exploitation of India by European capital, which finds its plainest expression in attacks upon the public utility companies, the second is the desire whether from political or economic motives for the Indianisation of the services, the third is the feeling of indignation aroused by anything savouring of differentiation in the treatment of Indians and Europeans. Indianisation of the services has been accepted in principle by Government and is steadily being carried into effect. But the rate at which the process shall proceed is a question on which most of the Indian members of the Council differ greatly from Government, and there are few directions in which the Council has exerted more consistent pressure. The feeling aroused by the differentiation in the treatment of Europeans and Indians is often discernible in the proceedings of the Council. An examination of the treatment of the Budget demands for education and for hospital staff will illustrate it, and also indicate the attitude of the Council. The demands were almost without exception passed; but they were always questioned by proposals for reduction, and the feeling expressed was strong.

236. **Attitude of the Council towards labour.**—When the first Council met in 1921 the most active phase of the labour unrest which followed the war was over. But labour was still in a ferment throughout India, and apart from its exploitation by the non-co-operators and Khilafatists for political ends labour itself was organising to assert its claims. Unions of employees were being formed and strikes were taking place in large numbers.

Bengal with its various industrial activities had its full share of these troubles. Legislation regarding factories, the settlement of labour disputes and the welfare of labour rests with the Indian Legislature, and in the proceedings of the Council there is little reference to the concerns of labour. The rules for the constitution of the Council provide for the special representation of the labouring classes by two nominated members. The Council as a whole evinces sympathy towards the labouring classes, whether agricultural or industrial; the Independents and Swarajists have been at all time quick to seize on industrial upheavals with their frequent sequels of disorder, to criticise and attack Government, but it has been left to the two nominated members to bring matters concerning labour before the Council.

237. **Attitude of the Council towards the depressed classes.**—The Minister for Education in the first Council secured the consent of the

Council to an increased grant for the education of the backward classes. The prominence given by Mr. Gandhi to the position of the depressed classes in India has indeed exalted the cry for special attention for them to the rank of a political shibboleth, and each party feels that it must express sympathy with their needs when occasion offers. But, apart from agreeing to increased grants for education, the Council has paid no special attention to their needs, and it was usually left to the nominated representative of these classes in the Council to bring to light their special interests; and there is more than a little truth in the bitter words of a speaker on the Budget of 1922: "So far as sweet words are concerned, I admit that from the highest rulers of the province to the so-called leagues, every one shows sympathy with the condition of the backward classes. But when the time for practical action comes, all sympathy evaporates."

238. **The Council and public opinion.**—There can be no doubt that as far as the Hindu members were concerned the Council was a true representation of the vocal portion of the electorate. For dyarchy was not popular and did not satisfy that section which clamoured for an increased share in the government of the province, even if it did not denounce the Reforms as a sham or go so far as to demand complete independence. The Ministerialist policy of working the Reforms for what they were worth as the price of securing official assent to the next stage of constitutional advance was not a popular policy. The money necessary to achieve success was lacking, and the support given to the policy in public was lukewarm. It is open to doubt, however, whether the relative strength of the various Muhammadan groups in the Council was a correct representation of Muhammadan public opinion. This was in the main suspicious of the good faith of the Hindu leaders and of any rapid advance towards *Swaraj* which was likely, if attained in the near future, to be a Hindu *raj*, under which the Muhammadans would fare worse than under the present régime.

It is impossible to gauge the extent to which the Council reacts upon public opinion. The keenness of members to have their utterances reported, and the zeal of the press to secure opportunities for reporting the proceedings, suggest that the Council may be exercising a growing power in the education and enlightenment of public opinion. On the other hand, the fact that the most powerful party, the Swarajists, has practically ignored the Council, and has consistently preferred the press as a means of propagating its views indicates that no very high opinion of the efficacy of the Council in this respect is entertained by them.

CHAPTER IX.

The Reforms and the Departments.

239. **Cost of reforms.**—Additional expenditure at headquarters has been an unavoidable accompaniment of the change in the system of government. The amount has varied with the number of Ministers, but is about five lakhs of rupees a year.

240. **Growth of departments.**—With the introduction of the Reforms a growth in the departments became unavoidable. Education and Local Self-Government, which had been branches of the old General and Municipal Department, became separate departments, each with a Minister, Secretary and Assistant Secretary. A separate department was also formed for Agriculture and Industries, the subjects with which it deals having formerly been distributed among several departments.

The transferred departments.

The four transferred departments as they now exist, each with its own office under a Secretary and Assistant Secretary, are concerned with the following main subjects:—

(1) Local Self-Government.
Public Health.
Medical.

(2) Education.
Registration.

(3) Agriculture and Industries.
Excise.

(4) Public Works.

The following table shows how they have been distributed among the Ministers from time to time. For the first three years the departments had the advantage of continuous control by one Minister, but in the total of two years since the beginning of 1924, during which there have been Ministers, there have been many changes:—

3rd January, 1921, to 3rd January, 1924.	Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea	Local Self-Government. Public Health. Medical.
	Mr. P. C. Mitter	Education. Registration.
	Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri.	Public Works. Agriculture and Industries. Excise.

4th January, 1924, to 29th February, 1924.	Mr. S. N. Mallik	Local Self-Government. Public Health. Medical.
	Mr. A. K. Fazl-ul Haq	Education. Registration.
	Mr. A. K. Ghuznavi	Public Works. Agriculture and Industries. Excise.
1st March, 1924, to 27th August, 1924.	Mr. A. K. Fazl-ul Haq	Education. Registration. Medical.
	Mr. A. K. Ghuznavi	Public Works. Agriculture and Industries. Excise. Local Self-Government. Public Health.
28th August, 1924, to 13th March, 1925.	No Minister.	
14th March, 1925, to 25th March, 1925.	Nawab Bahadur Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri.	Education. Registration. Agriculture and Industries.
	Raja Manmatha Nath Roy Chaudhuri.	Local Self-Government. Public Health. Medical. Public Works. Excise.
26th March, 1925, to 21st January, 1927.	No Minister.	
22nd January, 1927, to 25th January, 1927.	Sir Abdur Rahim	All departments.
26th January, 1927, to 28th August, 1927.	Mr. B. Chakravartti	Medical, Public Health — to 23rd March, 1927. Education. Public Works. Excise.
	Mr. A. K. Ghuznavi	Local Self-Government. Medical, Public Health — from 23rd March, 1927. Registration. Agriculture and Industries.
29th August, 1927, to 11th October, 1927.	No Minister.	
12th October, 1927	Sir P. C. Mitter	Local Self-Government. Medical. Public Health. Public Works. Agriculture and Industries.
	Nawab Musharruf Hossain	Education. Registration. Excise.

During the periods when there was no Minister the subjects under the transferred departments were at first administered by the Governor under the Transferred Subjects (Temporary Administration) Rules, and from the 13th June, 1925, when the transfer of the subjects was suspended under rule 6 of the Devolution Rules till the 21st January, 1927, were administered by Members of the Executive Council.

241. **Changes in the services.**—The grant of responsible self-government in the provinces involves the provincialisation of the services and a beginning has already been made in this direction with the services under the transferred departments. Thus, all recruiting to the Indian Educational Service and the Indian Service of Engineers has been stopped and these services are gradually being replaced by new provincial services. Similarly, specialist posts, which were formerly controlled by the Secretary of State, have now become provincial and some appointments have already been made by the local Government. A further result of this tendency is to be found in the reduction in the number of posts reserved for members of the Indian Medical Service.

242. **Effect of the Reforms on the transferred departments.**—In estimating the effect of the Reforms on the transferred departments, a distinction must be drawn between the first period of three years, during which the same three Ministers remained in office, and the period since 1924, during which either the new system of government was in suspense or shortlived Ministries were struggling for existence. It is only in the first period that the system can be said to have been working approximately in accordance with the intentions of the framers of the Government of India Act. In the second period either there was no Minister and, apart from the influence of the Legislative Council, the departments were administered in much the same way as they had been before the Reforms; or the Ministers were struggling to maintain their existence and the departments suffered from changes of Ministers and from political influences. But in the first period Ministers were in a more secure position and were able to devote themselves to the administration of their departments.

Local Self-Government Department.

243. **Local self-government.**—The period before the introduction of the Reforms had been one of much activity and change, and the Ministers found themselves in sympathy with the accepted policies of the departments. Already in the sphere of local self-government official chairmen of district boards, local boards and municipalities had been replaced by non-officials in accordance with the policy of

making over these bodies to popular control. A beginning had been made with the establishment of the new union boards, created by the Village Self-Government Act of 1919, and bills had been drafted for the radical amendment of both the Calcutta Municipal Act and the Bengal Municipal Act. With all these changes, the Minister, Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea, was in sympathy, and in particular with the Calcutta Municipal Bill, which with some modifications he succeeded in getting passed into law in 1923. In the same year he introduced the Bengal Municipal Bill, to which he had given its final shape, but the Council came to an end before any progress could be made with the bill.

244. **Medical relief.**—In the matter of medical relief it had long been the practice of Government to support the principal hospitals of Calcutta. Government also provided facilities for higher medical training at the Medical College and the hospitals attached to it: whilst the Campbell Medical School was an institution for the training of the lower grade of medical officers. Outside Calcutta, on the other hand, it was for the most part left to district boards, municipalities and private charity to provide medical relief. At Dacca a medical school for the training of medical officers of the lower grade had been working for many years; there was no other provision outside Calcutta for medical training, but Government had sanctioned in 1918 the establishment of a medical school at Burdwan, the whole cost being met from provincial revenues. This school was opened in 1921.

The first year of the Reforms was marked by the opening of the School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene and the new hospital for tropical diseases, the establishment of which was due to the genius and energy of Sir Leonard Rogers. A further notable addition in 1924 was the Pasteur Institute, the need for which in Calcutta was at once demonstrated by the fact that the number of patients in the first half-year of its working exceeded the number of those who had gone from Bengal for treatment at Shillong in the previous year.

There has been no great change in policy since the Department came under the control of a Minister in 1921. Both the Minister and the Legislative Council were in sympathy with the policy of extending medical education to centres in the districts, and thus not only meeting a need for medical assistance in rural areas but also providing a new avenue for employment for the middle class. The difficulty of providing hospitals of sufficient capacity to provide the basis for medical training and the general lack of funds stood in the way of rapid progress, and the only school so far established is one at Mymensingh in Eastern Bengal. Schemes for other schools, however, have made some progress, and it is hoped soon to establish four more schools,

Outside Calcutta the only Government hospital of importance is the Mitford Hospital at Dacca. The system of medical relief in the districts is based on a hospital at the district headquarters, which is ordinarily placed in charge of the Civil Surgeon of the district, and a number of outlying dispensaries. The funds of these institutions are chiefly derived from municipalities and district boards and from subscriptions. Small grants are made by Government, but these are mainly in return for services rendered to Government. The total of these grants in 1921 was Rs. 1,92,000, and in 1926 Rs. 2,32,000. The number of district hospitals and dispensaries in 1921 was 827. This has gradually risen to 1,095 at the end of 1926. In the year 1923, the Ministry of Local Self-Government, in order to encourage the establishment of dispensaries by district and union boards, sanctioned recurring grants of Rs. 250 for every new village dispensary established by union boards and Rs. 500 for new dispensaries established by district boards to serve the needs of a thana or police-station area. The grant was sanctioned for three years, and was renewed in 1926. The total number of patients treated annually in district hospitals and dispensaries has remained about the same, the figure for 1921 being 7,565,000 and the figure for 1926, 7,788, 000.

245. **Public health.**—Whatever may have been the cause, there has been a remarkable change for the better in the attitude of the people towards public health, and a great advance in the work done by the Public Health Department. The change in attitude may be illustrated by the fact that in 1921 there were 49 co-operative anti-malarial and public health societies and in 1927 representatives from 1,087 such societies came to Calcutta to pay homage to Sir Ronald Ross. It may fairly be claimed that the Public Health Department has succeeded in winning confidence in the measures it recommends. When District Health Officers were first appointed in 1920 and 1921, district boards, which were required to pay half their salaries, were inclined to regard them as expensive luxuries. They are now welcomed everywhere; it is proposed to establish a subordinate health staff in every one of the six hundred police-station areas in Bengal, and more than a third of the number are already at work. In 1920 about 2,500 tanks and wells were chlorinated in cholera-infected areas. This number rose to 9,950 in 1921; in 1926 in one district alone the number was 4,455. In 1921 not a single cholera-infected house was disinfected, and it was not for want of infection; in 1926 in one district 2,220 houses were disinfected. In 1921 there was no anti-cholera inoculation; in 1925 there were 101,736 inoculations; in 1926 more than 250,000 doses of vaccine were issued, and villagers were coming forward and offering to pay for the cost of it.

In 1921 the department made a special enquiry into the prevalence of kala-azar and found that it was widely prevalent in parts of Bengal

in which it had previously been unsuspected. The results are remarkable. In 1921, 7,689 patients were treated; in 1923, 51,740; in 1924, 130,952, and in 1925, 179,041. There were 600 centres at work in 1926, and it may now be said that there has been a marked decline in the number of sufferers from this scourge.

This work began before the Reforms. Its rapid development has been due to an enthusiastic department and a change in public opinion, which has been induced by propaganda, in which the Tropical School of Medicine has been closely associated, and confirmed by experience. It has had the active sympathy of Government, both when there has been a Minister and when there has been none; and though the funds spent upon it have not been large they increased from Rs. 23 lakhs in 1921-22 to Rs. 34 lakhs in 1926-27; the grant in the current year is Rs. 38 lakhs.

Education Department.

246. In the sphere of education there had also been much activity in the years preceding the Reforms, and though practical achievement continued to be strictly limited by the want of funds, the Minister, Mr. P. C. Mitter, found much material ready for his attention in 1921.

247. **Primary education.**—Following the principles laid down by the Government of India in 1913, the pre-Reform Government of Bengal had adopted a programme, which included the provision of a primary school under the control of the district board in each chaukidari panchayat union, supplementing the pay of teachers of other primary schools and establishing reformed training schools for primary school teachers in every subdivision. As the results achieved were disappointing the problem was further examined and a new scheme prepared. This was again modified after the introduction of the Reforms, Mr. Mitter obtaining the approval of Government to the principle that the cost of financing all proposals for primary education under the scheme should be shared by Government with the local bodies. But very little advantage was taken of this offer of assistance and by the end of 1926-27 the scheme had been introduced only in 21 municipalities and 72 unions, the Government grant amounting to Rs. 1,04,102 a year. The draft of a Primary Education Bill was completed in 1927, but it has not yet been introduced, partly owing to want of funds for the preliminary steps and partly owing to the change of Ministries.

There was no change in policy during the time when there was no Minister, but the department succeeded in increasing the grants to local bodies for primary education from Rs. 17,00,000 in 1924-25 to

Rs. 22,80,000 in 1927-28. Almost the whole of the increase was used for raising the pay of primary school teachers.

248. **Secondary and higher education.**—The Government of Bengal had generally approved of the recommendations of the Calcutta University Commission, whose chief proposals had been the reconstitution of the Calcutta University, the incorporation of the University of Dacca, the separation of intermediate from collegiate education and placing it under a suitably constituted body, the expansion of technical and vocational education, changes in the organisation of teaching and inspecting staffs, and the encouragement of education of girls, backward classes and Muhammadans.

Mr. Mitter devoted much time to the reform of the Calcutta University and the establishment of boards for secondary education, but no progress could be made owing to want of funds and the opposition of the University. The Dacca University Act had been passed in 1920, and in 1921 the University was at last established. Science teaching in mufassal colleges was improved, and encouragement was given to the education of girls and of the depressed classes. A further achievement stands to the credit of the shortlived Ministry of 1924, during which Mr. Fazl-ul Huq succeeded in securing funds for the Islamia College in Calcutta, the construction of which had long been held up by the financial stringency.

Other schemes, which had been included in the programme prepared by Mr. Mitter in 1923, have been carried out in subsequent years. Effect has recently been given to a scheme for improving the pay and prospects of teachers in secondary schools, including the creation of a provident fund. Another scheme for providing manual training has been put into operation in twenty-one Government and aided high schools, and its extension to a hundred more schools has been administratively approved. Provision has been made for garden and farm work in secondary schools and the improvement of teaching in engineering; and grants towards the maintenance of a hostel in North Calcutta for women students of colleges and the establishment of middle English schools for girls in certain district headquarters have been sanctioned.

The abolition of the Ministry in 1924 caused no change in policy. The department obtained a substantial increase in the grant for secondary education during this later period, and the grants to non-Government secondary schools were raised from Rs. 7,75,000 in 1924-25 to Rs. 10,84,000 in 1925-26 and again to Rs. 12,43,000 in 1927-28. Of the increase in the latter year, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 was devoted to increasing the pay of teachers. To the same period belongs the Dacca University (Amendment) Act, passed in 1925, which by providing

for an annual contribution by Government of Rs. 5½ lakhs placed the finances of the University on a stable basis.

Agriculture and Industries Department.

249. **Agriculture.**—Government's agricultural policy was enunciated in a resolution published shortly before the Reforms; its main objective was the provision of the best obtainable seed for any type of agricultural produce and the creation of an agency for its distribution. This policy of research followed by demonstration and propaganda has been fully justified by the conspicuous success achieved with such important crops as jute, paddy and sugarcane. It was accepted by the first Minister, Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, and, in spite of retrenchment and the repeated changes of Minister in the later years, the department has fortunately been able to maintain this policy without interruption.

The best methods of working Government demonstration farms had been discussed during the time of the first Ministry, and in 1924 Mr. Ghuznavi decided that a portion of every farm should be worked as an economic proposition so as to demonstrate that agriculture conducted on the lines recommended by the department could be made to pay. Another noteworthy development has been the increase in the number of private farms and of paddy seed farms, growing and distributing approved departmental seed, that have sprung up in various parts of the province as a result of departmental activities.

250. **Agricultural education.**—A matter to which the first Minister gave his early attention was the provision of agricultural education. The Sabour College was about to be closed at the end of the 1921-22 session and there was no institution in Bengal for higher agricultural education. The only agricultural schools in the province were two experimental schools opened at Dacca and Chinsura in 1920 and 1921 for the training of cultivators' sons. The whole question of agricultural education was discussed at the Provincial Board of Agriculture in August 1921, and early in 1922 it was decided to give effect to a long pending scheme for the establishment of an institute at Dacca for higher agricultural education, to convert the schools at Dacca and Chinsura into secondary agricultural schools, and to consider the establishment of elementary agricultural schools. But the financial difficulties of the province have stood in the way of these schemes. The Dacca Institute has not yet been established. The two vernacular schools at Dacca and Chinsura were raised to the secondary standard in 1922, but in 1924 the Chinsura school was abolished in accordance with the advice of the Bengal Retrenchment Committee. The same committee was opposed to the elementary agricultural schools, and the

schools have not yet been started. During the present Ministry with the co-operation of the Education Department provision has been made for instruction in farm and garden work in the ordinary secondary schools, and teachers are being trained for this purpose at the Dacca Secondary Agricultural School.

Some progress has been made in the matter of cattle improvement. The initial steps had been taken before 1921 by the establishment of the Rangpur Cattle Farm and of the cattle breeding section at Dacca, but an advance was made in 1927 when a Live Stock Expert was appointed; a scheme for cattle improvement, which includes the supply of stud bulls to co-operative organisations and the grant of premiums to encourage the maintenance of approved bulls, has been sanctioned and funds provided in this year's budget. A permanent committee of the various departments interested in the subject has also been formed to advise on matters connected with it.

The appointment of an Agricultural Engineer, whose main duties would be concerned with irrigation work and the care of farm machinery, was approved as an experimental measure in 1925, but no one has been appointed to the post as the present Minister is not convinced of the utility of the appointment.

251. **Sericulture.**—An up-to-date silk weaving institute has been established at Berhampore; and encouraging progress has been made in demonstration and propaganda work in the districts of Malda and Bogra for training silk rearers in better methods of rearing and of preventing disease.

252. **Veterinary.**—It has been the accepted policy of Government that veterinary treatment is essentially a local concern and a legitimate charge on the revenues of local bodies: Government provides the inspecting and controlling staff, but only makes a contribution towards the cost of the local staff. There has been one departure from this principle since the Reforms, namely, the decision by Mr. Ghuznavi in 1927 that the control of epidemics, as distinct from the ordinary care of animals is a provincial concern.

253. **Industries.**—The Industries Department was constituted in 1920 as a result of the recommendation of the Indian Industrial Commission and its activities have generally followed the lines indicated in the Commission's report. The financial stringency, however, prevented its development on the generous scale originally contemplated.

The educational work done by the department is described in the chapter on the Growth of Education in Bengal. Its policy in other directions has been to supply correct and up-to-date information on commercial and industrial matters, to ascertain by research and demonstrate the economic utilisation of available raw material, and to

assist local industries. Its activities, however, have been restricted by the want of funds and have also been affected by the industrial depression which began soon after the department was constituted. The necessity of retrenchment deprived the department of the services of its Industrial Intelligence Officer in 1921 and has confined the work of collecting and supplying information within narrow limits. An industrial chemist was appointed in 1921, but his laboratory was not completed until 1926. The staff available for demonstration work has been small, and retrenchment removed the Divisional Superintendents of Industries. The assistance of indigenous industries has mostly taken the form of advice and of help in obtaining facilities from other Government departments and railways.

The expenditure on the department was Rs. 7 lakhs in 1921-22. This was reduced to a little over Rs. 5½ lakhs in 1923-24; it was restored to over Rs. 7 lakhs in 1925-26, and has since been increased, the grant in the budget for 1928-29 being Rs. 8½ lakhs.

254. **Co-operative societies.**—The policy followed is based on the principles laid down by the Government of India in 1914. It has remained unchanged during the years of the Reforms, though there have been developments in new directions such as in the formation of milk societies and the organisation of societies for the sale of jute and paddy, and there has been a marked growth of irrigation and other societies.

Whilst there has been no change in policy, there has been a great expansion in the work of the department. The number of societies of all classes rose from 6,679 in 1921-22 to 12,819 in 1925-26, and the working capital of these societies from Rs. 3,68 lakhs to Rs. 7,52 lakhs. The principal functions performed by the department are those of organisation, inspection and audit. The cost to Government was Rs. 4,60,000 in 1921-22 and Rs. 4,90,000 in 1925-26. The estimated cost for the current year is Rs. 6,30,000.

255. **Excise.**—The excise policy followed since 1921 differs little from that laid down in 1914. In 1921 the Ministry restated the principle underlying that policy, which was directed towards securing a minimum of consumption with a maximum of revenue. As regards prohibition, it was also declared that this involved an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of individuals, and Government were not prepared to accept it as the goal of their excise policy. In the same year the Legislative Council rejected a resolution urging prohibition.

It was also declared that facilities would be afforded by the department towards the industrial use of alcohol. As a step towards this the duty on alcohol required for medicinal or other industrial purposes was reduced by over 50 per cent. It was also decided to abandon altogether the system of settling excise and opium shops by

annual auction and the Bengal fixed-fee system was extended throughout the province.

Besides the licensing boards in Calcutta and two other towns which already existed, licensing boards have now also been created in four districts as an experimental measure.

With regard to opium and other dangerous drugs, various measures of control were adopted as a result of the ratification by the Government of India of the various instruments which arose out of the Geneva Conference of 1924-25. The price of opium in Calcutta and its neighbouring districts was enhanced by Rs. 20 per seer in 1925. In 1927 the Secretary of State suggested that a reasonable standard of consumption of opium would be 30 seers per annum per 10,000 of population, and that special enquiries should be made in localities where consumption exceeded this rate. A committee was appointed to investigate conditions where the above standard is exceeded and other subsidiary measures to restrict consumption were taken.

Public Works Department.

256. The Public Works Department differs from the other three departments in that it is mainly an agency department for carrying out the works required by other departments and is not therefore concerned with any large questions of policy, except in the matter of roads. The department was responsible for three bills. The first was introduced by the Minister, Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, and became the Bengal Aerial Ropeways Act, 1923. The objects of the Act were to authorise, facilitate and regulate the construction and working of aerial ropeways. The other two Acts were passed when there was no Minister. The Bengal Highways Act, 1925, enabled Government to close temporarily any Government road and to make rules for the regulation of traffic, the prevention of obstruction and encroachments and other matters. The value of the bill was lessened by the Legislative Council reducing the penalties to trifling amounts. The most important of the three Acts was the Howrah Bridge Act, 1926. The bill was defeated in 1924 by a dilatory motion, but was passed in a later session, though the Legislative Council rejected the type of bridge which Government would have preferred to adopt.

The Reserved Departments.

257. **Effect of the Reforms on the reserved departments.**—In the reserved departments the actual system of administration has remained practically unaltered by the Reforms, but the machinery

of the new constitution has influenced its working in several ways, both directly and indirectly.

The direct influence has been exerted mainly through the increased power of the Legislative Council. In the old Legislative Council there was a majority of non-official members, and a bare majority of elected members; but the members were not elected on a direct franchise, and the composition of the Council was ordinarily such as not to offer any serious obstruction to Government business. The Reforms introduced a direct franchise, and largely increased both the non-official and the elected majority.

The power of the Legislative Council in its relations with Government has been greatly enhanced by the increase in the number of elected members. The reserved side of Government is in the difficult position of an irremovable executive which has to work through a legislature in which it does not command a majority. Not only has the Council power to reject bills introduced by Government, but private bills can also be introduced and the Council has power to pass bills unacceptable to Government. Similarly, whilst the old Council could only pass resolutions on the budget, which the Government were free to accept or not, the new Council has power to reject or reduce the demands made by Government. It is true that the Governor may certify that the passage of a bill relating to a reserved subject is essential for the discharge of his responsibility for the subject and thereupon the bill is deemed to have passed, and that he may withhold his assent from a bill passed by the Council; he may also certify that the expenditure provided for by a demand relating to a reserved subject is essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the subject and the Government may then act as if the Council assented to the demand. But the experience of the last seven years shows that every endeavour has been made to meet the wishes of the Legislative Council and a frequent use of the power of certification has been avoided. In only one case has a bill been passed into a law by certification, and in only one case has the Governor withheld his assent to a bill passed by the Council, the circumstances in both cases being exceptional. The power to certify demands was freely used in 1924 when the Council rejected almost all the demands for reserved subjects; but at other times it has been used sparingly, and the Council has been able to effect material reductions of demands. Apart from the exercise of constitutional powers, the members of Government have always shown a desire to get the support of the Council and a readiness to yield when the opposition of a majority was due to a real difference of opinion and not a mere desire to obstruct, with the result that concessions have often been made. An example is the reduction of the survey and settlement expenditure by a material change in the programme.

There has also been a reluctance to place before the Council matters in which there was reason to think that the attitude of the Council would be hostile. For example, bills for consolidating and modernising the laws relating to police administration, which had been drafted shortly before the Reforms, have not yet been introduced. The uncertainty as to the form in which the bills would emerge from the Council made the Police Department unwilling to run the risk of introduction.

The addition of a second non-official Indian Member of the Executive Council has increased the representation of Indian non-official opinion, both in the Executive Council and in the Joint Meeting of the two sides of Government. It has also had some effect on the policy of the departments under the Indian Member. For instance, the policy of the Irrigation Department is now more influenced by popular opinion than it was before.

The reserved departments have also been affected by the desire of all members of the Government to do the utmost possible for the transferred departments. The reasons for this attitude have been a recognition that the transferred departments are intended to serve important and urgent needs of the people, a wish to help the Ministers to achieve success, and the desire to comply with a popular demand. It is an attitude which was most evident in the later years when the transferred departments were being administered by Members of the Executive Council, and was most marked in the case of the Education Department, which was under the charge of the Finance Member. The effect of this sympathy with the transferred departments has been that the reserved departments suffered in the allocation of funds.

CHAPTER X.

Relations with the Government of India and the Secretary of State.

258. **General.**—In the working of the laws and rules governing the relations of the local Government with the Government of India and the Secretary of State, no difficulty of any importance has arisen in the relations between the Provincial Government, the Central Government and the Secretary of State. But certain problems have emerged which indicate the desirability of modifications in the existing arrangements.

259. **The High Court.**—The Calcutta High Court is directly under the administrative control of the Government of India, but the local

Government has to meet the whole cost of the Court from its own revenues. This arrangement is anomalous and with the need for consulting the local Government before any change involving expenditure is sanctioned leads to a dilatory and cumbersome system of triangular correspondence. In 1921 the Government of Bengal made an unsuccessful attempt to secure a devolution of power from the Government of India. Again, the local Government cannot pass any Bill affecting the jurisdiction of the High Court; hence, when the Bengal Children Act of 1922 conferred appellate and revisional powers on the High Court, these provisions had to be re-enacted by the central legislature to give them legal validity. A similar difficulty arose in the amendment of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

260. **Calcutta University and secondary education.**—By Act VII of 1921 the administrative control over Calcutta University, which till then vested in the Government of India, was transferred to the Government of Bengal. Under the Devolution Rules, however, the university and the control and organisation of secondary education were subject to legislation by the Indian legislature for a period of five years from 3rd January 1921. During this period, the Ministry of Education prepared a Bill to amend the law relating to Calcutta University, and submitted it for the previous sanction of the Governor-General under section 80A (*3*) (*f*) of the Government of India Act. As both the university and the Government of Assam objected to the provisions of the Bill, and as it did not completely embody the recommendations of the Sadler Commission, the Government of India refused their sanction, and the Bill had to be dropped. In 1926, the rules automatically changed, so that the university and secondary education became subject to legislation by the local legislature. The difficulty of legislating in respect of Assam still remains.

261. **Control of prisons.**—Under the Prisons Act, 1894, and rules made thereunder, the general control of prisons in all provinces is vested in the Government of India. In 1922, the Government of India issued certain instructions regarding the use of the punishment of whipping, and the classification of political offenders. To these orders the Government of Bengal took exception without success. In 1923 the subject of whipping was raised again by a resolution carried in the Legislative Council in favour of the abolition of whipping in jails. The Government of Bengal submitted certain proposals which did not meet with the approval of the Government of India. The difficulty was finally solved by the local Government being permitted to issue executive instructions on the subject, the statutory rules remaining unaltered.

262. **Financial.**—The new constitution conferred upon the local legislature for the first time the power to make laws imposing or

amending taxation without limitation in respect of certain " scheduled " taxes, and subject to the control of the Governor-General in Council in respect of other specified heads. Under these powers the local legislature passed three taxation bills—

(*a*) The Bengal Amusements Tax Bill.

(*b*) The Bengal Court-fees (Amendment) Bill.

(*c*) The Bengal Stamp (Amendment) Bill.

To the first of these the consent of the Government of India was not necessary and sanction for the introduction of the second was granted without comment. With regard to the third, the Central Government gave ready assent on the mutual understanding that certain proposed enhancements of stamp duty on various commercial documents would be deleted, the Government of India undertaking in its turn to introduce all-India legislation covering the increased taxes omitted from the Bengal Bill. The principle underlying this arrangement was the desirability of uniform taxation on commercial documents in all provinces, a proposition with which the Government of Bengal were in general sympathy. These arrangements were embodied in the Indian Stamp Amendment Act passed by the central legislature in 1923.

263. In the Bengal Fairs Bill it was proposed to authorise the levy of a terminal tax on pilgrims proceeding by rail to certain *mêlas* in Bengal. The Government of India disallowed this proposal on the ground that such powers should be exercised only in respect of large fairs of all-India importance and that the *mêlas* in question did not come within this category.

264. In 1921-22, the local Government suggested that railways should be declared liable to pay road and public works cesses under section 135 of the Indian Railways Act, but the Government of India declined to accept the proposal.

265. The rapid extension of road transport in recent years has directed increased attention to the question of motor taxation, and the local Government initiated an enquiry into the possibility of tapping this source of revenue in the interests of the local authorities responsible for the maintenance of roads. The Government of India, however, requested the local Government to await the results of an enquiry which they had themselves instituted,—a suggestion which the Government of Bengal have accepted.

266. The rules regarding the control of Famine Insurance Fund balances, and advances from the Government of India to the local Government, have worked smoothly, while no occasion arose for the exercise of the Government of India's control over provincial borrowing.

267. **Excise.**—The international and interprovincial aspects of excise administration naturally give rise to problems which only the central authority can handle. The obligations incurred by the Government of India at Geneva under the Drug Conventions of 1925 have involved the local Government in important developments of policy, and in 1926 the Government of Bengal protested against the action of the Central Government in accepting on its own responsibility obligations of which the enforcement would affect provincial revenues. The Government of India maintained that nothing had been undertaken which was not consistent with the pre-Reforms policy; and further claimed that they were not bound to consult local Governments before incurring obligations in the international sphere. This decision obviously could not be regarded as final if grave injury were done to provincial revenues.

In the matter of interprovincial adjustments of excise revenue, the Government of India intervened as a benevolent intermediary to prevent a conflict of interests and to bring about a solution acceptable to the different provincial Governments. This object was, in fact, achieved.

Generally it may be said that interference went only so far as was required by international or interprovincial relations.

268. **Control of Services.**—In the matter of the recruitment and control of the Civil Services in India, the relative powers of the Secretary of State, the Government of India and the local Government have been clearly defined in the Classification Rules and the Delegation Rules, 1926, which have been framed by the Secretary of State in Council under section 96B (*2*) of the Government of India Act. The general effect of these rules is a clearer definition of the control of the Secretary of State in Council over the all-India services, and the delegation to the local Government of control over the provincial and subordinate services, and officers holding special posts. But this delegation of power is accompanied by the important restriction that without the previous approval of the Governor-General in Council no first appointment can be made otherwise than by competitive examination, or selection by a permanent board.

Another important feature of the Reforms period in connection with the Civil Services is the creation of the Public Service Commission under the provisions of section 96C of the Government of India Act. The duties of the Commission which are detailed in the Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1926, are primarily in connection with the all-India services, but provision has also been made whereby the Commission if so requested may render help to local Governments in connection with provincial services or special officers.

An important point in connection with this Commission is the establishment of the convention that in certain classes of cases the advice tendered by the Commission shall, save in exceptional matters, be accepted by the Government of India.

269. No real difficulty of principle has been experienced in connection with the administration of the services under these rules. Only in two cases has there been a reference to the Governor-General in Council in connection with officers of all-India services and in neither were the orders of the local Government modified.

The final result of the changes of the Reforms period is the establishment of the methods of recruitment, discipline and promotion on a system of rules and regulations which can be altered only with the consent of authorities that are not likely to be swayed by any consideration other than the integrity and efficiency of the public services.

CHAPTER XI.

The Reforms and General Administration.

270. In considering the effect of the Reforms on general administration, and chiefly the administration in the districts, it is not easy to distinguish the changes due to the new system of government from those due to other causes. There have been causes operating for many years before the Reforms; there have been other causes arising from ideas such as produced the Reforms, and there are causes to be found in the present constitution, all reacting on one another, and together producing the changes in the form and spirit of the administration which have become apparent in recent years.

271. **The old system.**—The essence of the old system was that there was a series of one-man authorities, one subordinate to another, each responsible for the administration of the area in his charge. The Lieutenant-Governor was responsible to the Governor-General of India for the province, the Commissioner to the Lieutenant-Governor for his division, the District Officer to the Commissioner for his district, and the Subdivisional Officer to the District Officer for his subdivision.

The functions of the Commissioner and the District Officer were very wide. With the exception of the Civil Courts and the Courts of Session, over which the District Judge had authority in subordination to the High Court, the District Officer was concerned in and controlled all other activities of Government within his district. He was the representative of the sovereign power. As the District Magistrate, he was responsible for the maintenance of law and order

and controlled the police and the criminal courts; as Collector he was responsible for the due realisation of all Government revenues, land revenue, income-tax, excise, road cess and public works cess; his was the chief Revenue Court in the district, with both original and appellate jurisdiction. He was in many districts the chairman of the municipality at the headquarters of the district; he was always the chairman of the district board and, as such, had a large share in the control of such matters as roads and communications, public health, water-supply and education. He was responsible for everything that concerned the welfare of his district; in times of calamity or distress he was expected to take charge of the relief work, and his position in the district board enabled him to act promptly. It was through the Commissioner and the District Officer that all orders of Government came, and through the District Officer and the Commissioner that all requests to Government had to pass. On matters of policy Government ordinarily consulted the Commissioners, and the latter often consulted the District Officers. There was a community of ideas and traditions between Government and its officers, mutual understanding was easy, and the advice of the Commissioners carried great weight.

272. **Tendency to departmental control before the Reforms.**—For many years before the Reforms a gradual change had been taking place. With the growth of the modern demand for the more active promotion by Government of the moral and material welfare of the people, the field of Government activities was widening. New offices were created at the headquarters of Government to carry on these activities, but in the districts the new work was generally added to the burden of the District Officer or of the district board, of which he was the chairman. As the requirements became more exacting and the need of expert advice greater, the strengthening or creation of departments became necessary. Although Government clung to the principle that the authority of the District Officer must be maintained in all departments, it was obvious that as the departments grew in strength and appointed their own local officers, his advice and control were less needed, and the tendency was to transfer the control to local departmental officers, who were instructed to keep in touch with and consult the District Officer, and sought his help when they required it. This process was not limited to new departments such as that of Agriculture; a similar development had been taking place in the older departments, in which the increase of work made it necessary that departmental officers should relieve Commissioners and District Officers of some of their functions of control.

273. **The change to popular control of local bodies.**—Whilst the gradual extension of departmental control reduced the functions of the Commissioner and District Officer, a still greater change in

administration was brought about by the adoption of the policy of transferring local self-governing bodies to popular control. Although this cannot be attributed to the Reforms, it was in accordance with the ideas on which they were based. The first formula stated by the authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms in setting forth the principles of their proposals was that there should be, as far as possible, complete popular control in local bodies and the largest possible independence for them of outside control. In Bengal this principle had already been adopted, but it was applied more rapidly after the publication of the Report. In the case of municipalities, the change to popular control had been gradually taking place. From the time that the Bengal Municipal Act was passed in 1884, there were municipalities with non-official chairmen, but in all the district and subdivisional headquarters towns the District Magistrates or the Subdivisional Magistrates were ordinarily the chairmen. They were gradually replaced; in 1915 there were still official chairmen in 27 out of 112 municipalities; a substantial change was made in 1916, and there is now only one municipality in the plains districts which has an official chairman. The change in the more important case of the district boards came later. In 1917 five district boards for the first time elected their chairmen; in 1920 the privilege was extended to fifteen more and, in the following year, to the rest of the boards in the plains districts. The election of Subdivisional Officers as chairmen of the local boards was stopped in 1921. On the other hand, the Village Self-Government Act of 1919 gave the District Magistrate the new function of inaugurating and guiding the development of the new union boards.

274. **The position in 1921.**—The position, then, when the Reforms were introduced in 1921, was that the functions of Commissioners and District Officers had already been contracted by the growth of separate departmental control; the District Officer was already excluded from direct participation in the work of district boards and municipalities, though both he and the Commissioner retained the right to inspect these bodies, and the Commissioner appointed some of the members of local and district boards, usually on the nomination of the District Officer. By ceasing to be Chairman of the District Board, the District Officer had lost a wide sphere of activity, but the work of organising the new union boards was beginning.

275. **The effect of the new Constitution on District Administration.**—The effect of the constitutional changes of 1921 on district administration may be described as the effect of the creation of a new power, the power of a Legislative Council in which the majority of the members are elected. This power has affected district administration in various ways. It has placed the control of important departments in the hands of Ministers responsible to the Council, and in

the districts has set up persons who can influence the Government directly or through the Legislative Council, instead of through the District Officer and Commissioner. In other words, it has brought political influences to bear on district administration and has thereby still further changed the position of the old district and divisional authorities, modified the attitude of local self-governing bodies, and started a process of change in the attitude of the people towards Government.

276. **The effect on the Commissioner and District Officer.**—The influence of the new Legislative Council has accentuated the tendency to make departmental activities in the districts independent of the Commissioner and District Officer, especially in the transferred departments. Under the old constitution the advice of the local officers was sought on questions of policy, and reliance was placed on the advice they gave. Under the new system, although the local officers are still consulted, the views of the Legislative Council and local politicians carry more weight than before, and the decisions on both questions of policy and matters of local importance are often governed by considerations of political expediency. The result has been a contraction of the influence of the local officer both in relation to Government and in local affairs.

277. **The effect on the Commissioner and District Officer of the transfer of local bodies to popular control.**—It is the general opinion of officers of experience, and is indeed beyond doubt, that by far the greatest change in district administration was caused by the transfer of the district boards to popular control. Whilst this change was not directly due to the Reforms, being begun before the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms was written, it was conceived in the spirit of the Reforms, accelerated by them, and completed in the first year of the reformed system. To the Commissioner and the District Officer the change has meant much. The Commissioner has felt the loss of effective control over the branches of the administration directly concerned with the moral and material advancement of the people. The local self-governing bodies, as one Commissioner remarks, resent his criticisms and advice as unnecessary interference with their powers, and he has very little hand in shaping the policy of the Government in the Local Self-Government Department. The expectation that the boards would profit by the advice of experienced officers has not been realised. The District Officer has been affected even more than the Commissioner, because he has been deprived of functions which not only constituted the most interesting part of his work but also added much to the influence which his magisterial and revenue functions gave him, making him the authority to which all kinds of representations were brought. As the head of the District Board, he had a large share in the control over the funds available for roads

and water-supply, schools and dispensaries. This provided him with an incentive to tour in every part of his district and brought him easily into touch with the people.

The sense of administrative loss caused by exclusion from the work of the district board and the consequent loss of the power of the purse is illustrated by the importance which both Commissioners and District Officers attach to the discretionary grants placed at their disposal by Government. The grants are small; in the last two years the average sum allotted to a Commissioner has been about Rs. 10,000, and to a District Officer less than Rs. 2,000. But small as they are, great administrative value is attached to them. They enable officers on tour to give a little help in petty schemes of water-supply and to make gifts to schools, dispensaries and other local institutions. They thus make the visits of officers more welcome and do something to prevent the growth of the belief that Government has become indifferent to the needs of the people.

278. **The effect enhanced by the constitutional changes.**—To the constitutional changes of 1921 may be attributed an extension of the process which deprived the Commissioner and District Officer of their influence in local self-government. Not only have Ministers been inclined to attach greater importance to the views of the Legislative Council and local representatives, but they have also endeavoured to gain political support from their connection with local self-governing bodies. Under the Local Self-Government Act the power of appointing a certain proportion of local board and district board members rests with the Commissioner, who ordinarily relies on the nominations of the District Officer. But these appointments afford some opportunity for political patronage, and the Ministers have required Commissioners to obtain their approval before making the appointments. The result has been that Commissioners have sometimes been compelled to make officially appointments of which they do not approve. As an officer with experience of the Local Self-Government Department has remarked, many members of the Legislative Council desire to utilise their position for private purposes and the Ministers unfortunately have had to utilise every opportunity open to them of winning doubtful votes. One method has been the control of nominations to local bodies.

279. **Effect of the Reforms on local self-governing bodies.**—The effect of the Reforms on local self-governing bodies has been chiefly political; the view generally expressed by local officers is that, with the exception of union boards, these bodies are now more subject to political influences than before. This has been most apparent in those boards and municipalities in which a Swarajist majority prevails; in these the District Congress Committee controls the policy;

offices are closed on *hartal* days, and at elections not only subordinate officers but even contractors, village school-masters, vaccinators and medical officers of dispensaries are expected to canvass for the Swarajist candidates. On the other hand, cases are noted by officers in which a Swarajist chairman has excluded politics from local affairs, and there has been a marked improvement in administration. Communal feeling is reported to have an increasing influence and has been prominent in recent elections to local and district boards. The opinion is held by some officers that this is due to the Reforms. Thus an Indian District Officer remarks that the grouping of parties has followed cleavages of religion rather than cleavages of policy, and in consequence aspirants for political power have found it profitable to inflame religious jealousy in order to augment their following.

280. **Growth of interest in local self-government.**—At the same time, local self-government has become more real in the sense that the removal of official control has increased the consciousness of power and the feeling of responsibility in a large number of those responsible for the management of local bodies. By the creation of union boards, the practice of local self-government has been extended to classes which had little concern in it before—the traders, substantial cultivators and other landholders living in the villages. The mass of the people take very little more part in local government than they did before; nor would it be reasonable to expect any great change in this respect. But the educated classes feel that they have more authority both in local and provincial government, and there is a growing recognition of the fact that service in local affairs is a qualification for membership of the provincial council.

It is not possible to make any statement of the effect of the Reforms on the people that would be true of all parts of the province and of all classes. The change from the traditional habit of looking for help to the representatives of Government is necessarily slow, and in many parts of the province hardly amounts to more than an uneasy feeling that the power of those representatives to help has been diminished, or that they and the Government have become less sympathetic. It is not yet generally recognised that part of the power to help has been transferred to other representatives chosen not by the Government but by the people. The great majority of the people have no idea of the machinery of administration, nor of the changes which have been made in it, and the knowledge of the more educated people is vague. The old plan was simple; whatever the trouble might be, the authority to whom to apply was the Subdivisional Officer or District Officer. Now there is a confusing multiplicity of authorities. The conception of the new system has spread very slowly, especially in the more remote districts. In a country in which the majority of the people are illiterate and the Press of little

worth or influence outside the towns, the means of promoting an understanding of a new political system are small. Of the great mass of the people in all but a few districts, it may safely be said that they comprehend nothing of the meaning of a Legislative Council, and are hardly aware of its existence; nor do they know what their representatives are expected to do for them. In most matters they still look to the District and Subdivisional Officers, and they are only beginning to realise the disturbing fact that for most local needs they must now look elsewhere. In the more advanced districts this process of slow understanding has gone further. The idea of the Legislative Council is still vague, but there are signs that the voter is beginning to grasp the idea that the person for whom he votes is a representative with some responsibility to the electors, and may be displaced at the next election if he fails to make good his promises. To this extent the political education of the people has begun.

CHAPTER XII.

The Services under the Reforms.

281. The first effect of the Reforms on the services was not encouraging. In the words of the report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in 1924, the relations between the political classes and the services instead of being improved were markedly worsened. In the minds of the services the uncertainty of the political future of India, combined with attacks upon them in the press and on the platform, and their steadily deteriorating financial condition produced feelings of anxiety and discontent. On the other hand, in Indian political circles there was dissatisfaction because members of the all-India services, even in the transferred field, were still under the ultimate control of the Secretary of State, and because the rate of Indianisation adopted since 1919 was regarded as illiberal. The discontent was most prevalent in the all-India services. The pay of these services as well as the pay of most of the provincial services had been revised at the end of 1919 on the basis of the advice given by the Islington Commission, but the value of the revision to the European members of the services was largely reduced by the fall in the rate of exchange during 1920. Their feeling was reflected in the serious check in the supply of British recruits, and this together with the insistent demand for more rapid Indianisation led to the appointment of the Lee Commission.

282. **Effect of the Lee Commission.**—The results of that Commission's recommendations were an acceleration in the rate of Indianisation, a restoration of confidence in the services and the relief of the

more pressing difficulties of British officers. Confidence was restored by the attitude of the Commission and by the maintenance of the control of the Secretary of State. Of the financial concessions the more important were an improvement in the overseas pay, the grant of free passages for officers and their families, and an increase in the pensions of the uncovenanted services. These concessions supplemented the revised scales of pay which had been introduced in 1919, and the present rates of remuneration are now generally accepted as a reasonable compromise between the need for economy and the necessities of the services.

283. **Political influences.**—Generally speaking there is now a fair degree of contentment with regard to remuneration, and in endeavouring to estimate the effect of the Reforms on the services, therefore, the question is rather one of the effects of political influences. The hope expressed in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of an improvement in the relations of the services with the Legislative Councils and the Indian politician has not been fulfilled. Occasions for attacks on officers of all services, both British and Indian, are eagerly taken, both in the Legislative Council and the press, and there is little sign of a cessation of the vehement and sometimes malignant abuse to which the authors of the Reforms referred. These attacks are part of the political game and many, who are not opposed to the existence of the all-India services and would be opposed to their abolition, join in them. There are, however, those who recognise that the all-India services under the control of the Secretary of State, and in particular the Indian Civil Service, are a serious obstacle to their desire to get control of the administrative machine. The result in those whose political aim is immediate and complete self-government is an attitude of irreconcilable hostility to the services which are not under the control of the local Government, and this attitude finds frequent expression both in the press and in the Legislative Council. There are others whose views are those of the signatories of the Minority Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee of 1924, who recognised that generally speaking the attitude of members of the services was one of loyal co-operation, but considered that the entire constitution, the methods of recruitment and control of the services are incompatible with the situation created by the Reforms and the possibility of their further development, and therefore thought that the position of the services should be put on the same basis as in England, by their becoming mere instruments for the execution of the policy of the Government and having no political function to discharge. So long as the retention of the British officer is necessary—and the events of the last few years have confirmed the view of the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report that so far in the future as any man can foresee a strong element of Europeans will be required in India's public service—and so long as officers, both British and Indian, of all-India services

are employed in the provinces, the position of the services within a system of popular government is likely to present a constitutional problem of great difficulty. The demand of the services for protection involves the control of the Secretary of State, and this is inconsistent with complete responsible government.

Political influences of another kind have affected the control of the services by Ministers. This was not apparent during the first Ministry. The position of Ministers was not seriously threatened, and Ministers were able to resist any attempt to make them use their control of the services for political purposes. But with the less secure Ministries of later years, and a growing lack of a sense of responsibility in members of the Legislative Council, political pressure has begun to affect the services. This has been most apparent in the Registration Department, in which appointments have been given and transfers have been made for political purposes. But it has also affected higher grades in the services and appointments have been kept in suspense pending a vote on Ministers' salaries or the decision on a motion of no confidence. This shaping of official acts for political ends is more known to officers closely associated with Ministers than to other members of the services, but the knowledge of it is spreading and prevents growth of confidence in the Ministers' ability to maintain the requisite standard of fairness in the control of the services. There are no political appointments in Bengal such as are available in most democratic countries for the reward of political services, and until such patronage is available it will be difficult to keep the services free from political influences.

284. **Safeguards.**—Except in so far as has been indicated above, the safeguards provided for the protection of the all-India services have proved adequate. The Government of Bengal have not yet had occasion to refer any disciplinary case to the Public Service Commission, nor have they taken their advice on any service problem, but the retention of control by the Secretary of State has doubtless given confidence to the services. In practice, however, the most important safeguard is the control vested in the Governor; in particular, Devolution Rule 10 requires that no order affecting emoluments or pensions, no order of censure and no order on a memorial shall be passed to the disadvantage of an officer of an all-India or provincial service, and no order for the posting of an officer of an all-India service shall be made, without the personal concurrence of the Governor.

285. **Recruitment of provincial services.**—Direct recruitment to most of the provincial services is now made by competitive examination, and a Selection Board consisting entirely of officials has recently been formed to deal with first appointments to the provincial services by promotion and by selection. The rules under which the Selection Board are working also provide that the Board shall, if so directed by Government, deal with the competitive examinations for direct

recruitment. In directing that the Selection Board should consist of officials, the intention of the local Government was to prevent the operation of political and communal influences. Rules for the recruitment of subordinate services are under consideration.

The Judicial branch of the Bengal Civil Service is not included among the provincial services about which the Selection Board advises Government. In the matter of appointments to this Judicial service, the local Government acts on the advice of the High Court, in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. The result is that the principle in accordance with which a proportion of appointments is in other services given to Muhammadan candidates is not observed in this service. It would require legislation by the Indian legislature, made with the authority of the Secretary of State, to change the present method of appointment.

286. **Indianisation.**—In accordance with the recommendations of the Lee Commission, the Educational, Agricultural and Veterinary services and the Roads and Buildings branch of the Service of Engineers are being provincialised, and recruitment to the all-India services in these departments has ceased. Except for the promotion of a provincial service officer, the last appointment to the Indian Educational Service was made in 1921, the last appointment to the Indian Agricultural Service was made in 1920, to the Indian Veterinary Service in 1922, and the last European recruit to the Roads and Buildings branch of the Indian Service of Engineers was appointed in 1919. A European specialist officer was appointed for three years in 1927 in the Agricultural Department, three Europeans were appointed in 1926 and 1927 to specialist posts in the Public Works Department and two such appointments are being made in the Education Department in the current year.

In the Indian Medical Service, the local Government are required to employ such officers as are placed at their disposal by the Government of India. In the remaining all-India services Indianisation is proceeding on the lines recommended by the Lee Commission, but difficulties are anticipated in connection with the Indianisation of the Indian Police owing to the smallness of the provincial service from which selection is to be made.

The following statement shows the degree of Indianisation in the all-India services to which recruitment is still being made:—

1	2		3		4		5		6	
Service.	Sanctioned strength.		Actual strength.		Europeans.		Indians.		Percentage of columns 5 to 3.	
	January 1919.	January 1927.	January 1919.	January 1927.	January 1919.	January 1927.	January 1919.	January 1927.	January 1919.	January 1927.
Indian Civil Service.	196	193	171	168	153	127	18	41	10·5	24·4
Indian Police Service.	107*	107*	93	106	89	89	4†	17‡	4·3	16·0
Indian Forest Service.	16	21	16	22	12	15	..	7	..	31·8
Indian Medical Service.	34	41	34	41	26	31	8	10	23·5	24·4

* Including listed posts.
† All listed posts.
‡ Includes 9 direct recruits and 8 holders of listed appointments.

A striking fact is that whilst in January, 1908, there were twenty-four British officers of the Indian Civil Service in charge of subdivisions, the number in January, 1928, was only three.

287. **Proportionate pensions.**—The number of proportionate pensions taken, the number of officers who have taken leave with permission to retire on proportionate pension, and the number of officers who have returned either after retiring or after obtaining such permission to retire are shown in the following statement:—

1	2	3	4	5
Service.	No. entitled to apply for proportionate pension.	No. retired on proportionate pension.	No. on leave with permission to retire on proportionate pension.	No. afterwards returned.
Indian Civil Service ..	165	22	1	1
Indian Police Service	87	22	2	5
Indian Forest Service	12	1	....	....
Indian Educational Service.	39	10	3	....
Indian Agricultural Service.	4	1	....	....
Indian Veterinary Service.	2	....	....	....
Indian Service of Engineers.	19	1	....	1

288. **The present spirit of the services.**—The effect of the Reforms on the position of Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers has already been mentioned in describing the effect on district administration. It has been seen that from various causes there has been a change from a position of wide authority and responsibility, with interesting work closely concerned with the welfare of the districts and considerable influence on the policy of Government, to a position in which much of the interesting work has been taken away, authority is more limited, and responsibility is ordinarily less, but in which owing to political and communal agitation difficult situations are more likely to arise and have to be faced with the expectation of unsympathetic criticism. The service most affected is the Indian Civil Service, but the general effect on other services is similar. The Indian Police Service more than any other is exposed to vehement and sometimes malignant abuse, and its difficult task during days of non-co-operation and communal tension has been done with the consciousness that every opportunity of attack will be eagerly seized by both press and politicians. The safeguards for the service have proved adequate in the past, but the possible results of further political developments are viewed by members of the service with misgiving.

Other services have been less exposed to abuse, and their causes of complaint are less defined. Thus in the Forest Service complaint is made of the hampering effect of the new financial rules on forest work and there is apprehension about future policy. Neither is strictly a service matter, but the Forest officer identifies himself with his work. Policy has not been changed, but the Conservators of Forests note that there is an uneasy feeling among members of their service that the extension of the Reforms will affect their work, which, in the nature of things, is dependent on a continuity of policy. They also note that the feeling that the Government take little interest in the Forest Department except as a source of revenue has increased since the Reforms. That these feelings exist there is no reason to doubt, but it must be added that there has been no apparent falling off in the quality of the work done by officers of the service, and that in spite of the financial difficulties of the province the belief of Government in a policy of expansion has been shown by the fact that expenditure has increased more quickly than before the Reforms.

The comparatively large number of retirements on proportionate pension reflects the feeling of officers of the Indian Educational Service. The approaching extinction of the service is in itself a depressing factor, and difficulties have arisen owing to the increasing influences of political tactics on departmental questions.

In the Indian Medical Service some uneasiness is caused by the amount of political pressure which is brought to bear on the Minister, with the consequence that officers of the service do not feel the same

security about recognition of their merits as they did under the old regime; but the feeling is based more on apprehension about the future than on experience of the past.

The provincial services have been benefited by increased opportunities for promotion and in some departments have gained in status by taking the place of the all-India services. But they too have felt the effect of political changes and share the feeling of the all-India services that policy is now more influenced than before by political expediency and the desire to placate public opinion. The provincial service officer feels that he cannot place the same reliance on the ability of his superiors to protect him in the performance of an unpopular duty, and that it is well not to offend the local politician.

In conclusion it may be said that if the services are given reasonable protection from the corrupting influences of politics, then there is no cause for despondency. The services are already beginning to adapt themselves to new conditions. The generation of those who worked under the old regime and still have memories of different times is passing away. The younger men have no such memories and are growing into the existing system, and they find that the work is worth doing.

CHAPTER XIII.

Summary.

289. **Features peculiar to Bengal.**—It is proposed in this chapter to give a brief summary of the facts already set forth and to emphasise those which merit special attention. The history and circumstances of the various provinces in India, and their experiences during the years of the reforms, have been different, and it is important to remember that Bengal has features, some of which it shares with other provinces, but which in their combination are peculiar. Of these, the most important in their effects on financial, economic and political conditions are, first, the permanent settlement of the land revenue; secondly, the growth of a great industrial and commercial community in and near the port of Calcutta; and thirdly, the almost equal division of the population between the two great communities, Hindu and Muhammadan.

290. **Education.**—In the framework of the social and economic structure of Bengal, there are certain features that stand out sharply. Broadly, the Muhammadan population, which is in a minority in the western districts, preponderates to an increasing extent towards the eastern and middle northern districts. The great mass of this Muhammadan population lives by cultivation and its close connection with

the land conduces to economic stability. The educated class among the Muhammadans has remained comparatively small, and until recently, their demand was for an education of a special Muhammadan kind. Only in the last generation has their demand for secondary and University education made itself felt. On the other hand, amongst the Hindus there has always been a large and influential section with an hereditary inclination towards education and learning, and seeking occupation in Government service and in professional and clerical pursuits. This section readily accepted education of the western type, which promised greater opportunities for employment in the growing world of commerce. Thus there has been an insistent demand for more High Schools and Colleges, the establishment of which has resulted in large additions to the educated middle classes from other sections of the population. This educated Hindu middle class is too numerous for the present needs of the province, and its dependence upon service for a livelihood intensifies its economic weakness in periods of trade depression. For primary education the demand has been comparatively small; but it is now growing, especially among the Muhammadans, who realise the need for a general uplift of their community. The movement for the education of girls is of recent growth, and is developing on similar lines. The Hindu middle classes are leading the way and are demanding increased facilities for secondary education for girls. But from others the demand is still small. The general position, then, is that primary education and education for girls are still backward, but for both there are signs of a stronger demand, and a promise of development. Higher education of the western type, mainly literary in character, is widespread amongst the Hindu middle classes, and is attracting an increasing number of Muhammadans. This tendency, which is likely to continue, should help to minimise those differences in cultural outlook which are at present discernible in the two communities.

291. **Economic distress and its results.**—The high level of prices towards the end of the war, and the subsequent depression hit the Hindu middle classes severely. Unemployment caused and still causes much distress among them, and has led to the ready acceptance of the political dogma that foreign exploitation is the root-cause of India's troubles. The step to racial animosity was easy and natural, and the resulting hostility to Government has found constant and bitter expression both in the press and on the platform. Amongst the Muhammadans, the Khilafat question roused much excitement, and in the early years of the reforms brought Hindus and Muhammadans together in opposition to Government. Communal feeling was, for the moment, relegated to the background. But when Turkey solved the Khilafat problem in her own way, this feeling again emerged, and in the riots and controversies of recent years has shown an

intensity which appears to be due to a consciousness of the new struggle for political power, making the leaders unwilling to curb the intolerance of the masses.

292. **Transformation of the administrative machine.**—Throughout this religious, social and economic upheaval, the reforms and the spirit which produced the reforms have been at work, transforming the administrative machine in various directions, and introducing disturbing ideas and strange conditions. The one-man type of administration, which had already begun to disappear, underwent still more rapid changes. In one or other of three directions were distributed many of the powers of the district officer. The transference of district boards and municipalities to popular control was completed. The development of modern methods and the introduction of advanced ideas led to a sharper definition of departmental activities controlled largely from the headquarters of Government. And above all, the creation of constituencies and electorates introduced to Bengal a new type,—a politician who aspired to take a hand in the business of Government. As might be expected, the villager for whom these boons are intended, has not yet been able to appreciate their value. His vote is often given for he knows not what. He has few sources of information on the views of candidates for his suffrage, and fewer still on the subsequent activities of those who are successful at the polls. He does not understand the new system and he has not yet learnt to discount the value of political propaganda. But repeated elections are beginning to have their effect; the spread of union boards has introduced the ideas of local self-government into many villages; and the elector is slowly learning.

293. **Effect on official classes.**—For the services the period of the reforms has been one of adaptation to changed conditions. All have felt the effect of political changes which have tended to reduce the official from a position of initiative and control to that of a mere instrument of Government. The provincial services, however, have received some compensation for this adverse change in increased opportunities of promotion, and the last revision of their salaries was not illiberal. The position of the district officer has been affected more than that of other officials by the transfer of local self-governing bodies to popular control, by the increased control from the headquarters of Government of departmental activities in which he formerly took a large share, and by the increasing power of the politician. On the other hand, a fresh outlet for activity has been provided in the development of union boards, and for some years to come at least, the district officer is likely to find much interesting work in this direction. In the case of the all-India services, the results of the Lee Commission removed the more serious causes of discontent with

the conditions of service, and apprehensions regarding the future have been allayed by the protection afforded by the Government of India Act and the rules framed thereunder. On the whole, the official classes, both Indian and European, view the future without undue misgiving—in the hope and belief that the existing conditions and safeguards will be maintained.

294. **Difficulties of Government.**—Throughout the period, Government have had to face a position of almost continuous difficulty, created by a party which derives its strength mainly from the economic distress and racial animosity of the Hindu middle classes, and adheres firmly to a policy of non-co-operation to be followed so long as any element of alien control remains in the constitution. At first, the policy of obstruction outside the legislature was tried, and the administration was carried on under conditions of great difficulty. The decision of the Swarajist party in 1923 to obstruct Government from within added to the embarrassment of the latter. Coming from the electorates in influential numbers, the Swarajists applied themselves with skilful persistence to the task of obstructing the working of the constitution. In this they had the support and active approval of the politically-minded classes, and of the greater part of the press. At first, the policy was applied with little discrimination, and in some cases the results threatened to damage the Swarajist cause itself. Hence in later years, the policy of obstruction has been directed and controlled with greater skill. Attack has been concentrated on vulnerable points in the administration, while matters of domestic concern, such as the law of landlord and tenant and education, have been dealt with on their merits. With reference to such subjects, the legislature has been permitted to function in a normal manner, and the Swarajist members have taken part in constructive work. The proceedings of the legislature must therefore be judged from this standpoint—the resolve of an important section of it to hamper the administration in certain chosen directions. It is easy to criticise much that has taken place in the Council. But the wider object of the Swarajists must not be forgotten. The more immediate necessities of good government in certain subjects have been sacrificed —and that deliberately—as part of a policy which has a deep meaning, and makes a strong appeal to the non-Muhammadan electorates. It has its roots in economic and social conditions, and is likely to persist with an intensity which only a change in these conditions can relieve.

295. **Instability of Ministries.**—With the waning of the non-co-operation and Khilafat movements and the transfer of the attack on Government from the districts to the Council Chamber, terrorism again raised its head, and communal animosity developed a bitterness

till then unknown in Bengal. The machinery of the ordinary law was unequal to the task of suppressing revolutionary crime, and the adoption of special measures involving detention without open trial caused much resentment, and alienated many who sincerely condemned such crime. Communal strife amongst the masses centred largely round the questions of cow-killing and music before mosques, whilst in the political world questions such as the proportion of appointments in Government service were constantly being raised. These conditions were reflected in the legislature. The wreckers were strenthened from time to time by the support of those who were unable to see eye to eye with Government in its methods of dealing with sedition, or in its attitude towards communal strife, and both sides of Government were forced to rely largely on the use of the official block and the steady support of the non-official European group. Hence, since 1924, no stable ministry has been possible. It is true that the work of Government went on, and that the constitution itself provided the means of preventing a breakdown. But this negative success does not alter the fact that the constitution has worked uneasily and has not realised the expectations with which it was framed.

296. **The Financial Settlement.**—From the outset the period has been one of great financial difficulty, due to the injustice of the Meston Settlement. The main taxable resources arising from the great trading and industrial activities of the province are a preserve of the Government of India. The receipts from customs and income-tax go to swell the central revenues; while Bengal, left with little more than the slender resources that appertain to an agricultural province, and with the land revenue limited by a permanent settlement, has to pay for the maintenance of the administrative activities essential to the prosperity of a trading and industrial community. Increased taxation and retrenchment were necessary to maintain solvency and carry on the bare essentials of administration. This condition of continuous poverty denied the satisfaction of the demand for expenditure on public health, education and other matters of public welfare, and prevented the development in the electorate, the legislature or the press of any feeling favourable to the reforms.

297. **Conclusion.**—Broadly, it may be said that the social, political and financial conditions in Bengal have been such that the reformed constitution has not had a fair chance to prove its merits. Save during the period of the first ministry, there has not been a sustained effort to work the constitutional system by those on whom new opportunities of service were conferred and from whom some measure of co-operation was expected. The validity of this conclusion is not impugned by the existence of a small minority, which made a sincere

effort to operate the constitution. For a period of almost three years, the ministerial side of Government was in complete abeyance, and the fitful and precarious life of various ministries does little to relieve the sense of failure. The various causes that have contributed to this result have been set forth, and in a true appreciation of their nature and intensity lies the only hope of framing a constitution in such harmony with the economic and political life of the province as to afford some assurance of good government.

Part II.

Conclusions and Suggestions of the Government of Bengal.

1. **Application of the tests.**—In section 84A of the Government of India Act certain tests are prescribed, and certain subjects of enquiry have been proposed as likely to afford material for a decision on the success of the constitution and the degree of progress made towards self-government. For reasons which will appear hereafter, it has been urged with some force that these tests, in the circumstances that have arisen in Bengal, are inadequate and, in a sense, unsuited to the conditions that have prevailed. This contention, however, does not dispense with the necessity of applying the tests and, in the process of doing so, much that is useful is brought to light.

The tests and subjects of enquiry are—

(1) The co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service have been conferred;

(2) The extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility;

(3) The working of the system of Government;

(4) The growth of education;

(5) The development of representative institutions.

An examination of the descriptive material in Part I will show that little encouragement can be derived from the application of these tests. While acknowledging freely the value of the co-operation that has been received from the members of different ministries and their supporters, the Government of Bengal feel that there has been more obstruction than co-operation both within the legislature and without. The Legislative Council in performing its functions has shown some sense of responsibility in transferred subjects; but it has acted irresponsibly on many occasions in dealing with reserved subjects. Education has made but little progress, and the electorate is largely illiterate and incompetent. Local self-governing institutions have not advanced, except for the rapid development of Union Boards mainly under official control, and in spite of strong and persistent opposition by the *Swaraj* party in some districts. At first sight, these are formidable and depressing conclusions; and if the enquiry were to stop here, only one answer would be possible to the question whether Bengal has satisfied the tests of progress. But it may be and is urged with much reason that this analysis of the facts is inadequate. The apparent failure and stagnation are but the symptoms or

reflection of much more vital factors which cut deeply into the political life of Bengal. Obstruction is but a tactical move in the furtherance of a policy which has a wider and larger objective than the mere operation of the constitution. Moreover, it is argued, and with reason, that the form of the constitution itself foments a spirit of irresponsibility with regard to reserved subjects. Financial difficulties—both provincial and local—have made progress impossible; and education, one of the "test" subjects, has suffered from the general stringency. It may be conceded that the electorate has many defects, but they are not such as can be pressed to the point of condemnation. The Government of Bengal recognise the force of these contentions, which support, and may even be held to justify, the view that the tests of section 84A of the Government of India Act do not afford adequate material for an answer to the question out of which they arise. The reasons for this now demand attention.

2. **Financial settlement.**—In chapter IV of Part I it was shown that the financial settlement was alone sufficient to make the successful working of the reformed constitution extremely difficult. Bengal found itself in a condition of continuous poverty, which prevented an expansion of expenditure on beneficial measures, which might have made a complete change in the attitude of the electorate, the press and the legislature towards the reformed government. Not only were the Ministers unable to develop a policy of social amelioration but it was even found necessary to increase taxation and curtail expenditure severely to maintain solvency and carry on the bare essentials of the administration. In these circumstances it would not be reasonable to base arguments on the facts that no progress has been made in education, that local self-governing institutions have hardly advanced, and that no advantage has been taken of increased opportunities of service. The Ministers themselves and their supporters who laboured strenuously to keep the constitution going as a working concern might well ask what real opportunities they have had. In the circumstances, therefore, the Government of Bengal must give first place in its proposals to a complete revision of the financial settlement. Unless this be conceded, the successful working of the new constitution will be impossible, however good it may be in other ways. The minimum financial requirements of the province are set forth in Appendix I.

3. **Hostility to the element of foreign control in the constitution.**—The second vital factor in the situation lies in the existence of a strong and well organised party which definitely and consistently declines to operate any constitution framed outside India or by anyone other than Indians, unless it concedes complete self-determination in both provincial and central affairs. The origin and history of this party have been described elsewhere. In the first three years of the reformed

government, the ministry had the advantage of working in a Council, of which many members had had previous experience of political life under more stable conditions, and from which the extremist party kept away. But the period subsequent to the first Council has been almost barren of results, and that mainly because, as is likely to happen under any system of popular representation, the extremist Hindu party came to the front, with a membership in the Council sufficiently large and united to enable it to obstruct the working of the constitution and with a majority in the non-Muhammadan electorate prepared to give it continuous support and encouragement. The energy and combination of its representatives in the Legislative Council have enabled it to pursue its policy of obstruction with considerable success. Its strength is obvious; and the strong appeal which it makes to national sentiment cannot be ignored. The Hindu *bhadralok* are its main supporters. They are keen and enthusiastic politicians. They are prepared to organise themselves for propaganda purposes, and their "volunteers" are active in every election as canvassers. Hence in any system of direct popular representation this party under existing conditions is certain to be strongly represented in the Legislative Council. There is no ground for supposing that its policy will be other than one of permanent hostility to the Government, so long as any trace of foreign control remains in the constitution, and this hostility will find expression in constant attacks on the constitution itself—to the detriment of good government. In what manner these conditions can be met, and the difficulties arising from them overcome, is another matter. But, clearly, they must be taken into account in the framing of the new constitution.

4. **Communalism.**—It has just been observed that the *Swaraj* party finds its main support among the Hindu *bhadralok*. In the earlier years of the reforms a large number of Muhammadans, under the influence of the Khilafat movement, joined the non-co-operation movement; and in the second Council many Muhammadan members continued to support the *Swaraj* party. In recent years the Muhammadans have left the *Swaraj* party, but they have failed to form a political party of any strength, partly because the only bond of union has been communal interest, and partly because they have been split up into small groups by personal jealousies and dissensions. It is, however, likely that with very few exceptions they will be united in the demand for the maintenance of communal electorates, and the recognition of communal claims in all branches of the administration. This principle has already rooted itself deeply in the existing system of Government, and it still commands strong and steady support from influential sections of the population. This factor in the situation cannot be ignored and the Government of Bengal (with two dissentients) take the view that communal electorates must be retained for the

present. A detailed examination of this question is given in Appendix II.

5. **Unpopularity of Dyarchy.**—There is also the fact that the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution shortly known as "dyarchy" is unpopular. This dislike is not due to its merits or demerits, for owing to financial and political reasons dyarchy has not had a fair trial in Bengal. But the dislike is real and deep-seated, even if it is largely founded on prejudice, and must be taken into serious account when suggestions for the future are considered.

6. **General Conclusions.**—The question then is whether in the light of the history of the past seven years and of the tests of progress, it can be said that Bengal should be given a further instalment of self-government. Clearly there is no positive ground for asserting that the province has definitely made progress towards self-government. The most that can be said is that with less inadequate financial resources and with a constitution which met with more general approval better results might have been obtained. The proceedings in the legislature and the Corporation of Calcutta seem to indicate an absence of constructive and administrative ability among the popular representatives and it may reasonably be urged that the misuse of talent to obstruct the working of the constitution is itself a proof of unfitness for responsibility. This argument is not conclusive, but at least it affords a good reason for caution in the transfer of further powers. After giving the most anxious consideration to the problem, the Government of Bengal have decided to recommend an advance in responsible government, but only on the condition that safeguards are at present provided for the administration of certain subjects, *viz.*, Finance, Law and Order (*i.e.*, Political, Appointments, Police, Judicial and Jails) and European Education.

7. **Central and Imperial interests.**—It is desirable at this point to stress the fact that however great an advance is made in responsible government there must always be certain essential limitations to the sphere within which the advance is made. For Bengal is a part of India, which in turn is part of the Empire. The province is not a sovereign state, and therefore does not live for itself alone. Where central and imperial interests may chance to clash with what in the opinion of the local Government are the best interests of the province, a limitation must be imposed from without on the sphere of responsible government within the province. For example, the Imperial Government has certain responsibilities to foreign powers for the due discharge of treaty obligations in such matters as shipping, labour conditions and control of dangerous drugs. Again, the Central authority is vitally interested in the maintenance of public security, the purity

of the administration of justice, the strict demarcation of the spheres of taxation, the freedom of internal trade, and the prevention of any act likely to affect adversely the interests of another province. On all questions which might affect these subjects, some higher authority must have the right of controlling the activities of the local executive, and to this extent there cannot be complete responsible government within the province.

8. **Necessity of safeguarding certain subjects.**—(*a*) The persistent attacks on the police and magistracy in the Legislative Council justify hesitation in entrusting the Appointments, Police and Judicial Departments to Ministers solely responsible to a popularly elected Chamber. It may be that some of these attacks and much of the criticism have been due to a desire to embarrass Government, and that they would be fewer in number and diminish in intensity should a form of government which met with universal support be established. But in present conditions it would be unwise to make such a far-reaching assumption and dangerous to act on it. The history of the past seven years indicates that large sections of the politically minded classes and almost the entire Indian press are hostile to the official class, both European and Indian, on which falls the duty of enforcing the law and maintaining the peace. Communal feeling may create at any moment a position of great difficulty for a Minister directly responsible to a popular legislature. In the light of the experience of recent years, the Government of Bengal are agreed that the administration of these departments must be protected by safeguards.

(*b*) The administration of the Jails Department is complementary to that of justice and should be safeguarded so long as safeguards are provided for the latter.

(*c*) European Education is a matter of comparatively less importance, but in view of the strong views held on this subject by the communities concerned, the Local Government are agreed that for the present the special consideration already shown in connection with this subject should be continued. They recognise however that such special consideration cannot be permanently extended to the European and Anglo-Indian communities and look forward to the time when the safeguards can be withdrawn with the approval of all concerned.

(*d*) As regards the Political Department, some of the subjects dealt with therein are such that they cannot at present in fairness to the province or to individuals be placed in the hands of a Minister depending on the votes of a popularly elected legislature. In the course of time conditions may change but at present the Government of Bengal must press for safeguards in connection with the administration of this department.

(*e*) Finance stands by itself. The Government of Bengal recognise that the subject is one which could be entrusted without undue risk to a Minister responsible to a popularly elected legislature so long as the financial canons by which its administration is controlled remain unchanged. But they are unanimous in thinking that during the transition stage which in their opinion must elapse between the present dyarchical constitution and full provincial responsible Government special arrangements must be made for the administration of finance. For the financial difficulties of the province are very great and on their removal depends to a very great extent the future prosperity of the province. They consider that these difficulties can best be solved by an arrangement which will leave finance for the present in the hands of a Minister free from the anxieties of a political career and able to devote himself impartially to the consideration of all schemes affecting the financial prosperity of the province. They propose in addition that this Minister shall not be responsible for the administration of any other provincial subject so that his attitude to all schemes submitted for his consideration may be unbiassed and he may not be open to the charge of partiality. This will not prevent his being placed in charge of central subjects for which a provincial agent is required if such an arrangement makes for administrative convenience.

9. **Unitary Government.**—In the opinion of the Bengal Government a unitary form of government should be established, with a Ministry controlling all subjects; and the safeguards which they consider necessary to secure good government should be provided in two parts of the constitution, the legislature and the provincial executive government.

10. **Creation of a Second Chamber.**—The provision of safeguards within the legislature involves either such a composition of a single chamber as to secure a steady and reliable body—a device which is hardly consistent with popular election—or else the creation of a Second Chamber. The experience of recent years has shown that in matters of supply the Legislative Council have at times acted irresponsibly, and that it was only the use of the official block as a voting machine, together with the vote of the nominated members and the non-official European party, that prevented this tendency manifesting itself in other directions. If the official block is reduced, and the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects is abolished, then clearly the constitution must provide a powerful brake to check rash and precipitate action by the Legislative Council. If the executive government is to consist of a Ministry responsible to the legislature, then it is desirable that a brake should be provided within the legislature, rather than that it should be solely in the hands of the Governor. The Government of Bengal are therefore in favour of

creating a Second Chamber, composed of the more prudent and conservative elements in the people with sufficient powers of revision to prevent rash action by the other chamber. They recognise the danger of conflict between the two chambers, but regard this as preferable to the danger of conflict between the Governor and the legislature, the official and the non-official, the British and the Indian, and hope that the existence of the Second Chamber will strengthen the hands of the Ministry in guiding the more popular chamber.

The composition of the two chambers is discussed in Appendix III.

11. **Reasons for safeguards within the Executive Government.**—The conclusion that safeguards should also be provided within the provincial executive government proceeds from somewhat different considerations. A Second Chamber may serve to strengthen the hands of a Ministry and check a tendency to rashness in the legislature, but it can do little to secure a proper standard in everyday administration. The experience of recent years shows that it cannot for the present be hoped that a Ministry relying for its existence on the support of a majority in the Legislative Council will consist of men both able to lead and maintain their position and capable of inspiring confidence in their impartial administration. On the contrary, experience of the working of the Legislative Council has revealed the existence of political groups formed round personalities rather than of parties based on policy. These groups were constantly changing, and the main feature of them was the lack of leadership displayed by the temporary leaders of the groups. There is no evidence so far that among the political classes of Bengal there exist in any number persons who are likely to become party leaders with policies who can be trusted to administer the departments on considerations of policy rather than of temporary political or party gain. To this there was one large exception in the *Swarajist* party, but its barren creed of non-co-operation has produced the same result, namely, the absence of any proof of the existence in the party of members of administrative capacity. For the results of the *Swarajist* administration in the Corporation of Calcutta have not been such as to negative the deductions made from the working of the party in the Legislative Council. Safeguards are therefore required within the executive to ensure administrative efficiency in the departments for which in the opinion of the Local Government safeguards are required.

12. **Communal character of Political Grouping.**—The facts of recent years again show an increasing tendency towards political grouping on communal lines. This tendency reflects an increasing tension between the two great communities in Bengal. It is apparent that the consciousness of the struggle for the political power offered by the reforms and by the prospect of further changes has had much

to do with the political manifestations of this feeling, and it is only to be expected that this feeling will grow stronger as the restraining third party gives up or loses power.

13. **Effect of Communalism on the Services.**—An aspect of this communalism which cannot be overlooked is its effect upon the services. The political importance attached to communal representation in the services must already be apparent from several memoranda submitted to the Commission. If further proof be needed, it can be obtained from the proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Council.

14. **Retention of All-India Services.**—The Government of Bengal are of opinion that the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service must be retained for some time to come as All-India Services and must contain a British element.

15. **Various proposals.**—In endeavouring to find a solution of the constitutional problem which they could recommend as suitable to conditions in Bengal, the Government of Bengal have examined various proposals. If it be accepted that the present dyarchical system has not been successful and must be changed, the main alternatives appear to be—

(*a*) A return to autocracy or the system of government in vogue before 1921.

(*b*) An advance to complete responsible government such as that outlined in the All-Parties report.

(*c*) A system of complete provincial autonomy such as that recommended by the Associated Chambers of Commerce.

(*d*) Some kind of intermediate stage between the present dyarchical system and complete provincial autonomy.

16. **Reversion to autocrary discarded.**—The first alternative, that of reversion to autocracy or the system in force before 1921, is impossible; not only would it be impracticable but it would involve a breach of faith with India, for the declared policy of Parliament is the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire. This alternative can be discarded without further discussion.

17. **Proposals of the All-Parties Committee.**—The second alternative, namely, the proposal of the All-Parties Conference that nothing short of dominion status will satisfy India, must also be discarded as being entirely out of touch with reality. In the existing state of communal feeling and of education the proposal to constitute a provincial council solely on the basis of universal adult suffrage with one

member for one hundred thousand of the population of the province is one which must be considered to be outside practical politics at the present time. There can be no doubt that rightly or wrongly the vast majority of the Muhammadan population of Bengal is unwilling to trust itself to a single electorate. And further, the proposal that representation should be by population only ignores the enormous interests in the province of communities which are numerically very unimportant. Any system of government based on such a system of election is at present impossible.

18. **Proposals of the Associated Chambers of Commerce.**—The third alternative of complete provincial autonomy with all subjects transferred to the control of Ministers responsible to a local Legislative Council containing no official nominated members, which has been put forward by the Associated Chambers of Commerce, is not suitable for Bengal in present conditions. The Local Government are agreed that a legislature with no nominated official members is at present impossible in Bengal. They are further agreed that at present safeguards are required in connection with the administration of Police, Judiciary and Jails, and certain other departments. It is to be noted also that even the Associated Chambers recognise that special safeguards will be required to prevent wrongful and unfair treatment of magistrates and police officers of all ranks, and propose that the posting and transfer of District and Subordinate Judges should be supervised by the High Court if political and communal influence is to be excluded. Behind their optimism is therefore an uneasy feeling that all will not be well and in addition there is attached to the proposal to grant responsible government in provinces the condition that the position of the Government of India vis-à-vis the Legislative Assembly is strengthened. Progress in the provinces is to be accompanied by reaction at the centre.

19. **Objections to Centralisation of Law and Order.**—A suggestion has been made that the need for special arrangements for law and order can be met by treating law and order as central subjects. The Government of Bengal consider this suggestion unworkable, for it is impossible to carry on local administration if every question as to law and order in the province has to be referred to the Central Government before a decision is arrived at, and the Central Government will be overburdened with minor matters at the expense of more important business. The Government as a whole too are agreed that "Police" should not be made a central subject. The alternative is to make the Governor or some other person in the province the agent of the Central Government as regards the administration of law and order. The objection to the first course is that it would bring the Governor personally into local politics and make him the object of criticism in

actual matters of administration, which is undesirable. The Governor should normally be outside politics and above criticism. If an official of a Local Government is made the agent, then the position will be worse than at present. At present the Legislative Council may be irresponsible, but the officials have to explain matters connected with law and order to the local Council, and the local Council by resolution or motion and through the budget has the opportunity of expressing its opinion on matters connected with these subjects. If an official be the agent, the Central Government need not be called on to explain matters to the local Council unless the local Council is also made the agent of the Legislative Assembly. The present irresponsible position would continue in an exaggerated form.

20. **Dualism and Statutory Council Scheme.**—In these circumstances, it appears clear that any change from the existing system must be in the nature of a modified or improved dyarchy. Several schemes for effecting this have been propounded, two of which are dealt with below:—

(1) The first suggested involved a more complete separation than at present between the two halves of Government. The majority of the provincial subjects were to be dealt with by Ministers responsible to the Legislative Council, but the remaining subjects by Members who would be assisted by a Legislative Chamber on the lines of the Council of State. In cases of doubt as to which side of Government was to deal with any matter, the Governor would have power to issue directions which would be final. Each side would have its own purse and its own sources of revenue. Under this scheme the Legislative Council would be entirely responsible for the subjects within its ken and would not have the opportunity as at present of throwing out demands such as that for the pay of the police, knowing that it had no responsibility for such a subject, and that any mistakes it made would be remedied by the certifying power possessed by the Governor. At the same time popular opinion on reserved subjects would be voiced through the members of the Chamber. This system also provided for constitutional development. For as the growing signs of responsibility revealed themselves among the classes from whom the members of the Chamber would be recruited, the constitution of the Chamber could be modified so as to give more and more weight to popular opinion, and with growing signs of responsibility in the Legislative Council more subjects could be transferred to its control, leaving fewer to be dealt with by the Chamber. This

scheme has few friends and is open to the great objection that it is intensified dyarchy and starts with an accumulation of prejudice against it. Its working might generate friction and heat which would retard and not accelerate progress towards the goal of responsible government. Some other solution must therefore be found, if possible.

(2) Another suggestion has been made that all subjects might be transferred to Ministers, but that the Minister or Ministers in charge of subjects for which safeguards are considered essential should be assisted by a Statutory Committee or Council, of which the Minister would be President. The scheme is explained in Appendix IV. The Government of Bengal feel that the whole scheme is cumbrous and does not thereby avoid chances of friction. The opportunities for conflict between a statutory Member and a Minister would be great and the position of a Minister would be weakened by the knowledge that any scheme he proposed had to obtain the approval of his expert adviser or of the Cabinet before it could be put into force. The position of the Governor would be very difficult as he could not enforce his orders in a matter which was inconsistent with his responsibility under the Instrument of Instructions without the possibility of a change of Ministry, a general election, and finally a suspension of the constitution. In the final analysis this is probably true of any constitution where the Governor has any responsibility, but the Government of Bengal question the necessity of providing for it as the only solution of every difference of opinion between the Governor and his Cabinet in matters affecting his responsibility under his Instrument of Instructions.

21. **Proposals of the Government of Bengal.**—The final conclusion of the Government of Bengal is that in the present circumstances there cannot be a strictly logical constitution with full responsible government. Undoubtedly this is a period of transition, and in due course, sooner or later, the province will qualify for full provincial autonomy in the matter of all subjects which are reserved for provincial disposal, but the Local Government do not think that this stage has yet been reached. Conditions in the province are such that it would be unfair to leave any Governor who may come out to the province entirely unacquainted with Indian conditions without expert official advice. Further, the province will gain and not lose at present by the association of experienced officials with its Ministers in the work of administration. A section of the Government also believes that the administration of certain subjects, *e.g.*, Appointments, Law and Order, cannot

be transferred to ministerial control without creating a large measure of distrust and apprehension, which will be unfavourable to the advance of the province. Recognising therefore that their proposals are not strictly logical, the Government of Bengal suggest that the next stage should be unitary government by a body consisting of a Prime Minister and four Ministers responsible to the legislature and two official Ministers. The official Ministers would be in charge of Appointments, Law and Order, including Political, Police, Judicial and Jails, and at present of Finance and European Education, and all other subjects would be under the control of the other Ministers. The orders of Government would not be those of the Governor in Council or of the Governor acting with his Ministers, but of the local Government as a whole. This will imply that the proposals connected with appointments, law and order, etc., which are under official Ministers and which are brought before the Legislative Council must have been approved by the local Government as a whole or by a majority thereof and the Ministers as leaders of their parties would be responsible for supporting in the Council with their parties such proposals as had been approved by the local Government. The Governor would not be a member of the Cabinet, but would be supplied with copies of all its proceedings and would have the right of interfering and staying or forbidding action on a decision of the Cabinet in regard to any subject if he were satisfied that interference was essential to the discharge of his responsibilities for the good government of his province. Further, any Minister who was dissatisfied with the decision of the Cabinet in regard to any of the departments under his charge would have the right of submitting a minute of dissent on the subject to the Governor and of asking him to interfere in the exercise of his reserve powers.

22. **Term of office of official Ministers.**—There is disagreement on the question whether the two official Ministers should be appointed for a term of years or should go out with the other Ministers in the event of Government being defeated in the legislature and having to resign. The minority hold that these official Ministers should be appointed for a term of years and that from an administrative point of view it is impossible that they should go out with the other Ministers. One member of the Government also holds that so long as there are official Ministers, the Governor should be in the executive Government and not outside it.

23. **Summary.**—The scheme of provincial Government which the Government of Bengal recommend for the consideration of the Indian Statutory Commission is briefly described in the following outline.

24. **The Executive.**—The form of the Government should be unitary.

The Executive Government should consist of (1) the Governor and (2) a Cabinet of seven Ministers, one of whom should be the Prime Minister.

Of the seven Ministers, two should be officials. One of the two should under statutory rules hold the Political, Appointments, Police, Judicial, Jails and European Education portfolios. The other should be the Finance Minister; he may also be in charge of subjects for which the local Government is the agent of the Central Government, but should not ordinarily hold other portfolios. It should be open to the Governor in consultation with the Prime Minister to place the official Ministers temporarily in charge of other portfolios if need arises.

The Prime Minister and the other non-official Ministers should be as now elected members of the legislatures. The Prime Minister will be chosen by the Governor; the other Ministers will be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Their portfolios will be assigned to them by the Governor on the advice of the Prime Minister.

The salaries of all Ministers should be fixed by Statute.

The Prime Minister should preside over meetings of the Cabinet. All questions coming before the Cabinet should be decided by a majority.

25. **The Governor.**—The Governor should be outside and above the Cabinet, with statutory powers to interfere when he considers that the safety and tranquillity or interests of the province or any part thereof are essentially affected. (In the opinion of one member of Government, the Governor should preside at Cabinet meetings, so long as there are officials within the Cabinet.)

The proceedings of the Cabinet, together with the papers connected with them, should be laid before the Governor. He should have power to interfere *suo motu* or on the application of the Minister in charge of the portfolio concerned, and to overrule the Cabinet within the limits stated above. He should have the right to summon the Cabinet to meet him, if he wishes to discuss any matter with them.

The Governor should have powers to authorise expenditure in cases of emergency for the carrying on of any department. The Governor should have a power of certifying bills similar to the power now provided by section 72E of the Government of India Act in respect of reserved subjects. It is not necessary to limit the power to

particular subjects. It should be regarded as a power to be used only in exceptional circumstances with the approval of the Governor-General or His Majesty's Government.

The powers of the Governor in respect of bills passed by the legislature and of dissolving or prolonging the life of the legislature should be similar to the powers which he now possesses (*cf.* sections 81, 81A and 72B of the Government of India Act).

The Governor should have the power of dismissing a Minister or Ministry if he or they have been defeated in the legislature in circumstances which in the opinion of the Governor demand his or their resignation and he or they fail to resign. He should also have the power to dismiss a Minister or Ministry if he considers that the safety or tranquillity or the interests of the province demand such dismissal.

Should the constitutional scheme come to a standstill through obstruction, the Governor should have reserve powers to carry on the administration. He should have statutory powers to appoint Ministers, pay their salaries and make due provision for the administration by sanctioning payments in accordance with the current year's budget or the previous year's budget *plus* 5 per cent. if the budget for the current year has not been passed by the legislature. This would be at first for a period not exceeding six months, during which there would be a general election. If the deadlock were not removed as the result of the election, the constitution would be suspended for a period with the approval of the Governor-General in Council or other superior authority.

26. **The Legislature.**—In the opinion of the Government of Bengal the legislature should consist of an Upper and Lower Chamber, composed as shown in Appendix III.

It is proposed that the ultimate authority of the legislature should vest in a joint session of the two chambers, whether in matters of legislation, supply or votes of censure. Thus in matters of legislation the following procedure is suggested:—

(*i*) If a bill is passed by both Chambers, it becomes law subject to the assent of the Governor.

(*ii*) If a bill be passed by the Lower Chamber, the Upper Chamber may refer it back for reconsideration. If the Lower Chamber accepts the amendments proposed by the Upper Chamber, the bill becomes law subject to the assent of the Governor. If the two chambers do not agree, the bill should be taken in joint session, and the decision of the joint session will prevail, subject to the assent of the Governor if the bill be passed.

(*iii*) If the Lower Chamber rejects a Government bill, the Government may place it before the Upper Chamber. If the Upper Chamber passes it and the Lower Chamber again refuses to pass it, a joint session will be held; if the bill is passed by the joint session, it will become law subject to the assent of the Governor. Government bills should be introduced in the Lower Chamber.

(*iv*) Private bills may be introduced in either Chamber. If a private bill be rejected in the Chamber in which it is introduced, it will fail. If passed by both chambers, it will become law subject to the assent of the Governor.

All taxation and appropriation bills should be introduced in the Lower Chamber and should not be proceeded with unless passed by that Chamber. After passing the Lower Chamber such a bill should be laid before the Upper Chamber which may either pass the bill or reject it or suggest amendments to it. One member of the Government of Bengal would limit the power of the Upper Chamber to that of acceptance or rejection only. All are agreed that in the event of rejection the bill should be returned to the Lower Chamber which may either acquiesce in the decision of the Upper Chamber or demand that the bill be considered in a joint session of the two Chambers, in which case the decision of the joint session will be final. But there is a difference of opinion regarding the power of the Upper Chamber to amend such a bill. Three members take the view that the Upper Chamber should have the right of amending the bill and that if the Lower Chamber declines to accept the amendments the bill should go before a joint session. The remaining members would prefer to recognise definitely the superior financial power of the Lower Chamber by giving the Upper Chamber the right only to suggest amendments of the bill to the Lower Chamber. In the event of the Lower Chamber refusing to accept all or any of the amendments suggested the decision of the Lower Chamber will prevail. In all cases taxation and appropriation bills will be subject to the general powers of veto and control vested in the Governor.

In matters of supply, demands for grants should be moved in the Lower Chamber, and also laid before the Upper Chamber. The Upper Chamber will have no power to reject *in toto* any grant passed by the Lower Chamber but may only suggest amendments to it and refer it back to the Lower Chamber for consideration of the amendments. In the event of the Lower Chamber refusing to accept all or any of the amendments suggested, the decision of the Lower Chamber will prevail. In the event of the demand for any grant being rejected or reduced by the Lower Chamber, it shall be laid before the Upper Chamber which shall have power to restore the grant, subject to a

reference to a joint session should the Lower Chamber again refuse to approve the demand restored by the Upper Chamber.

Motions of censure on the Ministers may be made in either Chamber. If a motion is rejected in the Chamber in which it is made, it will fail. If having been passed in the Chamber in which it is made, it is rejected in the other Chamber, a joint session will be held on the request of the mover of the motion.

It is suggested that the Ministry should be represented in both chambers, that any Minister should have the right to speak in both chambers, but should vote only in the Chamber of which he is a member.

27. **Public Services.**—In all democratic constitutions the question of the recruitment and control of the public services is of vital importance. In India, the problem is complicated by the existence of imperial services, but even if there were no such services the control of the provincial services would require special consideration and regulation. It is true that disciplinary cases are on the whole few in number, but allegations of unfair treatment are sometimes made. Apprehensions for the future are mainly concerned with the possibility of unfair discrimination in selection for promotion or for special posts, and of postings or transfers for political reasons. Justification for these fears can be found in the experience of the past seven years. With regard to recruitment, discipline and cognate matters, the Government of Bengal propose that a Public Service Commission be established. The Commission would be entrusted with the selection of persons for appointment to the provincial services, special posts, and such of the subordinate services as it might be desirable to bring within its jurisdiction. Other lesser appointments would be made by the heads of departments as at present. The advice of the Commission would also be taken before members of such services were dismissed, removed or degraded, and also before orders on appeals were passed. It would be desirable to establish as early as possible the convention that ordinarily the advice of the Commission would be accepted by Government. For imperial services, the present rules should be retained.

28. The question of the control of promotion, postings and transfers is more difficult, since a Minister might find his activities hampered unless he had some control over his administrative staff. Nevertheless, the Government of Bengal are agreed that the control of the services should be non-political and in the hands of an independent board, which should make recommendations to the Minister in charge of the department concerned, provided that—

(*a*) no order affecting emoluments or pensions, no order of formal censure, and no order on a memorial should be passed to

the disadvantage of an officer of an all-India or provincial service without the personal concurrence of the Governor;

(*b*) no order for the posting of an officer of an all-India service or to certain classified appointments should be made without the personal concurrence of the Governor;

(*c*) where a Minister differs from the board a reference should be made to the Governor.

Generally, the Ministry should exercise its control by means of general rules laying down the principles on which the board should discharge its functions.

29. Supplementary notes by the Hon'ble Nawab Bahadur Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., of Dhanbari, the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, KT., C.I.E., and the Hon'ble Nawab Musharruf Hossain, Khan Bahadur, are attached.

Note by the Hon'ble Nawab Bahadur Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., of Dhanbari, Member of the Executive Council.

I would have preferred to give a further trial to the system of dyarchy in its present form after the obvious defects that hampered its working have been removed—particularly the financial stringency that stood in the way of most schemes of improvement and the absence of a separate purse for the Transferred Departments. I agree that the present system has not had a fair trial on account of these defects as also on account of the policy of obstruction followed by a certain section in the Council. Subject, however, to the following safeguards, I accept the scheme of provincial Government as outlined in the memorandum which is essentially a somewhat modified form of the present system.

2. In the present stage of progress of the province when the electorate generally has had hardly any education or developed any political instinct, it is essential in my opinion to provide for the due representation in the legislature as also in the executive of the Moslem community who constitute the major half of the population. I recognise, however, that this is only a period of transition and that ultimately when the Moslem community will have been equally advanced in education with their non-Moslem brethren, there is likely to be not anything like the present communal difference and then it may be possible to do away with this communal safeguard. The existing

communal difference is to my mind essentially due to the difference between the two communities in the matter of education, and when both the communities have attained the same level in this respect this difference will vanish and there will be no need for separate treatment. Till then it is indispensable that the interests of the Moslem community should be specially safeguarded. In order to expedite the pace of educational progress among Moslems, I suggest that the Education portfolio should as a rule be entrusted to a Moslem Minister.

3. It is also necessary that there should always be ready at hand an expert body of Muhammadans to advise Government in matters of policy on the various problems always cropping up in connection with Muhammadan education. I would therefore strongly urge the appointment, on a statutory basis, of an Advisory Board for Muhammadan Education. The Minister in charge of the Education portfolio will be bound by statute to consult the Advisory Board on all matters affecting the education of Muhammadans, and in case of any difference of opinion the matter should be referred to the Governor for final orders.

4. As regards the electorate, I would have adult suffrage while I would distribute between the Moslems and non-Moslems on population basis the seats in the legislature allotted to Indian non-officials, *e.g.*, after setting apart those kept for nomination of officials and experts and for the representation of the European and Anglo-Indian communities. I would follow this principle in the case of both the Chambers, and would distribute the seats between the two communities on the basis of population even if the principle of adult suffrage is not conceded. The population basis was not recognised last time when the present constitution was framed in view of what is known now as the Lucknow Pact. But no such consideration now stands in the way of the adequate representation of the two communities according to their numerical strength. This was recommended by the Government of India even on the last occasion though in circumstances explained it was not finally adopted. But there has since been a great revulsion of feeling among the Moslems against the Lucknow Pact and the present opportunity should therefore be taken to redress what is rightly felt as a wrong by the Moslems. For if the Moslems are reduced to a minority in the legislature even in Bengal and the Punjab where they are in the majority on the basis of population, then they cannot hope to be in majority or even in equality in the legislature in any of the provinces.

5. As regards the executive, I trust that the effect of my suggestions will be to make for due representation of the Moslem community in the executive as well.

Note by the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, Kt., C.I.E., Member of the Executive Council.

I do not agree with some of the opinions and observations of the memorandum: but as it follows a particular line of reasoning and as my line of thought and reasoning in coming to the conclusions that I have arrived at are different, I do not think it will serve any useful purpose to discuss all the opinions and observations of the memorandum with which I differ. I do not agree with all the conclusions embodied in the memorandum, but instead of discussing them point by point I think the best course will be to embody in this note the broad outlines of the conclusions to which I have arrived. There is, however, one point of a fundamental character to which I should at this stage refer, *viz.*, that the Cabinet of the Executive Government should have joint responsibility, should be responsible to the Legislature and that all Members of the Cabinet must go out of office when they fail to retain the confidence of the Legislature. With these observations I desire to append a note which will explain my views and conclusions on the subject.

Note.

2. **General.**—All provincial subjects should be transferred: there shall be no reserved subject. There should be provincial autonomy in all subjects which are really provincial. There will be nothing to debar the provincial Government from administering central subjects as agents of the Central Government and in the administration of such subjects there can be no question of autonomous form of the provincial Government.

The Executive Government should consist of—

(1) the Governor, and

(2) a Cabinet of *seven* Ministers, one of whom should be the Prime Minister.

All the Ministers should have joint responsibility and should be chosen by the Governor on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Ministers should be selected from both Houses. The Ministers as also Secretaries to Government (who are Members of the Legislature) may, at any time, speak in either House. Although the Ministers and the Secretaries will be able to speak in either House, they should only be Members of one House and will have the right of voting in one House only.

As regards the powers of the Governor I agree generally with the opinion of the majority as recorded in paragraph 25 of the Government memorandum.

3. **Legislature.**—The Legislature should consist of an Upper and a Lower Chamber.

As regards the power of either Chamber, I agree generally with paragraph 26 of the Government memorandum, but I hold that the Upper Chamber should have the right to make amendments in taxation and appropriation bills, and that if such amendments are not accepted by the Lower Chamber a joint session should be held. I do not, however, agree with all that has been suggested about the constitution of the Lower House and the Upper House in Appendix III of the memorandum. I note below my suggestions about the constitution of both the Chambers. I consider a suitable constitution for the two Chambers to be a matter of great importance. In this connection a question naturally arises whether the representation of special interests should be in the Lower or in the Upper House. After very careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that representation of special interests should be in the Lower and not in the Upper House. Representations of special interests will supply an element in the Lower House which will be missing in the Lower House if it be returned only from general constituencies. The creation of the Upper House does not relieve the necessity of a fully representative Lower House. It is not a sufficient reason to urge that the Upper House will provide a remedy or a safeguard. Political and other considerations may be such that it cannot often do so and the method it must be admitted is likely to be cumbersome. The Lower House should be the important House. It is desirable in every way to minimise the chances of mischief or mistake by proper representation in the Lower House. Attempt to remedy mistake or mischief through the Upper House will always be less satisfactory than the prevention of mischief or mistake through suitable representation in the Lower House. The creation of a Second Chamber does not in my opinion eliminate the necessity of special constituencies in the First Chamber.

I would like to constitute the Upper House in such a way that one may hope to rely on the broad-mindedness, sense of justice, practical patriotism and good sense of all the members rather than on the personal interests of the component groups of that House. Under present conditions it will be a mistake to compose the Upper House principally of persons representing wealth or landed aristrocracy. I would aim at an Upper House whose aim should be the welfare of the state and the people.

4. **The constitution of the Lower House.**—The total strength should be about 200:—

Nominated	...	15
Special constituencies representing different class interests	...	48
General constituencies	...	137
Total	...	200

It will be observed that the present number of official nominated members has been considerably reduced. The official nominated members should be limited to the Secretaries, heads of say two important departments and perhaps two official members of Government, if the official members agree to accept joint responsibility and go out of office along with non-official members according to the scheme of the majority of the members of Government; 9 to 11 nominated officials will suffice. The remaining four should be non-officials to provide representation of communities like the Indian Christian community and the backward classes.

The special constituencies should consist of representatives of commerce, Indian and British, landholders, labour and income-tax payers (the last two are new additions).

In the present Council about 65 per cent. represent elected general constituencies.

About 20 per cent. represent nominated members and about 15 per cent. represent special constituencies.

According to the above list we have increased the percentage of general constituencies to 68·5 instead of 65: that of special constituencies to 24 per cent. instead of 15 per cent., the nominated seats being decreased from about 18·5 per cent. to 7½ per cent.

5. I note below further details about the distribution of seats of the special and general constituencies:—

Special Constituencies.

(1) Labour ... 4.

At present there are two nominated labour members. This is unsatisfactory. Without going into details, I may say that it will be possible to devise special labour constituencies from more or less well-defined labour areas.

(2) Landlords ... 15.

In the present Council there are five landlords' seats in a body of 114 elected members. In the pre-Reform Council there were five

landlords' seats in a body of 27 elected members. The reduction of the number of landlords' seats in my opinion has not been fair, in view of the large interests of the landholding interests in the province. The landlords are responsible for the collection and payment of about one-third of the total income of the provincial Government irrespective of the fact whether they are able to collect their rentals punctually and amicably. In point of fact they have great difficulty in collecting their rentals amicably and punctually as is evidenced by the fact that 54 per cent. of the litigation in Bengal consist of rent-suits and 37 per cent. money-suits. A large majority of these money-suits are for bonds which the tenants execute when they want longer time than the statutory period of limitation of three years and 11 months for the payment of their rent. The landlords also pay considerable sums to the provincial exchequer in the shape of court-fees and stamps. They also pay about 75 lakhs through the Government to the District Boards of Bengal whose total income from taxation is only about 95 lakhs. The landlords also have the proprietary interest in practically the whole of rural Bengal. It will appear from the aforesaid facts that the landholding classes have a very large interest in the administration of the province. In the present Council the commercial interest has 15 seats while the landholding interest has only five: questions vitally affecting landholding interests constantly come up before the local Legislative Council, but questions affecting commercial interests come up not before the local Legislative Council but before the Central Legislature. Nor do the commercial interests contribute any revenue to the local Government. If on account of the position occupied by the commercial interests they are allowed 15 seats although they do not pay revenue to the local Government and although their vital interests hardly come up before the local legislature the landholders ought to have at least the same number of seats as the representatives of the commercial interests in the local legislature. If the seats allotted to the landlords be not increased for some theoretical consideration then in fairness the seats allotted to commercial interests should also be reduced. It is said that as landholders can come in through the general electorates there is no justification for increasing their number. My answer to this suggestion is that the landholders who represent general constituencies are returned by voters perhaps 90 per cent. of whom are tenants. Those landholders therefore when their class interest conflict with those of tenants will be unable to press their class interest.

(3) Universities ... 3.

The Calcutta University is responsible for the examination and standard of examination of the whole of the province and has a larger number of voters as compared with those of the Dacca University

which is responsible for a small local area. It is suggested that the Calcutta University should return two members and the Dacca University one member.

(4) Income-tax payers ... 6.

One for each division and one for Calcutta. They represent an important class and if class interests are retained they should be allowed special seats.

(5) European Commerce ... 14.

Although European commercial interests pay very little revenue to the provincial exchequer and although their more vital questions come up not before the local legislature but before the central legislature, yet as they occupy a very important position in the province their seats are proposed to be increased from 11 to 14.

(6) Indian Commerce ... 6.

For reasons somewhat similar and for the reasons justifying the retention and increase of European commercial seats, the Indian commercial seats are proposed to be increased from 4 to 6.

General Constituencies ... 137 seats.

In the present Council there are 85 seats for general constituencies, out of these 17 represent urban constituencies and 68 represent rural constituencies. These 17 urban seats should be retained. To these should be added 5 more urban seats for the mufassal municipalities after separating the mufassal municipalities from rural constituencies. The majority of the Government members agree with me and are of opinion that the urban seats should be separated from the rural seats. The 68 rural seats should be increased to 115 so that the rural constituencies can be made more compact and in view of the importance of rural areas (93·5 per cent. of the population live in rural areas) their number should be increased. My personal opinion is that we should allot 100 seats to direct election for rural areas and set apart 15 seats for indirect election by wide electoral colleges, but in deference to the opinion of the majority I would be content to bring this point to the notice of the Commission leaving it to them to come to a decision. My personal opinion is that indirect election through electoral colleges will make it possible for a better type of candidates to be returned. In the pre-Reform Council most members were returned through electoral colleges and many who have experience of both Councils will, I believe, admit that members of the pre-Reform Councils were,

generally speaking, men of more practical experience and better standing. The electoral colleges of the pre-Reform days were rather limited in number, but this may be remedied by making all members of district boards, union boards, and chaukidari panchayats voters for this indirect election. As I am proposing 100 members to be returned by direct election and only 15 by indirect election I think I am suggesting a good compromise. If my suggestions be accepted by the Commission I think these 15 men are likely to add to the efficiency and practical wisdom of the Legislative Council.

Upper House.

6. I agree with the Government memorandum that the strength should be 80. I suggest the following alternatives:—

First alternative.

Elected	...	45
Members in their own right	...	20
Purely nominated	...	15
Total		80

Second alternative.

Elected	...	50
Nominated	...	30
Total		80

The election in the Upper House should be by electoral colleges. The minimum age of the members should be as suggested in the Government memorandum.

The 45 members of the first alternative scheme may be elected as follows:—

(1) To be elected by the Lower House, but the persons to be elected must be persons other than members of that House	...	4
(2) To be elected by members of District Boards, the Presidents of union boards and panchayati (chaukidari) unions (five from each division)	...	25
(3) By the Commissioners of mufassal municipalities (to be suitably divided division by division)	...	8

(4) By the Senate of the Calcutta University	...	1
(5) By the Court of the Dacca University	...	1
(6) By the Councillors and Aldermen of the Calcutta Corporation	...	1
(7) By Government pensioners drawing a pension of not less than Rs. 3,600 annually (to be suitably distributed into different electoral groups)	...	5
Total	...	45

Members in their own right.

(1) Persons having a permanent residence in the province who have served as Members of Governor-General's Executive Council, or as Member or Minister to the local Government for a period of not less than one year and who have retired from their office (the persons are to be chosen automatically by means of rules which will prescribe either seniority or length of service as the standard)	...	8
(2) Persons having a permanent residence in the province who have served as High Court Judges for a period of not less than 3 years, or as members of the Indian Civil Service, or persons who have held listed appointments for a period of not less than five years and who have retired from their office (the persons to be chosen automatically by means of rules which will prescribe either seniority or length of service as the standard)	...	6
(3) Title-holders (who are permanent residents in the province) not below the rank of Raja or Nawab among Indian title-holders and not below the rank of Knights or C.S.I.'s amongst English title-holders (to be chosen automatically by appropriate rules)	...	6
Total	...	20

The rest should be nominated.

With regard to the second alternative the election of the 45 members may be on the lines indicated in the first alternative. The remaining five may be elected by a constituency consisting of retired members of the Governor-General's Executive Council, Members or

Ministers of the local Government, retired Judges of the High Court, and retired members of the Indian Civil Service.

Note by the Hon'ble Nawab Musharruf Hussain, Khan Bahadur, Minister.

The Commission has been appointed to advise Parliament as to the best means of securing gradual realisation of complete self-government in India. Self-government as meant in western countries is the enforcement of the will of the majority over the minority population. In western countries every individual State has got homogeneous population, but in India it consists of heterogeneous elements with various degrees of civilisation and culture, so if India is to have self-government, it must have a constitution unique in its nature with safeguards for the protection of the interest of the minority. Constituted as India is at present, with its population hopelessly divided in matters of religion and interest, it is impossible to think of joint electorates in India. Quite recently, in the division list of the Bengal Tenancy Bill, we have seen Hindus with one or two exceptions going in a body in favour of the landlords and the Muhammadans in favour of tenants. Here the interests of the Hindu and Muhammadan councillors have been found quite at variance with each other. Again, in the voting list of the Dacca University Bill, the Hindus in a body went against the Bill and the Muhammadans supported the same. This is also due to the clash of interest. To allow a joint electorate—a Muhammadan to elect a Hindu and a Hindu to elect a Muhammadan—is not practical politics, at least for the present. I would, therefore, urge the Commission to recommend separate electorates for different communities in India. In places where the Muhammadans are in a minority, even if the reservation of seats be allowed, the minority will not be able to send any representative of its own as the person who will be elected will have to be elected by the majority of the voters belonging to the other community.

2. The great political philosopher John Stuart Mill in chapter VII, page 53 of his book on Representative Government, says:—

> "That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to the greater, is a familiar idea; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number to become equally powerful with the greater and blotting out the smaller number altogether. In a representative body actu-

> ally deliberating the minority must of course be overruled, and in an actual democracy (since the opinion of the constituents, when they insist on them, determine those of the representative body) the majority of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege, one part of the people rule over the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy which professes equality as its very root and foundation."

So if the principle enunciated by that great political philosopher John Stuart Mill, which is true for all countries and for all ages, is followed, the Muhammadan and Hindu minorities, distinct in thought, culture and interest, should be allowed to elect their representatives for the legislative bodies through the medium of separate electorates. A Muhammadan chosen by Hindus can never be expected to represent the feelings and interest of the community. Some leading Hindus may think that the joint electorate is an ideal method of representation, but I am probably right in saying that the Hindus of East Bengal feel that their interest is not adequately safeguarded by joint electorates. The *Hindu Sabha* of Pabna and *Charu Mihir* of Mymensingh have frequently expressed such ideas.

3. The next question is what should be the proportion of seats distributed amongst the various communities. My answer is that it should be proportionate to the numerical strength of the different communities so far as the general electorate is concerned. The majority of population should, under no pretext whatsoever, be deprived of their position of the majority in the Council. The European community should have seats in the Council commensurate with the interest and political importance of the community.

4. The next question that arises in everybody's mind is what form of government the future constitution should provide, dyarchic or unitary. (The country as a whole has condemned dyarchy and Europeans and Indians alike have expressed their opinion against it. If now in the name of safeguards dyarchy is perpetuated, the working of it will be more difficult in future than at present, if not altogether impossible.)

All that can be said in this connection is that as long as the communal troubles last the subjects such as Police and the Administration of Justice should be temporarily administered by His Excellency with the help of an official, but as soon as the Governor is convinced that the two communities have settled down and there is no lurking suspicion in the minds of each about the other, the subject should be transferred for popular administration. The length of the transition period should be clearly defined.

5. **Cabinet.**—The cabinet should consist of members of all communities. A convention has been established in Bengal, indeed in India, to have in the cabinet, whether as a Minister or Member, representatives of different sections of the population. This should be continued in future.

6. **Secretary.**—At present the respective position of the Secretary and Minister is quite anomalous. The Secretary in the form of a note issues orders, and if the Minister agrees with that order it is all right, but if he disagrees and the matter in the *opinion of the Secretary* is of importance he can go over the head of the Minister to the Governor for its disposal by the Governor. The Minister is responsible to the legislature for the good and efficient work of the department entrusted to him, but the rules as they stand have made him an ornamental figurehead. This has given a good handle to the Swarajists against the existing constitution. Attempts are being made by interested parties to take away this shadow of authority even from the Minister and to give the entire power and control to the Secretary. But as long as the Minister remains responsible to the legislature for the good and efficient working of the department he should have supreme control over the Secretary, the heads of departments and the members of the service.

7. **Council.**—The Legislative Council should consist of 250 members. It should be representative of all sections of population. In western countries the profession and tendencies of mind determine the parties, but in India profession alone determines the party. For example, the higher caste Hindus who are not allowed to touch a plough have grouped themselves into one class while their less fortunate compatriots professing the same religion but following the pursuit of

labour who are called Namasudras, form a separate group. These two classes can be safely described as capitalists and labourers. On the other hand Muhammadans can be safely described as labouring agriculturists with few exceptions here and there. A high class Hindu whom I have described as a capitalist can under no circumstances represent the agriculturists and the labourers in the Council and look after their interest, as we have found to our painful regret that the high class Hindus now in Council have voted against the interest of the agriculturists in the last session of the Bengal Legislative Council when the Bengal Tenancy Bill was discussed. So if real representatives are to be chosen they must be chosen from each class and the disposal of every question in the Council by majority can be thought of only when the different parties and interests have sent their true representatives in the Council. For this purpose Hindu labourers should get separate representation as in the case of Muhammadans and the number of members to be elected by them for the Council should be proportionate to their numerical strength. It may be argued that in England the joint electorate is considered a good medium for electing members of different interests and no separate electorate is necessary there. The reply can at once be found in the number of literates among the population in England, which is about 95 per cent. while in India it is not more than 7 per cent.

8. **Finance.**—As long as the Government is divided into two separate sections—transferred and safeguarded—finance of these two sections must be separate. One of the Ministers should be in charge of transferred finance and an official should be in charge of safeguarded finance.

9. **Franchise.**—The Nehru Report demands adult franchise for the whole of India. This seems to be a little premature; those that are in the habit of exercising the privilege of voting should be granted the right of voting in Council elections and the franchise should be extended to the electors in union boards.

APPENDIX I.

Financial Requirements of Bengal.

(*Vide* paragraph 2 on page 205.)

The chapter entitled "The Financial Position in Bengal" in Part I of the Report reviewed the financial history of the province and the effect of the last financial settlement from the introduction of the Reforms up to 1925-26. This note examines the present financial position and future prospects.

2. **Present financial position.**—The financial position of Bengal in 1928-29 as presented to the Legislative Council and as revised on latest information available is as follows:—

	Rs.	Rs.
Opening balance	....	**2,20,86,000**
Receipts on revenue account	10,94,11,000	
Recoveries of provincial loans	10,88,000	
Interest on Famine Insurance Fund ..	45,000	
		11,05,44,000
		13,26,30,000
Add—Interest on fixed deposit of 50 lakhs for one year from 1st April 1928 at 2¾ per cent. (Rs. 1,37,500).	....	1,38,000
Add—Refund of interest on account of Chittagong Port Loan, Chittagong, having been declared a major port—		
1925-26	7,000	
1926-27	86,000	1,79,000
1927-28	86,000	
Total	....	**13,29,47,000**

	Rs.	Rs.
Expenditure on revenue account* ..	11,19,62,000	
Repayment of loans taken from Central Government.	6,25,000	
Payment of loans by local Government ..	18,93,000	
Famine Insurance Fund	89,000	
Expenditure on account of supplementary grants.†	6,86,000	
		11,52,55,000
Add—Public Works Department establishment under "60—Civil Works."	....	1,68,000
Tools and Plant under "60—Civil Works."	....	13,000
Shampukur police-station under "60—Civil Works."	....	1,13,000
		11,55,49,000
Deduct—		
Interest on Chittagong Port Loan ..	86,000	
Savings under "27—Ports and Pilotage" on account of the declaration of Chittagong as a major port.	12,000	
		98,000
Total	....	**11,54,51,000**
Estimated revenue including opening balance	....	**13,29,47,000**
„ expenditure	....	**11,54,51,000**
„ closing balance	....	**1,74,96,000**

The whole of this balance is not a free balance. The following items of non-recurring expenditure totalling **Rs. 56,33,000** are earmarked for purposes to which Government are committed:—

	Rs.
Famine Insurance Fund	12,00,000
Depreciation Fund for Government Presses	1,56,000
Dacca University Moslem Hall	6,50,000
Bhatpara sewerage and water-supply scheme	7,00,000
Calcutta Bridges, roughly	8,00,000
Medical schools in districts (Berhampore, Barisal, Jalpaiguri, Chittagong).	10,22,000
Agricultural education in secondary schools	1,18,000
Soadighi and Gangakhali Drainage Scheme	7,64,000
Payment to Government of India of value of cantonment lands and buildings at Dacca.	2,23,000
Total	56,33,000

	Rs.	Rs.
* As presented to the Council	....	11,78,26,000
Less—Provincial contribution	54,47,000	
Calcutta Police	4,00,000	
Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University	17,000	
		58,64,000
		11,19,62,000
† Famine relief	1,00,000	
Jail Warders' pay	40,000	
Police Officers' pay	5,46,000	
Total	6,86,000	

The above sum of Rs. 56,33,000 will not be expended in one year, but with the exception of the Famine Insurance and Depreciation Funds, the other sums will have to be paid within the next few years. The "free balance" therefore stands at Rs. 1,18,63,000 which is very near the minimum working balance for the province, viz., one crore. The balances had to be drawn on this year in order to produce equilibrium and, in view of the fact shown below that normal revenue is not up to normal expenditure, the depletion of the balances cannot be avoided except by a large increase of revenue.

3. **Normal Revenue.**—The actual revenue in 1926-27 was Rs. 10,59,64,000 and in 1927-28 was Rs. 10,89,00,000.

The estimated revenue in 1928-29 is—

	Rs.
(1) as presented to the Council	11,05,44,000
(2) interest on fixed deposit of 50 lakhs from April 1928 to March 1929.	1,38,000
(3) refund of interest on Chittagong Port Loan	1,79,000
Total	11,08,61,000

Items (2) and (3) are abnormal receipts and other abnormal receipts are Rs. 5,00,000 on account of recovery of survey and settlement costs, and Rs. 84,000 under XL—Extraordinary receipts on account of the sale-proceeds of Government land at Porabazar. Deducting these, which total Rs. 9,01,000, the normal annual revenue of the province is estimated at **Rs. 10,99,60,000.**

4. Most of the revenue is derived from Land Revenue, Excise and Stamps, which between them produce about 82 per cent. of the total revenue. Of the other sources of revenue, Forests, Registration and Scheduled Taxes are the most important. The figures for the last three years are—

	1926-27. (actuals).	1927-28. (actuals).	1928-29. (estimate).
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Land Revenue ..	3,11,18,000	3,15,10,000	3,22,00,000
Excise	2,25,17,000	2,24,33,000	2,29,00,000
Stamps	3,31,60,000	3,47,88,000	3,56,00,000
Forests	31,24,000	33,83,000	35,00,000
Registration ..	38,50,000	40,17,000	40,50,000
Scheduled Taxes ..	16,91,000	19,46,000	18,00,000
Total ..	9,54,60,000	9,80,77,000	10,00,50,000

NOTE.—The figures of Land Revenue include other items. For comparison with the figures for 1925-26 given in Part I, paragraph 87, the figures for 1926-27, 1927-28 and 1928-29 are Rs. 2,87,01,000, Rs. 2,88,49,000 and Rs. 2,88,50,000.

The existence of the permanent settlement prevents land revenue from being an expanding source of revenue. The comparatively small increase that has taken place is derived from Government estates and the small temporarily settled areas. In the 1928-29 estimate, there are abnormal receipts of about Rs. 5,00,000 on account of recoveries of survey and settlement costs. In excise matters the policy of Government is to see that no increase in consumption of intoxicating articles is permitted merely for the sake of revenue and is directed towards securing a minimum of consumption with a maximum of revenue. Excise revenue is therefore limited by these considerations. The Forest income is expanding, but is comparatively small.

Stamps, Registration and Scheduled Taxes.—The local Government imposed additional taxation under these heads and the excess of receipts in 1927-28 over the receipts before the additional taxation was imposed was—

	Rs.
Stamps	74,04,000
Registration ..	14,32,000
Scheduled Taxes ..	19,46,000
Total ..	1,07,82,000

The average excess for the 3 years 1925-26, 1926-27 and 1927-28 was Rs. 1,00,64,000. Thus it appears that out of the normal revenue of Rs. 10,99,60,000 over one crore may be assigned mainly to the taxation imposed by the local Government since the Reforms. Existing sources of revenue have thus been exploited and under present arrangements there is little or no hope of further expansion.

5. **Normal expenditure.**—As stated in paragraph 2, the estimated expenditure this year is Rs. 11,54,51,000. From this amount abnormal items totalling **Rs. 27,85,000** have to be eliminated as follows:—

	Rs.	Rs.
Excess under class I loans over the normal of Rs. 2,45,000 (including co-operative loans)—		
Budget	7,95,000	
Less—Normal	2,45,000	
		5,50,000
Loan to Chittagong Port	....	6,75,000
Excess under Irrigation over the normal of Rs. 34,00,000—		
Working expenses—XIII	18,89,000	
15	15,63,000	
16	2,45,000	
	36,97,000	
Less—Normal	34,00,000	
		2,97,000

	Rs.	Rs.
Excess under "41—Civil Works" over the normal of Rs. 1,00,00,000—		
"41—Civil Works"	1,02,08,000	
"60—Civil Works"—		
Rs. 1,68,000 / 13,000 / 1,13,000	2,94,000	
	1,05,02,000	
Less—Normal	1,00,00,000	
		5,02,000
Special Officer, Reforms, and his staff (including Rs. 1,000 for hill allowance).	....	35,000
One sheer leg and crane for Narayanganj Dockyard.	....	15,000
Excess under "43—Famine Relief" over the normal owing to unusual agricultural distress.	....	2,11,000
Abnormal expenditure under survey and settlement.	....	5,00,000
		27,85,000

The normal annual expenditure this year therefore amounts to—

Rs.
11,54,51,000
-27,85,000
11,26,66,000

This is the amount necessary for performing the existing ordinary functions of Government in spite of the retrenchments effected some years ago.

6. **Retrenchment in Expenditure.**—The budget estimate for 1921-22 showed a deficit between income and expenditure of Rs. 2,08,00,000. This was to be met by drawing on the balances, but in order to maintain solvency in future, the Government of Bengal had to reduce expenditure as well as impose new taxation. The expenditure of all departments was closely examined and orders were issued in October 1921 to effect specific retrenchments totalling Rs. 45,29,000 during 1921-22 and Rs. 89,43,000 during the following year and to exercise the strictest economy in all directions. Though there was a very substantial decrease in receipts in 1921-22 due to the general dullness of trade and in part to a disturbed political situation, the measures of retrenchment reduced the deficit to Rs. 1,70,58,000. From the following year the Government of India waived for three years the provincial contribution of Rs. 63 lakhs. The three taxation bills became law and it was hoped that the deficit would be wiped ou..

Later in the year it became evident that the additional revenue would not be up to expectations and further retrenchment was found to be inevitable. The expenditure of all departments was again examined; economy was enforced and specific retrenchments amounting to Rs. 48,89,000 were ordered. The result was that, as against an estimated expenditure from revenue of Rs. 10,68,74,000, the actual expenditure was kept down to Rs. 9,59,22,000 in 1922-23. Meanwhile a Retrenchment Committee had been appointed and in addition to the above restrictions of expenditure enforced before the Retrenchment Committee reported, Government, after considering the recommendations of the Committee issued orders which effected a retrenchment of Rs. 20,63,000 on the reserved side and Rs. 11,31,000 on the transferred side up to the close of the financial year 1924-25. It was calculated that the ultimate retrenchment, when full effect was given to these orders, was Rs. 21,82,000 (reserved) and Rs. 15,68,000 (transferred) or a total of Rs. 37,50,000.

Expenditure from revenue continued to be restricted during 1923-24 and 1924-25 when the figures were Rs. 9,77,95,000 and Rs. 9,76,12,000, respectively. From 1925-26 the provincial contribution was again remitted and registration fees were raised from 1st June 1925. From the balances thus accumulated by economy, retrenchment, additional taxation and the remission of the provincial contribution, expenditure on a limited scale, mainly of a non-recurring nature, has been possible only in the last three years and most of it has been required to keep pace with normal growth. In estimating the restriction of expenditure it has to be remembered that it has been enforced in spite of the increased cost of the services since the initiation of the Reforms. Economic conditions following the war led to a revision of the emoluments of the services, both superior and inferior, and much of this increased expenditure was not under the control of the local Government. Larger expenditure on this account had to be incurred during 1921-22 and the extent of the increase since then under certain heads is shown in the following table:—

	1921-22.	1926-27.	Increase.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Pay of officers ..	1,88,16,000	1,94,03,000	5,87,000
Pay of establishment ..	2,56,48,000	2,95,03,000	38,55,000
Cost of passages ..	....	2,80,000	2,80,000
Total ..	4,44,64,000	4,91,86,000	47,22,000

Expenditure on development has had to be restricted in order to meet the above liabilities.

7. **Liabilities.**—To the figure of Rs. 11,26,66,000 of normal annual expenditure shown in paragraph 5 have to be added the annually recurring liabilities which attach to the existing activities of Government. These liabilities totalling **Rs. 33,86,000** are as follows:—

	Rs.	Rs.
Recurring charges—Medical schools (Jalpaiguri Rs. 70,000, Chittagong Rs. 59,000).	1,29,000	
Howrah Bridge	4,00,000	
Loan charges on Damodar Canal project. (Revised estimate Rs. 75,61,000 less expenditure up to 1927-28, Rs. 22,20,000 = Rs. 53,41,000.) Interest on Rs. 53,41,000 at 5 per cent. (Repayment will begin from 1934. By that time the canal will be productive. The loan is repayable in 60 years.)	2,67,000	
Loan charges for Council Chamber on Rs. 23,56,000 at 5¼ per cent. (Rough estimate Rs. 25,56,000 less expenditure in 1927-28, Rs. 2,00,000 = Rs. 23,56,000.) (The loan is repayable in 50 years.)	1,34,000	
Maintenance of Council Chamber (roughly)	50,000	
Loan charges on Bally Bridge (equated payment on a loan of Rs. 36,23,000 at 5¼ per cent. repayable in 50 years).	2,06,000	
Loan charges on Bakreswar irrigation project (Rs. 4,91,000 at 5 per cent. for 15 years).	47,000	
Revision of pay of Eastern Frontier Rifles	30,000	
Public Health organisation	7,00,000	
Agricultural education in secondary schools	53,000	
Physical instruction in schools	50,000	
Improvement of the pay of police constables, head constables and sergeants.	12,19,000	
Improvement of the pay of jail warders ..	84,000	
Revision of pay of Medical College staff ..	17,000	
		33,86,000

Most of this expenditure has to be met from next year, *e.g.*, the increased pay of the police and jail warders was sanctioned from 1st November this year and the full effect of the increase will fall on next year's budget. In calculating the normal annual expenditure a figure of 1 crore has been taken in respect of Public Works. This normal figure was fixed years ago and no longer represents actual necessities. Actual expenditure has been higher for some years and the average increase for the last 3 years has been Rs. 9,73,000. Therefore Rs. 9,73,000 should be added to the annual normal requirements of this Department. The total expenditure which has to be incurred to perform the ordinary duties of Government on the existing scale is therefore—

Rs.
11,26,66,000
33,86,000
9,73,000
11,70,25,000

The normal revenue as already calculated in paragraph 3 is **Rs. 10,99,60,000.** The excess of annual expenditure over annual revenue is therefore **Rs. 70,65,000,** to which has to be added the sum of **Rs. 56,33,000** mentioned in paragraph 2 representing the non-recurring commitments of Government, expenditure on most of which is obligatory in the next 2 or 3 years.

8. **Future needs.**—In the first place there are projects which have been worked out in detail and have received the administrative approval of Government. Schedules of such schemes have been prepared according to the prescribed practice for the consideration of Government when it comes to frame the budget for next year.

The estimated cost of these schemes is as follows:—

	Recurring.	Non-recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Departmental schemes ..	21,24,000	45,82,000	67,06,000
Civil Works—			
(1) Major works ..	....	37,59,000	46,88,000
(2) Minor works ..	....	9,29,000	
			1,13,94,000

9. Other schemes which have been similarly worked out and have been administratively approved and are awaiting funds are estimated to cost as follows:—

	Recurring.	Non-recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Departmental schemes ..	14,36,000	36,54,000	50,90,000
Civil Works—			
(1) Major works ..	....	1,48,79,000	1,70,67,000
(2) Minor works ..	....	21,88,000	
			2,21,57,000

The total of the above two sets of schemes is—

Rs.
1,13,94,000
2,21,57,000
3,35,51,000

The distribution of these projects between departments of Government is shown in Statements II to IV. This estimate of about 3 crores and 35 lakhs, of which **Rs. 35,60,000** represent annually recurring

expenditure, is not a guess of indefinite requirements. The schemes have all been prepared with reference to definitely ascertained needs and have been scrutinised and finally approved by the administrative and Finance Departments. They are not all of recent growth; many of them would have been given effect to if the province had been given adequate resources during the last seven years and represent only a portion of the leeway which requires to be made up as a result of the financial settlement made in 1921.

10. In addition to the schemes which have received Government's approval after examination, there are many projects which have been prepared by Government or heads of departments and are under consideration, including building projects, for which estimates have been framed but which have not yet passed through the stage of administrative approval. The estimates for these are (*see* Statements V and VI)—

	Recurring.	Non-recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Departmental schemes ..	1,59,82,000	1,06,26,000	2,66,08,000
Civil Works	....	7,25,74,000	7,25,74,000
		Total ..	9,91,82,000

The total for schemes actually approved and under examination is thus—

Rs.	
3,35,51,000	
9,91,82,000	
13,27,33,000	(*see* Statement I)

of which **Rs. 1,95,42,000** is for annually recurring expenditure.

There are also other lines of development, for which even rough estimates are not possible at present, the more important of which are the development of agriculture in accordance with the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the eradication of water hyacinth and the development of industries, all of which will involve large expenditure.

11. To sum up, normal expenditure has overtaken normal revenue, which is not of an expanding nature, and Bengal is now living on its balances, which have been built up from retrenchment, restriction of new expenditure and additional provincial taxation. Annual revenue is in deficit to the extent of **Rs. 70,65,000** and there are commitments of non-recurring expenditure amounting to **Rs. 56,33,000**, most of

which have to be faced within two or three years. Schemes formulated and approved to meet elementary needs on recognised lines are estimated to cost **Rs. 3,35,51,000,** of which a sum of **Rs. 35,60,000** is of an annually recurring nature. Including projects under examination for future development, the total estimate is over **13 crores** of rupees, of which nearly **2 crores** are for annually recurring expenditure. Considering that this estimate represents expenditure much of which ought to have been incurred in the last seven years, and that a certain portion of non-recurring expenditure is linked with the annually recurring expenditure, the conclusion is reached that an additional income of at least **3 crores** of rupees is necessary to enable the province to meet its existing liabilities and to carry on the administration in the immediate future.

12. **Proposed sources of additional revenue.**—The industrial wealth of the province is reflected in the income-tax paid by its inhabitants and one of its most valuable agricultural products is jute. It is from these two sources, where the taxable capacity of the province is largely concentrated, that Bengal should derive the additional revenue it requires.

Income-tax.—The Government of India receive from Bengal more revenue in the form of income-tax than from any other province. An analysis of income-tax assessments was made in 1920 at the instance of the Finance Relations Committee and showed that over 90 per cent. of the income-tax collected in Calcutta came solely from Bengal. But the province receives no share of the expanding revenues derived from the development of industry within its borders. It is suggested that there should be an allocation of income-tax based in some proportion or other of the total income-tax collected or of the total assessed incomes in the provinces. By way of illustration the following tables are given to show the amounts which would have been derived from an allocation of one anna in the rupee on the assessed incomes and income-tax collected in Bengal during the last few years:—

Income-tax.

Year.	Assessed income in Bengal.	What one anna in the rupee on this would amount to.
	Rs.	Rs.
1922-23 ..	47,55,84,000	2,97,24,000
1923-24 ..	49,65,90,000	3,10,37,000
1924-25 ..	47,13,61,000	2,94,60,000
1925-26 ..	51,29,35,000	3,20,58,000
1926-27 ..	49,40,92,000	3,08,81,000

Actual collections of income-tax in Bengal.

Year.	Income-tax.	Super tax.	Total.	What one anna in the rupee on this would amount to.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1923-24 ..	3,44,47,000	2,58,68,000	6,03,15,000	37,70,000
1924-25 ..	3,30,42,000	2,24,17,000	5,54,59,000	34,66,000
1925-26 ..	3,41,72,000	2,51,87,000	5,93,59,000	37,10,000
1926-27 ..	3,24,49,000	2,45,40,000	5,69,89,000	35,62,000

Jute.—The yield of the export duty on jute for the last five years is given in the following table:—

Export duty on jute in Bengal.

	Year.	Raw.	Manufactured.	Total.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Figures taken from the Finance and Revenue accounts of the Government of India.	1922-23	1,43,55,000	1,81,50,000	3,25,05,000
	1923-24	1,54,80,000	1,96,63,000	3,51,43,000
	1924-25	1,63,79,000	2,06,98,000	3,70,77,000
	1925-26	1,56,20,000	2,07,79,000	3,63,99,000
	1926-27	1,68,36,000	2,20,77,000	3,89,13,000

Almost the whole of the jute crop is grown in Bengal, but its revenue producing value is enjoyed by the Government of India. The Fiscal Commission on page 100 of their report stated that " some portion, if not the whole, of an export duty falls on the home producer "; again the Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee in paragraph 156 of their report say as regards the duty on jute, " the article upon which it is imposed is a true monopoly," and then later on " in spite of the monopolistic character of the product, there exists a possibility that in certain conditions of the trade a portion of the export duty may fall on the producer. For this reason a considerable increase in the rate of duty involves the likelihood of differential taxation on the inhabitants of Bengal." In paragraph 508 of their report the Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1924-25 were of the following opinion:—

> " Consumption taxes, both customs and excises, are almost universally Imperial, the reason lying partly in the difficulty of tracing incidence and partly in the fact that the general control of the inter-State trade is one of the

most important of the Imperial functions. Though restriction of consumption is sometimes a State affair, at any rate in the first instance, India differs from most of the world in making restrictive excises a source of State revenue."

Neither of the reasons adduced in this paragraph applies to an export duty on jute. There is no difficulty in this particular instance of tracing incidence, and the general control of inter-State trade does not enter into the question any more when the duty on jute is an excise duty than it does when it is an export duty. There is nothing in the general principles as regards consumption taxes to prevent in this particular case an excise duty on jute being a provincial source of revenue.

In view of the condition of Bengal's finances and the fact that the jute crop is practically a monopoly of Bengal and one of its most valuable agricultural products, it is suggested that, if the Government of India adopt a policy of abolishing the jute export tax, the Government of Bengal should be empowered to impose excise duties on jute, as funds are required, up to a maximum of the present export duty. If the Government of India are not in a position to abolish the export duty, the Government of Bengal are strongly of opinion that the duty should be reduced and that, by the amendment of the Scheduled Taxes Rules where necessary, power should be given to the Local Government to raise revenue from jute.

The additional annual revenue of 3 crores of rupees required by the Government of Bengal to carry on the administration of the province can justly be claimed from the above two sources.

STATEMENT I.

Abstract of requirements.

Departmental Schemes.

	Recurring.	Non-recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
(1) Schemes in schedules for 1929-30	21,23,718	45,82,022	67,05,740
(2) Other schemes administratively approved not included in schedules.	14,36,515	36,53,676	50,90,191
(3) Schemes under consideration or in contemplation.	1,59,81,623	1,06,26,045	2,66,07,668
Total ..	1,95,41,856	1,88,61,743	3,84,03,599

Civil Works.

	Non-recurring.	
	Rs.	
(1) Schemes selected for inclusion in schedules ..	37,59,259	(Major works).
	9,29,341	(Minor works).
(2) Other schemes administratively approved (not included in schedules up to 30th September 1928).	1,48,78,044	
(3) Schemes considered desirable	7,25,74,321	
(4) Minor works administratively approved ..	21,87,500	
Total ..	9,43,28,465	
Grand total ..	13,27,32,765	
or, say,	13,27,33,000	

STATEMENT II.

Administratively approved schemes, other than Civil Works, not included in 1929-30 schedules.

Major heads.	Non-recurring.	Recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
5—Land Revenue	80,056	6,000	6,000
		93,000	1,73,056
6—Excise	....	3,000	3,000
26—Police	42,221	3,47,836	3,90,057
31—Education	33,46,571	9,26,743	42,73,314
32—Medical	....	20,000	20,000
33—Public Health	80,000	....	80,000
34—Agriculture	30,192	12,968	43,160
35—Industries	74,636	26,968	1,01,604
Total ..	36,53,676	14,36,515	50,90,191
			or, say, 50,90,000

STATEMENT III.

41.—Civil Works administratively approved.

Major Works not included in 1929-30 schedules.

Major heads.	Non-recurring.	Recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Land Revenue	1,68,250	....	1,68,250
Registration	5,25,512	....	5,25,512
Irrigation	9,62,413	....	9,62,413
General Administration ..	11,14,809	....	11,14,809
Administration of Justice ..	14,66,663	....	14,66,663
Jails	96,260	....	96,260
Police	49,56,540	....	49,56,540
Education	12,84,110	....	12,84,110
Medical	20,22,199	....	20,22,199
Agriculture	2,69,895	....	2,69,895
Industries	2,60,400	....	2,60,400
Civil Works	14,98,376	....	14,98,376
Forests	57,311	....	57,311
Excluded area	1,95,306	....	1,95,306
Total ..	1,48,78,044 or, say, 1,48,79,000	....	1,48,78,044 or, say, 1,48,79,000

STATEMENT IV.

41.—Civil Works administratively approved.

Minor Works.

Major heads.	Non-recurring.	Recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Excise	9,965	....	9,965
Forests	7,500	....	7,500
Registration	91,003	40,000	1,31,003
Irrigation	90,000	....	90,000
General Administration ..	2,87,716	....	2,87,716
Administration of Justice ..	2,48,906	....	2,48,906
	6,290	....	6,290
Jails	2,28,000	....	2,28,000
Police	4,64,255	....	4,64,255
Education	3,27,550	....	3,27,550
Medical	2,26,364	....	2,26,364
Agriculture	71,415	....	71,415
Industries	3,500	....	3,500
Civil Works	24,729	....	24,729
Excluded area	60,307	....	60,307
Total ..	21,47,500	40,000	21,87,500 or, say, 21,88,000

STATEMENT V.

Schemes, other than Civil Works, under consideration.

Major heads.	Non-recurring.	Recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
5—Land Revenue	75,000	1,829	76,829
6—Excise	2,03,915	5,988	2,09,903
7—Stamps	950	1,160	2,110
8—Forest	1,12,820	67,997	1,80,817
	968	23,712	24,680
9—Registration	71,219	8,69,320	9,40,539
22—General Administration ..	....	3,318	3,318
24—Administration of Justice ..	50,000	15,615	65,615
25—Jails	5,90,000	4,42,124	10,32,124
26—Police	16,87,196	16,57,400	33,44,596
27—Ports and Pilotage	....	984	984
31—Education	33,59,974	1,15,19,267	1,48,79,241
31—Education (Reserved) ..			
32—Medical	15,32,935	3,65,806	18,98,741
33—Public Health (Reserved) ..	13,000	....	13,000
33—Public Health	14,17,697	1,31,428	15,49,125
34—Agriculture	8,92,467	5,92,093	14,84,560
35—Industries	1,44,250	2,72,002	4,16,252
46—Stationery and Printing ..	....	11,580	11,580
52A—Forest	4,73,654	....	4,73,654
Total ..	1,06,26,045	1,59,81,623	2,66,07,668 or, say, 2,66,07,000

STATEMENT VI.

41.—Civil Works.

Civil Works under consideration.

Major heads.	Non-recurring.	Recurring.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
(1) Excise	37,000	....	37,000
(2) Registration	46,75,000	....	46,75,000
(3) Irrigation	4,72,26,000	....	4,72,26,000
(4) General Administration ..	91,085	....	91,085
(5) Administration of Justice ..	15,00,000	....	15,00,000
(6) Jails	60,49,200	....	60,49,200
(7) Police	43,81,031	....	43,81,031
(8) Education	34,86,869	....	34,86,869
(9) Medical	31,89,125	....	31,89,125
(10) Agriculture	12,28,190	....	12,28,190
(11) Industries	2,19,700	....	2,19,700
(12) Civil Works		....	4,86,321
(13) Civil Works	4,86,321	4,800	4,800
Total ..	7,25,69,521	4,800	7,25,74,321 or, say, 7,25,74,000

APPENDIX II.

Retention of Communal Electorates.

(*Vide* paragraph 4 on page 206.)

The Government of Bengal fully recognise the disadvantages of communal electorates, and the force of the argument that they do not form a satisfactory basis for the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India. But with one dissentient they consider that under existing conditions in Bengal communal electorates must be retained. It is possible that in time experience will convince the Muhammadans in Bengal that they can secure adequate representation by common electorates; but at present the feeling among Muhammadans in favour of separate electorates is undoubtedly very strong. The experience of the last few years has shown that the present system is workable; there is no strong demand for changing it, and there is no imperative reason why it should be changed.

2. The views of the Hon'ble Nawab Bahadur Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., of Dhanbari, Member of the Executive Council, are contained in the note below:—

"No comment on the working of the Reformed Constitution can be complete without a reference to the absolute necessity and the undoubted justification of the system of the separate representation of Muhammadans through separate electorates. I would not have thought it necessary to make any reference to this question had it not been for the fact that the terms of reference to the Royal Commission include a consideration of this important feature in the system of election of members to the various legislatures and that doubts have been expressed as to the utility or necessity of such a system, with opinions varying from total abolition of the system to its maintenance subject to various modifications. To my mind there should be a clear expression of opinion on the part of the Government strongly supporting the system of separate representation of Muslims through communal electorates in the Legislative Council, proportionate to the strength of Muslim population in the Presidency.

"To begin with, a system of representation of any community in legislatures is not unknown in other countries enjoying a representative form of government. In defending this system, which was a feature of the Minto-Morley reforms, Lord Morley referred to the existence of separate electorates in Cyprus, Bohemia and elsewhere, but even if such a method of representation had been without a precedent, the political conditions prevailing in India amply justify a provision of such a character in any scheme which contemplates the transference of power to the people. However repugnant a system of communal

representation may be to British ideas, it is an absolute necessity in a country like India. If it is once admitted, as in my opinion it must be, that voters at elections are swayed by communal bias the necessity of safeguarding the interests of minorities becomes fundamental. It is sometimes argued that the Muslims are not in a minority in Bengal and hence do not need any protection. This argument against separate electorates ignores the fact that the Muslim majority in Bengal is a very narrow one and that the influence of the so-called Hindu minority is so potent and predominant that the majority of Muslim voters can hardly exercise any freedom of vote at elections. Moreover, although the Hindu population may be slightly in the minority, their voting power is very much in excess of their strength in population. In practice, therefore, the Muslims who can really be counted upon to represent truly Muslim interests are in a minority in the matter of voting and would easily be out-voted by the Hindus in a system of voting without proper safeguards. The recent successes of Muslims in the elections to the local and district boards in Eastern Bengal convey a misleading idea of the real situation. In the first place, in those places where the Muslims were so successful the Muslim population was so greatly predominant that the electoral rolls were predominantly composed of Muslim voters and the Hindus were unable to make any appreciable impression on the strength of the Muslim position. Secondly, these elections took place so soon after the communal disturbances of the last two years that the Muslim voters were naturally swayed by an anti-Hindu feeling of an intense character which rose above any adverse pressure that might have been brought to bear upon them. It is difficult to say how far these Muslim successes would be repeated when the memories of these communal disturbances will disappear with the lapse of time. On the other hand, the history of elections in Bengal has uniformly recorded the fact that wherever the Muslims are in a minority in the population they have been ousted wholesale by the Hindus at the polls. The records of elections in municipalities, where the Muslims are in a minority all over Bengal, except in Dacca, amply bear out the truth of these remarks and reveal the dangers to which Muslims are exposed in a system of election without any safeguard to their interests. Even in Dacca, the last municipal election resulted in the return of a majority of Hindu commissioners. One glaring instance of communalism was exhibited during the last Legislative Council elections which deserves more than a passing notice. Two candidates, one a Hindu and the other a Muslim, contested the seat representing the Dacca University on the Council. The Muslim candidate was a brilliant graduate of Oxford and, both as a scholar and in the matter of experience in politics and university affairs, he was head and shoulders above his Hindu rival. The electors were mostly graduates and all of them men who could be expected to rise superior to communal considerations; and yet the

number of Hindu votes which the Muslim candidate secured was practically nil. If this can happen in the case of voters representing an university, what cannot be the length to which communalism would go in elections where the voters are men with far less education and culture, not to speak of a sense of responsibility?

" One more argument in favour of separate electorates for the two communities ought not to be overlooked. The present Reforms are admittedly of a transitory character, principally meant to train the people not merely to understand the value and utility of a vote, but also to help them to acquire a sense of responsibility in the discharge of public duties by experience derived through the exercise of the powers entrusted to them. It is essential that all possible steps should be taken to prevent a friction between the two communities till both of them acquire the necessary civic spirit to enable them to work in harmony with one another and to rise superior to communal considerations. These were undoubtedly the considerations which weighed with the Indian National Congress when all the recognised political leaders of India belonging to the various communities accepted the principle of communal representation in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Even the authors of the present Reforms accepted this Pact between the two communities as affording a suitable training ground for the political evolution of the two communities under peaceful conditions. The recent events have conclusively shown that there has been no change in the political conditions, which would justify a departure at this stage of a principle which has been well recognised as a necessary feature of political advancement in India.

" I would strongly repudiate the suggestion from some quarters that communal electorates are responsible for the recent unfortunate tension of feeling between the two communities; on the contrary I am inclined to believe that had it not been for the separate representation of the two communities in the Council, the points of friction would have been far greater.

" I now come to the proposal of earmarking a certain number of seats for the Muslims in a system of joint electorates. To my mind such a system will not only not afford any safeguards but will be positively harmful by embittering the feelings of the two communities. It is evident that the Hindus will naturally seek to thrust upon the Muslims their own nominees who, though belonging to the Muslim community, will be mere tools in their hands and who could never be trusted to represent real Muslim opinion. The Muslims will not be in a position to retaliate, in view of their inexperience and inability to properly organise themselves, and the success of the Hindu manœuvres will rankle in their hearts and give rise to natural resentment. Very few representative Muslims subscribe to this view of joint electorates with reservation of seats, and it is significant that even

Mr. Jinnah, who has now come forward as the chief exponent of this view, actually supported a resolution moved by Sir Ali Imam at the annual meeting of the Muslim League held at Aligarh in December 1925, urging the continuance, in any scheme of Reforms, of the system of communal electorates.

" The next question that arises is as to the amount of representation which the Muslims should be allowed to have in the Bengal Legislative Council. The Muslim opinion is now unanimous that the representation of Muslims should be proportionate in strength to their numbers in the population. The inadequate representation advocated in the Lucknow Pact, viz., 40 per cent. of the total number of elected Indians, has been repudiated by all the Muslim leaders who had been parties to the Pact. I deem it my duty to emphasise a demand which has behind it the unanimous support of the entire community."

3. The views of the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, KT., C.I.E., Member of the Executive Council, are given in the following note:—

" The question of communal electorates was taken up in our Government at a time when I was the only Hindu member of Government, and I regret to observe that in the wider interests of the future of my country I have to differ from my colleagues.

" The Government note to which this is annexed starts with the admission that ' the Government of Bengal fully recognise the disadvantages of communal electorates and the force of the argument that they do not form a satisfactory basis for the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India.' The majority of Government members, however, have recommended communal electorates for Muhammadans. I venture to suggest that no valid and cogent reasons have been put forward for accepting communal electorates for the Muhammadans. At the outset it is stated that under ' existing conditions ' communal electorate for the Muhammadans must be retained, but it is nowhere stated what are the ' existing conditions ' that demand communal representation. It is possible that the memorandum of the majority of the members of Government, when they referred to ' existing conditions,' had in view the conditions referred to in paragraph 118 (page 104), Part I of the Report. If so, I would respectfully point out that the materials and incidents referred to in that paragraph were more or less of recent occurrence. I have pointed out elsewhere that before the introduction of communal electorates with a wide franchise as a result of the reforms, breaches of the peace between Hindus and Muhammadans due to communal tension were practically unknown, at any rate, in rural Bengal. In my opinion the introduction of these communal electorates with a wide

franchise, is an important contributory cause of these breaches of peace. Leaders of the communities with political ambitions stressed the communal rather than the national point of view in their speeches, writings and programmes. Some of these leaders with political ambitions also in many cases utilised the services of religious preachers—and these preachers were often half-educated and fanatical. When these communal teachings and preachings reached the masses through these fanatical sources, the passions, prejudices and bigotry of the masses were roused, and the masses in various localities had recourse to the only thing they understood, viz., physical force, and this resulted in rioting and breaches of the peace and the consequent dislocation of the peaceful and normal activities of society. I am free to concede that these communal leaders with political ambitions perhaps in most cases did not intend or even contemplate such results, but once the passions and brutal instincts of the uneducated masses were roused the so-called leaders were powerless to check their supposed followers. The vicious circle was completed when the uneducated masses and the half-educated classes of each community brought pressure on the leaders of the respective communities to set right the wrongs which they suffered from the other community and some of the educated leaders succumbed to that pressure. To my mind, therefore, from the " existing conditions " if by that the incidents referred to in paragraph 118, in Part I, be intended, an opposite conclusion should be drawn. These post-reform communal riots cannot reasonably be put forward as a justification for the retention of communal electorates. To do so would be begging the very question we are asked to answer. The true line to adopt would be to take steps which can remove the incentive for raising the passions and prejudices of the masses on communal lines. The next reason put forward is that the experience of the last few years has shown that the present system is workable and lastly it is stated that there is no strong demand for changing it, and there is no imperative reason why it should be changed. These reasons to my mind, I say this with the utmost respect, would hardly bear close examination. In the first place, I would point out that although these have been put forward as reasons they are really more in the nature of mere assertions than reasons. No facts have been put forward to justify the assertion that the experience of the last few years has shown that the present system is workable. In what way has experience shown it to be workable? If it be meant that experience shows that the system has worked well, that remains to be proved. I think it must be admitted by all who have not prejudged the question that the system of communal electorates is directly antagonistic to the evolution of a party system, and it must be conceded that parties with definite programme and principles are essential for the success of the great experiment on which the British Parliament has started us.

The existence of communal electorates has very often encouraged the programme and policy of setting up community against community. It is very natural that this should be so. It has definitely handicapped public men and administrators of both communities whose aim was to act justly and fairly to all. Such action was often disliked by important sections of both communities as these critics thought that their ambition to advance in public life depended on their success in these artificially divided communal electorates.

"From my experience of the Legislative Council I cannot say that I agree with the assumption of the majority that the system has worked well; for, apart from being responsible for other defects, communal electorates rendered the evolving of a party system extremely difficult. On many occasions it tended to create opposing and bitter communal camps amongst the members of the Legislative Council. It rendered the settlement of communal and even other questions in a spirit of give-and-take well-nigh impossible. Members of the Legislative Council naturally desire re-election and appeal to communal feeling is a good passport towards winning the support of voters artificially divided on communal lines. In rural areas in Bengal rioting and bloodshed over communal matters were unknown until recent days. In order to make success in election easy, artificially nurtured communal questions were raised which when they permeated into the ignorant masses resulted in breaches of the peace. In days when communal electorates were unknown, the good faith of an Indian officer (whether Hindu or Muhammadan) was never questioned by any section of the public on the ground of his community, but as a result of communal electorates we come across the sad spectacle of one Indian community evincing feelings of suspicion towards Indian officers because they belong to another community. I refrain from entering into an examination of the problem in any greater detail, but I would conclude this paragraph by reiterating my opinion that the system has not worked well.

"I also join issue with the assertion that there is no strong demand for changing it. So far as the Hindu community is concerned, every important section is against communal representation. The Indian National Congress, which represents a very important section of the people, has suggested the abolition of communal representation. The Liberals, who also represent important though not numerically large elements, are also against it. The British Indian Association, which represents an important class in Bengal, is also for its abolition. Unlike the position in 1918, practically all Hindu interests are against communal representation.

"The Muhammadan opinion is also divided, though I am willing to proceed on the assumption that an important section of the Muhammadans in Bengal are likely to demand communal representation. I

have, however, a shrewd suspicion that many Muhammadans urge communal representation, because they apprehend that, unless they do so, they will have a poor chance in the public life of the province in case communal electorates be recommended by the Statutory Commission. In the recent discussion that we had in the Bengal Legislative Council on a resolution moved by Sir Abdur Rahim on the 30th July 1928, the question of communal representation came up directly for the consideration of the Council on an amendment moved by Mr. A. K. Fazlul Huq. Mr. Huq desired that to clause (*f*) of Sir Abdur Rahim's resolution the following be added, namely, ' by means of a system of separate communal electorate.' There was an interesting, though a somewhat angry debate on this amendment and as a result of the voting the amendment of Mr. Huq was defeated, thirty voting for it and fifty voting against it. It may be noted that some of the Muhammadan members spoke and voted against the amendment of Mr. Huq. The majority of the members of Government are, therefore, not correct in saying that there is no strong demand for changing communal electorates. The Legislative Council demands abolition, so does the Hindu community backed up by a section of the Muhammadan community.

" The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report accepted communal representation for Muhammadans with a good deal of hesitation. I desire to examine the question of communal representation from some of its broader aspects. I would mention at the outset that all persons who had to deal with the question of communal electorate, are agreed that on general grounds the system was unsupportable. If some agreed to support it, they simply did so under what they considered to be special and peculiar circumstances existing in India at the particular time when they gave their support. Most supporters of communal representation expressed the pious hope that a time would come when the Muhammadans themselves might not press for it. The question was examined with some care by the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in paragraphs 227-231 of that Report. They state that the system was opposed to the teaching of history, that it would perpetuate division by creeds and classes, would mean the creation of political camps organised against each other, and teach men to think as partisans and not as citizens. They further observed that it would retard the growth of the citizen spirit which was so essential to lead India on to the goal of self-government and that once it was introduced it was difficult to see how the change from this system to national representation could ever occur. Further it would encourage the Muhammadan community to settle down into a feeling of satisfied security, and would militate against its effort to educate and qualify itself to make good in its struggle for advance. Its existence would also militate against the growth of a spirit of give-

and-take which was so desirable for the advance of political life. After saying all this against the acceptance of communal electorates they ultimately accepted communal electorates and put forward the following reasons for doing so:—

(1) the Muhammadans were given communal electorate in 1909 and communal electorate was, therefore, an existing fact;

(2) the Hindus acquiesced in communal electorates;

(3) the two great national institutions, namely, the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League, had come to an agreed decision accepting communal electorate; and

(4) as communal electorates were in existence, any attempt to go back upon them would rouse bitter opposition from that community.

I will take up these points one by one. I may at once observe that points (2) and (3) no longer operate to-day. The Hindus do not any longer acquiesce in communal electorates for Muhammadans, nor is there at the present moment any general agreement between the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League accepting communal electorates for the Muhammadans.

" As regards the 4th point, I would point out that many prominent and public-spirited Muhammadan leaders like the Maharaja of Mamudabad, Sir Ali Imam, Dr. Ansari, Mr. Jinnah and others are no longer in favour of communal representation. If its abolition would lead to bitterness—an unreasonable bitterness—amongst a section of the Muhammadan community, its retention would lead to bitterness amongst the whole Hindu community. Some prominent Muhammadan public men like Sir Ali Imam and others who, in 1906, were in favour of communal representation, have openly changed their views. Communal representation has been in existence for nearly 20 years and by the time the new constitution comes into operation, it will be in existence for more than 20 years. If it was supported, it was supported only as a passing phase of our national life. If it be allowed to continue for more than 20 years and be continued for another 10 years, it will make the change even more difficult at the end of 30 years. It has already taught the two great communities to think as partisans and not as citizens. Its continuance will soon turn the two communities into armed camps. Even the strongest protagonists of communal electorates are agreed that " it is essential that all possible steps should be taken to prevent friction between the two communities *till both of them acquire the necessary civic spirit to enable them to work in harmony with one another and to rise superior to communal consideration.*" Such protagonists express the pious hope that the time will come when the necessary civic spirit will be forthcoming to do away with the communal representation. If 20 years

did not produce this much-desired consummation, will 30 years do it? I doubt it. On the other hand if it is retained it will make each community more suspicious of the other and far from engendering the necessary civic spirit, it will teach the communities to think more as communal partisans and act as such. The apprehension of rousing bitter opposition, therefore, should not, in fairness to the other communities, a section of the Muhammadan community who no longer support the system, and to the wider interests of India and the Empire, stand in the way. I may repeat that perhaps the opposition will not be as bitter as some would like to make out. Many Muhammadan supporters of communal representation are doing so because they apprehend that if the Statutory Commission recommend the retention of communal representation they will have poor chance of retaining their position in public life if they speak against it at the present time.

" Lastly, I maintain that our experience of the working of communal electorates under the present constitution proves that the position is quite different from that under the Morley-Minto scheme. Our experience of the working of the present constitution would justify abolition of communal electorates. Under the Morley-Minto scheme there were about 6,000 Muhammadan voters and perhaps not more than 2,000 non-Muhammadan voters (the election of the non-Muhammadan constituencies being mainly through electoral colleges). Under the present constitution we had, in 1926, 623,217 non-Muhammadan voters and 529,995 Muhammadan voters (total 1,153,212 voters). Under the Morley-Minto constitution there was very little risk of communal questions permeating into the masses. The voters were very limited in number and were much superior to the majority of the present voters in education and intelligence. The defects of the present system of communal electorates were, therefore, far less pronounced under the system obtaining under the Morley-Minto scheme. Under the present constitution we have a fairly large number of voters artificially divided into communal camps. Unfortunately prospective and successful candidates for election have often tried to educate their voters to think and act on communal lines. This was thought to be an easy line for ensuring success in elections. Some of them have even gone to the length of preaching bitterness towards the other community. In Bengal this programme has been more marked from January 1926. It is significant (*see* paragraph 118 of Part I of the Report) that breaches of peace and communal tension were highest between January 1926 and the time of the general election towards the end of that year, and that after the general election was over the situation improved to some extent. The tension created by the propaganda of communal bitterness in the press and on the platform, however, left its mark on the communal position in Bengal to-day. The communal cleavage in Bengal has become worse after January 1926 than it ever was

before. Another noteworthy fact that should be taken into consideration in this connection is that the 1926 election was the first election fought in Bengal in which the programme and propaganda of communal bitterness loomed large. The election of 1923 was fought on other issues. The chief plank in the election of 1923 was hatred of the British and Government on the one side and co-operation with the British and the Government on the other. The result was disastrous to the party of co-operation. I will not enter here into the causes which led to this disastrous result for the party of co-operation, but I will point out what is relevant for a consideration of the question of communal electorates. In the election of 1923 an important section of the Hindus combined with an influential section of Muhammadans—the Khilafat party—on the common platform of hatred towards the British. The communal issue in the election of 1920 did not play a very important part, partly because its implications were not fully realised so soon after the abolition of the limited electorates of the Morley-Minto scheme. A section of the Muhammadans who were not Khilafatists, raised the communal issue even in the election of 1923, but in the absence of any powerful leader and with the Khilafat question looming large this issue was not as important an issue in 1923 as in the election of 1926. My conclusion, therefore, is that experience shows that communal electorates on the basis of broad franchise has a disturbing effect on the mind of the masses and has a tendency towards encouraging breaches of the peace.

"As to the first point the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report do not go into the reasons which prompted Lord Minto, with the concurrence of Lord Morley, to accept communal representation in 1909. At any rate the ground of 'political importance' that was urged by some Moslem leaders in 1906 before Lord Minto, does not find any place in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. Nor does that ground find a place in the Government memorandum. The reasons put forward by the majority of our Government, as I have already pointed out, are more or less colourless. The general trend of the reasoning for communal electorates is not political importance but political weakness in spite of the existence of a majority in the population. In the absence, therefore, of the reasons which existed in 1909, and in view of the different conditions which obtain to-day, I do not think the first reason requires a more detailed examination.

"Assuming that Muhammadan communal representation be allowed to stand, what percentage of the Indian-elected seats should be allotted to the Muhammadan community? In the course of the discussion of this question I propose to touch on some of the points that arise in this connection.

"It is contended that if communal representation be allowed the percentage of Muhammadan seats that should be reserved for the

Muhammadans in the Bengal Legislative Council should be on the basis of the population, or in other words it should be 54 per cent. instead of 40 per cent., as at present. For the reasons noted below my submission is that in justice and fairness to all communities the number of seats which should be allowed to the Muhammadan community, if communal representation be allowed to that community, should be much less than 40 per cent. and should not certainly be on the basis of population. The 40 per cent. standard was based on a pact arrived at between the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League in their joint session at Lucknow popularly known as the Lucknow Pact. There is no such pact in existence to-day. The Indian National Congress is no longer in favour of communal representation. All important sections of the politically-minded Hindus are no longer in favour of communal representation. Muhammadan opinion about communal representation is also divided. The 40 per cent. which was arrived at was the result of negotiations and compromise in which allotment of seats in other provinces played an important part. It has no other foundation than the foundation of the pact itself. As that pact has ceased to be in operation the basis of allotment of 40 per cent. has also ceased to exist. The number of seats that should be allowed to the Muhammadan community in the Bengal Legislative Council should, in my opinion, be decided amongst others on the following important factors:—

(1) The voting strength of the respective communities.

(2) Interest in public affairs of the two communities.

(3) Educational advance.

(4) Payment of taxes by the two communities.

"If the percentage be arrived at by a *quasi*-judicial body like the Statutory Commission on a just consideration of these points, neither community should have any reasonable ground for complaint. It would appear from the figures given in Statement VII of the Report on the General Election of 1926 in Bengal (page 47) that the number of non-Muhammadan voters was 623,217 and of Muhammadan voters 529,995. The percentage of Hindu voters is, therefore, about 54 and of Muhammadan voters about 46. But the voting strength should not be the sole factor. It should be checked amongst others by the three points mentioned above.

"I will next take up the question of interest in public affairs of the two communities. In the sphere of public charities, Muhammadans, in spite of their numerical strength, are much in the background. On an examination of the list of the endowments in the hands of the University of Calcutta for scholarships and prizes on the results of University examinations, it appears that out of 155 endowments up to 1927 only one has been created by a Moslem. From a list of landed

properties vested in the Treasurer of Charitable Endowments, it appears that only one is by a Muhammadan and 19 by Hindus. Out of 89 endowments consisting of securities, 1 is by a Muhammadan and 77 by Hindus, the respective values being Rs. 13,000 and Rs. 25,00,000. A notable feature of the charities is that those created by Muhammadans are communal in character whereas almost all those created by non-Moslems are non-communal.

"Judged by the test of public and social service it will have to be admitted that Muhammadans are very backward. In flood relief, famine relief and on other occasions of social service, even in areas predominantly Muhammadan, it is the Hindus and not the Muhammadans who are found to be active and conspicuous.

"In movements affecting public health, education and social service the Hindus are in the vanguard. Most of their movements are run on non-communal lines. The few Muhammadan movements affecting some of these problems that exist, are mostly run on communal lines.

"There are four Indian-edited and Indian-owned daily newspapers that are published in English in Calcutta. The proprietors and editors of all these are Hindus. The Muhammadans have no English-edited daily. Of the vernacular dailies and weeklies a very large percentage is edited and owned by the Hindus. A comparatively small percentage is edited and owned by the Muhammadans.

"Judged by the test of education it would appear that the non-Muhammadans are far ahead of the Muhammadans as statistics prove conclusively. From the census figures of 1921 for Bengal, it appears that out of the total male literates in English amounting to 734,000 no less than 574,000 are Hindus and only 128,000 are Muhammadans. Out of the total male literates amounting to 39 lakhs there are 26 lakhs Hindus and 12 lakhs Muhammadans. In Bengal 158 out of 1,000 Hindus and 59 out of 1,000 Muhammadans are literates. From the Report of the Director of Public Instruction of Bengal for 1924-25, it appears that out of 30,653 pupils reading in colleges 26,100 or 85·2 per cent. are Hindus and 3,926 or 12·8 per cent. are Muhammadans. On a calculation based on the census figures for 1921 for Bengal out of 1,580,415 male Hindus of school-going age 876,410 or 55·43 per cent. attend schools; out of a total of 1,943,670 male Moslems of school-going age 755,400 or 38·86 per cent. attend schools. Out of 900 odd schools in Bengal it appears that only 57 have been established and maintained by Muhammadans. It appears from page 52 of Part I of the Report that according to the census of 1921 only 9·4 per cent. of the Muhammadan males and ·4 per cent. of the Muhammadan females are literate, while the corresponding numbers for the Hindus are 27 and 3·2. From page 50 of the same Report it will appear that there is a relative decline

in the number of the Moslem pupils in the high and middle stages of instruction of the general schools. It would appear from the Appendix to Chapter II of the said Report, page 61, that the public of Bengal, as compared with the Government, spend large sums of money for the education of their children. If the figures of these contributions are investigated it can be shown that in spite of the numerical superiority of Muhammadans a very large percentage of these contributions comes from the Hindus. The National Council of Education has a well-equipped technical school at Jadavpur, 24-Parganas. It will appear from page 60 of the same Report that that institution has an income of about 3 lakhs and receives no aid from Government. The money that was necessary to produce the income of 3 lakhs came from the Hindus.

"There are four very important endowments of the Calcutta University. One was founded by Sir Taraknath Palit. Another was founded by Sir Rash Behari Ghose. The third was founded by Raichand Premchand of Bombay and the fourth by Prosonno Kumar Tagore. All these endowments run into several lakhs of rupees and each was founded by a Hindu. The following table quoted from page 15 of the Report on the General Election of 1926 in Bengal regarding illiteracy amongst rural voters in Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies is interesting:—

Percentage of illiteracy.

	Bengal Legislative Council.		Legislative Assembly.	
	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.
1st enquiry ..	41	55	....	....
2nd enquiry ..	41·2	61·7	....	....
3rd enquiry ..	33·4	52·7	8·5	25·5

"I shall next take up the question of payment of taxes by the two communities. It is true that Government publications do not set out figures showing the quota contributed by the different communities to the provincial revenue, but on a rough calculation made on the basis of well-known facts it would appear that less than 20 per cent. of taxes in Bengal is paid by Moslems. According to the Civil Budget estimate for the Government of Bengal for 1927-28, the sum

of 10 crores 73 lakhs odd is the gross income of the province. Out of this the sum of 9 crores 91 lakhs odd is derived from the principal heads, *e.g.*, Land Revenue, Excise, Stamp, Forest, Registration and Scheduled Taxes. The balance of 82 lakhs represents the credit side of administrative income, namely, income from Jails, Police, educational fees, etc. Excise accounts for Rs. 2,30,75,000 and land revenue accounts for Rs. 3,14,62,000. The Muhammadans whose religion forbids partaking of intoxicating substances do not contribute towards excise revenue. Practically the whole of the excise revenue amounting to over 2¼ crores is paid by the Hindus. In land revenue the direct payment to the Government exchequer is made mostly by Hindus. The Muhammadans no doubt as tenants pay rents to their Hindu zamindars, but if the land revenue be not paid punctually by the sunset of the date fixed for the payment of four instalments as prescribed on a statutory basis the property is sold. It is, however, in land revenue that the Muhammadans make some contribution indirectly as tenants. The Muhammadans, however, predominate in East Bengal and the Hindus predominate in West Bengal. The land revenue as also the rate of rent in West Bengal is higher than in East Bengal. For example, the highest land revenue is paid for the Burdwan Division and the lowest in Chittagong Division, the land revenue of the former being Rs. 77,51,960 and of the latter Rs. 19,11,518. The Hindu population of the Burdwan Division is about 85 per cent. and the Muhammadan population is about 13 per cent. In the Chittagong Division the Hindu population is about 23 per cent. and the Muhammadan population is about 72 per cent. An overwhelmingly large percentage of the zamindars are Hindus.

"The sum of 2 crores 21 lakhs is raised on Judicial stamps. It would appear from Government figures that about 54 per cent. of the litigation in Bengal consist of rent suits and about 37 per cent. money suits. From our general knowledge of litigation in these suits one can safely assert that an overwhelmingly large amount of the court-fees is paid by the non-Moslems. The sum of Rs. 1 crore 26 lakhs is raised on non-Judicial stamps. Well-known facts justify me in stating that an overwhelmingly large percentage of this income is also paid by the non-Moslems. On a careful consideration of well-known and broad facts it appears that the non-Muhammadans contribute practically the whole of the income derived by Government from Excise and a very large percentage of the income derived from other sources is also paid by the non-Muhammadans. The estimate of 20 per cent. referred to above is, I venture to think, an over-estimate in favour of the Muhammadans. Whether my estimate is controverted or not I suggest an enquiry either through a committee or an official selected by the Statutory Commission to ascertain what amount of taxes is paid by each of the two communities. It ought not to be difficult to find out

the respective contribution of taxes paid by the two communities with reasonable approximation. The significance of these facts is obvious, when it is remembered that Muhammadans form about 54 per cent. of the total population of Bengal and that it is proposed to secure representation to them on the population basis. Having regard to the separatist tendencies of some of the present-day Muhammadan leaders, specially in Bengal, it would be unfair, unjust and inexpedient to entrust to this community the spending of revenues raised by taxation mostly from other communities.

" If the percentage of communal seats be fixed by calculation merely of the voting and the rating strength of the two communities then on figures quoted above not more than 33 per cent. of the seats can be allotted to the Muhammadan community, but if the test of interest in public affairs, educational advance and other factors be taken into consideration then the percentage should be even lower. Considering the question from every point of view, I do not think the Muhammadan community can complain of any unfairness if the percentage for special electorates of their community (in case such electorates be retained) be fixed at 30 per cent.

" I venture to think the contention that the percentage of seats should be on the basis of population cannot be justified. A majority community has no right to special treatment. In paragraph 231 of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report it is stated that there was no justification to set up communal representation for Muhammadans in any province where they form the majority of the voters. I doubt therefore that but for the Lucknow Pact communal representation would have been granted to Muhammadans in Bengal. The recent experiences in District Board elections show that the Muhammadans are in no need for communal representation. It is immaterial even if some of these elections took place soon after communal disturbances. Whenever these elections may take place, now that the Muhammadan community is more self-conscious, the Hindus have little chance in those districts where the Muhammadans are in a majority.

" The best solution in my opinion would be to provide joint electorates for the Muhammadans and the Hindus reserving a certain number of seats for each community. This system will make it necessary for the Hindu candidates to approach not only the voters of his own community but also the voters of the Muhammadan community. Similarly the Muhammadan candidates will have to approach the voters of both communities. The present incentive for raising communal issues and creating communal cleavage will disappear. The present system tends to the creation of communal political camps organised against each other. The system that I suggest will encourage a spirit of give-and-take between the two communities and will promote toleration between

them. This will meet the argument of those Muhammadans who apprehend that in areas where the Hindus predominate the Muhammadan has no chance. Similarly this will meet the apprehension of the Hindus in East Bengal that they will have no chance of election as the Muhammadans will vote on communal lines. I agree with the view that at the present moment voters at elections are swayed by communal bias. I may in this connection refer to the speech of Maulvi Abdul Karim reported at pages 91 to 94 of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council (31st July to the 11th August 1928). At page 94 he refers to an incident where an influential Hindu zamindar and a Mussalman of moderate means stood for election. Most of the electors were the Muhammadan tenants of the Hindu zamindar who was practically sure to be returned and his rival also saw he had no chance. But the rival procured the services of a Maulvi who was held in esteem by the Mussalmans of the locality. This Maulvi addressed the voters and told them that if they voted for the Muhammadans then on the Day of Judgment they would rise with the Muhammadans, but if they voted for the *kafir* (Hindu) then on the Day of Judgment they would rise with the *kafirs*. The speaker went on to observe: "If the Hindu zamindar got five votes his Mussalman rival got fifty times five and all these were votes of the tenants of his rival." This unfortunately is a true picture but if joint electorates with reservation of seats be provided, then as the Muhammadan and the Hindu will have to vote for one or more Muhammadan and one or more Hindu candidate, not only will the incentive to rouse communal feeling disappear but there should be no apprehension that no Muhammadan or Hindu will be returned because of communal bias. I refrain from setting out particulars as to the number of seats that should be reserved for either community if my suggestion of joint electorates with reservation of seats be accepted. Of course the reservation of Muhammadan seats in East Bengal will be larger and those of Hindus in West Bengal will be larger. It has been argued that if this system be adopted then the Hindus will seek to thrust upon the Muhammadans their own nominees. To my mind this apprehension is baseless. It will be equally true to say that the Muhammadans will be able to thrust upon the Hindus those who will be the nominees of the Muhammadans. In point of fact in many districts in East Bengal where Muhammadans predominate they will have an effective voice in returning candidates. In West Bengal where Hindus predominate naturally they will have also an effective voice in returning candidates. That the Muhammadans at least in rural areas are not powerless to return their own nominees must be admitted and the result of the various District Board elections show that where the Muhammadans predominate they can sweep the polls. The system of reservation of seats will be a good compromise between communal electorate and a free election. If this system be accepted then in

course of time it will be possible to do away with communal elections and national representation will be possible. On the other hand if communal representation be retained then the longer it is retained the more difficult it will be to have a free election on the basis of national representation.

"In my opinion the special communal electorates have done the greatest possible injury to the Muhammadan community, inasmuch as it has encouraged that "community to settle down into a feeling of satisfied security." In the words of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report that community is "under no inducement to educate and qualify itself to make good the ground which it has lost compared with the stronger majority." I am as keen as anyone, not excepting the members of the Muhammadan community, that it is imperative that the Muhammadan position should be improved as rapidly as possible in education, wealth and public spirit. I hold the view that if more than half the population lags behind in education, wealth and public spirit the province must lag behind. The people of Bengal can never hope to advance if 54 per cent. of Bengalis do not make adequate advance in education, wealth and public spirit. From that point of view I am all in favour of providing true foundations of self-help for the Muhammadan community. I suggest that the true interest of the Muhammadan community will be far better served if a sufficient sum, say, 10 lakhs of rupees be earmarked annually on a statutory basis for scholarships to Muhammadans than a system of communal electorates. Communal electorates if perpetuated will dwarf the Muhammadan community. If special educational facilities be provided for them it will encourage self-help and exertion amongst them and without self-help and exertion no community or nation can hope to advance. The bulk of the Muhammadans in Bengal are of the same race with the Hindus of the province. There is no intrinsic difference in capacity or merit between the two communities; and if the necessary educational impetus be provided by a statutory grant for scholarships the Muhammadans will very soon be able to stand shoulder to shoulder with their present competitors. But if money be provided on a statutory basis for scholarships to Muhammadans it is only fair that money should also be provided on a similar basis for the backward classes. That class also requires help. They are poor and illiteracy amongst them is much larger. If we hope to attain a democratic system of Government at some future time we must look in advance and take steps to educate and to improve the educational and economic condition of the poorer sections of our people."

4. The views of the Hon'ble Raja Bhupendra Narayan Sinha Bahadur, of Nashipur, Minister, are embodied in the following note:—

"As I was not in office when the decision was made to recommend the retention of communal electorates, I wish to record the following

observations. I maintain that the existing system of communal representation has encouraged and accentuated communal jealousies and has been responsible for a good deal of mischief all round. I feel that until the system is abolished it will be impossible for the people to think except in terms of their communal interests and to make the force of their opinions felt in the Government. I am convinced that the abolition of the system would tend to create a greater solidarity and sense of identity of interests in the people. I would, therefore, suggest the abolition of communal representation and would safeguard the interests of Muhammadans and minority communities by the reservation of minimum number of seats."

APPENDIX III.

Composition of the Legislature.

(*Vide* paragraphs 10 and 26 on pages 209 and 217.)

(*a*) **The Lower House.**—It is proposed to increase the strength of the Lower Chamber to 200 to be made up as follows in the opinion of the majority:—

General constituencies	...	140
Special constituencies	...	35
Nominated	...	25
Total	...	200

A minority would increase the representation of the special constituencies at the expense of the general.

The Government of Bengal (with two dissentients) are of opinion that communal electorates should be retained for Muhammadans, non-Muhammadans, Europeans and Anglo-Indians and (with one dissentient) that urban and rural areas should be separated for electoral purposes. They are agreed that constituencies of the same class should as far as possible be uniform in size and that urban electoral units may be smaller than rural electoral units. It is proposed to increase the rural representation as compared with urban and to frame single-membered constituencies as far as possible.

The Government of Bengal propose that the special electorates for the Universities and Commerce and Industry should be retained. As regards the electorates for landholders the original justification for these was that the landholders required special representation

because they would be unable to secure adequate representation on a numerical territorial basis of population satisfying a moderate qualifying test, and because many of them would think it derogatory to seek the suffrages of their own tenants and they might be defeated in the general constituencies by candidates resorting to more popular methods of appeal than they would care to use. But though there are only 5 landholders' constituencies there are in the present Council actually 18 Hindu and 12 Muhammadan elected members whose names are on the rolls of the landholders' constituencies—elected from both general and special constituencies. Although several landholders have thus entered the Council through the general constituencies it is proposed that steps should be taken to secure the representation of the landholding interests by special electorates on the ground that members elected from general constituencies may not be free to press the interests of the landholding classes, when these differ from those of their constituents. It is proposed that the elections to the Lower House should be direct and that females should continue to exercise the franchise and should in future be allowed to stand for election. The Hon'ble Nawab Bahadur Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., of Dhanbari, and the Hon'ble Sir Provash Chunder Mitter, KT., C.I.E., are of opinion that females should not be allowed to stand for election.

It is recognised that the number of officials who should be nominated to the Council should be reduced, but in the present state of political education and experience it is recognised that there must be some nominated official members to assist the Ministers in their Council business. It is proposed, however, to confine these nominated official members to the two official Ministers (if there are any) and otherwise mainly to Secretaries to Government and heads of departments and expert members required for any special bill.

The other nominated members are intended to represent Indian Christians, labour and depressed classes, should it not be possible to devise a suitable electorate for all or any of these. Should an electorate be devised, the number of nominated members will be reduced and the number of representatives of special constituencies be correspondingly increased.

Candidates for election need not be residents of the constituency for which they stand and as at present voters in special constituencies should be allowed to stand from general constituencies. The Ministers dissenting, the Government of Bengal are of opinion that candidates should not be permitted to stand for more than one constituency at a time.

The Government of Bengal propose that the life of the House should be four years and that the President of the House should be elected.

(*b*) **The Upper House.**—The necessity of an Upper Chamber has already been explained.

The strength should be 40 per cent. of the Lower Chamber, *i.e.*, 80.

As regards its composition it is proposed that there should be a small number of nominated officials and that the non-official portion should be partly elected and partly nominated. For some constituencies the election to the chamber should be direct and for the remainder electoral colleges will be devised. It is proposed that the franchise should be higher than that for the Lower House, that the age-limit for a voter should be 21 and for a member should be 35 years and that females should be eligible to vote but not to stand as candidates in elections.

The Government of Bengal with two dissentients, are of opinion that there should be separate electorates for Muhammadans, non-Muhammadans, Europeans and Anglo-Indians, but that European and Indian commerce need not be represented in the chamber otherwise than by nomination. Persons representing special interests should be nominated at the discretion of the nominating authority.

As regards the systems of election it is proposed that it should be by ballot in Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies, by post in University constituencies and by proportional representation by means of the transferable vote in European and Anglo-Indian constituencies, in case there are plural member constituencies.

The Government of Bengal are of opinion that the term of office of the Upper House should be five years and that its President should be elected.

APPENDIX IV.

Statutory Council Scheme.

[*Vide* paragraph 20 (*2*) on page 214.]

The suggestion is that a unitary type of Government be established with a cabinet directly responsible to a popular chamber. The Minister or Ministers in charge of subjects for which safeguards are considered essential should be assisted by a statutory committee or Council, of which the Minister would be President.

2. The committee would be composed of two senior officials, appointed by the Governor-General in Council on the recommendation of the cabinet and the Governor, and holding office for a fixed term of five years. In rank and pay their status should be consistent with the importance of their position in the constitution.

3. All departmental files would come up from the Secretary of the department through a member of the committee to the Minister (according to a suitable division of work by executive order) and all instructions from the Minister or cabinet would come down through the committee.

4. First stage of safeguards.—Should the member of the committee concerned be of opinion that any proposal or instruction is mistaken or harmful, he would have the right to request that it be discussed in a meeting of the committee. If a majority agreed with the Minister, who would himself have a vote, the matter would end there.

5. Second stage of safeguards.—If the statutory members could not come to an agreement with the Minister, they would have the right to require that the matter be referred to the cabinet with their views. The cabinet might in its discretion invite the Statutory Councillors to attend a meeting of the cabinet to explain their views and take part in the discussion. But the Councillors would take no part in the final decision. Should the cabinet agree with the Minister or reaffirm its views as the case might be, the view of the cabinet would prevail, unless the third stage of safeguards comes into operation.

6. At this point the second step in the system of safeguards is completed. A full re-examination of doubtful proposals is secured in the light of the views of experienced and responsible officers. It might be considered safe to stop at this point and abide the result. But if this safeguard be not sufficient, the next stage would be as is described below.

7. Third stage of safeguards.—Should the Statutory Councillors consider that the proposal or its probable consequences is inconsistent with the Governor's responsibility under his Instrument of Instructions, they would have the power of requiring a reference to the Governor. Should the Statutory Councillors differ, the view of the cabinet would prevail.

(NOTE.—The Governor's Instrument of Instructions would cover such subjects as the rights of minorities, public security, personal freedom in matters of religion, trade and commerce, the maintenance of financial integrity and solvency, the enforcement of a proper standard of State morality, etc.)

8. On a reference coming before the Governor, he would endeavour to reach an agreement with the cabinet. He would have the right of inviting the Statutory Councillors to attend and take part in such discussions as might take place. Should the Governor be unable to reach an agreement with the cabinet, the cabinet would have to choose between:—

(*a*) acceptance of the Governor's views, and
(*b*) resignation.

9. Should only a minority of the cabinet decide to resign, the remaining Ministers (or the Chief Minister if he remained) would have an opportunity of replacing them.

10. Should the whole cabinet resign, a new cabinet would be formed. Should the new cabinet adopt the views of its predecessor and receive the support of the legislature, the Governor would have the power of dissolving the chamber.

11. Should the matter be one of urgency, the Governor would have power to issue orders directly through the statutory committee to prevent the stoppage or dislocation of the administrative machine.

12. Should the new legislature support the views of its predecessor, the Governor would either yield or the fourth stage in the safeguards would come into operation.

13. At this point the third stage in the safeguards is completed, and a stop might be made here. The position is that the matter in dispute has been fully examined, and the electorates have had an opportunity of expressing their views. It might reasonably be urged that the Governor should accept the views of the new cabinet and the new legislature, and that the consequences should be awaited. On the other hand, if the risk is too great, the last stage of the safeguards would be put into operation.

14. Fourth stage of safeguards.—Should the Governor be of opinion that the matter is of such fundamental importance that he cannot yield without violating his duty under his Instrument of Instructions, he would suspend the legislature, dismiss the cabinet, carry on the administration by means of nominated Councillors, and report the breakdown of the system of administration to the Governor-General in Council. If this stage were actually reached it would be proof that this particular experiment in self-government had failed.

(NOTE.—If an Upper House is created, the nominated Councillors would be chosen therefrom and would operate with it.)

15. General remarks.—In the scheme the position of the cabinet is recognised throughout. It is an integral and central portion of the system and it is fully informed and consulted at all stages.

16. Both the cabinet and the Governor have the benefit of the advice of experienced administrators, whose views, however, at no stage overrule the views of the cabinet. Unless the Governor himself takes action, the Councillors' views cannot prevail.

17. Even the Governor himself cannot carry out his wishes (save in matters of immediate urgency and necessity when delay is impossible) until he has given the electorate an opportunity of expressing its views.

18. If the safeguards stop at the third stage, popular opinion actually prevails. It is only in the fourth stage (if it be embodied in the constitution) that public opinion is definitely ignored.

19. It may be said that the position of a Secretary under the present system corresponds to that of the proposed Statutory Council. He has a right of taking up to the Governor those matters in which he disagrees with a Minister. But there are differences arising from the status of the Statutory Council and the proposed procedure which justify the view that the system cannot be described as the same as that now existing. In all subjects which are not safeguarded, the cabinet and the legislature will be supreme, and their views final. On a law point, a Secretary might require a reference to the Chief Minister unless the latter were himself concerned. No external official control is contemplated in subjects not safeguarded. Again, it is but natural that Ministers should resent a system whereby a Secretary can make representations over their heads to the Governor. Public criticism has often touched on this point. But a Statutory Council would occupy a different position. A large volume of public opinion would agree that it is right and proper that a Minister in charge of important subjects should have the assistance and advice of experienced administrators, who might themselves, in fact, be Indians. Not only so, but many would agree that a power to hold up doubtful proposals and to compel further consideration is not derogatory to the cabinet, but a safeguard which a purely Indian Government might itself retain.

20. There is nothing abnormal or unusual in the scheme. Statutory Councils are not uncommon in other constitutions. Cabinets have been known to resign on disagreement with another authority, *e.g.*, an Upper House, and the power to dissolve a legislature is not infrequently vested in Governors. There is no scope for the exercise of arbitrary authority, save in the last stage when the system of government set up by the constitution has ceased to function normally.

21. It may be taken as an objection that ill-advised action on the part of the cabinet would not necessarily relate to a matter of such importance that on it a constitutional crisis should be forced. This objection applies to all systems in which safeguards are provided. Reliance must be placed on the judgment and discretion of those who are to work the system. It is also possible that by a series of actions, none of which would justify the forcing of a crisis, the tone of the administration might be gradually lowered and a final stage reached which could be described as "bad government"—and this without the Statutory Council ever having had a good case in which to take action. The answer is that a gradual deterioration in the administration would form the subject of enquiry by the next Statutory Commission, if there be such, unless the electorates themselves had dealt with the matter and insisted on better government. But the argument need not be pushed to such lengths. If popular government in India is going to result in bad government, the remedy must await the event and any attempt to provide safeguards against such a contingency is futile at this stage.

22. Briefly, it may be said that the scheme places political power in the hands of the cabinet, and with good will and capacity in the Ministers there is no reason why good government should not be assured by the operation of only the first stage of the safeguards. The cabinet has the benefit of experienced advice before it adopts a mistaken policy or commits itself to the legislature. The Governor likewise has the advantage of this advice. The Statutory Council constitutes a buffer beneath the cabinet which protects the administrative machine and the public from the violent shock and harmful results of ill-considered action. On the other side, the powers of the Governor supply a safety fuse which burns out when the pressure becomes dangerous, and thereby protects the body politic from mischief until the electorate has had time to examine the position and re-constitute the legislature.

APPENDIX V.

General franchise and the basis of representation.

The Government of Bengal have, at pages 248 and 265 of this report expressed the opinion that separate electorates should be retained in Bengal for Muhammadans, non-Muhammadans, Europeans and Anglo-Indians. They also stated their view that urban and rural areas should be separated for electoral purposes, that constituencies of the same class should as far as possible be uniform in size, that urban electoral units might be smaller than rural, and that rural representation should be increased as compared with urban. No opinion, however, was offered on the question of the nature of the franchise in the general Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan constituencies nor on the question whether representation in those constituencies should be on the basis of population or otherwise.

2. **Enquiry into result of lowering franchise.**—It was decided to make enquiries to ascertain the effect, both on the number and the character of the electorates in these general constituencies in rural areas, of lowering the qualifications for the franchise. The line of enquiry was suggested by the fact that there exists in the greater part of rural Bengal a franchise with qualifications similar in kind to, but lower than the qualifications for, the franchise for the Legislative Council. As stated on page 129 of Part I of the Report, two of the qualifications of electors in the rural constituencies of the Legislative Council are the payment of cess of not less than one rupee and the payment of union rate or chaukidari tax of not less than two rupees. The qualifications of electors for the Union Boards are of the same kind, but whilst the payment of the same amount of cess is required, the minimum amount of union rate or chaukidari tax which must be paid is one rupee instead of two rupees. Enquiries, based on the electoral rolls of the Union Boards, have been made to ascertain the probable results of substituting the payment of not less than one rupee of union rate or chaukidari tax for the present Legislative Council qualification based on a payment of not less than two rupees.

3. **The extent of the enquiry.**—For various reasons, Union Boards have not been established in four out of the twenty-seven districts in Bengal; in a fifth district they have not been completely established in any thana or police-station area, and the collection of figures useful for comparison was not possible. Enquiries were made in the other twenty-two districts and covered either the whole district or those thanas in which Union Boards have been completely established. The results are given in Statement I appended to this note.

4. **Results of enquiry.**—The most interesting fact that emerges from an examination of these figures is that the lowering of the franchise would reverse the proportions of Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan voters and bring them more into accordance with population percentages. The percentage of Muhammadans in the population of Bengal in 1921 was 53·55, of Hindus 43·72 and of others 2·73. In the rural constituencies alone the percentage of Muhammadans was 55·33 and of non-Muhammadans, including Hindus and others, 44·67. Of the voters in the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan urban and rural constituencies in the 1926 election the percentage of Muhammadans was 45·95 and the percentage of non-Muhammadan voters was 54·05; in the rural constituencies the percentages were 48·84 and 51·16. Assuming that there would be a similar result in the districts and thanas in which Union Boards have not yet been established, it is calculated that the lowering of the franchise would make the Muhammadan percentage of the voters in the rural constituencies about 57·75 and the non-Muhammadan about 42·25. The Muhammadan vote would increase from about 513,000 to more than 1,121,000, and the non-Muhammadan from about 540,000 to about 900,000. The total number of voters would rise from about 1,050,000 to a figure over 2,000,000; the enfranchised percentage of the adult male and female population would rise from 4·8 to more than 8.

5. **Opinions on question of lowering franchise.**—The Government of Bengal have considered these figures with reference to the question whether it is desirable to broaden the franchise. On this question opinion is divided. On the one side it is thought that as the present electorate is largely ignorant and illiterate and not yet competent to understand or decide political questions, it would be a mistake to lower the franchise and thereby add to the electorate a large number of voters of whom the ignorant and illiterate would form a still larger percentage. On the other side it is held that if more power is to be transferred to a legislature responsible to an electorate, the representative character of the legislature must be strengthened by increasing the number of the electorate. The present percentage of the population which is enfranchised is so small that it cannot claim to represent the people. The members of Government who take this view, are of opinion that the figures indicate that the adoption of a franchise similar to that now in force for Union Board elections would provide an electorate which would still be workable and would at the same time be more adequate to express the views of the people. It would have the further advantage of giving to each of the two chief communities a voting strength which would be approximately proportionate to their population strength. Whilst no figures are available to show whether and to what extent the lowering of the franchise

would increase the number of voters belonging to the lower and depressed classes among the non-Muhammadans, it is probable that their number would be substantially increased and therefore that the lowering of the franchise would tend to give some representation by election to these classes. It is also apparent that a large increase in the number of voters in rural areas will facilitate that increase in rural representation which in the opinion of Government is desirable.

6. **Representation on population basis.**—A majority of the members of Government, consisting of two Muhammadan and one European member, are further of opinion that the representation of the Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan elements on the Legislative Council through the general constituencies should be proportionate to their numbers in the population, that is, that on the basis of the 1921 census, the Muhammadans should have about 55 and the non-Muhammadans about 45 per cent. of the members representing the general constituencies. The two Hindu members of Government are opposed to this.

7. **Enquiry into numbers of urban voters.**—Enquiries have also been made to ascertain the number of voters, Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan, in both urban and rural areas. The results are shown in Statements II and III appended to this note. The chief interest of these figures is that they show how small comparatively is the number of Muhammadan voters in urban areas. They also show that in order to give effect to the suggestion of the Government of Bengal that urban and rural areas should be separated for electoral purposes, it would in most cases be necessary to include several municipalities in one constituency in order to obtain a sufficient number of voters.


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Results of adopting Union Board franchise

District.	Population.		Council electorate in rural constituencies.		Union Board electorate.	
	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Burdwan ..	266,281	1,172,645	8,878	36,800	14,189	42,512
2. Birbhum ..	212,460	635,110	5,895	19,418	10,689	30,215
3. Bankura ..	46,601	973,340	1,417	28,918	2,725	50,004
4. Midnapore ..	180,672	2,485,988	3,396	47,323	....	....
5. Hooghly ..	173,633	906,509	5,451	20,792	10,981	47,923
6. Howrah ..	202,475	794,928	2,346	12,481	7,062	34,080
7. 24-Parganas ..	909,786	1,718,419	14,320	31,604	10,803	17,202
8. Nadia ..	895,190	592,382	19,442	26,779	69,298	50,391
9. Murshidabad ..	676,257	586,257	12,562	18,434	21,956	19,832
10. Jessore ..	1,063,555	658,664	26,821	22,447	76,032	50,687
11. Khulna ..	722,887	730,147	18,509	23,806	25,889	26,533
12. Rajshahi ..	1,140,256	349,419	25,927	10,867	46,774	17,781
13. Dinajpur ..	836,803	868,550	28,002	24,619	77,769	47,093
14. Jalpaiguri ..	231,683	704,586	7,612	10,952	....	....
15. Darjeeling ..	8,516	274,232	....	....	....	....
16. Rangpur ..	1,706,177	801,677	40,692	24,762	84,764	44,024
17. Bogra ..	864,998	183,608	16,781	5,396	63,645	11,871
18. Pabna ..	1,053,571	335,923	14,223	9,819	47,435	20,038
19. Malda ..	507,685	477,980	10,562	10,387	21,112	16,246
20. Dacca ..	2,043,246	1,082,721	24,387	25,646	77,716	62,827
21. Mymensingh ..	3,623,719	1,214,011	65,787	33,027	64,214	14,987
22. Faridpur ..	1,427,839	822,019	32,513	29,642	99,955	66,765
23. Bakarganj ..	1,851,239	772,517	61,596	29,744	....	....
24. Tippera ..	2,033,242	709,831	20,269	13,614	79,489	41,684
25. Noakhali ..	1,142,468	330,318	17,337	7,356	45,254	16,525
26. Chittagong ..	1,173,205	438,217	28,554	13,265	61,869	23,399
27 Chittagong Hill Tracts	7,292	165,951	....	....	....	....

MENT I.

3, PAGE 272.]

for electorates in rural constituencies.

Percentage of Muhammadans in—			Percentage of non-Muhammadans in—			Remarks.
Population.	Council electorate.	Union Board electorate.	Population.	Council electorate.	Union Board electorate.	
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
18·5	19·4	25·0	81·5	80·6	75·0	Excludes thanas in Asansol subdivision.
25·1	23·3	26·1	74·9	76·7	73·9	Excludes figures for three chaukidari unions.
4·6	4·6	5·1	95·4	95·4	94·9	For all thanas.
6·8	6·6	....	93·2	93·4	....	Union Board not introduced.
16·0	20·8	18·6	84·0	79·2	81·4	For all thanas.
20·3	15·8	17·1	79·7	84·2	82·9	Excludes figures for 5 thanas.
34·6	31·2	53·5	65·4	68·8	46·5	Excludes figures for 28 thanas.
60·2	42·0	57·9	39·8	58·0	42·1	For all thanas.
53·6	40·6	52·6	46·4	59·4	47·4	Ditto.
61·7	54·4	60·0	38·3	45·6	40·0	Ditto.
49·8	43·7	49·5	50·2	56·3	50·5	Excludes figures for 10 thanas.
76·6	70·6	72·5	23·4	29·4	27·5	Excludes figures for Nator and Naogaon subdivisions.
49·1	53·2	62·3	50·9	46·8	37·7	For all thanas.
24·8	41·1	....	75·2	58·9	....	Union Board not introduced.
3·2	....	....	96·8	....	....	Ditto.
68·1	62·2	65·8	31·9	37·8	34·2	For 23 thanas out of 30 thanas.
82·5	75·9	84·6	17·5	24·1	15·4	For all thanas.
75·8	59·2	70·3	24·2	40·8	29·7	Ditto.
51·6	50·5	56·6	48·4	49·5	43·4	For 8 thanas out of 15 thanas.
65·4	48·7	55·3	34·6	51·3	44·7	Excludes figures for 8 thanas.
74·9	66·5	81·0	25·1	33·5	19·0	For 16 thanas only out of 51 thanas in the district.
63·5	52·3	59·9	36·5	47·7	40·1	For all thanas.
70·6	67·4	....	29·4	32·6	....	Union Board not completely introduced in any thana.
74·1	59·9	65·7	25·9	40·1	34·3	For all thanas.
77·6	70·4	73·3	22·4	29·6	26·7	Ditto.
72·8	68·3	72·6	27·2	31·7	27·4	Excluding figures for 7 thanas in Cox's Bazar subdivision.
4·1	....	....	95·9	....	....	Union Board not introduced.

STATEMENT II.

[See paragraph 7 on page 274.]

NON-MUHAMMADAN.				MUHAMMADAN.			
Name of constituency.	Total number of voters in the constituency.	Total number of voters in urban area of the constituency.	Total number of voters in rural area of the constituency.	Name of constituency.	Total number of voters in the constituency.	Total number of voters in urban area of the constituency.	Total number of voters in rural area of the constituency.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Burdwan North	19,639	3,788	15,851	Burdwan Division North—			
Burdwan South	17,161	2,529	14,632				
Birbhum ..	19,418	757	18,661	Burdwan ..	8,878	1,913	6,965
Bankura West	17,250	2,012	15,238	Birbhum ..	5,895	242	5,653
Bankura East ..	11,668	2,696	8,972	Bankura ..	1,417	148	1,269
Midnapore North	26,352	5,048	21,304				
Midnapore South	10,659	..	10,659		16,190	2,303	13,887
Midnapore South-East.	10,312	1,173	9,139	Burdwan Division South—			
Hooghly Municipal.	10,624	10,624	..	Midnapore	3,396	682	2,714
				Hooghly ..	5,451	..	5,451
Hooghly Rural	20,792	..	20,792	Howrah ..	2,346	..	2,346
Howrah Municipal.	14,585	14,585	..		11,193	682	10,511
Howrah Rural	12,481	..	12,481	Hooghly *cum* Howrah Municipal—			
				Hooghly ..	1,481	1,481	..
				Howrah ..	2,840	2,840	..
					4,321	4,321	..
Total Burdwan Division.	190,941	43,212	147,729		31,704	7,306	24,398
Calcutta ..	32,619	32,619	..	Calcutta ..	4,446	4,446	..
24-Parganas Municipal North.	13,904	13,904	..	Barrackpore Municipal.	3,599	3,599	..
24-Parganas Municipal South.	11,389	11,389	..	24-Parganas Municipal.	2,785	2,785	..
24-Parganas Rural Central.	9,782	..	9,782	24-Parganas Rural.	14,320	..	14,320
24-Parganas Rural South.	12,711	..	12,711	Nadia ..	19,442	2,561	16,881
24-Parganas Rural North.	9,111	..	9,111	Murshidabad ..	12,562	2,096	10,466
Nadia ..	26,779	10,574	16,205	Jessore North	9,421	345	9,076
Murshidabad ..	18,434	6,860	11,574	Jessore South	17,400	579	16,821
Jessore South ..	10,727	663	10,064	Khulna ..	18,509	932	17,577
Jessore North ..	11,720	667	11,053				
Khulna ..	23,806	2,215	21,591				
Total Presidency Division.	180,982	78,891	102,091		102,484	17,343	85,141

NON-MUHAMMADAN.				MUHAMMADAN.			
Name of constituency.	Total number of voters in the constituency.	Total number of voters in urban area of the constituency.	Total number of voters in rural area of the constituency.	Name of constituency.	Total number of voters in the constituency.	Total number of voters in urban area of the constituency.	Total number of voters in rural area of the constituency.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Rajshahi ..	10,867	1,986	8,881	Rajshahi North	16,120	469	15,651
Dinajpur ..	24,619	1,464	23,155	Rajshahi South	9,807	948	8,859
Jalpaiguri ..	10,952	960	9,992	Dinajpur ..	28,002	633	27,369
Malda ..	10,387	1,462	8,925	Jalpaiguri .. *cum*	7,612	305	7,307
Rangpur East ..	9,511	355	9,156	Malda ..	10,562	909	9,653
Rangpur West	15,251	940	14,311	Rangpur East	19,696	227	19,469
Bogra .. *cum*	5,396	1,480	3,916	Rangpur West	20,996	443	20,553
Pabna ..	9,819	1,775	8,044	Bogra ..	16,781	867	15,914
				Pabna ..	14,223	949	13,274
Totai Rajshahi Division.	96,802	10,422	86,380		143,799	5,750	138,049
Dacca City ..	2,501	2,501	..	Dacca City ..	1,605	1,605	..
Dacca Rural ..	25,646	473	25,173	Dacca West Rural.	7,252	..	7,252
Mymensingh West	11,115	2,464	8,651				
Mymensingh East	21,912	4,014	17,898	Dacca East Rural.	17,135	198	16,937
Faridpur North	13,330	1,627	11,703				
Faridpur South	16,312	1,315	14,997	Mymensingh North-West.	12,525	1,946	10,579
				Mymensingh South-West.	11,966	456	11,510
				Mymensingh Central.	24,155	701	23,454
Bakarganj North	15,786	2,788	12,998	Mymensingh East.	17,141	1,043	16,098
Bakarganj South	13,958	1,404	12,554				
				Faridpur North	17,270	775	16,495
				Faridpur South	15,243	377	14,866
				Bakarganj North	21,465	136	21,329
				Bakarganj West	22,893	843	22,050
				Bakarganj South	17,238	237	17,001
Total Dacca Division.	120,560	16,586	103,974		185,888 ..	8,317	177,571
Chittagong ..	13,265	1,604	11,661	Chittagong North.	13,666	1,859	26,695
Tippera ..	13,614	2,796	10,818				
Noakhali ..	7,356	443	6,913	Chittagong South.	14,888		
				Tippera North	9,961	652	9,309
				Tippera South	10,308	671	9,637
				Noakhali East	8,498	..	8,498
				Noakhali West	8,839	396	8,443
Total Chittagong Division.	34,235	4,843	29,392		66,160	3,578	62,582

STATEMENT III.

[SEE PARAGRAPH 7 ON PAGE 274.]

Division.	Total number of voters.		Total number of voters in urban area.		Total number of voters in rural area.		Percentage of voters in urban area.		Percentage of voters in rural area.	
	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.	Non-Muhammadan.	Muhammadan.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Burdwan ..	190,941	31,704	43,212	7,306	147,729	24,398	22·6	23·1	77·4	76·9
Presidency	180,982	102,484	78,891	17,343	102,091	85,141	43·6	16·9	56·4	83·1
Rajshahi ..	96,802	143,799	10,422	5,750	86,380	138,049	10·7	4·0	89·3	96·0
Dacca ..	120,560	185,888	16,586	8,317	103,974	177,571	13·8	4·5	86·2	95·5
Chittagong	34,235	66,160	4,843	3,578	29,392	62,582	14·1	5·4	85·9	94·6
Total Bengal	623,720	530,035	153,954	42,294	469,566	487,741	24·7	8·0	75·3	92·0

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

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